Evan Siljander, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1664

Evan Siljander,
Relator,

vs.

Teri Lachermeier,
Respondent,

Sean Deringer,
Respondent,

Kimi Paumen,
Respondent.

Filed July 24, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Office of Administrative Hearings
File No. OAH 8-0325-38770

Evan Siljander, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Teri Lachermeier, Buffalo, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Sean Deringer, Maple Lake, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Kimi Paumen, Buffalo, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge.
Shortly before the November 2022 election, relator Evan Siljander filed a complaint
against respondents Teri Lachermeier, the mayor of Buffalo, and two others, alleging that
their campaign materials and fundraising practices violated the Fair Campaign Practices
Act (the Act). Minn. Stat. §§ 211B.01-.37 (2022). An administrative law judge dismissed
the complaint without a hearing, concluding that the complaint failed to set forth a
prima facie case for violations of the Act. See Minn. Stat. § 211B.33. Because we conclude
that Siljander’s complaint does not set forth a prima facie violation of the portions of the
Act governing bribery, treating, and solicitation, we affirm in part.
See Minn. Stat. § 211B.13. But because we conclude that Siljander’s complaint sets forth
a prima facie case that Lachermeier’s Twitter profile page, Facebook profile page, and
certain social-media posts may violate the Act’s provisions governing required disclaimers,
we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings. See Minn. Stat. § 211B.04.
FACTS
On October 23, 2022, Siljander filed a complaint with the Minnesota Office of
Administrative Hearings alleging that respondents Teri Lachermeier, Sean Deringer, and
Kimi Paumen violated the Act during Lachermeier’s mayoral campaign.
See generally Minn. Stat. § 211B. At the time of the complaint, Lachermeier was the
incumbent mayor of Buffalo campaigning for re-election. Paumen was a member of
Lachermeier’s campaign committee. Deringer was the incumbent Wright County Sheriff.
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Siljander’s complaint alleges, first, that Lachermeier, Deringer, and Paumen
violated the Act by providing vo ters with alcoholic beverages at two campaign events— a
joint campaign fundraiser with Deringer held at Lachermeier’s home and a fundraiser at a
local pub. Siljander attached to the complaint copies of the public Facebook invitation1 for
the event at Lachermeier’s home and a Facebook post about the event at the local pub.
Second, the complaint alleges that respondents violated the Act by failing to include the
required disclaimers on various campaign materials. Disclaimers explain who prepared
and paid for the campaign material. See Minn. Stat. § 211B.04. According to the
complaint, Lachermeier’s Twitter profile page, Facebook profile page, campaign website,
fundraising website, and social-media posts lacked the required disclaimers. Attached to
the complaint were screenshots of:
• Lachermeier’s Twitter profile page, which contained a link
to Lachermeier’s campaign website, terilachermeier.com;

• Lachermeier’s Facebook profile page, which included a
link to TeriLachermeier.com;

• the homepage of Lachermeier’s campaign website,
terilachermeier.com, which included the disclaimer “Paid
and Prepared for by Teri Lachermeier for Mayor”;

• donation pages from Lachermeier’s fundraising websites,
which include the disclaimers “Paid for by Teri
Lachermeier for Mayor” and “Prepared and paid for by Teri
Lachermeier for Mayor”; and

• various social-media posts from Lachermeier’s Twitter and
Facebook accounts, only some of which contained a
disclaimer on the post itself.

1 The Facebook invitation for the event at Lachermeier’s home invited the public to “Come
join me and Sheriff Sean Deringer for appetizers, beer, and wine.”
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An administrative law judge dismissed the complaint without a hearing, concluding
that it failed to provide sufficient facts and details to set forth a prima facie case for
violations of the Act.
Siljander appeals.
DECISION
The fundamental issue before us is whether t he administrative law judge erred by
determining that Siljander failed to allege prima facie violations of the Act by respondents.
To address this issue, we begin with an overview of the complaint process under the Act
before proceeding to Siljander’s allegations.
The Act regulates campaign practices and financing. Prior to 2004, county attorney
offices were tasked with investigating all alleged violations of the Act.
Minn. Stat. § 211B.32 (2003); see also Hon. Raymond Krause, Minnesota’s
OAH: 30 Years of Innovation in Administrative Review, Bench & Bar of Minn., Feb. 2006,
at 20. Because this process used significant time and resources, the legislature amended
the Act to provide th at complaints alleging a violation of the Act must be filed with the
Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings. Minn. Stat. § 211B.32, subd. 1;
Krause, supra, at 20. This new system allowed complaints to be addressed more
expediently before the elections took place. Krause, supra, at 20.
Each complaint filed with the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings “must
be in writing, submitted under oath, and detail the factual basis for the claim that a violation
of law has occurred.” Minn. Stat. § 211B.32, subd. 3. To ensure complaints are promptly
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considered during elections, once a complaint is filed, the administrative law judge
assigned to review the complaint must make a preliminary determination for its disposition
within three business days. Minn. Stat. § 211B.33, subd. 1. “If the administrative law
judge determines that the complaint does not set forth a prima facie violation” of the Act,
they must dismiss the complaint. Minn. Stat. § 211B.33, subd. 2(a). In order to set forth
a prima facie case, the complaint must include evidence or allege facts that, if accepted as
true, would be sufficient to prove that a violation of the Act has occurred.
Barry v. St. Anthony-New Brighton Indep. Sch. Dist. 282, 781 N.W.2d 898, 902
(Minn. App. 2010). If the administrative law judge determines that the complaint sets forth
a prima facie case, the matter proceeds to a probable-cause hearing.
Minn. Stat. § 211B.33, subd. 2(b).
At the probable- cause hearing, if the administrative law judge determines that the
complaint is frivolous or that there is no probable cause to believe that a violation of the
Act occurred, they must dismiss the complaint. Minn. Stat. § 211B.34, subd. 2(a). If there
is probable cause, the chief administrative law judge must schedule the complaint for an
evidentiary hearing before a panel of three administrative law judges .
Minn. Stat. § 211B.34, subd. 2(b); Minn. Stat. § 211B .35, subd. 1. At the evidentiary
hearing, the panel must determine whether the alleged violation occurred, and then it must
dismiss the complaint, issue a reprimand, find that a statement made in campaign material
was false, impose a civil penalty, or refer the complaint to a county attorney.
Minn. Stat. § 211B.35, subd. 2.
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Here, the process ended with the administrative law judge’s determination that the
complaint failed to set forth a prima facie case. Our review of that decision is governed by
Minnesota Statutes section 14.69 (2022), which provides that we may affirm the agency’s
decision or remand for further proceedings. See Minn. Stat. § 211B.36, subd. 5. We may
also modify the decision “if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been
prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are” in
violation of constitutional provisions, in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of
the agency, made upon unlawful procedure, affected by other error of law, unsupported by
substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted, or arbitrary or capricious.
Minn. Stat. § 14.69. This standard of review places this case in a similar posture as a
motion to dismiss under rule 12 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Abrahamson v. St. Louis Cnty. Sch. Dist., 819 N.W.2d 12 9, 133 (Minn. 2012).
Accordingly, we “consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as
true and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of” the complainant.
Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 2003).
Siljander argues that the administrative law judge erred by determining that his
complaint failed to set forth prima facie violations by respondents of (1) the provisions of
the Act governing required disclaimers on campaign materials and (2) the provisions of the
Act governing bribery, treating, and solicitation. We address each argument in turn.
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I. The administrative law judge appropriately dismissed the allegations
regarding Lachermeier’s fundraising and campaign websites but erred by
determining that the complaint failed to set forth a prima facie case regarding
a lack of disclaimers on all Lachermeier’s social-media accounts and posts.

Siljander argues that Lachermeier’s fundraising website, campaign website,
Facebook profile page, Twitter profile page, and a myriad of individual Facebook and
Twitter posts do not contain the required disclaimers under the Act.
To address this issue, we turn to the Act. The Act generally requires disclaimers on
campaign materials. Minn. Stat. § 211B.04, subd. 1. The Act defines campaign materials
to include “any literature, publication, or material that is disseminated for the purpose of
influencing voting at a primary or other election, except for news items or editorial
comments by the news media.” Id. Disclaimers must include the name and address of the
person or committee disseminating the campaign materials. Minn. Stat. § 211B.04,
subd. 1(a). There is no dispute before us that neither the exhibits attached to Siljander’s
complaint constitute campaign materials nor about the adequacy of the wording of the
disclaimers shown on those exhibits. But Siljander argues that some of the exhibits lack
required disclaimers.
Not all campaign materials require disclaimers. Disclaimers are not required on
“online banner ads and similar electronic communications that link directly to an online
page that includes the disclaimer.” Minn. Stat. § 211B.04, subd. 3(c)(3). In addition, the
disclaimer requirements “are satisfied for an entire website or social media page when the
disclaimer . . . appears once on the home page of the site.” Minn. Stat. § 211B.04, subd. 4.
With these disclaimer exceptions in mind, we examine the exhibits reflecting
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Lachermeier’s fundraising website, campaign website, Facebook profile page, Twitter
profile page, and social-media posts from her Twitter and Facebook accounts.
Regarding Lachermeier’s fundraising and campaign websites, as the
administrative law judge properly determined, the copies of these websites, attached to
Siljander’s complaint, show the required disclaimers on the websites—that they were
prepared and paid for by Teri Lachermeier.
Turning to Lachermeier’s Facebook and Twitter page , because these are
social-media websites, the disclaimer requirement would be satisfied by having the
disclaimer “once on the home page of the site.” Id. However, the copies of Lachermeier’s
Facebook profile page and Twitter profile page attached to Siljander’s complaint do not
contain such disclaimers. Instead, they appear to contain a link to Lachermeier’s campaign
website, which has the disclaimer. At this preliminary stage, this factual allegation raises
the question of whether a link to an online page containing the disclaimer satisfies the
statutory exception for when a disclaimer appears on the homepage of the social-media
site. Id. As a result, Siljander’s complaint sets forth a prima facie case for a violation with
regard to Lachermeier’s Facebook profile page and Twitter profile page.
Below, the administrative law judge did not explicitly address whether
Lachermeier’s fundraising website and Twitter profile page constituted social-media pages
for which—under the Act—the disclaimer requirement is met by having the disclaimer on
a home page, as opposed to every individual post. Id. Instead, the administrative law judge
concluded that the posts met the disclaimer exception because they were “online banner
ads and similar electronic communications.” Minn. Stat. § 211B.04, subd. 3(c)(3)
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(emphasis added). This was error. Online ban ner ads and similar electronic
communications satisfy the disclaimer requirement by containing a direct link to an online
page that contains the disclaimer. Id. We observe no direct links to an online page on the
individual social-media posts attached to the complaint. Accordingly, these posts should
be analyzed under the portion of the Act that governs social-media pages.
See Minn. Stat. § 211B.04, subd. 4.
Finally, we turn to the copies of the social-media posts from Lachermeier’s
Facebook and Twitter accounts, some of which do not include disclaimers. We disagree
with Siljander’s contention that the Act requires that each individual social-media post
must contain a disclaimer. Rather, the Act provides that the disclaimer requirements for
“an entire website or social media page” are satisfied when the disclaimer “appears once
on the home page of the site.” Id. But as explained above, the home page of the
social-media page needs the disclaimer. And the copies of these pages attached to the
complaint do not include them. Therefore, because the complaint sets forth a prima facie
violation of the disclaimer requirement for Lachermeier’s Facebook profile page and
Twitter profile page, that violation implicates certain posts from those accounts as well.2

2 Siljander further argues that the term “home page” from the Act is unclear and
unconstitutional. We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo.
ILHC of agan, LLC v. County of Dakota, 693 N.W.2d 412, 421 (Minn. 2005). But “the
use of general language in a statute does not make it vague.”
Hard Times Cafe, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 625 N.W.2d 165, 171-72
(Minn. App. 2001). A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute for vagueness
“must show the [ordinance] lacks specificity as to [its] own behavior rather than some
hypothetical situation.” Id. at 172 (quotation omitted). Siljander fails to do so here. We
further observe that if the statute were unconstitutional, it would not be enforced against
respondents.
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Our decision here does not mean that a violation of the Act occurred. And we
acknowledge that sorting through the 66 pages of materials attached to the complaint within
the three-day period allocated by the Act to the administrative law judge presented a
significant challenge. But that does not change our standard of review. See Abrahamson,
819 N.W.2d at 133 (explaining that the posture of a campaign-finance case is similar to a
motion to dismiss under rule 12). Accordingly, we conclude that Siljander’s complaint has
alleged sufficient facts and details at this preliminary stage to set forth a prima facie case
for violation of the Act with regard to Lachermeier’s Facebook profile page,
Twitter profile page, and certain posts from those accounts that do not contain the
disclaimer. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a hearing concerning whether there is
probable cause to believe that pages and posts from those accounts violate the disclaimer
requirements.
II. The administrative law judge appropriately determined that the complaint did
not set forth a prima facie violation of the Act governing bribery, treating, and
solicitation.

Siljander further contends that the administrative law judge erred by concluding that
his complaint failed to set forth a prima facie violation of the Act when it alleged that
respondents served alcohol at two campaign events in exchange for votes. According to
Siljander, this conduct violated the portion of the Act prohibiting bribery, treating, and
solicitation, which prevents candidates from giving or promising money or other valuable
things in exchange for votes. Minn. Stat. § 211B.13, subd. 1.
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This portion of the Act provides:
A person who willfully, directly or indirectly, advances, pays,
gives, promises, or lends any money, food, liquor, clothing,
entertainment, or other thing of monetary value, or who offers,
promises, or endeavors to obtain any money, position,
appointment, employment, or other valuable c onsideration, to
or for a person, in order to induce a voter to refrain from voting,
or to vote in a particular way, at an election, is guilty of a
felony. . . . Refreshments of food or nonalcoholic beverages
having a value up to $5 consumed on the premises at a private
gathering or public meeting are not prohibited under this
section.

Id. Siljander argues that the administrative law judge erred by determining that
respondents did not violate the final sentence of this section —“Refreshments of food or
nonalcoholic beverages having a value up to $5 consumed on the premises at a private
gathering or public meeting are not prohibited under this section.” Id. Siljander appears
to assert that this sentence creates a per se rule that disallows candidates from providing
voters alcoholic drinks at fundraisers. We disagree.
Rather than reading a sentence in isolation to create a per se rule against
candidates providing alcohol to voters, we construe the statute as a whole.
Schmidt ex rel. P.M.S. v. Coons, 818 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Minn. 2012). We examine this
sentence relied on by Siljander in light of its context within a statute that specifically
concerns bribery, treating, and solicitation. We read this final sentence, which follows a
section of the statute that prohibits candidates from inducing voters, as a safe harbor. A
candidate has not committed bribery, treating, or solicitation by offering food or alcoholic
beverages valued at less than five dollars. Minn. Stat. § 211B.13, subd. 1. It would be
contrary to this context to interpret this sentence as a per se rule against candidates
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providing voters alcohol absent any other evidence of bribery, treating, or solicitation.
Moreover, as the administrative law judge highlighted, reading this sentence to impose
such a per se rule would be legally inconsistent with another law that expressly permits the
provision of food and beverages in this context. See Minn. Stat. § 10A.01,
subd. 26(a)(5) (2022) (stating that proper noncampaign disbursements include payments
for food and beverages); see also Avis Budget Car Rental LLC v. County of Hennepin,
937 N.W.2d 446, 452 (Minn. 2020) (stating that courts do not read statutes in isolation).
In sum, we discern no error in the administrative law judge’s determination that the
complaint did not set forth a prima facie violation where it merely alleged that Lachermeier,
Deringer, and Paumen provided food and beverages at campaign events.
Because Siljander’s complaint sets forth a prima facie case that Lachermeier’s
Twitter profile page, Facebook profile page, and certain social-media posts violate d the
Act, we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings. Because Siljander’s complaint
does not set forth a prima facie violation of the portions of the Act governing bribery,
treating, and solicitation, we affirm in part.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.