State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1659

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Micheal Anthony Sparks,
Appellant.

Filed July 31, 2023
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-21-691

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Jeffrey D. Albright, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant Michael Anthony Sparks challenges his conviction for ineligible person
in possession of ammunition, arguing that (1) the district court erred by denying his motion
to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his apartment , (2) the evidence of
constructive possession of the ammunition was insufficient, and (3) a delay violated his
speedy-trial rights. We affirm.
DECISION
I. Search of Apartment

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see State v. Buswell, 460
N.W.2d 614, 617 (Minn. 1990). Generally, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
private actors. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 617. However, government involvement may
transform a private search into a governmental search subject to the constraints of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. Courts consider “(1) whether the government knew of and
acquiesced in the search and (2) whether the search was conducted to assist law
enforcement efforts or to further the private party’s own ends.” Id. at 618. When reviewing
a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo. See State v.
Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
Sparks’s landlord conducted a routine inspection of his apartment and, when he saw
ammunition on the entertainment center, he called law enforcement, who executed a search
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warrant, and found the ammunition. The state charged Sparks with ineligible person in
possession of ammunition. See Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020) (providing, in
relevant part, that a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence shall not possess
ammunition). Sparks moved to suppress the ammunition evidence seized in the warranted
search of his apartment on the grounds that the warrant was supported by information
obtained in the illegal search by his landlord and moved to dismiss the state’s case for lack
of probable cause. The district court denied both motions, determining that the landlord’s
search of the apartment was a private search and thus not subject to Fourth Amendment
protection. Sparks argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress his
landlord’s warrantless search of his home. He argues that the search was subject to Fourth
Amendment protection because it was “a joint endeavor conducted for the dual purposes
of assisting law enforcement and investigating concerns about the lease.”
Here, we agree with the district court’s determination that the landlord’s search of
Sparks’s apartment was a routine, private inspection. The testimony at the contested
omnibus hearing establishes that law enforcement communicated with the landlord about
Sparks prior to their inspection of Sparks’s apartment and that the landlord told law
enforcement that he intended to inspect Spark’s apartment. But beyond this limited contact
between the landlord and law enforcement, there is no evidence in the record that law
enforcement did or said anything else, actively or passively, to acquiesce to the search or
knew that any contraband was located in the apartment. See Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 619.
As the state explains, law enforcement did not tell or ask the landlord to perform the
inspection and they played no part in the landlord’s inspection of Sparks’s apartment. Such
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antecedent contact between law enforcement and the landlord is inadequate to trigger the
application of the exclusionary remedy under the Fourth Amendment. See id.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellate courts conduct a heightened two-step analysis when evaluating the
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn.
2013). First, we identify the circumstances proved. Id. In doing so, we “consider only those
circumstances that are consistent with the verdict,” meaning we assume the jury believed
the state's witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses. Id. at 599.
Second, we review the circumstantial evidence as a whole and “determine whether
the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id . (quotations omitted). In doing so, we do not defer to
the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences. Id.
Sparks was convicted of possessing ammunition as an ineligible person. See Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). Because the ammunition was found in Sparks’s apartment, the
state argued that he constructively possessed it. Constructive possession applies when the
state “cannot prove actual or physical possession . . . but where the inference is strong that
the defendant at one time physically possessed the [contraband]” and “continued to
exercise dominion and control over [the contraband].” State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609,
610 (Minn. 1975).
The circumstances proved are as follows. Sparks left his apartment one hour before
the landlord’s inspection. The landlord found the ammunition in plain view on Sparks’s
entertainment center in Sparks’s living room in a decorative arrangement surrounded by
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Sparks’s personal property. And other ammunition of the same type and color were found
in Sparks’s closet next to the entertainment center.
Sparks argues that the state failed to prove that he was exercising dominion and
control over the ammunition because multiple people had accessed the apartment prior to
the search. Thus, Sparks contends the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Sparks was the person who possessed the ammunition. However, when viewing the
evidence as a whole and in light of the substantial evidence tying Sparks directly to the
ammunition, the inference that someone else arranged the ammunition alongside Sparks ’s
personal possessions only because other people had access to Sparks’s apartment is not
reasonable. See State v. Andersen, 784 N.W2d 320, 330 (Minn. 2010) (explaining that
appellate courts “will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the
basis of mere conjecture”). Because the sole reasonable inference is that Sparks
constructively possessed the ammunition, the circumstances proved do not offer a rational
hypothesis other than guilt.
III. Speedy Trial

Sparks argues that the 370-day delay between his demand for speedy trial and when
trial began violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy
trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Because the right to a speedy trial is a constitutional right,
this court reviews whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial de novo. State v.
Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2017).
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To determine whether a violation of a speedy-trial right occurred, Minnesota courts
analyze four nonexclusive factors established by the United States Supreme Court in
Barker v. Wingo: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant
asserted his or her speedy-trial right; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.
407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972). “None of the Barker factors is either a necessary or sufficient
condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of a speedy trial . . . they are related
factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.”
Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 628 (quotation omitted). Analyzing the Barker factors therefore
involves a “difficult and sensitive balancing process in which the conduct of both the [s]tate
and the defendant are weighed.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
A. Length of Delay

“The delay is calculated from the point at which the Sixth Amendment right
attaches, which is when a formal indictment is issued or when the person is arrested and
held to answer a criminal charge. State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Minn. 1986). Here,
because Sparks was charged on August 30, 2021, and trial took place on September 13,
2022, the delay was approximately 379 days, which triggers review of the remaining three
factors. See id. (explaining that “delay of seven months is long enough to trigger the
consideration of the other Barker factors).
B. Cause of Delay

A “deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be
weighted heavily against the government,” but a “more neutral reason such as negligence
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should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate
responsibility . . . must rest with the government.” Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 628.
This factor weighs against Sparks. First, Sparks requested continuances and agreed
to process other pending charges against him prior to this one, prioritizing other interests
over speed. The state did not request any continuances. Second, there is no record support
of Sparks’s assertion that the delay was caused by overcrowding. Third and finally, there
is no evidence or argument that the state attempted to hamper Sparks’s defense with the
delay.
C. Assertion of the Right

This court considers not only whether a defendant demanded a speedy trial but also
the “frequency and force” of the demand. State v. Paige, 977 N.W.2d 829, 840 (Minn.
2022). “[T]he frequency and force of a demand must be considered when weighing this
factor [because] the strength of the demand is likely to reflect the seriousness and extent of
the prejudice which has resulted.” State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn. 1989).
Sparks argues that he demanded a speedy trial at an omnibus hearing. However, as
the state argues, the transcript clearly shows that Sparks was requesting a speedy omnibus
proceeding. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.01(a) (stating that omnibus hearings must be held
within 28 days of a combined Rule 5 and Rule 8 hearing). Moreover, the demand was
infrequently voiced, even when speedy trial demands for other cases involving Sparks were
being discussed, and, on January 14, 2022, defense counsel specifically said, “there is not
a demand.” Thus, this factor weighs against Sparks.

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D. Prejudice

This court considers three interests when determining whether a defendant suffered
prejudice: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be
impaired.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 20 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). The third
interest, preventing impairment of the defense, is the “most serious.” Id.
We conclude that there is no evidence of prejudice to appellant from the delay at
issue. Here, the first two interests are not implicated because Sparks was already in custody.
See id. Because Sparks does not make any argument as to why the delay prevented him
from presenting his defense—the third Taylor factor—it appears that this factor does not
favor Sparks. Id.
E. Balancing

Sparks has demonstrated a basic element of a speedy-trial violation —that his trial
was delayed. However, other factors balance against th at consideration. Sparks sought
continuances, prioritizing other considerations over speed, which caused delays. Most
crucially, he suffered no impairment to his defense because of the delay. Thus, this delay
does not implicate the values that the speedy trial right protects.
Affirmed.