State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1592

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Wilson Lee Townsel,
Appellant.

Filed July 17, 2023
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File Nos. 62-CR-19-2193, 62-CR-21-1414, 62-CR-21-1528

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Larkin , Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the d istrict court’s revocation of his probation for first-degree
assault, arguing the district court erred because it did not adequately find that the need for
2
confinement outweighed the policies favoring continued probation and because the record
does not support such a conclusion. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2019, appellant Wilson Lee Townsel was driving his truck with his then-
girlfriend T.A.W. as a passenger. Townsel became angry, r eached over T.A.W. to open
the door, and pushed her out of the moving truck. T.A.W. tried to hang on to the truck
while Townsel continued driving but fell onto the street. Officers later responded to a call
for emergency services and found T.A.W. bleeding from her knees, ankles, and head with
a large area of skin peeled back on her forehead. After being rushed to the hospital, doctors
discovered she had a ruptured spleen, fractured ribs, and a collapsed lung that required
emergency surgery and recovery in the intensive care unit.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Townsel with first -degree assault and
issued a no -contact order prohibiting Townsel from contacting T.A.W. Townsel entered
an Alford guilty plea. Under the plea agreement, both parties asked the district court for a
downward dispositional d eparture. The district court convicted Townsel of first -degree
assault and stayed his 110- month prison sentence, placing him on probation for ten years.
The district court imposed special conditions of his probation, which included having no
contact with T.A.W. and remaining law abiding.
In March 2021, the probation department alleged that Townsel violated the
conditions of his probation three times by contacting the victim in violation of the no-
contact order and by failing to remain law abiding. The state charged Townsel with felony
violation of a no- contact order for each incident. Townsel pleaded guilty to two of the
3
three charges in exchange for the third charge to be dismissed. While Townsel awaited
sentencing, the probation department alleged Tow nsel again violated his probation based
on a police report where T.A.W. told officers that Townsel forced her into his car and drove
her to a gas station where she managed to escape from him.
The district court held a combined sentencing and probation- violation hearing. For
Townsel’s two felony violation-of-a-no-contact-order offenses, the district court stayed the
execution of both a 28-month sentence and a 32- month sentence for five years and placed
Townsel on probation. As part of the conditions of his probation, the district court required
Townsel to serve one year in the workhouse in Ramsey County. Turning to the alleged
probation violations corresponding to his first -degree assault offense, Townsel admitted to
the violations. The district court ord ered Townsel to serve one year in the workhouse ,
concurrent with the time imposed for his other cases, and continued Townsel’s probation.
The district court specified that Townsel must turn himself in to custody for the workhouse
in July.
Townsel failed t o turn himself in at the workhouse . Instead, he absconded to
Georgia with his wife for around a year and failed to stay in contact with his probation
agent during that time. The probation department filed a probation- violation report. In
2022, Townsel was apprehended in Minnesota on an active warrant and appeared before
the district court for a probation- violation hearing. Townsel admitted that he violated the
terms of his probation by failing to turn himself in to the workhouse and not contacting his
probation agent while living in Georgia. The district court revoked Townsel’s probation
and executed his sentences on all three offenses.
4
This appeal follows.
DECISION
The district court has broad discretion to revoke probation and this court will reverse
only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249- 50
(Minn. 1980). Before the district court revokes probation, it must conduct a “three -step
analysis” and make specific findings on the Austin factors. Id. at 250. The district court
must (1) “designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated ”; (2) “find that
the violation was intentional or inexcusable ”; and (3) “find tha t the need for confinement
outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Id. These factors require the district courts to
“seek to convey their substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon” and
“prevents courts from reflexively revoking probation.” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d
602, 608 (Minn. 2005). We review whether the district court made the required findings
to revoke probation de novo. Id. at 605.
Townsel contends the district court failed to make findings relevant to the third
Austin factor and that the record does not support its conclusion that “the policy in favor
of probation is outweighed by the need for incarceration in [Townsel’s] case.” On the third
Austin factor, district courts balance “the probationer’s interest in freedom and the state’s
interest in insuring his rehabilitation and the public safety.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250.
To make a finding on this factor, the district court considers the following subfactors and
determines whether: (1) “confinement is necessary to protect the public from further
criminal activity by the offe nder,” (2) “the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if [the offender] is confined,” or (3) “it would
5
unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.”
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d a t 607 (quotation omitted).
Townsel argues the district court failed to make proper findings on the third Austin
factor because the district court only recited the language of the factor in a conclusory
manner and failed to justify why incarceration was necessary. He also contends the district
court never addressed any of the subfactors and that revoking his probation was a “reflexive
reaction.”1 We di sagree. Even though the district court did not expressly identify the
subfactor it relied on when it found that the need for confinement outweighed the policies
favoring probation, the record shows that the district court based its revocation on the third
subfactor. See id. (“[I]t would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if
probation were not revoked.”). The district court also stated its “substantive reasons for
revocation” and specified the “evidence [it] relied upon” before it found the need for
incarceration outweighed the policies favoring probation. Id. at 608. We do not need to
“scour the record” to understand the district court’s rationale. Id.
Here, the state alleged that Townsel violated the conditions of his probation when
he failed to turn himself in to custody to serve one year in the workhouse in July 2021 and
failed to keep in contact with his probation agent while living in Georgia. At the probation-
violation hearing, Townsel admitted to the violations and that he did not “have a good
reason why [he] didn’t turn [himself] in.” The district court considered the

1 We also disagree that the district court’s decision was “reflexive.” At the hearing, the
district court paused to consider the relevant facts and explained to Townsel, “I’m putting
a lot of thought into this, okay? That’s why I’m taking time here.”
6
recommendation of the probation department, which asked the district court to continue
Townsel’s probation and order him to serve a year in the workhouse as he was previously
required to do.
Relevant to the third Austin factor, the district court acknowledged that Townsel
benefitted from a downward dispositional departure on his first-degree assault offense. See
State v. Fleming, 869 N.W.2d 319, 331 (Minn. App. 2015) (holding courts may properly
consider the grant of a downward dispositional departure when deciding whether to revoke
probation), aff’d, 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016). And when the district court first placed
Townsel on probation, it “warned [Townsel] not to come back” with probation violations.
The district court also considered “the original offense and [Townsel’s] intervening
conduct” as part of its analysis. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607. Here, the district court
reviewed the criminal complaint and serious circumstances of the offense . The district
court observed that it was a “terrible assault” that left a “large section of [the victim’s] skin
peeled back from [her] skull and ble[d] profusely” together with “large bruises . . . bloody
areas on her knees and ankles . . . fractured ribs, collapsed lung, [and a] ruptured spleen.”
Turning to Townsel’s conduct after being placed on proba tion, the district court
considered probation’s conclusion that “[Townsel] didn’t develop any good track record
with probation at all.” The district court found that, on top of absconding to Georgia and
ignoring his requirement to turn himself in to the w orkhouse, Townsel violated the law at
least twice during probation by violating the no- contact order and accruing convictions for
those offenses. The district court noted that Townsel was lucky that another judge of the
district court did not execute his sentences when the judge convicted and sentenced
7
Townsel, placing him on probation for two felony violations of the no- contact order. We
conclude that the record conveys the district court’s finding that it would unduly depreciate
the seriousness of Townsel’s violations of failing to turn himself in, absconding to another
state and failing to keep in contact with his probation officer , to not revoke probation.
As the district court made a “fact-specific record” and “convey[ed] [its] substantive
reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon ,” we conclude the district court made
adequate findings on the third Austin factor. Id. at 608. Moreover, t he district court’s
conclusion is well-supported by the record, and it did not abuse its discretion by revoking
Townsel’s probation.
Affirmed.