State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1605

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Micah Montre Marrison,
Appellant.

Filed October 2, 2023
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Goodhue County District Court
File No. 25-CR-22-117

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Stephen F. O’Keefe, Goodhue County Attorney, Christopher J. Schrader, Assistant County
Attorney, Red Wing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges his conviction of second-degree
manslaughter, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he was coerced into pleading
guilty. Because appellant failed to advance substantiated reasons for withdrawal of his
guilty plea, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2022, appellant Micah Montre Marrison was charged with third-degree
murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.195(b) (2020), and third- degree drug sale, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1(1) (2020), for selling Percocet containing
fentanyl to J.L. that caused her death.
Marrison pleaded guilty to second-degree manslaughter in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.205(1) (2020). Marrison made the standard trial waivers during the plea hearing,
and he acknowledged that he faced a prison sentence and that “the length of that prison
sentence is going to be between 58 months and 81 months, meaning the judge has the
discretion at the time of sentencing to sentence [Marrison] within that range.” Marrison
also confirmed that he had enough time to speak with his lawyer, and that it was his “free
will and desire” to plead guilty.
The district court received a presentence investigation report from the department
of corrections, which recommended an 81-month sentence. The next day, Marrison filed
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming granting it would be fair and just because
3
he was pressured into pleading guilty and received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Marrison’s motion, concluding
Marrison failed to show that withdrawal would be fair and just. In S eptember 2022, the
district court sentenced Marrison to 81 months’ imprisonment. Marrison appeals.
DECISION
A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it. Dikken
v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. 2017). However, withdrawal of a guilty plea is
permitted in two circumstances. First, district courts must allow a defendant to withdraw
a guilty plea, even after sentencing, when “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Second, a district court may allow withdrawal
before sentencing when it is “fair and just” to do so. Id., subd. 2. Although the fair-and-just
standard is “less demanding than the manifest injustice standard, it does not allow a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea for simply any reason.” State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d
643, 646 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).
District courts must give due consideration to two factors in determining whether
withdrawal would be fair and just: “(1) the reasons a defendant advances to support
withdrawal and (2) prejudice granting the motion would cause the State given reliance on
the plea.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 2010) (explaining Minn. R. Crim.
P. 15.05, subd. 2). The burden is on the defendant to provide reasons for withdrawal, and
the burden is on the state to show that withdrawal would cause prejudice. Id. This court
reviews a district court’s decision to deny a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea
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under the fair-and-just standard for an abuse of discretion, reversing only in the “rare case.”
Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989); see also Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97.
Marrison argues it would be fair and just to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea
because counsel coerced him into pleading guilty by “literally begging him to accept the
plea.” According to Marrison, counsel “gathered his materials to storm out in a huff when
[Marrison] resisted the deal,” and counsel “threatened [Marrison] with 140+ months if
[Marrison] didn’t take the deal.”
“A plea of guilty must not be the product of coercion. ” State v. Abdisalan, 661
N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2003). But claims that
a guilty plea resulted from coercion must be supported by the record. See Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 97 (looking to the record for signs of pressure to plead guilty).
As the district court stated, Marrison’s “allegation of undue pressure is difficult to
square with the record.” At the start of Marrison’s plea hearing, the district court clarified:
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Marrison, I’m going to turn my
attention to you right now. Have you had enough time to talk
to Mr. Gavin?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Has he answered all of your questions?
THE DEFENDANT: So far, yes.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions now that you need
to have answered before I put you under oath and ask you some
additional things?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Just one.

THE COURT: Okay. You can ask the question, but I don’ t
want you to go into the facts. So just lean over to your attorney
and ask him what the question is. We ’re off the record while
you do that.
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(Off the record.)

THE COURT: All right. We’re back here on the record. Mr.
Marrison, was the question that you had answered by your
attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you have any other questions that you need
to have answered before we go forward?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So with respect to the now amended
Count 1, which is manslaughter in the second degree as a
felony, in violation of Minnesota Statutes 609.205 (1), how do
you plead to that count, guilty or not guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

Marrison acknowledged (1) that he signed the plea petition after reviewing it with
counsel, (2) that he had enough time to talk to counsel about the plea deal, and (3) that it
was his free will and desire to plead guilty. Nothing in the record suggests that Marrison
was coerced into pleading guilty.
This is not a “rare case” requiring reversal. Kim, 434 N.W.2d at 266. Because
Marrison failed to advance substantiated reasons for withdrawal of his plea under the
fair-and-just standard, the district court acted within its discretion in denying his motion to
withdraw, and we need not address prejudice to the state in granting the motion. Raleigh ,
778 N.W.2d at 97 -98; see also State v. Cubas , 838 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Minn. App. 2013)
(“Even when there is no prejudice to the state, a district court may deny a plea withdrawal
6
under rule 15.05, subdivision 2, if the defendant fails to advance valid reasons why
withdrawal is fair and just.”), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 31, 2013).1
Affirmed.

1 In his pro se brief, Marrison claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because of “counsel’s lack of investigation and hiring of an expert witness.” Marrison’s
claim is not persuasive because appellate courts “generally will not review attacks on
counsel’s trial strategy.” Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004) (“[t]he extent
of counsel’s investigation is considered a part of trial strategy); see also State v. Jones, 392
N.W.2d 224, 236 (Minn. 1986) (rejecting an ineffective-assistance- of-counsel claim that
counsel failed to hire an investigator and interview witnesses).