In re the Marriage of: Kenneth Dion Hull, petitioner, Appellant,
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Amarreh v. Amarreh 918 N.W.2d 228
- 963 N.W.2d 214 not in our corpus
- Marriage of Sefkow v. Sefkow 427 N.W.2d 203
- Gada v. Dedefo 684 N.W.2d 512
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1505
In re the Marriage of: Kenneth Dion Hull, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Carissa Elizabeth Hull,
Respondent.
Filed November 6, 2023
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge *
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-19-2156
Zachary B. Smith, Vox Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Richard D. Crabb, Hill Crabb, LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE , Judge
This is an appeal by Kenneth Dion Hull (father) from the district court judgment
awarding Carissa Elizabeth Hull (mother) sole physical custody and primary residence of
their child K.D.H., and parenting time to him . Father also appeals from the denial of his
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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motion for amended findings or a new trial. Because the district court’s findings are not
clearly erroneous and its conclusions are not contrary to law, we affirm.
DECISION
Father first argues that the district court failed to properly consider the application
of Amarreh v. Amarreh , 918 N.W.2d 228 (Minn. App. 2018) to the facts of this case. In
that case this court determined “that a sustained course of conduct by one parent designed
to diminish a child’s relationship with the other . . . may be grounds for denying . . .
custody.” Id. at 231-32. Here, the district court did not find that mother’s conduct was a
“sustained course” or that it was “designed to diminish ” the child’s relationship with the
father. Instead, the district court found that the mother neither knew, nor had reason to
believe, that certain allegations against father were false. Additionally, the district court
found that mother did not intend to influence the custody proceedings by her allegations.
While the custody evaluator had a different view, the district court implicitly credited the
critique of the custody evaluation by finding there was no evidence mother knew the
allegations were false . Credibility determinations are for the district court, not this court.
See In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 223 (Minn. 2021); Sefkow v .
Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988); Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn.
App. 2004) (stating that appellate courts “neither reconcile conflicting evidence nor decide
issues of witness credibility, which are exclusively the province of the factfinder”).
Next, father argues that the district court incorrectly analyzed the enumerated
statutory best interest factors for determining child custody disputes . See Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1 (2022). The district court devoted over 18 pages to its analysis of the
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best interests’ factors and analyzed each factor in detail. We observe no abuse of discretion
in this analysis.
Finally, father argues that the district court did not analyze the statutory be st
interests’ factors independently of the previous temporary orders. Father claims that the
district court’s conclusions as to the impact a specific factor had was expressed in relation
to the parenting time schedules of the temporary orders instead of an independent analysis.
Father references the admonition of Minn esota Statutes section 518.131, subdivision 9(a)
(2022) that a temporary order “[s]hall not prejudice the rights of the parties or the child
which are to be adjudicated at subsequent hearings in the proceeding.” It is true that the
district court’s analysis of the best interest factors included facts which were the product
of temporary orders such as living locations and conditions of both parents and family and
community resources available to the child. The district court even observed that moving
the child “was too drastic . . . and failed to consider the dramatic impact it would have on
many of the sources of security this child has in his current community.” This “was
exacerbated by the fact [f]ather did not have a coherent plan for how he would address
these significant shortfalls.” Such observations were factual and not based on prior
temporary orders. We observe no statutory violation and affirm.
Affirmed.