State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1586

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Aaron Lavell Ross,
Appellant.

Filed July 24, 2023
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-21-7342

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant Aaron Lavell Ross challenges the validity of his guilty plea for one count
of felony violation of a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO).1 Because his plea was
accurate, voluntary, and intelligent, we affirm.
DECISION
An appellant may challenge the validity of a guilty plea for the first time on direct
appeal when the grounds for the challenge do not go outside the record on appeal.
State v. Newcombe, 412 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied
(Minn. Nov. 13, 1987). The appellant has the burden of showing that their guilty plea was
invalid, and we review this question de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn.
2010).
To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be “accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent.” Id. An accurate guilty plea is “established on a proper factual basis.” Id.
Voluntariness refers to “what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea
agreement” and whether the appellant pleaded guilty due to “improper pressure or
coercion.” Id. at 96. Intelligence guarantees that the appellant understood the charges, the
rights they waived, and the consequences of the plea. Id. Ross challenges his plea on all
three grounds.

1 This offense violates Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 2(d)(1) (2020).
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A. Ross’s plea was accurate.
In his principal brief, Ross argues that his plea was not accurate because he did not
establish a proper factual basis at his plea hearing. Ross pleaded guilty to one count of
felony violation of a DANCO. This plea requires Ross to admit to five elements: Ross
(1) violated the terms of (2) an existing DANCO (3) that he knew about, (4) he knew his
behavior was prohibited by the DANCO, and (5) the violation occurred within ten years of
the first of two or more previous qualified domestic-violence-related -offense convictions.
See Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2 (2020).
Ross argues that he only admitted to one prior felony conviction for domestic
assault, not two. He cites to the following colloquy during the factual basis portion of the
plea hearing:
ROSS’S ATTORNEY: Okay. And were you previously
convicted on April 6, 2018, of a felony domestic assault in Clay
County?
ROSS: Yes.
ROSS’S ATTORNEY: And would you agree that both of
those two convictions is what makes this one a felony?
ROSS: Yes.

But, after receiving Ross’s appellate brief, the state contacted the court reporter because
the original transcript “seemed odd.” After checking the accuracy of the transcript, the
court reporter filed an amended transcript, which corrected the colloquy as follows:
ROSS’S ATTORNEY: Okay. And were you previously
convicted on April 6, 2018, of a felony domestic assault in Clay
County?
ROSS: Yes.
ROSS’S ATTORNEY: And also convicted on March 12,
2018, of felony domestic assault in Clay County as well?
ROSS: Yes.
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ROSS’S ATTORNEY: And would you agree that both of
those two convictions is what makes this one a felony?
ROSS: Yes.

Because we approve the supplemental transcript under rule 110.05 of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, Ross’s plea was accurate given that the factual basis
he gave provided a proper foundation for his guilty plea. See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
B. Ross’s plea was both voluntary and intelligent.
Ross alleges that his plea was neither voluntary nor intelligent because he did not
understand the charges he faced, the rights he was relinquishing, and the consequences of
doing do. But these are all requirements of an intelligent plea, not a voluntary plea. Id. at
96. Accordingly, we only analyze the intelligence prong of Ross’s plea.
First, Ross argues that there is nothing to show that he understood the enhancement
element of the charge to which he pleaded guilty. But because the amended transcript
makes it clear that Ross did understand this aspect, this argument fails.
Second, Ross contends that he did not understand the rights he was relinquishing
and the consequences of doing so. For example, Ross posits that his plea was unintelligent
because the district court did not question him on a number of other matters of which a
defendant should be informed under rule 15.01, subdivision 1, of the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure, including:
• whether he was satisfied that his attorney was fully
informed as to the facts of the case, had represented his
interests, and fully advised him;
• whether he was under the influence, had a mental disability,
or was undergoing treatment;
• whether he understood the state’s witness would be
required to testify in open court in Ross’ presence;
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• whether he understood that if he went to trial he had the
right to testify, and if he did not, the prosecutor and judge
couldn’t comment to the jury on the failure to testify;
• whether he waived the right to testify;
• whether he was making any claim of his innocence; and,
• that he could move to withdraw his plea.

Ross acknowledges this court held in State v. Doughman that failure to address all of the
matters in rule 15.01 or to fully inform a defendant of all constitutional rights does not
render a plea unintelligent and involuntary if the record is adequate to establish the
intelligence of the plea. 340 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. App. 1983), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 15, 1984). He distinguishes his case from Doughman because he had no
written plea petition.2 But whether or not there was a plea petition, if the “record reveals
careful interrogation by the [district] court and the defendant had full opportunity to consult
with his counsel before entering his plea, the court may safely presume that the defendant
was adequately informed of his rights.” Hernandez v. State, 408 N.W.2d 623, 626
(Minn. App. 1987) (citing State v. Propotnik , 216 N.W.2d 637, 638 (Minn. 1974)). And
when the district court questioned Ross, he agreed that he wanted to enter into the plea
agreement and that he “had enough time to talk to [his] attorney about the agreement.”
Furthermore, Ross’s counsel “is not required to advise the defendant of every
consequence for the defendant’s plea to be intelligent.” Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821,
823 (Minn. 2016). Ross cannot point to a single consequence of his plea of which he was

2 While there was no written plea agreement, Ross pleaded guilty as part of a global plea
deal that resolved charges in multiple counties, which was put on the record orally at the
combined plea and sentencing hearing. We note that many issues on appeal could have
been avoided if there had been a written plea agreement.
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not informed, and it is his burden to do so. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Because Ross had
the full opportunity to consult counsel before entering his plea, he was adequately informed
of his rights.
C. Ross’s pro se arguments are without merit.
In his pro se supplemental brief, Ross alleges a Brady violation and submits
additional arguments regarding the intelligence and voluntariness of his plea. 3
Ross argues that prosecutors did not disclose material evidence in violation of
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). “Whether a discovery violation occurred is an
issue of law which this court reviews de novo.” State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 489
(Minn. 2005). Three elements must be met to prove a Brady violation: (1) the evidence
must be favorable to the defendant because it would have been either exculpatory or
impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution, intentionally
or otherwise; and (3) the evidence must be material. State v. Thoresen, 965 N.W.2d 295,
304 (Minn. 2021). Evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Ross has failed to establish that the third element was satisfied. Ross alleges that
the prosecution withheld an incident report until after his plea. But the incident report in

3 Ross also alleges bias by the law enforcement officers involved in his case. Because Ross
neither identifies what statute was violated nor provides caselaw to support his bias claim,
we need not address it. State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc.,
558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (explaining that appellate courts decline to reach issues
that are inadequately briefed).
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question involves Ross reporting fraud by the victim. This information is not material to
the charge Ross pleaded guilty to—felony violation of a DANCO. Because Ross cannot
demonstrate that the incident report was material, his Brady claim fails.
Ross also offers additional arguments to show that his plea was neither voluntary
nor intelligent, as argued by his counsel. Ross claims that his plea was not intelligent
because he was not provided any discovery materials before he accepted the plea offer. If
the record shows that a defendant had full opportunity to consult their counsel before
entering a plea, courts may “safely presume” that a defendant was adequately informed of
their rights. Hernandez, 408 N.W.2d at 626. Because Ross stated on the record that he
understood the agreement and had enough time to talk with his attorney, his argument fails.
Ross next contends that he was coerced into taking the plea deal. Specifically, he
posits that the alleged withholding of the incident report was part of an effort by multiple
counties to “railroad” him into a global plea deal. The voluntariness of a plea is determined
from the relevant circumstances. State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994). At
the hearing, Ross engaged in the following exchange with the court:
THE COURT: Has anybody made any threats or promises to
you to enter into this agreement other than what we have
outlined in court today?
ROSS: No. Just from my understanding —just what was
outlined.

And the district court accepted Ross’s guilty plea, stating, “Mr. Ross, the Court will find,
sir, that you have voluntarily pled guilty.” Because this testimony cannot be overcome by
a vague assertion of coercion based on discovery that is not relevant to the guilty plea,
Ross’s plea was voluntary.
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In sum, Ross’s plea was valid because it was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.
And Ross’s pro se arguments to the contrary do not persuade us otherwise.
Affirmed.