Charles Matthew Waters, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1632

Charles Matthew Waters, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Anita Marie Waters,
Respondent.

Filed June 26, 2023
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge*

Nicollet County District Court
File No. 52-FA-22-468

Charles Matthew Waters, North Mankato, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Anita Marie Waters, Fridley, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order dismissing his petition for an order
for protection (OFP) against respondent on behalf of himself and the parties’ minor
daughter. Appellant argues that the district court erred: (1) in its interpretation of the

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 (2022); (2) in its determination that
appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing domestic abuse under Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01; and (3) dismissing the petition for an OFP. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Charles Matthew Waters petitioned for an OFP against respondent Anita
Marie Waters, his estranged wife, on behalf of himself a nd the parties’ minor daughter
(daughter) under the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act (the Act),1 Minn. Stat. § 518B.01. In
an affidavit in support of the petition, Charles alleged that daughter was “being terrorized
by her mother, who herself is mentally ill, as part of an ongoing campaign of deliberate
parental alienation, and deprivation of parental rights.” He also alleged that Anita had
violated a harassment restraining order (HRO) that he had against her. Charles submitted
several exhibits in support of his petition, including a video showing Anita retrieving her
car from Charles’s residence while the HRO was in effect.
In the affidavit and supporting documents, Charles listed several instances of
conduct that comprised the alleged parental alienation. Charles alleged that Anita asked
daughter to choose to either live with Anita or Charles and that daughter chose Anita.
Charles also alleged Anita ran so-called “Dad’s coming!” drills, told daughter that Charles
was pretending to be disabled but was not disabled, sought to replace Charles as “co-
parent” with Anita’s ex-husband, and replaced daughter’s grandparents with Anita’s
former mother-in-law. Charles also alleged that his phone had been blocked from

1Because both the appellant and respondent share a last name, we refer to the parties by
their first names throughout this opinion.

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daughter’s prior phone, and he did not have her new phone number. Charles also alleged
Anita has not fostered any visitation or attempts to communicate between daughter and
him, although he acknowledged in a memorandum in support of his petition that daughter
had stated she was happy and did not want to live with her father. Charles asserted that
Anita’s conduct had caused mental health issues for daughter, alleging that daughter was
staying up until early hours of the morning and began treatment for anxiety, depression,
and suicidal ideation four months after leaving to live with Anita.
The district court held a hearing on September 21, 2022. Both parties testified at
the hearing; no other testimony was presented. Charles’s testimony was generally
consistent with the allegations raised in his pe tition. He testified that Anita had alienated
daughter from him, and that Anita violated an HRO when she retrieved a car on his
property. He also asserted that “[Anita] admitted to what amounts to assault in court. It’s
on the transcript. She said she pushed me.”2
Anita testified regarding daughter’s choice to reside with her: “I made the decision
to leave. I broached the subject with [daughter]. I gave her opt-- I said, ‘You can stay if
you want, absolutely, but I need to leave.’ . . . and [daughter] said, ‘I’m coming with you.’”

2 The district court record before us does not contain any transcript in which Anita admits
to pushing Charles. Charles filed an addendum along with his informal brief that contains
a transcript from a different proceeding. This court, however, may not base its decision on
matters outside the record, and we may not consider materials not produced and received
in evidence below. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988); see also Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (defining the record on appeal). We decline to consider the new
materials Charles attached to his informal brief.

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Anita testified regarding daughter’s mental health issues and Charles’s allegations of
parental alienation:
[W]hen [daughter] started talking to me about her anxiety
issues and things like that, I started taking her to therapy first.
I didn’t want to jump to medication right away, and the therapy
has been helping. Her therapist is fantastic, in regular contact
with her . . . .

As far as the accusations of alienation and — and, you
know, manipulating the kids, I have done none of that . . . I
don’t tell [daughter] what to say. All of her thoughts—
everything that she’ s said and done have been of her own
volition.

Anita also testified that “I have never been aggressive. I have never been abusive.” And
that “[Charles] would punch holes in walls . . . he acts physically and violently when
angered.” Regarding the alleged HRO violation, Anita stated that there was an agreement
that she would pick up the car “because it couldn’t be parked on the street because he let
the tabs expire.”
Charles countered that Anita’s testimony was not credible. He asserted:
[Anita] saying that I get angry is simply her excuse to—for her
inability to parent. She goes along with anything I say and
says, ‘Oh, okay, okay, okay,’ and then when she goes behind
my back and does something, she says, ‘Well, but you get
angry, so I didn’t want a confrontation.’

She can’t handle debate. She can’t handle discussion.
She’s too submissive to stand up for anything . . . .

I’ve never once punched a hole in a wall. One time
when I was frustrated with the kids for allowing the dog to eat
the carpet while they were watching TV, I put my hands up and
went ‘D-mn it’ on the wall like this, and one hand went
through. I did not punch it ever. That’s never happened.

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The district court took the matter under advisement and ultimately dismissed
Charles’s petition. The district court reasoned that Charles had failed to provide competent
evidence to prove both the allegations in his petition and his assertions regarding Anita’s
conduct. The district court also rejected Charles’s proposed interpretation of the Act.
Charles appeals.
DECISION
On appeal from the district court’s denial of his petition for an OFP, Charles argues
the district court erred in dismissing his petition for an OFP for three reasons: (1) the district
court applied an incorrect definition of “domestic abuse” when determining whether an
OFP was warranted; (2) the district court determined that the HRO violation did not amount
to domestic abuse; and (3) the district court determined Charles had not met his burden of
proving the occurrence of domestic abuse warranting the issuance of an OFP. Because the
district court properly considered Charles’s petition under the statutory definitions
established in the Act, and because the record supports the district court’s factual
determinations, we affirm.
Appellate courts review a district court’s decision regarding whether to grant an
OFP for an abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn.
2018). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are
unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against
logic and the facts on record.” Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022)
(quotation omitted). Under the Act, a district court may issue an OFP upon a finding of
domestic abuse. Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 498-499; see also Minn. Stat. § 518B.01,

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subds. 4, 6. Domestic abuse for purposes of the Act is defined as any of the following if
committed against a family or household member: (1) “physical harm, bodily injury, or
assault,” (2) “the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault,” or
(3) “terroristic threats” or other specified offenses. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a).
A petitioner under the Act “has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that domestic abuse . . . has occurred in order for a district court to issue an OFP.”
Olson ex rel. A.C.O. v. Olson, 892 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Minn. App. 2017). “The
preponderance of the evidence standard requires that to establish a fact, it must be more
probable that the fact exists than that the contrary exists.” City of Lake Elmo v. Metro.
Council, 685 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2004); see also Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 871
(Minn. App. 2022) (citing City of Lake Elmo in an OFP appeal). “No relief is available,
however, unless a petitioner first shows that domestic abuse has occurred.” Thompson ,
906 N.W.2d at 499 (quotation omitted).
I. The district court applied the correct definition of domestic abuse.
Charles first argues that the district court erred in dismissing his petition for an OFP
because it applied an incorrect definition of domestic abuse. Specifically, he argues that
the district court should have applied a definition from the reporting-of-maltreatment-of-
minors statute, which defines “physical abuse” to include “mental injury.”3 See Minn. Stat.

3 Charles argues, in the alternative, that the definition of domestic abuse in the Act is
unconstitutionally vague. Charles did not follow the procedural requirements of Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 144. Thus, this constitutional challenge is not properly before this court, and
we decline to address it. See Theorin v. Ditec Corp., 377 N.W.2d 437, 440 n. 1 (Minn.
1985) (stating that issue was not properly before this court where relator failed to follow
rule 144).

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§ 260E.03, subd. 18(a) (2022). The district court concluded that the definition of “domestic
abuse” in the Act does not include the definition of “physical abuse” from section 260E.03.
The district court noted that section 518B.01, subdivision 2(a), specifically defines
“domestic abuse” for purposes of the Act. We agree.
“We review de novo the district court’s construction and application of a statute. ”
Braend v. Braend, 721 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Minn. App. 2006). In this case, the legislature
explicitly defined “domestic abuse” in the Act. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a). When
a phrase is “defined in a statute, that definition controls.” State v. Morgan, 968 N.W.2d
25, 30 (Minn. 2021). Charles cites no authority supporting his argument that courts should,
in the context of a petition for an OFP under the Act, apply a definition of “physical abuse”
from a statute relating to reporting the maltreatment of minors. Inadequately briefed
questions are not properly before this court and need not be addressed. See State, Dep’t of
Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining
to reach an issue not adequately briefed); Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co.,
187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) (“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and
not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be
considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection”); Braend, 721
N.W.2d at 929 (applying Schoepke in an OFP appeal); see also Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13
N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944) (stating that “on appeal error is never presumed. It must
be made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal . . . . [T]he burden of showing
error rests upon the one who relies upon it”). Were we to consider the question, we would
conclude the district court did not err when it considered Charles’s petition under the

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definition of domestic abuse in the Act and declined to ap ply the definition of “physical
abuse” from section 260E.03.
II. The district court did not err when it determined that the alleged OFP violation
was not domestic abuse.

Charles next argues that the district court erred when it determined that Anita’s
alleged violation of an HRO did not amount to domestic abuse. Charles asserts Anita
violated an HRO when she retrieved a car from his property and that a violation of an HRO
is a “[q]ualified domestic violence-related offense” as defined in the Act. See Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 2(c). He argues that a qualified domestic violence-related offense is
sufficient to establish domestic abuse. We are not persuaded that the district court
misapplied the law.
Charles again appears to challenge the district court’s application of the Act, which
we review de novo. Braend, 721 N.W.2d at 927. When interpreting statutes, “all
provisions in the statute must be read and interpreted as [a] whole.” State v. Pakhnyuk,
926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019). There is a “statutory presumption that the legislature
intends an entire statute to be effective and certain” and “[t]he legislature would not . . .
employ[] different terms in different subdivisions of the statute if it had intended those
subdivisions to have the same effect.” Vlahos v. R&I Const. of Bloomington, Inc. , 676
N.W.2d 672, 677 n.4 (Minn. 2004).
A party seeking an OFP can establish the occurrence of domestic abuse by
demonstrating that the facts fit any one of the three statutory definitions of domestic abuse
established in subdivision 2(a). Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 498-99; see also Minn. Stat.

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§ 518B.01, subd. 2(a). None of those definitions, however, specifically reference a
qualified domestic violence-related offense. That term is defined separately in subdivision
2(c) of the Act. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(c) (incorporating definition from Minn.
Stat. § 609.02, subd. 16 (2022)). The term “qualified domestic violence-related offense,”
is only referenced in, and therefore relevant to, subdivision 14 of the Act. Subdivision 14
of the Act establishes aggravating criminal penalties for OFP violations based on OFP
violations. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(c)-(d) (establishing aggravated penalties
in cases involving previous qualified domestic violence-related offenses).
Reading the statute as a whole and giving effect to all the language therein, Charles’s
argument that a qualified domestic violence -related offense automatically amounts to
domestic abuse is without merit. The language and structure of the Act show the legislature
intended a “[q]ualified domestic violence-related offense” under subdivision 2(c) to be
distinct from a finding of “domestic abuse” under subdivision 2(a). We presume the
legislature, by giving these terms separate definitions under separate subsections, intended
for them to have different meanings. Vlahos, 676 N.W.2d at 677 n.4. Further, Charles
cites no authority to support his argument that the occurrence of a qualified domestic
violence-related offense automatically falls under one of the three statutory definitions of
domestic abuse established in subdivision 2(a) of the Act, and therefore we need not
address it. See Wintz, 558 N.W.2d at 480; Schoepke, 187 N.W.2d at 135; Braend, 721
N.W.2d at 929; see also Waters, 13 N.W.2d at 464-65.
Further, to the extent Charles argues that Anita’s specific actions in retrieving a car
from Charles’ home amounted to domestic abuse, we disagree. We note that the occurrence

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of a qualified domestic violence-related offense may, in some cases, also establish the
occurrence of domestic abuse warranting the issuance of an OFP —but only to the extent
that offense also establishes “physical harm, bodily injury, or assault,” or one of the other
statutory definitions established in subdivision 2(a) of the Act. In this case, Charles
testified that Anita retrieving the vehicle violated an HRO, but he did not testify that this
caused him any harm. He also submitted a video that merely shows Anita entering a
vehicle and leaving in that vehicle. The district court found that the video Charles
submitted did not provide any evidence that Anita committed domestic abuse against
Charles or daughter. We discern no clear error in the district court’s findings. This court
has construed domestic abuse to require “either a showing of present harm or an intention
on the part of [the] appellant to do present harm.” Andrasko v. Andrasko, 443 N.W.2d 228,
229-30 (Minn. App. 1989). Because the record does not contain any allegations of harm
or evidence of conduct which falls under the definition of domestic abuse in the Act, the
district court did not err when it determined that the alleged HRO violation was not
domestic abuse.
III. The district court did not clearly err when it determined that Charles failed to
prove that domestic abuse occurred.

Finally, Charles argues the district court erred in its finding that the evidence
Charles submitted to the court did not establish that Anita committed domestic abuse
against either Charles or daughter. The district court found that “[Charles] failed to prove
the allegations of his petition. He made numerous assertions about [Anita’s] conduct
without competent evidence of that conduct . . . . He also did not establish that [Anita] has

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committed domestic abuse against him.” Because the record does not support the
conclusion that the district court clearly erred in its findings, and because this court defers
to the district court’s credibility determinations, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it dismissed Charles’s petition for an OFP.
When reviewing a district court’s decision to grant or deny an OFP, “[a]n appellate
court will neither reconcile conflicting evidence nor decide issues of witness credibility.”
Aljubailah v. James, 903 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted). Rather,
appellate courts “review the record in the light most favorable to the district court’ s
findings” and “reverse those findings only if we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99
(Minn. App. 2009) (quotations omitted). And where the district court’s findings implicitly
indicate that the district court found a party’s testimony credible, this court will defer to
that credibility determination. Id.
In this case, the district court heard conflicting testimony from Charles and Anita.
Charles alleged that daughter is suffering emotional harm caused by parental alienation
perpetrated by Anita. Based on our careful review of the record, we are satisfied that the
district court did not clearly err in its finding that the evidence failed to establish Charles’s
claims. While Charles argues the court should order daughter be evaluated by an expert
on parental alienation, the burden is on the party seeking the OFP to prove their claims.
Olson, 892 N.W.2d at 840. Moreover, the allegations Charles brought forward— even if
supported by the evidence—do not support the conclusion that there was domestic abuse.
There is no evidence of actual—or the infliction of fear of—physical harm, bodily injury,

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or assault arising out of any of Charles’s allegations. Charles’s allegations may well
suggest a tumultuous relationship, but they do not constitute domestic abuse under the Act.
Charles also argues the district court erred in determining he did not meet his burden
of demonstrating the occurrence of domestic abuse based on his testimony that “[Anita]
admitted to what amounts to assault in court. It’s on the transcript. She said she pushed
me.” The record before us, however, contains no other evidence that Anita admitted to
pushing Charles. The district court determined Charles did not establish that Anita has
committed domestic abuse against him. Implicit in this determination is that the district
court discredited Charles’s testimony and credited Anita’s testimony—that she has never
been abusive towards Charles. We defer to that credibility determination. Pechovnik, 765
N.W.2d at 99. No other evidence in the record supports Charles’s allegations of physical
abuse. Therefore, on this record, the district court’s finding that Charles failed to establish
that Anita has committed domestic abuse is not clearly erroneous.
In light of the record before us, and the clear statutory language of the Act , we
discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s dismissal of Charles’s petition for an
OFP.
Affirmed.