Richard Theodore Knoll, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1550

Richard Theodore Knoll, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed April 24, 2023
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-CR-17-154

Richard Theodore Knoll, Mora, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey R. Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Nicholas J. Colombo, Assistant County
Attorney, Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Wheelock ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Richard Theodore Knoll challenges the district court’s denial of his
postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing after this court affirmed his
conviction for third- degree burglary on direct appeal. Because the district court did not
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abuse its discretion when it determined that Knoll’s claims lack merit and Knoll was not
entitled to a postconviction evidentiary hearing, we affirm.
FACTS
Knoll was arrested in March 2017, when police officers responding to a burglary
report found him inside a locked garage on private property. Respondent State of
Minnesota charged Knoll with third -degree burglary, Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 3
(2016), fifth-degree drug possession, Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2016), and
attempted misdemeanor theft, Minn. Stat. §§ 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1), .17, subd. 1 (2016).
The district court granted Knoll conditional release pending trial.
Knoll was represented by multiple different public defenders throughout the pretrial
and trial proceedings in his case. On two occasions, Knoll requested continuance s to
consult with his preferred public defenders about settlement offers and his defense strategy.
Both times, Knoll assured the district court that he wanted to waive his right to have a
speedy trial.
The case was tried on October 5, 2018; a jury found Knoll guilty of the third-degree
burglary offense, and not guilty of the remaining charges. At sentencing, the district court
stayed execution of a 15-month sentence and placed Knoll on probation for five years.
Represented by an appellate public defender, Knoll filed a direct appeal to this court.
He argued that the district court committed plain error by allowing the prosecutor to
introduce evidence of an accomplice’s guilty plea to the burglary offense. We affirmed
Knoll’s conviction. State v. Knoll, A19-0764, 2020 WL 1129872, at *3 (Minn. App.
Mar. 9, 2020).
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On May 13, 2022, Knoll filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, asking the
district court to vacate his conviction “to correct the manifest injustice inflicted through
procedural error and the mismanagement of the case [as] required by law.” Knoll’s petition
argued that he was entitled to relief on four grounds: (1) violation of his constitutional
right to a speedy trial, (2) ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel,
(3) prosecutorial misconduct, and (4) the jury’s legally inconsistent verdicts. In a separate
motion, Knoll moved for an evidentiary hearing to develop his postconviction claims.
On September 7, 2022, the district court denied Knoll’s postconviction petition and
motion for an evidentiary hearing. The district court determined that Knoll’s speedy-trial,
prosecutorial-misconduct, and inconsistent-verdict claims were Knaffla-barred 1 because
Knoll knew or should have known of these claims at the time of his direct appeal.
Alternatively, the district court ruled that, even if these claims were not Knaffla-barred,
they lacked merit. Although the district court determined that Knoll’s ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims were not procedurally barred, it concluded that there was no
“evidence in the record to suggest that either trial counsel, or appellate counsel was
ineffective.” The district court denied Knoll’s request for an evidentiary hearing for the
same reason.
Knoll appeals.

1 See State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) (“[W]here direct appeal has once
been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be
considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”).
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DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kn oll’s petition for
postconviction relief.

An appellate court reviews “the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an
abuse of discretion.” Pearson v. State , 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). “A
postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary
or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly
erroneous factual findings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Initially, we agree with the district court’s determination that Knoll’s speedy-trial,
prosecutorial-misconduct, and inconsistent-verdict claims were Knaffla-barred. See
Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741. When a postconviction petitioner has had a direct appeal, the
petitioner cannot subsequently raise claims that were known at the time of the direct appeal
in a petition for postconviction relief. Id. Because the bases for Knoll’s speedy-trial,
prosecutorial-misconduct, and inconsistent-verdict claims were known to him at the time
of his direct appeal, but were not included in his direct appeal, he is barred from raising
them in a subsequent petition for postconviction relief. See id. Moreover, because the
basis for Knoll’s claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance was also known
to him at the time of the direct appeal, we conclude that this claim— which was first raised
in the postconviction petition—is also Knaffla -barred.
However, Knoll’s postconviction petition also alleged that his appellate attorney
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise his speedy-trial, prosecutorial-
misconduct, and inconsistent-verdict claims on direct appeal. In this appeal, Knoll does
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not pursue his argument that appellate counsel should have raised the issue of prosecutorial
misconduct on direct appeal. But he argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise the speedy-trial and inconsistent-verdict claims on direct appeal, and for
failing to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He contends that the
district court erred by concluding otherwise and denying his petition for postconviction
relief. Because Knoll’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was not known
to him at the time of his direct appeal, this issue is not Knaffla-barred. We therefore
consider whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Knoll’s request for
postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 2
Under the federal and state constitutions, a criminal defendant is entitled to the
assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. This right means
“the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added). The threshold for assessing any ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim is “whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To prevail on a claim that counsel
was ineffective, a defendant must show that (1) counsel was deficient and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. “If a claim fails to satisfy one of the

2 Because Knoll’s brief to this court does not argue that the appellate attorney was
ineffective for failing to pursue a claim of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal, we
do not consider this issue.
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Strickland requirements, [an appellate court] need not consider the other requirement.”
State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017).
To prove that counsel’s performance was deficient, a defendant must show it “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. A
petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome the “strong
presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”
Gail v. State, 732 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Minn. 2007). An attorney meets the objective
reasonableness standard when the attorney “provides [the] client with the representation of
an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent
attorney would perform under the circumstances.” State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 633
(Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). “Appellate counsel does not have a duty to raise all
possible issues, and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims on appeal.”
Zumberge v. State, 937 N.W.2d 406, 413 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). Nor does
appellate counsel “act unreasonably by not raising issues that he or she could have
legitimately concluded would not prevail.” Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 371 (Minn.
2016). To prove prejudice, the defendant must show that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Andersen v. State , 830 N.W.2d 1, 10
(Minn. 2013).
Because the Strickland test involves mixed questions of law and fact, an appellate
court reviews a district court’s determinations de novo. State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706,
715 (Minn. 2019). “[T]o determine whether [a defendant’s] appellate counsel was
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ineffective, [a reviewing court] must look to the merits of [the defendant’s] underlying
claims.” Onyelobi v. State, 932 N.W.2d 272, 280 (Minn. 2019).
Knoll argues that his appellate attorney provided ineffec tive assistance of counsel
by failing to argue on direct appeal that delays in commencing his trial deprived him of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, by failing to challenge the jury’s verdicts as legally
inconsistent, and by failing to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To
evaluate Knoll’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we address the merits
of these three issues.
A. Right to Speedy Trial
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide criminal defendants the
right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. The
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure also provide that:
A defendant must be tried as soon as possible after entry
of a plea other than guilty. On demand of any party after entry
of such plea, the trial must start within 60 days unless the court
finds good cause for a later trial date.

Unless exigent circumstances exist, if trial does not start
within 120 days from the date the plea other than guilty is
entered and the demand is made, the defendant must be
released under any nonmonetary conditions the court orders
under Rule 6.01, subd. 1.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b).
Appellate courts review alleged violations of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial de novo. State v. Griffin, 760 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. App. 2009). To determine
whether a delay rises to the level of a violation of the constitutional speedy-trial right,
8
reviewing courts use the balancing test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 244-45 (Minn.
2021); State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999). To determine whether there
was a violation of a defendant’s speedy-trial right, an appellate court considers four
nonexclusive factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the
defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and ( 4) the prejudice to the defendant.
State v. Paige, 977 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2022).
A 60-day delay is presumptively prejudicial and requires a weighing of the latter
three factors. Windish , 590 N.W.2d at 315-16. None of the factors alone is “either a
necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.”
Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. An evaluation of the factors “is not a check-the-box, prescriptive
analysis,” and instead involves an assessment of “how the factors interact with each other
in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 245 (quotation
omitted). Reviewing courts may also consider “other circumstances as may be relevant.”
Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
We agree with Knoll that the 581 days he waited for a trial was a lengthy delay,
which requires us to consider the three other factors. But those three factors do not
establish a constitutional speedy-trial violation. Much of the delay was attributable to
Knoll. The record shows that he requested two continuances knowing that those
continuances would significantly delay his trial. Knoll twice waived his right to a speedy
trial. And the record shows that he never demanded a speedy trial. While awaiting trial,
Knoll was on conditional release. The delay did not violate his rule 11.09(b) right to release
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from custody, and he was not prejudiced by having to endure a lengthy pretrial detention.
Finally, Knoll’s postconviction petition and brief do not explain how his defense was
prejudiced by the delay.
The pretrial delay in Knoll’s case did not amount to a violation of his constitutional
right to a speedy trial. Because the speedy -trial claim lacks merit, Knoll’s appellate
attorney did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise the claim on
direct appeal.
B. Inconsistent Jury Verdict
We next consider whether Knoll’s appellate attorney provided ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel by failing to argue on direct appeal that the jury’s verdicts were legally
inconsistent, and therefore invalid. “Nothing in the constitution requires consistent
verdicts.” State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 325 (Minn. 2005) (citing United States v.
Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1984)). Generally, a defendant who is found guilty of one
count of a two-count complaint is not entitled to a new trial or dismissal solely because a
jury acquitted of the second count, even if the verdicts are logically inconsistent. Id.
(quoting State v. Juelfs, 270 N.W.2d 873, 873-74 (Minn. 1978)). Appellate courts
“reverse[] convictions based upon legal inconsistency only in cases involving multiple
guilty verdicts that are inconsistent with one another, not in cases of alleged conflict
between guilty and not -guilty verdicts.” State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 821 (Minn.
2013).
Citing State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 1990), Knoll argues that he is
entitled to a new trial because the jury’s verdicts in his case were legally inconsistent.
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Legally inconsistent verdicts occur “when proof of the elements of one offense negates a
necessary element of another offense.” Steward v. State, 950 N.W.2d 750, 755 (Minn.
2020) (quotation omitted). In Moore, for example, the supreme court ordered a new trial
for the appellant who was found guilty of both first-degree premeditated murder and
second-degree m anslaughter—verdicts that required to jury to find that the appellant
“caused the death of his wife with premeditation and intent and at the same time caused
that death through negligence or reckless conduct.” 458 N.W.2d at 94. But since Moore,
the supreme court has clarified that jury verdicts are only legally inconsistent if they are
guilty verdicts. Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 326. When a jury acquits of one count and renders
a guilty verdict on another count, there may be logical inconsistency. Id. But a logical
inconsistency alone does not require a new trial. Id.
Knoll argues that the verdicts in his case were legally inconsistent because the jury
found him guilty of third-degree burglary and not guilty of attempted misdemeanor theft.
But because one of these verdicts was an acquittal, the verdicts were not legally
inconsistent. And given that the inconsistent-verdicts issue has no merit, Knoll’s appellate
attorney did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by electing not to raise it in
Knoll’s direct appeal.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
Finally, Knoll argues that his appellate attorney provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by not challenging the performance of his trial attorney. Knoll contends that the
attorney who ultimately represented him at trial was unprepared and performed poorly. He
identifies two specific instances of deficient performance: the attorney’s decision to
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stipulate to the admission of forensic evidence and the attorney’s failure to impeach Knoll’s
codefendant on cross-examination.
However, because Knoll cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the attorney’s
conduct in either of the instances he alleges, his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claim lacks merit. See Mosley, 895 N.W.2d at 591 (stating that a court may reject a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel if the postconviction petitioner fails to establish
prejudice). The forensic evidence that was the subject of the attorney’s stipulation
concerned a drug charge that resulted in a not-guilty verdict. Thus, the stipulation did not
affect the outcome of Knoll’s trial. Moreover, even without the codefendant’s testimony
acknowledging that the codefendant and Knoll entered the garage without permission, the
evidence of Knoll’s guilt of third-degree burglary was strong. At trial, the jury saw video
evidence of Knoll squeezing through a padlocked door to exit the garage when the police
ordered Knoll and his codefendant to come out. Given the strong evidence of Knoll’s guilt,
any shortcoming in the trial attorney’s cross -examination of the codefendant would not
have prejudiced Knoll. Because an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim would
have failed on the Strickland prejudice requirement, Knoll’s appellate attorney did not
provide ineffective assistance of counsel in opting not to pursue such a claim.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Knoll’s
postconviction claims. Knoll’s claims were Knaffla-barred because he knew of them at the
time of his direct appeal but did not raise them. And because Knoll’s claims have no merit,
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his appellate attorney did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by not pursuing
them on direct appeal.3
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Knoll’s request for a
postconviction evidentiary hearing.

A postconviction petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the
petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is
entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2020). A petitioner’s allegations in
support of a hearing “must be more than argumentative assertions without factual support.”
Brocks v. State, 753 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). An appellate
court reviews “the ultimate decision by the postconviction court to grant or deny an
evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.” Caldwell v. State, 853 N.W.2d 766, 770
(Minn. 2014). Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the appellate court reviews the
postconviction court’s “underlying factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions
de novo.” Id.
The district court determined that Knoll was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
because there was no “evidence in the record to suggest that either trial counsel, or appellate
counsel was ineffective.” We discern no abuse of discretion in this determination. As
noted, Knoll’s postconviction claims lack legal merit. Because the record conclusively

3 The state argues for the first time on appeal that Knoll’s postconviction petition was
untimely. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2) (2020) (“[N]o petition for postconviction
relief may be filed more than two years after . . . an appellate court’s disposition of
petitioner’s direct appeal.”). Because Knoll’s postconviction claims fail on their merits,
we do not address this issue.

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shows that Knoll is not entitled to relief on those claims, no evidentiary hearing was
warranted.4
Affirmed.

4 Knoll alleges several additional errors by the district court: (1) the 119-day delay between
the filing of his postconviction petition and the district court’s order violated due process,
(2) the district court failed to remain impartial, and (3) the district court created a “quasi-
judicial” hearing process when it analyzed his claims. But Knoll does not provide any
legal authority for those arguments. An appellate court “will not consider pro se claims on
appeal that are unsupported by either arguments or citations to legal authority.” State v.
Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008). Accordingly, we do not address these claims of
error.