Toby Earl Johnson,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A22-1609

McLeod County Thissen, J.

Toby Earl Johnson,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: June 28, 2023
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

________________________

Daniel P. Repka, Repka Law, LLC, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Ryan Hansch, McLeod County Attorney, Steven R. Ott, Assistant County Attorney,
Glencoe, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
The district court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to correct his sentence
under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, because the sentence was authorized by law.
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
2
O P I N I O N
THISSEN, Justice.
Appellant Toby Earl Johnson appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion
to correct his sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Johnson argues that the
failure to complete a sentencing worksheet for his first-degree premeditated murder
conviction means that his sentence of life in prison is unlawful. Because Johnson’s life
sentence was mandated by Minn. Stat. § 609.185(1) (2000), we affirm.
FACTS
In September 1999, a grand jury indicted Johnson for (1) first-degree intentional
murder while committing a kidnapping in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(3) (1998),
(2) second-degree intentional murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1)
(2014), and (3) kidnapping in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3) (2022),1 for the
kidnapping and murder of Randy Pool. 2 In April 2000, Johnson pleaded guilty to an
amended count one3 and count two, and the State agreed to dismiss count three.
About a month later, the district court held Johnson’s sentencing hearing. The
sentencing worksheet prepared in advance of the hearing analyzed the sentence for count

1 The different dates in the statutory citations are due to the court’s convention of
citing to the most recent version of the Minnesota Statutes in which the applicable language
in effect at the time of the conduct in question appeared.

2 For a more detailed recitation of the underlying facts of this case, see Johnson v.
State, 641 N.W.2d 912, 913–15 (Minn. 2002).

3 The amended count one changed first-degree intentional murder while committing
a kidnapping to first-degree premeditated murder under an aiding and abetting theory of
liability.
3
two (second-degree intentional murder), but it did not include a recommended sentence for
count one (first-degree premeditated murder). In the sentencing worksheet, the probation
officer calculated the presumptive sentence for second-degree murder under the Sentencing
Guidelines as 306 months. The district court ultimately convicted Johnson of first-degree
premeditated murder, dismissed the second-degree murder count, and sentence d Johnson
to life in prison with the possibility of release after 30 years. Johnson has since filed
multiple challenges to his conviction and sentence, each of which was denied.4
The current case arises from Johnson’s third motion to correct his sentence pursuant
to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Johnson claims that the district court violated his right
to due process by sentencing him to a longer sentence than the 306-month sentence
recommended in the s entencing worksheet completed for the charge of second-degree
murder.
The district court denied Johnson’s motion. The court concluded that “[a]lthough a
Sentencing Worksheet is required to be filed for felony offenses and it was not for Count 1
of this Indictment, failing to do so for the charge of first-degree murder does not cause

4 Johnson, 641 N.W.2d at 916–18 (rejecting a claim that Johnson’s sentence was
illegal for violating separation of powers principles); Johnson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 173,
175–77 (Minn. 2011) (affirming a denial of a motion to correct sentence that challenged
the validity of Johnson’s guilty plea); Johnson v. State , 877 N.W.2d 776, 778–80
(Minn. 2016) (denying a claim that Johnson’s sentence was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). Johnson also filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea in March 2019, alleging that he failed to provide a sufficient factual basis for the
plea. The district court denied this motion. Johnson did not appeal this denial but filed a
motion for reconsideration in December 2019. The district court denied the motion to
reconsider, which Johnson appealed. We dismissed Johnson’s appeal of the motion to
reconsider by order. State v. Johnson, No. A20 -0867, Order at 2–4 (Minn. filed Dec. 16,
2020).
4
Defendant’s sentence to be ‘unauthorized.’ ” The district court further concluded that the
failure to file a worksheet did not violate Johnson’s due process rights.
Johnson appealed.
ANALYSIS
A district court’s decision on a motion to correct an unauthorized sentence is
evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard. Evans v. State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 359
(Minn. 2016). But when the question of whether a district court abused its discretion in
sentencing turns on the legal meaning of a statute or rule, or whether the sentence violates
the constitution, the underlying question of legal meaning or constitutionality is reviewed
de novo. See State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 148 (Minn. 2007); Evans, 880 N.W.2d
at 359.
In this case, Johnson argues that the district court denied him due process of law by
sentencing him without the benefit of a sentencing worksheet in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.115, subd. 2a (2022), and Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.16. We review the denial of
his motion to correct his sentence for an abuse of discretion, but his statutory/rules
interpretation and constitutional claims de novo.
Under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[t]he court may at any time
correct a sentence not authorized by law.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. A sentence
is not authorized by law when it is “contrary to law or applicable statutes.” State v. Schnagl,
5
859 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2015). Importantly, Johnson does not challenge the validity
of his conviction for first-degree murder and limits his argument to the proper sentence. 5
The mandatory sentence for a first-degree murder conviction was and remains life
in prison. Minn. Stat. § 609.185(1). Because the murder did not qualify as a heinous crime
under Minn. Stat. § 609.106, subd. 2 (2000), the minimum sentence for the conviction was
life with the possibility of release after 30 years. Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 4 (2000). This
was the sentence pronounced by the district court in this case. The sentence was therefore
not “contrary to law or applicable statutes.” Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d at 301. In fact, the
sentence is the minimum statutorily mandated sentence for Johnson’s conviction of
first-degree murder. 6 In short, the life sentence imposed on Johnson for his first -degree
murder conviction was not only authorized but required by law.

5 Had Johnson challenged the validity of his conviction for first- degree murder, the
procedural limitations set forth in Minnesota’s post-conviction statute, Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01 (2022), and State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976), would apply.
See State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477, 482 (Minn. 2015) (construing a Rule 27.03 motion to
correct a sentence as a petition for postconviction relief where the defendant’s “challenge
to his sentence implicate[d] more than simply his sentence”).

6 The decisions Johnson relies on to support his argument are factually distinct
because they both involve unjustified departures by the district court. See State v.
Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539–41 (Minn. 2004) (reducing a sentence where the district
court mistakenly imposed a sentence higher than the presumptive sentence); State v.
Amundson, 828 N.W.2d 747, 753–54 (Minn. App. 2013) (correcting a sentence where the
district court imposed consecutive sentences instead of the presumptive concurrent
sentences without offering justification). In contrast, in this case, there is no presumptive
sentence—the sentence for first-degree murder is a mandatory sentence of life in
prison. The district court did not depart. See generally State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681,
697 (Minn. 2006) (“The sentence for first-degree premeditated murder is not determined
using the sentencing guidelines.”).
6
The fact that the sole recommendation in Johnson’s sentencing worksheet was
306 months for second-degree murder does not change this conclusion. It is true that Minn.
Stat. § 609.115, subd. 2a, and Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.16 currently direct that a
sentencing worksheet be prepared for crimes carrying a mandatory life sentence. And it is
undisputed that no sentencing worksheet was prepared for the first -degree murder charge
in this case.
But Minn. Stat. § 609.115, subd. 2a, and Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.16 did not exist
in 2000 when Johnson was sentenced. See Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125, 133
(Minn. 2016) (stating that “for a sentence to be eligible for correction under Rule 27.03,
subdivision 9, the sentence must have been illegal at the time it was imposed”). 7
Section 609.115, subdivision 2a, was added in 2005, years after Johnson’s conviction
became final. Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 14, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1098. And
the definition of “Sentencing Worksheet” upon which Johnson relies was not added to the
Sentencing Guidelines until 2012. Compare Minn. Sent. Guidelines (2012),8 with Minn.
Sent. Guidelines (2000). Consequently, Johnson’s argument that his 2000 sentence is
unauthorized fails because it is based on a statute and guidelines provision that did not exist

7 Our opinion should not be read to suggest that imposition of a mandatory life
sentence for first-degree murder in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a) (2022) is
unlawful if a sentencing worksheet was not prepared on the first-degree murder conviction
before imposition of the sentence. We have no need to reach that issue here.

8 The definition is currently found in Sentencing Guidelines 1.B.16, but was found in
Sentencing Guidelines 1.B.15 in 2012. Minn. Sent Guidelines (2012). See generally
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Guidelines Revision Project: Adopted
Modifications (April 2012) (explaining changes to guidelines including the addition of the
definition of “sentencing worksheet”).
7
until well after his sentence was finalized. In addition, his due process arguments premised
on the failure to comply with those unenacted provisions also fail.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.