State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1627

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Benjamin Edward Meat,
Appellant.

Filed November 6, 2023
Reversed and remanded
Ede, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-20-1091

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Wesley Van Ert, Assistant County Attorney,
Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jess ica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
In this direct appeal following a jury trial, appellant challenges his conviction for
third-degree assault. Appellant requests a new trial, arguing that the district court denied
his constitutional right to present his defense and committed reversible error by
(1) declining to instruct the jury on self-defense and (2) excluding reputation and prior
conduct evidence regarding the alleged victim. Because the district court abused its
discretion by refusing to provide a self- defense instruction when there was evidence to
support it and that error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse and
remand for a new trial.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Benjamin Edward Meat with
third-degree assault, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.223, subdivision 1
(2018), and domestic assault by strangulation, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.2247, subdivision 2 (2018). Defense counsel filed a pretrial notice of self-defense. The
district court received the following relevant evidence at trial.
S.M. testified as follows. Prior to the charged incident, S.M. and Meat had been in
a relationship for three years, and they had two children together. On an evening in April
2020, S.M. and Meat were drinking vodka and waiting for friends to visit their shared
residence when they got into a food fight. The altercation began when S.W. and Meat
started throwing sour cream and chili at each other. Although S.M. initially believed that
they were having fun, she eventually asked Meat to stop and became upset when he did
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not. After S.M.’s request to end the food fight failed, she tried to end it by using a kitchen
sprayer on Meat and throwing food back at him.
S.M. further testified that she felt provoked because Meat would not stop. She threw
a bowl of chili at Meat, after which Meat became agitated and began yelling in S.M.’s face
for her to hit him. Meat threw S.M. to the ground, causing her face to hit the floor and her
nose to bleed. Meat kicked S.M. in the chest and back, and he punched her. S.M. tried to
get Meat off her by grabbing his hair, but he grabbed her bra, lifted it above her chest, and
used it to pin her down to the floor. Meat pressed S.M.’s bra into her neck so that her
breathing and blood flow were constricted, which caused her to feel like she briefly lost
consciousness. Meat ran out the front door and S.M. followed, but when she looked around,
Meat was gone. As a result of Meat’s actions, S.M.’s tooth went through her lip, causing it
to swell; her left eye was swollen shut due to an orbital fracture; and she felt pain in her
neck.
1
Meat provided the following testimony . On the day of the incident, S.M. began
drinking vodka around 11:00 a.m., and had finished a half liter bottle by 3:00 p.m. S.M.
sent Meat to the liquor store to retrieve more alcohol, and Meat believed “everything was
fine” at that point. Meat began drinking alcohol at about 10:00 p.m. Meat and S.M. were
expecting a visit from friends that evening, and S.M. was preparing chili.

1 The parties stipulated to the admission of medical records, which showed that S.M.
“presented with a left orbital fracture.” In addition, the parties stipulated that Meat inflicted
substantial bodily harm upon S.M. The state also offered the testimony of the police
officers who had responded to the incident. One described a chaotic scene that appeared to
include blood on the walls. Another noted that, at the time of his arrest, Meat had injuries
to the knuckles of his left hand, which had blood on it.
4
Meat testified that he was standing near the microwave and S.M. was standing near
the kitchen sink when she hit Meat in the face with sour cream. Meat perceived S.M.’s
actions to be the start of a food fight that was all in fun. He thought that S.M. was happy
because she laughed after she hit him with the sour cream. Meat threw sour cream back at
S.M. and the food fight continued until S.M. stated, “f’n stop it now.” Meat, however, was
already in the process of throwing more sour cream at S.M. at the same time as S.M. told
him to stop. After the sour cream struck S.M. in the face, Meat could tell that S.M. was
angry. Meat took off running as fast as he could, but S.M. came after him and caught him
by his hair.
Meat reported that he was wearing his hair loose (i.e., unbraided), and that S.M.
used her hold on it to throw Meat around. As S.M. was grabbing Meat’s hair, Meat
attempted to reach back and grab her hands to get her to let go. But S.M. refused to release
Meat’s hair, despite Meat’s pleas that she let go of him. S.M. continued to swing Meat
around by his hair, causing his body to be thrown from side to side. Meat feared his neck
would be injured and his hair would be pulled out. He decided to defend himself by
reaching up and striking S.M. with his left fist. Because Meat was bent over toward the
floor when he threw the punch, he could not see.
Meat stated that, after he struck S.M., she released her grasp on him, and he ran out
onto the porch. S.M. ran out after Meat an d told him that she was calling the police. Meat
left the residence and went to his mother’s house. Meat’s mother photographed his hands
and hair, which showed sour cream from the food fight. Meat contacted police dispatch
and reported the incident. Police officers later arrested Meat at his mother’s house.
5
Following Meat’s testimony, the district court declined to charge the jury with
Meat’s requested self-defense instruction. The court based this ruling upon its
determination that Meat was the aggressor in the incident:
The case law is very clear that if a person is an aggressor in an
incident, that is insufficient proof to trigger that instruction to
be given.

I understand [the defense’s] argument . . . , about parsing out
the timeline. But this is all one incident that flowed from one—
from the food fight into the assault that did occur.

I’m also noting—that’s my primary reason, is there is sufficient
evidence that he was an aggressor during the incident. . . .

And so based on that, I am declining to include the self-defense
instruction in this matter.

(Emphasis added.)
During deliberations, the jury asked the district court, “If the defendant acted in self-
defense, is it considered assault?” The court responded by reiterating the following
instruction on the duties of the judge and jury:
It is your duty to decide the questions of fact in this case. It is
my duty to give you the rules of law you must apply in arriving
at your verdict. You must follow and apply the rules of law as
I give them to you, even if you believe the law is or should be
different. Deciding questions of fact is your exclusive
responsibility. In doing so, you must consider all the evidence
you have heard and seen in this trial. You must disregard
anything you may have heard or seen elsewhere about the case.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on Count 1, assault in the third degree, and a
verdict of not guilty on Count 2, domestic assault by strangulation. The district court stayed
6
execution of a 12-month-and-1-day sentence and placed Meat on supervised probation for
three years.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Meat asserts that the district court erred by declining to instruct the jury on self-
defense and that the district court’ s instructional error was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. The state responds that the district court “did not abuse its discretion in
denying the defense’s request for a self-defense” instruction because it was
“uncontroverted” that Meat “provoked S.M. by throwing sour cream at her.” Meat has the
better argument.
“A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if there is evidence
to support it.” State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted);
see also State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 207 (Minn. 2006) (“A party is entitled to a
particular jury instruction if evidence exists at trial to support the instruction.” (quotation
omitted)). “The defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to support a claim
of self-defense.” State v. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 629 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Self-defense consists of four elements: “(1) an absence of aggression or provocation;
(2) an actual and honest belief that . . . bodily harm would result; (3) a reasonable basis
existed for this belief; and (4) an absence of reasonable means to retreat or otherwise avoid
the physical conflict.” State v. Soukup, 656 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn. App. 2003) (citing
State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 1997)) (holding that these same “principles
of self-defense in homicide cases apply to assault cases as well”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr.
7
29, 2003). “The defense is sufficiently raised when a defendant creates a reasonable doubt
as to whether the level of force used was justified.” Id. at 429 (citing State v. Stephani, 369
N.W.2d 540, 546 (Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1985)). Once the defense
has met its burden of producing a sufficient threshold of evidence to support a claim of
self-defense, see id., “the state has the burden of disproving one or more of these elements
beyond a reasonable doubt,” Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 629 (quotation omitted).
“We evaluate a district court’s refusal to give a jury instruction for an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 559 (Minn. 2009). “It is an abuse of the district
court’s discretion to refuse to give an instruction on the defendant’s theory of the case if
there is evidence to support it.” Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 629 (quotation omitted). Even in
cases where determining whether a d efendant has met his burden on an element of self-
defense is “a close call,” the Minnesota Supreme Court has “made clear that[,] in keeping
with the presumption of innocence, trial courts should resolve all doubts as to the
legitimacy of a self-defense claim in favor of the defendant” because “it is the jury’s duty
to determine what evidence is credible[.]” Id. at 631 (quotation omitted); see also State v.
Edwards, 717 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn. 2006) (“In evaluating whether a rational basis
exists in the evidence for a jury instruction, the evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to the party requesting the instruction.”); cf. State v. Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d 588,
596 (Minn. 2005) (emphasizing that “both credibility determinations and the weighing of
evidence are tasks reserved to the jury”).
As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Meat met his burden of production on self-
defense elements two through four. See Soukup, 656 N.W.2d at 428. Meat testified that he
8
was in fear of his neck being injured and his hair being pulled out. The district court
determined that Meat had an actual and honest belief he was in danger of bodily harm and
that a reasonable basis existed for that belief. Meat was not required to show an absence of
reasonable means to retreat or otherwise avoid the physical conflict because the incident
occurred inside the residence that he shared with S.M. “[U]nder the so-called ‘castle
doctrine,’ a person need not retreat from his or her home before acting in self-defense.”
State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Minn. 2014) (footnote omitted).
Overall, Meat sufficiently raised self -defense through his testimony that he struck
S.M. one time to defend himself from the neck injury he feared S.M. would inflict, after
which S.M. released her grasp on Meat and he left the residence. This was sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt as to whether the level of force Meat used was justified, shifting
to the state the burden of disproving one or more of the self-defense elements beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 629; see also Soukup, 656 N.W.2d at 431
(“whether a defendant’s use of force was reasonable is a fact question and, like all factual
disputes, should be decided by the fact-finder”).
The district court, however, denied Meat’s request for a self-defense jury instruction
based on its determination that Meat could not satisfy the first element of self-defense. In
particular, the district ruled that there was “sufficient evidence” that Meat was an aggressor
during the incident. But the trial record is replete with evidence that could support a jury’s
finding to the contrary.
Meat testified that it was S.M. who initiated the food fight by hitting him in the face
with sour cream. Meat also stated that he did not provoke S.M. by continuing to throw sour
9
cream at her after she told him to “f’n stop it now.” Instead, Meat claimed that he was mid-
throw when S.M. simultaneously told him to stop. And Meat said that, after the sour cream
he threw struck S.M. in the face and he could tell that S.M. was angry, he took off running
as fast as he could, but S.M. came after him and caught him by his hair. Based on this
testimony, there was evidence in the record that Meat did not act with aggression or
provocation.
Furthermore, even assuming for purposes of argument that Meat acted with
aggression and provocation by throwing sour cream at S.M. after she asked him to stop,
his testimony that he ran away is evidence that he actually and in good faith withdrew from
the conflict, and that his flight impliedly communicated such withdrawal to S.M.
“Although a defendant who is the first aggressor ordinarily is not entitled to claim self-
defense, the right to self-defense will be revived if the defendant actually and in good faith
withdraws from the conflict and communicates that withdrawal to the victim.” State v.
Radke, 821 N.W.2d 316, 324 n.3 (Minn. 2012) (citing Bellcourt v. State, 390 N.W.2d 269,
272 (Minn. 1986) (holding that “communicat[ing] that withdrawal” may be done
“expressly or impliedly”)).
In other words, Meat presented evidence to support his self-defense theory of the
case and the jury instruction he requested. At the very least, Meat and S.M.’s respective
testimonies indicate that the issue of aggression and provocation was both disputed and
controverted, meaning that resolution fell within the jury’s purview, rather than that of the
district court. Instead of permitting the jury to make credibility determinations and weigh
evidence as to the presence or absence of aggression or provocation, see Dahlin, 695
10
N.W.2d at 596, the district court itself weighed the evidence and made those
determinations. The court did so in ruling that there was “sufficient evidence” that Meat
was an aggressor during the incident, thereby determining that S.M.’s version of events
was more credible than Meat’s testimony.
The disputed and controverted nature of the trial evidence distinguishes the present
matter from the cases advanced by the state. For example, the state relies on Soukup, but
in that case, “[t]he uncontroverted testimony establishe[d] that, as a matter of law, appellant
destroyed whatever self-defense claim he might have had by reacting to Soukup’s assault
with a greater -than-warranted level of force.” 656 N.W.2d at 432 (emphasis added).
Moreover, “[t]he record [did] not indicate any effort by appellant to avoid or retreat from
combat,” the “appellant did not testify, nor did he present other witnesses on his behalf[,]”
and “[t]here simply [was] no evidence suggesting that appellant’ s use of force was
reasonable or justified under the circumstances.” Id. (emphasis added).
2
We therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to
instruct the jury on Meat’s self-defense theory when there was evidence to support it. See
Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 629. Even if the question whether Meat acted with aggression or

2 The state’s citation to other distinguishable cases is likewise unavailing. See, e.g., State
v. Holisky, No. A15-0153, 2016 WL 363411, at *2 (Minn. App. Feb. 1, 2016) (“The district
court appropriately denied Holisky’s request for a self-defense jury instruction because
Holisky failed to present evidence supporting his self-defense claim.” (Emphasis added.));
State v. Vazquez, 644 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Minn. App. 2002) (affirming the district court’s
declination of a self-de fense instruction not on aggression or provocation grounds, but
rather because “[t]he record support[ed] the trial court’s determination that Vazquez did
not have an actual and honest belief that he was in imminent danger once he gained control
over the gun”).
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provocation was a close call, the presumption of innocence required the district court to
resolve all doubts as to the legitimacy of Meat’s self-defense claim in his favor, insofar as
the ultimate duty of determining what evidence is credible belongs to the jury. See id. at
631; see also Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d at 596.
Having determined that the district court abused its discretion in declining to instruct
the jury on self-defense, we now “evaluate [that] erroneous omission . . . under a harmless
error analysis.” State v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Minn. 2004). “If the erroneous
omission of the instruction might have prompted the jury, which is presumed to be
reasonable, to reach a harsher verdict than it might have otherwise reached, defendant must
be awarded a new trial.” Id. (quotation omitted). “If, however, beyond a reasonable doubt
the omission did not have a significant impact on the verdict, reversal is not warranted.”
Id. (quotation omitted); see also State v. Schoenrock, 899 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Minn. 2017)
(“An error in jury instructions requires a new trial if we cannot say beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error had no significant impact on the verdict.” (quotation omitted)).
There is evidence in the record that the district court’s omission of the self-defense
jury instruction affected the jury’s verdict. During deliberations, the jury specifically asked
the district court, “If the defendant acted in self-defense, is it considered assault?”
Moreover, the jury’s split verdict —acquitting Meat on Count 2, domestic assault by
strangulation—suggests that the jury’s credibility analysis of the state’s sole percipient
witness to the charged incident (S.M.) played a critical role in its deliberations. If, in
weighing all the evidence, the jury determined Meat’s use of force was reasonably
necessary to prevent the harm he feared, then it could have also acquitted Meat on Count
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1, assault in the third degree, based on Meat’s theory of self -defense. But because the
district court declined to instruct on self-defense, the jury had no basis upon which it could
have acquitted Meat on the assault charge.
Given this record, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted self-
defense instruction was harmless error and that it did not have a significant impact on the
verdict. Instead, we conclude that the erroneous omission of the instruction might have
prompted the jury to reach a harsher verdict than it might have otherwise reached. As such,
we must award Meat a new trial. See Lee, 683 N.W.2d at 316.
Because we are reversing and remanding for a new trial based on the district court’s
failure to instruct the jury on self-defense, we decline to consider the evidentiary issues
Meat raises in this appeal. On remand, the district court should evaluate the admissibility
of evidence in light of this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.