State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1570

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Brandon Stuart Moore,
Appellant.

Filed October 16, 2023
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Chippewa County District Court
File No. 12-CR-22-58

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ed Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Matthew Haugen, Chippewa County Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
This is a direct appeal from judgments of conviction for aggravated first-degree
controlled-substance crime (sale) and unlawful possession of a firearm. Appellant first
argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for the aggravated
2
controlled-substance crime because the state failed to prove that he was within “immediate
reach” of a firearm. Second, appellant argues that he should receive a new trial because the
waiver of his right to counsel was invalid. Appellant also raises additional issues in a pro
se supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the procedural history and the evidence received during
the jury trial. On January 24, 2022, a law-enforcement officer, K.J., was near Granite Falls
when he saw appellant Brandon Moore driving eastbound on highway 212. K.J. observed
that Moore’s 2004 sedan had expired license tabs, so he activated his squad car’s
emergency lights and siren and followed Moore, who co ntinued driving for
“approximate[ly] three miles.” Moore’s sedan “was all over the road, weaving within its
lanes [and] crossing over the fog line.” Moore eventually pulled over in front of an ethanol
plant while K.J. remained in his car approximately “[f]ifty feet” away.
K.J. told Moore that he was under arrest, ordered him to put his hands up and out of
the window, and directed him to turn off the sedan’s motor. Moore put his hands up but
refused to “shut the vehicle off and get out of the vehicle.” A deputy’s squad car and a third
squad car pulled up to assist K.J. For “over ten minutes,” Moore and the police officers
engaged in back-and-forth yelling.
After repeated attempts to ask Moore to exit his sedan, law-enforcement officers
“determined that [they] would go up, make contact with [Moore], and take him into
custody.” K.J. arrested Moore. During a search of Moore’s person, officers found
“approximately six grams of methamphetamines in his pocket as well as a half-a-gram in
3
his sweatshirt pocket.” During a search of Moore’s sedan, officers found a “large stack of
money in the armrest,” approximately $3400, which was “all in one bundle wrapped with
multiple rubber bands.”
Officers continued searching the sedan and discovered the front glovebox was
locked. The ignition key was “sitting right on the front seat by the armrest,” and the officer
used it to unlock the glovebox. Inside the glovebox, the officer found a “black handgun”
with “several rounds of ammunition” and a plastic grocery bag . The grocery bag held
approximately 110.816 grams of methamphetamine.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Moore with aggravated
controlled-substance crime in the first degree (sale) under Minn. Stat. § 152.021,
subds. 1(1), 2b(1) (2020) (count one), aggravated contro lled-substance crime in the first
degree (possession) under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subds. 2(a)(1), 2b(1) (2020) (count two),
and unlawful possession of a firearm under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020) (count
three).
The district court conducted at least six hearings in 2022 during which the court
discussed Moore’s right to counsel with him. At a bail hearing on January 26, the district
court informed Moore of his charges and their penalties. Moore interjected, “I am not the
defendant. This is the defendant’s seat. I am not the defendant. I’m here by special
appearance. I’ve been kidnapped against my will and I’m forced to be here and I’m under
duress.” The district court again attempted to read the charges and inform Moore of his
4
constitutional rights, but Moore stated, “You are in business with . . . Chippewa County,
so you cannot tell me those are my rights.” The district court then informed Moore:
You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to
say anything about what the State claims that you did. If you
do say something about the facts of the case, what you say can
be used against you in this or in any other case. You have the
right to be represented by an attorney. You can hire your own
attorney or you can ask the Court to appoint an attorney if you
cannot afford one. You have the right to a twelve-person jury
trial. At the trial you have the right to call and ask questions of
witnesses, the right to subpoena witnesses. You have the right
to testify yourself if you want to or remain silent, and if you
decline to testify, no one can comment to the jury about your
failure to testify.

(Emphasis added.)
At a hearing on February 7, the district court again informed Moore of the charges,
their maximum penalties, and his constitutional rights. When the district court asked Moore
whether he wanted a public defender to represent him, Moore stated, “I reserve all my
rights without prejudice. I do not participate in any public functions.” The district court
responded that if “at any time you change your mind and wish to have an attorney, we
would be very happy to look at your application and if you qualify, we will definitely
appoint an attorney to help you out.” The district court then scheduled Moore’s omnibus
hearing and reiterated that he would be “best served by having an attorney represent [him]
at that hearing.”
5
During the omnibus hearing on February 28, Moore was self-represented, and the
following exchange took place:
DISTRICT COURT: Sir, do you—do, would you like to have
an attorney? I know we’ve talked about that before.
MOORE: I don’t do business with no counties. I don’t do
business with the government.
. . . .
DISTRICT COURT: Very well. And understand, like we
talked before, if you want to have an attorney help you and you
cannot afford one, I will appoint one to represent you.
MOORE: What do I need an attorney for? I’m not—I’m not
participating in no public hearings.

(Emphasis added.)
During a hearing on March 16, the district court informed Moore of his “right to be
represented by an attorney during the case” and stated that it would “appoint an attorney if
[Moore] cannot afford one.” In response, Moore stated that he was “not the named
defendant.” The district court explained that Moore should notify the jail if he changed his
mind about an attorney and wanted assistance filling out the proper forms. 1

1 Relevant to the issues raised in Moore’s supplemental appellate brief, Moore filed two
documents that the district court treated as motions. On February 4, 2022, Moore filed an
“affidavit of truth” stating that he is a “freeborn Sovereign” and has never “voluntary
elected to be treated as a United States citizen subject to its jurisdiction” or the “jurisdiction
of any of the several states.” On February 14, 2022, Moore filed an “addendum” to his
“affidavit of truth.” On March 21, 2022, Moore filed a letter with the district court and
asserted that “without probable cause Officer [K.J.] did an unlawful arrest” and an
“unlawful search and seizure of [Moore’s] body” and sedan.
In a March 28, 2022 order, the district court treated Moore’s “affidavit of truth” and
addendum as a “motion to challenge jurisdiction.” The district court denied the motion
after determining that Moore’s “sovereign citizen jurisdictional defense has no conceivable
validity in American law.” The district court also considered the March 12 letter to be a
motion to dismiss, then determined that law enforcement had probable cause to arrest
Moore.
6
At a hearing on May 9, the district court again asked Moore “if [he] want[ed] to
have an attorney help.” Moore responded that he “object[ed] to all of this” and “had nothing
to do with” the “named defendant.” The district court informed Moore that it was “going
to appoint an attorney as advisory counsel,” and the court’s order appointing advisory
counsel followed a few days later.
At a hearing on May 19, the district court discussed the role of advisory counsel:
The defendant represents himself. He has not requested
appointment of an attorney, has not hired an attorney. Because
of concerns about fairness in the proceeding, I have appointed
Andrew Hodny as advisory counsel. Sir, this means that you
can ask Mr. Hodny questions, he’ll be present during all of the
proceedings, and under the rules, he will take over if you want
him to take over as your attorney.

Moore stated, “I don’t need no advisory counsel,” and, “I’m not here to represent
myself . . . [because t]hat name [Brandon Moore] is an artificial entity . . . .” The district
court responded:
Sir, if you— if you would like to have an attorney represent
you, Mr. Hodny is appointed as advisory counsel. That’s
different from having an attorney represent you and again, I
remind you that you have that right, either to hire an attorney
or request that the Court appoint one, and if you fill out the
application, I’ll look at it and if you qualify, a public defender
will be appointed to represent you.

(Emphasis added.)

On the first day of Moore’s scheduled jury trial, the district court asked Moore
whether he wanted to be present. Moore refused to attend. The district court then asked if
Moore wanted advisory counsel to “make any presentation to the jury” on his behalf.
Moore refused to answer. The district court informed Moore that it would take breaks
7
throughout the trial and “check with persons at the jail to see if [Moore] changed [his]
mind” and wanted to participate. The state proceeded with its evidence, and Moore did not
attend the trial.
The jury found Moore guilty of all three charges. The district court entered
judgments of conviction on counts one and three, determined count two was the same
behavioral incident as count one, and sentenced Moore to 98 months in prison for count
one.
Moore appeals.
DECISION
I. The evidence is sufficient to sustain Moore’s conviction for aggravated
first-degree controlled-substance crime.
Due process requires the state to prove every element of the charged crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Minn. 2020). The statute under
which Moore was convicted provides:
A person is guilty of aggravated controlled substance
crime in the first degree if the person violates subdivision 1,
clause (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), or subdivision 2, paragraph (a),
clause (1), (2), or (3), and the person or an accomplice sells or
possesses 100 or more grams or 500 or more dosage units of a
mixture containing the controlled substance at issue and:
(1) the person or an accomplice possesses on
their person or within immediate reach, or uses, whether by
brandishing, displaying, threatening with, or otherwise
employing, a firearm[.]

Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2b(1) (emphasis added). To sustain Moore’s conviction for
aggravated first-degree controlled -substance crime, the state was required to prove that
8
Moore possessed (1) at least 100 grams of methamphetamine and (2) a firearm on his
person or within “immediate reach.” See id.
In his brief to this court, Moore challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the
second element. Moore argues that his conviction for aggravated first- degree
controlled-substance crime must be reversed because the “State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the firearm in the locked glove box was within his immediate reach.”
Moore’s challenge requires us to interpret the meaning of “immediate reach,” which raises
a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d
551, 556 (Minn. 2017).
The primary focus of statutory interpretation is “to effectuate the intent of the
legislature.” State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16 (2022). If the legislature’s intent is clear from the text of the statute, then we apply
that plain meaning. State v. Khalil, 956 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Minn. 2021); see also Minn.
Stat. § 645.16. When, as here, “a statute does not define terms, we may look to the
dictionary definitions of those words and apply them in the context of the statute to
determine whether the phrase has a plain and unambiguous meaning.” Fordyce v. State,
994 N.W.2d 893, 897 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). To determine the plain meaning,
“we first construe words and phrases in the statute ‘according to rules of grammar and
according to their common and approved usage.’” State v. McReynolds, 973 N.W.2d 314,
318 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2020)).
If after we consider the text of the statute, we determine that it is “subject to more
than one reasonable interpretation,” then the statute is ambiguous. State v. Thonesavanh,
9
904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). An appellate court may apply
canons of construction to resolve an ambiguity. State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 924
(Minn. 2019). In short, the first step in statutory interpretation determines whether the
statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 435.
Moore argues that the phrase “immediate reach” is unambiguous and carries a
temporal limitation such that a firearm is within immediate reach only if it can be accessed
instantly or without delay. Moore contends that because the firearm was in the locked
glovebox, “he could not gain immediate access to it” because it would have taken additional
time to access the firearm by shutting off the car and using the ignition key to unlock the
glovebox. The state, on the other hand, argues that “immediate reach” unambiguously
means that the state must prove that Moore was within close proximity of the firearm—
that is, he “could reach it without first relocating to a different position.”
The legislature did not define “immediate reach.” Minn. Stat. § § 152.01, .021
(2020). As a result, we turn to dictionary definitions. See Fordyce, 994 N.W.2d at 897 .
“Immediate” is defined as “[o]ccurring at onc e; happening without delay” and “[c]lose at
hand; near: in the immediate vicinity .” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 878 (5th ed. 2018). The word “reach” is defined, first, as “[t]o stretch out or put
forth (a body part); extend: reached out an arm,” and, second, as “[t]o touch or grasp by
stretching out or extending.” Id. at 1463. Th e definitions of reach necessarily include
physical accessibility; that is, for something to be within reach, or reachable, the person
must be capable of “touch[ing]” or “grasp[ing]” it by “stretching out or extending.” Id.
10
In short, the common understanding of “immediate reach” includes two meanings.
In the relevant statute, “immediate” is an adjective modifying the noun “reach.”
“Immediate reach,” therefore, first has a temporal meaning that is synonymous with
touching something “without delay,” as Moore argues. Second, “immediate reach” also has
a spatial meaning that is synonymous with touching something “close at hand,” as the state
argues. We therefore conclude that the phrase “immediate reach” within the statute
establishing the aggravated first-degree controlled-substance crime is ambiguous because
it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, as shown by the parties’
reasonable interpretations of this phrase based on common dictionary definitions including
both temporal and spatial access.
Having concluded that the statute is ambiguous, we may ascertain legislative intent
by examining
(1) the occasion and necessity for the law;
(2) the circumstances under which it was enacted;
(3) the mischief to be remedied;
(4) the object to be attained;
(5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the
same or similar subjects;
(6) the consequences of a particular interpretation;
(7) the contemporaneous legislative history; and
(8) legislative and administrative interpretations of the
statute.

Minn. Stat. § 645.16; Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d at 924 (applying factors in section 645.16 to
ambiguous statutory language).
The legislative history illuminates the legislature’s intent for providing that having
a firearm within “immediate reach” is an aggravating factor. The statute establishing the
11
aggravated first-degree controlled-substance crime was enacted in 2016 as part of the Drug
Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA), which sought to impose harsher penalties for drug dealers
and to reduce sentences for chemically dependent and low-level offenders. Hearing on S.F.
3841 Before the Judiciary Budget Div. (May 9, 2016) (statement of Sen. Latz).
Related caselaw on searches incident to arrest also guides our analysis of what is
within a defendant’s reach. In Chimel v. California, the Supreme Court reasoned that police
officers may search the arrestee and the “area into which an arrestee might reach” to
prevent possible destruction of evidence or use of a weapon to “effect his escape.” 395 U.S.
752, 763 (1969). In State v. Fisher, we explained that incident to a lawful arrest, police
may search “the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing
that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.” 588 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Minn. App. 1999) (quoting Chimel,
395 U.S. at 763), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 1999). This caselaw suggests that we should
consider “immediate reach” in terms of what is within a defendant’s control.
We construe “immediate reach” within the statute establishing the aggravated
first-degree controlled-substance crime by giving effect to the legislature’s intent to impose
harsher penalties for more serious drug offenders and by considering related caselaw
indicating that a defendant’s reach includes what is within their control. We conclude that
“immediate reach” requires the state to prove that a firearm is accessible by touching
because the defendant’s access is “without delay” and “close at hand.”
Having determined the proper meaning of “immediate reach” for purposes of the
statute establishing the aggravated first-degree controlled-substance crime, we now
12
consider appellant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. When an element of an offense
is supported by direct evidence, our review is limited “to a painstaking analysis of the
record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
conviction, is sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v.
Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016). Moore’s conviction is supported by direct
evidence because the state proved the location of the firearm in the sedan by testimony of
“a witness’s personal observations [that] allows the jury to find the defendant guilty
without having to draw any inferences.” Id.
2
The record evidence includes testimony from a police officer that Moore, at the time
of his arrest, had access to a firearm in a locked glovebox and the key to the glovebox was
in the sedan. The officer also testified that Moore drove a relatively small vehicle, that the
glovebox was close to the driver’s seat, and that Moore would have been able to reach the
firearm while sitting in the driver’s seat.
We conclude that the record includes sufficient direct evidence that the firearm was
within Moore’s immediate reach because he had physical access to the firearm and the key
to the glovebox was in the sedan. Because Moore was in the driver’s seat and the key to
the glovebox was in the sedan, the firearm was “close at hand” and he was able to access
it by touch “without delay.” We are not persuaded by Moore’s argument that the fact that
the glovebox was locked necessarily meant the state failed to prove the firearm was within

2 Because we conclude that direct evidence in the record sustains Moore’s conviction, we
need not consider the state’s argument that circumstantial evidence also sustains Moore’s
conviction because it proves he constructively possessed the firearm.
13
his “immediate reach.” Because the glovebox key was in the sedan, Moore’s access to the
firearm was both “without delay” and “close at hand.” Thus, the record evidence sustains
Moore’s conviction for aggravated first-degree controlled-substance crime.
II. Moore validly waived his right to counsel by conduct.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to counsel. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Minn. Const. art. I , §§ 6, 7. Defendants
equally have the constitutional right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 832 (1975). To satisfy constituti onal requirements, a criminal defendant’s waiver of
counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880,
884-85 (Minn. 2012).
“Whether a waiver of a constitutional right is valid depends upon the particular facts
and circu mstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused.” State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 275-76 (Minn. 1998) (quotation
omitted); see Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 886 (stating that the lack of an “on-the-record inquiry
regarding waiver . . . does not require reversal when the particular facts and circumstances
of the case demonstrate a valid waiver”). “A defendant who seeks to waive the right to
counsel should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so
that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with
eyes open.” Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 276 (quotation omitted).
It is the district court’s duty to ensure the constitutional requirements are met. State
v. Hawanchak, 669 N.W.2d 912, 914 (Minn. App. 2003). In felony cases, Minnesota law
requires a written waiver of counsel signed by the defendant unless the defendant refuses
14
to sign. Minn. Stat. § 611.19 (2022); Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4). It is “strongly
encourage[d]” for district courts to discharge their duty to the defendant by securing a
written waiver. State v. Gant, __ N.W.2d __, __, 2023 WL 5340023, at *7 (Minn. App.
Aug. 21, 2023). When there is no written waiver form, district courts must advise
defendants of the following before accepting a waiver:
(a) nature of the charges;
(b) all offenses included within the charges;
(c) range of allowable punishments;
(d) there may be defenses;
(e) mitigating circumstances may exist; and
(f) all other facts essential to a broad understanding of
the consequences of the waiver of the right to counsel,
including the advantages and disadvantages of the decision to
waive counsel.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4); accord State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d, 496, 504 (Minn.
2009).
Appellate courts will overturn a “finding of a valid waiver of a defendant’s right to
counsel if that finding is clearly erroneous.” Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 504 (quotation omitted).
Clear error occurs when “there is no reasonable evidence to support the finding or when an
appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.”
Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 885. When facts are not in dispute, appellate courts review de novo
whether a defendant constitutionally waived his right to counsel. Id.
Moore argues that the district court did not fulfill its duty to ensure a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver because it did not obtain a written waiver-of-counsel form
or advise appellant of all facts and consequences before accepting his waiver of counsel.
The state concedes that the district court did not obtain an express or written waiver of
15
counsel. The state also points out , however, that the Minnesota Supreme Court has
recognized that a defendant may also waive their right to counsel by conduct or by
forfeiture. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 504.
Appellate courts consider the state’s argument that Moore waived counsel by
conduct or forfeiture. A defendant waives his right to counsel by conduct when he “engages
in dilatory tactics after he has been warned that he will lose his right to counsel” without
ever affirming his decision to proceed pro se. Id. at 505. As with other affirmative waivers,
the district court must conduct a formal colloquy with the defendant before finding a valid
waiver by conduct. Id. In contrast, a defendant waives his right to counsel by forfeiture
when he “engages in extremely dilatory conduct.” Id. (quotation omitted). This differs from
waiver by conduct because “[f]orfieture does not require the court to conduct a waiver
colloquy with the defendant.” Id. “Forfeiture is usually reserved for severe misconduct,
when other efforts to remedy the situation have failed.” Id.
Caselaw illustrates waiver by conduct and waiver by forfeiture. In State v. Langston,
we concluded that a self-represented defendant waived the right to counsel. No. A17-1136,
2018 WL 1701898, at *9 (Minn. App. Apr. 9, 2018). 3 Langston appeared self-represented
over the course of several months and repeated sovereign-citizen arguments that questioned
the district court’s legitimacy. Id. at *2-4, 8. The district court repeatedly advised Langston
of his right to counsel and asked if he wanted a lawyer, but Langston replied, “No, I would
not,” and, “Why would I need a lawyer?” Id. at *8. Relying on Worthy and Rhoads, we

3 Although Langston is nonprecedential, we find it persuasive.
16
affirmed that Langston knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel
based on the “overall context and language of the court’s discussions and advisories,
Langston’s behavior, and Langston’s familiarity with the legal system.” Id. (emphasis
added) (citing Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 884-85).
In Jones, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that Jones forfeited his right to
counsel when almost a full year passed between his first bail appearance and trial and he
“repeatedly told the district court that he planned on retaining private counsel” yet
consistently appeared without counsel. 772 N.W.2d at 506. The district court “granted
[Jones] three continuances solely for the purpose of giving him” time to secure private
counsel and “set his trial date four months after his omnibus hearing so that he could hire
counsel.” Id. Despite Jones’s objection to proceeding without legal representation, the
supreme court held that Jones’s dilatory conduct forfeited his right to counsel. Id.
Though we are not persuaded that Moore’s behavior was so extreme as to amount
to a waiver of counsel by forfeiture as in Jones , we conclude that he waived the right to
counsel by his conduct as in Langston. Moore repeatedly questioned the district court’s
authority and rejected the district court’s multiple suggestions to apply for a public
defender or seek private counsel. The district court repeatedly advised Moore of his right
to counsel, the range of possible punishments, and the nature of the state’s charges against
him. At each of six hearings, the district court urged Moore to obtain counsel, either
through the public defender’s office or privately. The district court later appointed advisory
counsel on Moore’s behalf before trial. Moore refused legal counsel at every stage of the
proceedings. Based on this record, we conclude that Moore waived his right to counsel by
17
his conduct in repeatedly refusing to respond to the district court’s efforts to advise Moore
of his right to counsel, to give Moore an opportunity to retain counsel, and to ask Moore if
he wanted to apply for court- appointed counsel. We are persuaded that when Moore
rebuffed the district court’s repeated efforts to protect Moore’s constitutional right to
counsel, Moore waived his right to counsel by his conduct.
III. The arguments in Moore’s supplemental brief do not warrant relief.
In a supplemental brief, Moore raises two additional issues: first, that law
enforcement obtained evidence from an unlawful search and seizure and, second, that the
district court and state lacked jurisdiction.
In support of his position on the first issue that the firearm should have been
suppressed, Moore argues that “[a] police officer may not perform a limited protective
weapons search of a person stopped for a routine traffic offense based solely on a possible
risk of flight absent any evidence that the person is armed and dangerous, poses a threat to
the officer’s safety, or is involved in a more serious crime.” Moore’s person was searched
incident to his arrest, however, and not during a traffic stop. During a search incident to a
person’s arrest, police may search the “person’s body and the area within his or her
immediate control.” State v. Robb, 605 N.W. 2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2000) (citing Chimel,
395 U.S. at 763).
In support of his position on the second issue that the complaint should have been
dismissed, Moore argues that the district court lacked subject -matter jurisdiction to hear
the case under the Eleventh Amendment and the case-and-controversy requirement under
Article III of the United States Constitution. He correctly states that to establish Article III
18
standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the
defendant’s conduct and that a favorable court decision will redress the injury. However,
the Minnesota Constitution provides that “[t]he district court has original jurisdiction in all
civil and criminal cases and shall have appellate jurisdiction as prescribed by law.” Minn.
Const. art. VI, § 3. And, as the district court noted in response to Moore’s jurisdiction
argument, “[a] person may be convicted and sentenced under the law of this state if the
person commits an offense in whole or in part within this state.” Minn. Stat. § 609.025(1)
(2020).
We conclude that the arguments in Moore’s supplemental brief do not demonstrate
a basis for relief.
Affirmed.