A22-1552

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1551
A22-1552

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Ayyoob Dawood Abdus-Salam,
Respondent.

Filed April 3, 2023
Reversed and remanded
Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-CR-22-14236, 27-CR-22-15423

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Anna R. Light, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Drake D. Metzger, Jasmin Quiggle, Metzger Law Firm, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas , Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Wheelock ,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
1. A charge of second- degree riot under Minnesota Statutes section 609.71,
subdivision 2 (2020), can survive a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause over the
defendant’s assertion that cars are not dangerous weapons under section 609.02,
subdivision 6 (2020), if the state presented facts showing that the defendant knew that the
2
cars would be driven with passengers hanging from them and in a reckless manner
dangerously close to onlookers during an illegal intersection “take-over.”
2. If a car is used in a manner that qualifies it as a dangerous weapon under
Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 6, the person so using the car during a riot
is “armed with a dangerous weapon” under the second-degree riot statute, section 609.71,
subdivision 2.
OPINION
ROSS, Judge
The state charged alleged “take-over” organizer Ayyoob Abdus- Salam with two
counts of second-degree riot, armed with a dangerous weapon. The charges rested on the
state’s theory that cars are dangerous weapons during planned intersection takeovers where
some participants spin their cars in “donuts” dangerously close to onlooking revelers while
passengers hang outside the spinning cars from open windows. The district court dismissed
the charges for lack of probable cause that the cars constituted dangerous weapons,
reasoning that the state’s allegations and supporting facts did not show that the cars “were
. . . intentionally driven toward anyone” and were not driven “in a manner to cause the
passengers hanging out of [them] to fall or be thrown from [them].” Because the district
court focused only on whether participants’ use of the cars intentionally or actually caused
serious injury, it failed to address the alternative legal question of whether a jury could find
that the cars were used in a manner “likely to” cause death or great bodily harm, and
because we hold that the facts as alleged could support that finding, we reverse and remand.
3
FACTS
These two consolidated cases concern a novel form of entertainment in urban
Minnesota: the mob-oriented blocking of traffic from entering large intersections so that
participating cars can “spin donuts” within close range of an encircling crowd of ex cited
observers while passengers hang precariously outside the cars’ open windows. Our primary
concern in this appeal is determining whether a car engaging in this activity can constitute
a “dangerous weapon” under Minnesota’s riot law.
The state charged respondent Ayyoob Abdus -Salam with two counts of second-
degree riot based on events occurring on April 9 and April 23, 2022, the first in Minneapolis
and the other in Brooklyn Center. The criminal complaints allege that Abdus-Salam
promoted “intersection take-overs” in urban areas. The state later submitted four video
recordings of the events. Based on the complaints and videos, at each takeover participants
use their cars to keep traffic out of a predetermined large intersection. They gather in
crowds while some spin donuts in the intersection, some hang outside the spinning cars’
windows, some spectate inside the donut’s center, and the others stand and cheer in a circle
just beyond the cars’ rotations.
The video recordings depict various takeovers. One of the videos is a YouTube
documentary of sorts entitled “MN Season Opener.” It begins with a silver Dodge Charger
spinning its tires and revolving quickly around a group of about eight onlookers watching
and recording the action from the front of the spinning car at the donut’s center. One
passenger is hanging out of the window straddling the closed passenger door with one leg
inside the car and his other leg and entire torso outside the car. We see the Charger ’s tail
4
end moving in a circle that outlines the outside edge of the donut and whipping around
within inches of other seemingly eager observers. Most of the onlookers appear to be using
their cell phones to create their own video recordings of the event while they stand in the
growing fog of burnt rubber. One of the outside-the-donut onlookers stands a few inches
closer than the others. We see the Charger’s rear violently strike his right hip and jettison
him into the air, feet skyward and head groundward. The back of the onlooker’s head and
neck seem to crash onto the pavement. He pauses a moment on his back, then he rolls
himself into a crawling position, and we see the Charger continue to spin around as the
video dissolves into the next scene.
The next scenes include different Chargers and other muscle cars performing the
same donut-spinning maneuvers, again usually around a handful of inside-the-donut
gawkers, and a larger crowd standing at the outside edge of the donut sometimes within
inches or a few feet of the tail end of the spinning cars. One of the cars, a purple Charger,
has four occupants hanging outside. One straddles the driver-side door. Two are sitting
mostly outside the closed passenger-side door. And the fourth somehow clings outside the
driver’s side, having only part of his right arm and the bottom of his right leg inside the
car.
Another video also copied from a YouTube posting is a more professionally styled
documentary with participants discussing takeovers as a safe alternative to gang violence
and other crimes. It also depicts takeovers in or near Minneapolis and cars spinning with
passengers hanging from open windows (one is almost entirely outside while driving and
spinning donuts), clinging to the roof, or hanging onto open car doors.
5
A third and fourth video were each recorded by a police helicopter. In the third
video, in a Minneapolis parking-lot staging area dozens of cars gather before leaving to
take over an intersection. It shows cars spinning donuts withi n a large encircling crowd at
an intersection blocked by about 30 cars. Outside the open window of one donut-spinning
car, we see a man hanging by only his arms, with his entire body outside as he keeps his
knees bent so as to maintain his lower legs and feet barely above the pavement. Three
passengers hang outside another spinning car while a nother sits inside its open trunk. In
the fourth video, we observe the Brooklyn Center takeover. A red car in which Abdus-
Salam was a passenger enters the crowd-occupied intersection at the beginning of the
event, performs donuts, and speeds off before police track down and seize the car.
The state based its charges of second- degree riot against Abdus -Salam on its
allegations that Abdus-Salam organized the takeovers and that, in doing so, he knew or had
reason to know that the participants would be “armed with a dangerous weapon,”
specifically, a motor vehicle. The district court dismissed the charges for lack of probable
cause, concluding that the cars used in the takeovers did not constitute dangerous weapons.
The state appeals.
ISSUES
I. Did the district court err by dismissing the second-degree riot charges against
Abdus-Salam based on its conclusion that the facts failed to establish probable cause
to believe that the cars used in the takeovers were dangerous weapons?

II. Can a person be “armed with” a car within the meaning of the second-degree riot
statute?
6
ANALYSIS
The legislature has not addressed the specific conduct alleged in this case in the way
it has addressed other particular driving misconduct. For example, from 1937 until 2006,
the legislature described reckless driving only generally as the operation of a vehicle in a
manner demonstrating “a willful or wanton disregard” for persons or property. 1937 Minn.
Laws ch. 464, art. 5, § 27, at 744; Minn. Stat. § 169.13, subd. 1 (2004). But in 2006, the
legislature identified roadway racing specifically, mandated that “[a] person shall not race
any vehicle upon any street or highway of this state,” and classified racing particularly as
reckless driving—a misdemeanor. 2006 Minn. Laws ch. 260, art. 2, § 1, at 733; see also
Minn. Stat. § 169.13, subd. 1(a), (b) (2006). Unlike street racing, the legislature has not
specifically described and determined the penalty for “spinning donuts” with a vehicle on
a public street, let alone the additional conduct alleged here—blocking traffic from entering
an intersection and spinning donuts within close range of an encircling crowd with
passengers hanging mostly outside the car.
Lacking a statute that closely describes this behavior, the state seeks to prosecute
Abdus-Salam for second-degree riot on the theory that he organized the revelries having
reason to know that he or others would come armed with dangerous weapons, namely, cars.
By dismissing the criminal complaints after recognizing that “the drivers were operating
their vehicles in a careless and reckless manner near crowds of spectators,” the district
court appears to imply that the offending conduct would have better suited charges of
reckless driving or careless driving rather than second-degree riot. This may be so. But our
question today is not whether a different statute fits Abdus-Salam’s conduct; it is whether
7
the state’s second-degree riot charges should have survived Abdus- Salam’s motions to
dismiss for lack of probable cause. Given our caselaw defining the statutory term,
“dangerous weapon,” and the modest showing necessary to meet the probable-cause
standard, our answer is yes. The question comes in two stages. First, the state asks us to
hold that cars used in the manner alleged here can qualify as dangerous weapons. Second,
Abdus-Salam asks us to hold that, even assuming the cars might qualify as dangerous
weapons, cars are not the sort of thing a person can ever be “armed with” under the riot
statute. We address the arguments in turn.
I

The state asks us to reverse the district court’s pretrial order dismissing the criminal
complaints for lack of probable cause. The state can appeal a pretrial order only if it shows
unequivocally that the district court’s ruling was both erroneous and would critically
impact the state’s ability to prosecute the case. State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 683
(Minn. 2009). The district court’s dismissing a criminal charge necessarily has a critical
impact on the state’s ability to prosecute that charge. See id. at 684 (holding that an order
dismissing impaired-driving charges has a critical impact even when other charges remain).
We therefore must decide whether the district court’s pretrial dismissal was in error. We
hold that it was.
The state argues that the district court erroneously concluded that the state’s
complaints and supplemental evidence failed to establish probable cause supporting the
second-degree riot charges. After a defendant challenges the charges against him for lack
of probable cause, the district court “must determine whether probable cause exists to
8
believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.” Minn. R.
Crim. P. 11.04, subd. 1(a). A district court should deny a motion to dismiss for lack of
probable cause “if the facts before [it] present a fact question for the jury’s determination
on each element of the crime charged.” State v. Lopez, 778 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 2010)
(quotation omitted). We review the facts underlying a district court’s probable-cau se
determination for clear error and review its application of the probable-cause standard to
those facts de novo. Id. at 703. The district court’s dismissal and the state’s appeal focus
on only the “dangerous weapon” element of the second-degree riot charges.
The district court dismissed the second-degree riot charges for lack of probable
cause because it found the dangerous-weapon element lacking. In relevant part for our
circumstances, a person is guilty of second-degree riot when he gathers with at least two
others and disturbs the peace by intentional conduct and “is armed with a dangerous
weapon or knows that any other participant is armed with a dangerous weapon.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.71, subd. 2. Because the district court concluded that the cars described in the
criminal complaints and depicted in the supplemental video recordings were not, as a
matter of law, dangerous weapons, we must decide whether the circumstances presented
to the district court create at least a fact question for the jury to determine whether the cars
were dangerous weapons.
We believe that the circumstances presented leave a fact question for the jury on the
dangerous-weapon element. Among other things, a dangerous weapon is any “device or
instrumentality that, in the manner it is used . . . is calculated or likely to produce death or
great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6. And “great bodily harm” includes any
9
injury that makes death highly probable, that permanently disfigures, that permanently or
protractedly impairs the functioning of any organ or bodily member, or that constitutes
other serious bodily harm. Id., subd. 8 (2020). The state does not argue that Abdus-Salam
and others engaged in the allegedly riotous conduct used the cars in a manner calculated
to produce death or great bodily harm, only that they used the cars in a manner likely to
produce that result.
The state correctly contends that the district court failed to properly address the
“likely to” aspect of the dangerous-weapon definition. The district court placed significant
emphasis on what was intended and on what actually occurred but did not address whether
a jury might determine that the manner in which the cars were being used would likely kill
or greatly injure:
[A] vehicle can become a dangerous weapon if it was used in
a manner calculated to cause great bodily harm. The vehicles
in this case were not used in a manner calculated to cause great
bodily harm. Defendant organized an event where drivers
would come to “spin” or “do donuts.” Although the act of
“spinning” is both risky and reckless, Defendant had no
knowledge that the vehicles would be used in a manner
calculated to cause great bodily harm. In these cases, the
drivers were operating their vehicles in a careless and reckless
manner near crowds of spectators. The vehicles were not
intentionally driven toward anyone nor were they driven in a
manner to cause the passengers hanging out of the vehicle to
fall or be thrown from the vehicle, resulting in harm or injury.

Based on this rationale, the district court concluded that “[t]here is no probable cause that
the drivers were operating their vehicles in a manner calculated or likely to produce death
or great bodily harm.” Although the district court’s conclusion repeated the “calculated or
10
likely to” standard, its analysis considered only what the stunt driving was calculated to
do.
The statute does not define the term “likely,” and the parties offer various
definitions. But we adopted a definition almost 40 years ago in a case involving a charge
of assault with a dangerous weapon. In State v. Graham, we considered the definition of
“dangerous weapon” and the district court’s legal conclusion that the word “likely” in the
phrase “in [a] manner . . . likely to produce death or great bodily harm” could be interpreted
by a jury in a way that diluted the state’s burden of proof. 366 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn.
App. 1985). We agreed that the term could lead to that result, but, rather than strike the
statutory term as unconstitutional, we remedied the constitutional problem by approving a
definition that would replace the challenged language with the substitute phrase, “in [a]
manner . . . known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.” Id. at 338
n.1. After we issued that opinion, the model jury instruction was modified to mirror the
phrase we suggested. Compare 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 13.06 (1990), with 10
Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 13.06 (1985). A supreme court opinion later referred to the
same language as the “appropriate” definitional instruction for jurors deciding whether an
instrument constituted a dangerous weapon. State v. Gebremariam, 590 N.W.2d 781, 78 3
(Minn. 1999) (plurality opinion). Finally, in State v. Weyaus, we endorsed as an accurate
definitional instruction the phrase, “anything . . . that in the manner it is used or intended
to be used is known to be capable of producing death or great bodily harm.” 836 N.W.2d
579, 582– 83 (Minn. App. 2013) (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted), rev. denied
(Minn. Nov. 12, 2013). Having adopted and confirmed the meaning that a jury should apply
11
when determining whether an object is a dangerous weapon, our appellate courts have
clarified how to approach the question of probable cause as to the dangerous-weapon
element.
The state’s charges of second-degree riot should therefore survive Abdus-Salam’s
motions to dismiss if the circumstances present a fact question as to whether he knew that
the cars in his planned takeovers would be used in a manner known to be capable of
producing death or great bodily harm. We believe that the district court accurately observed
that the exhibition drivers operated their cars in a reckless manner. Their reckless driving
occurred both in extremely close proximity to other revelers and while others clung to the
sides and tops of the circling and whipping cars. It is not only a matter of reasonable
inference that an onlooker could easily be struck by the fast-whipping cars, the state
provided video evidence of an onlooker in fact being struck, flipping in the air, and possibly
landing on his head on the roadway. The state presented no evidence that any reveler has
died or been seriously injured, but evidence of that circumstance is not necessary under the
definition of dangerous weapon. And a person viewing the video evidence might easily
imagine someone losing his grip on the side of a circling car and suffering a head injury
from the pavement or being driven over, resulting in great bodily harm. We are certain that
the question ought to reach the jury. We hold that the state presented facts sufficient to
survive the motions to dismiss, allowing it the chance to prove to a jury that the cars were
dangerous weapons.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Abdus -Salam’s attempt to confine the cars’
manner of use to “the act of spinning and doing donuts.” We do not apply the phrase
12
“manner of use” so narrowly. In State v. Cepeda, for example, we concluded that a thrown
beer bottle was a dangerous weapon. 588 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. App. 1999). We did not
consider the manner of use based solely on the defendant’s throwing; we considered that
the fact the bottle broke when it hit the victim showed the force of the bottle and the
proximity to the victim struck by it. Id. at 749. Similarly here, in addition to the act of
spinning donuts, we consider the anticipated close proximity between cars and onlookers,
the stunt riders clinging to the sides of the moving cars, and the fact that onlookers could
be and are occasionally struck by the sliding cars.
We emphasize that our decision rests only on whether a threshold factual showing
of probable cause supports the charges. This is a low standard. Lopez, 778 N.W.2d at 705.
Our opinion should not be interpreted as suggesting how a fact- finder should decide the
presently disputed element or any other in deciding whether Abdus-Salam is guilty of
second-degree riot. And we offer no opinion as to whether, as Abdus-Salam implies, a
lesser offense would have been more fitting. It is up to the prosecuting agency to determine
which offense to charge and up to the legislature to determine whether the charged conduct
should be more precisely addressed by statute.
II
Abdus-Salam attempts to support the district court’s decision dismissing the charges
on his alternative notion that one cannot be “armed with” a car under the riot statute. He
asserts that being armed with a dangerous weapon under the statute is limited to “physically
holding and wielding with one’s hands a dangerous weapon.” During oral argument, his
counsel punctuated the argument with his view that, if a group of rioters began a
13
disturbance equipped with clubs, knives, and cars to violently confront police, only the
rioters holding clubs and knives would be “armed with” the instruments of their attack, not
the ones using their cars to press the line of officers. Abdus- Salam’s brief argues that, at
the very least, the statute is ambiguous and therefore unconstitutionally vague. The
prohibition against attending a riot armed with a dangerous weapon is ambiguous, contends
Abdus-Salam, because “armed with” might mean either being “personally equipped with
a weapon small enough to hold and wield, like a firearm, pitchfork, flaming tiki torch, or
blade” or it might instead mean “using a weapon regardless of the size, such as a vehicle,
fighter jet, or Sherman tank.” For the reasons that follow, his argument fails.
Before we address the merits of Abdus- Salam’s ambiguity and interpretation
argument related to the term, “armed with,” we first respond to the state’s implication that
Abdus-Salam forfeited the argument. The state accurately asserts that Abdus-Salam did
not specifically argue to the district court that a person cannot be armed with a motor
vehicle. But the supreme court rejected a similar argument in a related situation in State v.
Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551 (Minn. 2017). The Vasko appellant expressly challenged only
whether the evidence was sufficient to convict her under a city’s property-clean -up
ordinance, but this court had considered the broader question of whether the ordinance was
ambiguous. 889 N.W.2d at 555. The supreme court rejected the state’s contention that this
court should have treated the ambiguity argument as forfeited. Id. at 555–56. It reasoned
that, because “it is often necessary to interpret a criminal statute when evaluating an
insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim,” this court could also address whether “an ordinance
is ambiguous even though neither party argues that it is.” Id. at 556. The Vasko rationale
14
applies in the probable-cause assessment here, where Abdus-Salam has consistently argued
that a motor vehicle cannot constitute a dangerous weapon in the context of the second-
degree riot statute. His interpretation argument opens the door to the question of whether
the statute is ambiguous. We answer the question on its merits.
The unambiguous meaning of the statutorily undefined term, “armed,” belies
Abdus-Salam’s contention that the phrase “armed with” in the second-degree riot statute is
unconstitutionally ambiguous. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit a state from punishing a person for violating a statute that is
impermissibly vague. United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 89–90 (1975) (Fifth
Amendment); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353–54 (1983) (Fourteenth
Amendment). But a criminal statute is not impermissibly vague or ambiguous if it both
explains the offense with such definiteness that an ordinary person can understand what
conduct it prohibits and it is written so as not to encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. Holder v. Humanitarian L . Project, 561 U.S. 1, 17 (2010). The legislature
expects us to apply words and phrases “according to their common and approved usage.”
Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2022). Our review of the history of the term “armed” and its
commonly accepted usage at the time the legislature included it in the riot statute convinces
us that the statute is neither ambiguous nor limited by the weapon’s size or method of
operation.
The etymology of the term does not support Abdus-Salam ’s argument. The word
“armed” began its journey into Minnesota law from its Latin derivation in the thirteenth
century. See The Oxford English Dictionary 634–36 (2d ed. 1989, reprt. 1991). The Old
15
French term “armes” and its variants refer to “[i]nstruments of offence used in war,” and,
more generally, simply “weapons.” Id. at 634. We see that by 1710 the notion that “arms”
included both handheld weapons and larger weapons was apparent in English, as the
London Gazette then referenced the subcategory of “small [a]rms” and, by 1883 in the
United States, Harper’s Magazine similarly referenced “side arms.” Id. Long before then,
the term “arms” had evolved for use as a participial adjective, appearing as “armed” in
English by 1297, meaning literally, “[f]urnished with arms.” Id. at 636. And early use of
“armed” included ships equipped with cannons, not merely small weaponry. Id. To “arm”
oneself with an object has never meant to place an object into one’s hands or arms, as one
might suppose from the homograph; one can be said to have armed himself by becoming
equipped with arms (as in weapons), in the same sense that a person might become clothed
(dressed with clothes ) or that a horse might become saddled (overlain with a saddle).
Contrary to Abdus- Salam’s position, being “armed” has never been generally limited to
being equipped only with handheld weapons.
The meaning of “armed” went virtually unchanged from its appearance in 1297
through the time the Minnesota legislat ure included the phrase “armed with” in the riot
statute seven centuries later. The legislature criminalized rioting in 1963. See 1963 Minn.
Laws ch. 753, art. 1, § 609.71, at 1230. And the word “armed” still meant “furnished with
weapons of offense or defense.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 119 (1961
ed.). The word “arm” continues to mean “[t]o equip with weapons” today, The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 96 (5th ed. 2011), and the definition includes
no express or implied limit to the size of the weapons being possessed or to their means of
16
use. Under the enduring meaning of the words “arm” and “armed,” a person can be armed
with a small and simple weapon or a weapon that is large and operated by sophisticated
means; a thirteenth-century French castle could have been armed with crossbows and
trebuchets, a modern military unit can be armed with rifles and drones, and urban rioters
might be armed with guns and motor vehicles.
Corroborating our conclusion that one can be armed with a motor vehicle as a
dangerous weapon, caselaw informs us that a motor vehicle can be a dangerous weapon if
it is used in an assault in a manner likely to result in death or great bodily harm. See, e.g.,
State v. Bakdash, 830 N.W.2d 906, 914 (Minn. App. 2013) (“By intentionally driving his
vehicle onto a sidewalk into a group of pedestrians, appellant used his vehicle as a
dangerous weapon.”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 2013); Minn. Stat. § 609.222 (2020)
(criminalizing assault with a dangerous weapon). That one can commit an assault with a
car as a dangerous weapon necessarily implies that one must be armed with a car during
the assault, defeating Abdus-Salam ’s general theory that one can never be armed with a
car. Abdus-Salam argues against any analogy to the assault statute based on the difference
between the riot statute’s “armed with” language and the assault statute’s “with” language,
insisting, “Certainly, if the legislature intended the second degree riot statute to be
considered similar to the second degree assault statute, it would have worded them
identically.” The argument misses the point. The assault statute enhances the penalty of a
person who uses a dangerous weapon to commit the underlying assault offense. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.222, subd. 1 (“Whoever assaults another with a dangerous weapon . . . .” (emphasis
added)). By contrast, the riot statute enhances the penalty of a person who possesses a
17
dangerous weapon during the underlying riot offense. Minn. Stat. § 609.71, subd. 2 (“When
three or more persons assembled disturb the public peace by an intentional act or threat of
unlawful force or violence . . . each participant who is armed with a dangerous weapon or
knows that any other participant is armed with a dangerous weapon . . . .” (emphasis
added)). A person can be armed with a dangerous weapon without using it to commit the
underlying crime, but he cannot use a dangerous weapon without being armed with it.
And finally, we have found cases from other jurisdictions recognizing that one can
be armed with a motor vehicle while committing various crimes. See McNeil v.
Commonwealth, 468 S.W.3d 858, 866 (Ky. 2015) (“The evidence . . . made it plain that
McNeil was not simply ‘armed with’ a car, but he ‘used’ it as a dangerous instrument in
the furtherance of a theft, one indisputably involving physical injury.”); State v. Schordie,
570 N.W.2d 881, 882 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997), rev. denied (Wis. Mar. 17, 1998) (“Schordie
was subsequently convicted of recklessly endangering safety while armed with a motor
vehicle . . . .”); DeWhitt v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1055, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“If, as here,
criminal recklessness is committed and the defendant is ‘armed’ with a vehicle used in such
a manner as to be considered a deadly weapon, then the requirements of [the more serious
criminal-recklessness offense] are also met.”). Of course, these cases from elsewhere do
not directly establish the meaning of our Minnesota statute, but they confirm our
impression that the concept of a person being “armed with” a car is not as novel as Abdus-
Salam suggests. We hold that, if a car is used in a manner that qualifies it as a dangerous
weapon under Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 6, the person so using the
18
car during a riot is “armed with a dangerous weapon” under the second-degree riot statute,
section 609.71, subdivision 2.
DECISION
Because the state alleged sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that the cars used in the intersection takeovers were dangerous weapons, we
reverse the district court’s order dismissing the state’s second-degree riot charges and
remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.