State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1589

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Kayli Anne Feekes-Benedict,
Respondent.

Filed March 27, 2023
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-21-3097

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian Melton, Clay County Attorney, Megan J. Kelly, Courtney O’Reilly, Assistant
County Attorneys, Moorhead, Minnesota (for appellant)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Melvin R. Welch, Welch Law Firm, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s decision to not receive
a police report as evidence at a suppression hearing because the state did not produce the
officer who wrote the report to testify. The state argues that the district court’s decision
was error in the wake of State v. Pauli, 979 N.W.2d 39, 42 (Minn. 2022), a recent
Minnesota Supreme Court decision, which held that the Minnesota Rules of Evidence do
not apply in full force at suppression hearings. But because the district court has clear
discretion to determine the reliability of evidence at suppression hearings and the state
interprets Pauli too broadly, we affirm.
FACTS
In September 2021, the state charged respondent Kayli Anne Feekes-Benedict with
two counts of misdemeanor driving while impaired.
1 In August 2022, Feekes-Benedict
filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from her arrest claiming it was unlawful
and lacked probable cause. In November 2022, the district court held a suppression
hearing. At the suppression hearing, the state offered o ne exhibit, a police report written
by the officer who stopped Feekes-Benedict’s vehicle. The state did not intend to call any
witnesses and did not have the officer who wrote the report available, relying on the holding
in a recent Minnesota Supreme Court case, id. at 42, to assert that it did not have to abide
by the Minnesota Rules of Evidence at suppression hearings.

1 In violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivisions 1(1)-(5) (2020).
3
The district court refused to receive the police report, reasoning that Pauli does not
support the assertion that officers do not have to testify to their police reports at suppression
hearings. The state then requested that, before the district court dismiss the case against
Feekes-Benedict, the court stay the proceedings so it could wait for its related appeal to be
heard.2 The district court, in its subsequent order, granted Feekes-Benedict’s motion to
suppress and stayed dismissal of her case for five days for the state to perfect its appeal.
The state appeals.
DECISION
The state maintains that it did not need to have the arresting officer testify for the
district court to receive the officer’s police report, which outlined Feekes-Benedict’s
vehicle stop that led to her impaired-driving charges. The state relies upon a holding in
Pauli, which states that “[t]he Minnesota Rules of Evidence do not apply with full force
during suppression hearings” in arguing that there is a limited right to confrontation at
pretrial hearings.
3 979 N.W.2d at 42. On the other hand, Feekes- Benedict asserts that
since the state has the burden to show that the evidence obtained against her was obtained

2 The state had the opportunity to request a continuance to locate the officer and have him
testify, but instead chose to pursue an appeal. The record and oral argument revealed that
the state (specifically Clay County) has attempted to admit evidence, such as police reports,
body-camera footage, and squad-camera footage without officer testimony at suppression
hearings in other cases since the Pauli decision was released.
3 The state further contends that presentation of evidence beyond the police report makes
the proceeding “a discovery expedition.” But the two main collateral functions of pretrial
hearings, such as suppression hearings, are (1) for “the defendant to engage in a form of
discovery,” and (2) perpetuation of testimony on both sides—the defendant has an
opportunity to confront the state’s witnesses against them, and the prosecution gets to
“assess the credibility of [its own] witnesses.” State v. Florence, 239 N.W.2d 892, 896
(Minn. 1976). As a result, the state’s argument is not persuasive.
4
lawfully and Pauli does not remove that burden, the district court properly granted her
suppression motion after refusing to admit the state’s evidence.
Because this appeal concerns a district court’s decision at the pretrial stage, we will
reverse its decision only if the state can “clearly and unequivocally show both that the trial
court’s order [had] a critical impact on the state’s ability to prosecute the defendant
successfully and that the [district court’s decision] constituted error.” State v. Zanter, 535
N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d
620, 627 (Minn. 2017) (explaining that an appellate court views critical impact as a
threshold issue and will not review a pretrial order absent such a showing). Once the
critical-impact threshold has been met, we review a district court’s factual findings in a
pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence under a clearly erroneous standard and
review its legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn.
2008).
We first address whether the state met its burden of showing that the district court’s
decision had a critical impact on its case . “Critical impact has been shown not only in
those cases where the lack of the suppressed evidence completely destroys the state’s case,
but also in those cases where the lack of the suppressed evidence significantly reduces the
likelihood of a successful prosecution.” State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 551
(Minn. 1987). The critical-impact inquiry is a fact-dependent determination.
State v. Sexter, 935 N.W.2d 157, 161-62 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17,
2019).
5
Although the state had the option to— but did not—request to continue the case until
the time where it could produce the officer to testify at the suppression hearing and follow
through with the prosecution of Feekes-Benedict, the district court’s order had a critical
impact on the state’s case. The district court’s refusal to receive the state’s police report
and granting of Feekes -Benedict’s suppression motion left the state with a complete lack
of evidence to prosecute her impaired-driving charges. See Joon Kyu Kim,
398 N.W.2d at 551. And the district court, after giving the state a five-day stay, dismissed
the charges against F eekes-Benedict, cementing the critical impact as it “destroy[ed] the
state’s case.” Id.; see also State v. Under dahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 684 (Minn. 2009)
(explaining that the dismissal of charges has a critical impact on the prosecution’s case).
As a result, we conclude that the state met its burden of establishing critical impact to its
case, even though that critical impact was largely created by the state’s decision not to
produce the officer to testify.
We next turn to whether the district court’s refusal to receive the police report
without accompanying officer testimony and the ensuing suppression order were in error
given the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Pauli. Since the district court’s
interpretation of Pauli as applied to the state’s proffered evidence is a legal determination,
we review this question de novo. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502. But we review the district
court’s ultimate determination of whether to admit the evidence for an abuse of discretion.
See Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Minn. 1997) (“The
admission of evidence rests within the broad discretion of the [district] court and its ruling
6
will not be disturbed unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or constitutes an
abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted)).
When the district court makes determinations regarding preliminary questions on
the admissibility of evidence, it is not bound by the rules of evidence, unless these questions
concern privileges. Minn. R. Evid. 104(a). At a suppression hearing, the state carries the
burden to establish that the evidence challenged by the defendant was obtained in
accordance with the constitution. State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn. 2018);
see also State v. Terrell, 283 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Minn. 1979) (concluding that at an omnibus
hearing where a defendant sought suppression of evidentiary items, prosecution should
have called witnesses rather than relying on the grand-jury-testimony transcript).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to receive the police
report and granting the defendant’s motion to suppress because the district court has ample
discretion in determining the reliability of evidence and the state too broadly interpreted
the holding in Pauli. At the suppression hearing, the state had the burden to establish that
the evidence obtained at Feekes-Benedict’s vehicle stop was obtained legally. Edstrom,
916 N.W.2d at 517. The state made no offers of proof at the suppression hearing. Instead,
the state presented only the police report written by the arresting officer without that officer
present to testify.4 In doing so, the state failed to meet its burden at the suppression hearing,

4 The state also argues that the defendant’s right to confrontation at a pretrial hearing is
“significantly relaxed” compared to trial and , as a result, it did not need to produce a
witness for its police report. Even taking the “significantly relaxed” standard as true, the
rights of the defendant under the Confrontation Clause still exist such that witnesses may
need to be called. Even Pauli recognized that in many instances, the admissibility of
7
and the district court properly granted Feekes -Benedict’s suppression motion. The state
relies on Pauli to assert that (1) the district court should have received the police report
into evidence to go toward its burden and (2) it did not need a witness to show the validity
of the stop and the legality of the evidence.5 We disagree.
First, the district court has wide discretion in receiving evidence at the pretrial
stages. In fact, Pauli reinforces the role of the district courts as gatekeepers of evidence,
and it permits—but does not require—district courts to disregard the rules of evidence at
pretrial hearings. 979 N.W.2d at 50. Pauli does not, however, preclude the court from
enforcing limitations on evidence proffered by the state. The Minnesota Supreme Court
stated:
District court judges still serve a vital gatekeeping function that
Rule 104(a) does not eliminate. But Rule 104(a) by its plain
text—and supported by principles of judicial economy and
rulings from other jurisdictions—does not require rigid
adherence to the Rules of Evidence at suppression hearings.

Id.; see also Minn. R. Evid. 104(a) (stating that preliminary questions concerning the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the district court, subject to relevancy
standards, and in making its determination, it is not bound by the rules of evidence).
Further, Pauli explains that although “not bound to follow the Rules of Evidence,
district court judges can and should still exclude evidence they deem unreliable.”

certain evidence is dispositive of a case and in such instances, the rules of evidence may
be necessary to protect the interests of litigants. 979 N.W.2d at 50.
5 The state argued at oral argument before this court that Feekes-Benedict could have called
the officer as a witness at the suppression hearing. This argument fails.
The state— not the defendant—has the burden of proof at a suppression hearing. Edstrom,
916 N.W.2d at 517.
8
979 N.W.2d at 50 (emphasis added) (explaining that “a district court’s ability to reject
unreliable evidence is not eliminated by allowing the court to consider evidence beyond
what is admissible under the rules”). The district court utilized this discretion when it
refused to receive the police report here. As a result, the district court did not err in its
interpretation of Pauli, which permitted its exercise of discretion to refuse to receive the
report as unreliable evidence.
Still, the state asserts that because the district court’s order did not mention
reliability as the basis for its refusal to receive the evidence, it did not properly use its
discretion. Again, we disagree. The district court is not required to state with specificity
that it is refusing evidence for being unreliable in its order. It is enough that the district
court reasoned in its decision to refuse the police report and grant Feekes-Benedict’s
suppression motion based on a concern with the Confrontation Clause, which involves
testimonial evidence, because this consideration goes directly to the reliability of the
evidence the state presented. See Minn. R. Evid. 104(a) (stating that the preliminary
questions on the admissibility of evidence sh all be determined by the court); see also
State v. Tate, 969 N.W.2d 378, 384 n.7 (Minn. App. 2022) (holding that the Confrontation
Clause commands that testimonial -evidence reliability be assessed in a particular manner
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination), aff’d, 985 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 2023).
Second, the state extrapolated a broader rule from Pauli than is permissible when it
tried to submit the police report without officer testimony. Contrary to the state’s
interpretation, Pauli does not permit the state to skirt by the rules of evidence pertaining to
its burden at a suppression hearing. And it does not require the district court to receive any
9
of the state’s presented evidence even if it deems that evidence unreliable. Instead, Pauli
merely allows the district court to receive evidence at suppression hearings that may not
strictly abide by the rules of evidence to aid in its pretrial determinations—at its discretion
and as it considers fit for the case at issue. As such, we do not discern an abuse of discretion
by the district court in determining that this evidence was unreliable.
In sum, because the state’s reliance on Pauli was misplaced and the district court
has wide discretion in determining the reliability of evidence at the pretrial stage, as
outlined in Rule 104(a) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence and Pauli, we affirm.
Affirmed.