State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1667

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Laurssia Keyair Likness,
Appellant.

Filed June 5, 2023
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-CR-16-214

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey R. Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Nicholas J. Colombo, Assistant County
Attorney, Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Reilly , Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s restitution order, arguing that the state
failed to carry its burden to prove the amount of restitution by a preponderance of the
evidence. We affirm.
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FACTS
In 2012, appellant Laurss ia Keyair Likness applied for cash and food assistance
from the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP), food assistance from the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Medical Assistance (MA)
benefits. When she submitted her combined application to these programs, Likness
indicated she received social security income. Likness also noted she did not have income
from any other sources, or any vehicles, bank accounts, or cash. Her application was
approved, and she received public assistance from the progr ams from August 2012 to
February 2015.
At the time , as part of each program’s ongoing disclosure requirement, Likness
verified her continuing eligibility for the programs through various written forms and in -
person interviews with eligibility workers from Isanti County Family Services (the county).
Likness represented o n all forms that she did not have income from any other sources, or
any bank accounts, vehicles, or cash. And Likness orally confirmed the accuracy of her
answers on the forms when she met with eligibility workers in -person.
In February 2014, the county discovered Likness had two Guaranty Bank accounts,
vehicles, and cash income. After an investigation, the county determined that Likness
failed to report income and assets that rendered her ineligible to receive public assistance
from all three programs. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Likness with wrongfully
obtaining public assistance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 256.98, subd. 1(1) (2014).
The district court held a bifurcated jury trial. The jury would first consider whether
Likness was guilty and then—if they found her guilty—would consider whether her
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defense of cognitive impairment would relieve her of criminal responsibility . During the
guilt phase of the trial, the jury heard testimony from the county’s fraud investigator and
Likness. The investigator testified she met with Likness as her eligibility worker many
times before the investigation. The investigator stated she reviewed sta tements from
Likness’s unreported bank accounts, which showed that Likness regularly made substantial
unreported cash deposits. The investigator explained she added up the cash deposits
Likness made each month to determine whether Likness exceeded the $5, 000 asset limit to
qualify for MFIP assistance. The investigator also determined Likness exceeded the
relevant income or asset limits for all three programs for some months between August
2012 and February 2015. She created a detailed report showing which months Likness was
ineligible for each particular program and calculated the corresponding monthly
overpayments. Ultimately, she determined Likness received a total overpayment of
$37,516.92.
Likness testified that she and some of her children received social security income.
Likness explained that she would convert her social security checks into cash at another
bank, use the cash to pay for her needs, and deposit the remaining cash into her Guaranty
Bank accounts. Likness testified the cash deposits flagged by the investigator were
“leftover” social security funds and denied lying about her assets to receive more money
from public assistance. The jury found Likness guilty of the offense.
In the second phase of the trial, Likness presented evidence of her learning
disabilities and difficulty understanding the public assistance forms. The state presented
evidence from a psychologist who opined, based on multiple evaluations, that Likness
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portrayed herself as being severely impaired but did not suffer from cognitive impairment
at the time of the offense. The jury rejected Likness’s cognitive -impairment defense .
The district court stayed the imposition of Likness’s sentence and placed her on
probation for ten years, ordering her to pay $35,288.92 in restitution in $50 monthly
installments. The total amount ordered in restitution reflected the county’s losses from
each program as calculated by the investigator minus payments Likness had mad e by the
time of sentencing: $12,332 in MFIP, $2,621 in SNAP, and $20,335.92 in MA.
Likness appealed her conviction and argued the evidence was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that she intended to defeat the purposes of all of the public
assistance programs listed in the criminal statute, including those that did not apply to her.
State v. Likness, No. A20-0108, 2021 WL 961116, at *1 (Minn. App. 2021) (order op.),
rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 26, 2022). This court rejected Likness’s sufficiency- of-the-
evidence and statutory -interpretation arguments, affirming the district court’s judgment of
conviction. Id.
In November 2019, Likness filed a challenge to the amount of restitution asserted
by the state and ordered by the district court. Likness did not contest the amount she owed
corresponding to the overpayment of MFIP benefits. But Likness argued the state did not
satisfy its burden to establish the amount overpaid in SNAP and MA benefits because
(1) the investigator did not testify to the asset limits or income thresholds associated with
the programs, and (2) the state did not establish Likness’s income t hat rendered her
ineligible. The district court denied Likness’s restitution challenge and concluded the
state’s exhibits and the investigator’s testimony showed by a preponderance of the
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evidence that Likness was ineligible and received overpayment in SNAP and MA benefits
in the amounts set forth by the state.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
The district court has broad discretion to award res titution and the district court’s
order will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d
910, 913 (Minn. 2015). We review the district court’s factual fi ndings for clear error, but
review questions about the district court’s authority to order restitution de novo. Id.
Factual f indings are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, we are “left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred. ” State v. Diede , 795 N.W.2d 836,
846-47 (Minn. 2011).
A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution if the offender is convicted.
Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1 (2018). This statutory right serves to restore victims to the
financial positions they were in before the crime occurred. State v. Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d
662, 666 (Minn. 2007). When ordering restitution, the district court must consider the
amount of economic loss sustained by the victim and the defendant’s ability to pay. Minn.
Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a) (2018). Victims must describe the nature and amount of
economic loss with “reasonable specificity” and the record must contain a factual basis for
the restitution award. State v. Keehn, 554 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Minn. App. 1996), rev. denied
(Minn. Dec. 17, 1996). When a defendant challenges the amount of restitution after it is
awarded, the state has the burden of proving the amount by a preponderance of the
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evidence. Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a) (2018); see also State v. Thole, 614 N.W.2d
231, 235 (Minn. App. 2000).
Likness argues that the state failed to meet its burden to show the award was proper
because the state did not establish the eligibility requirements for SNAP and MA generally
and as applied to Likness. Indeed, the investigator only testified that an asset limit of
$5,000 applied to render Likness ineligible for MFIP. She did not specify the income
guideline for SNAP and MA. But in denying Likness’s restitution challenge, the district
court did not adopt Likness’s assertion that the income limits or guidelines must be stated
on the record to conclude that Likness was ineligible for benefits and that restitution for
overpayment was proper. Rather, the district court found that the investigator specified in
her testimony that she used the relevant eligibility thresholds for each of the programs in
her overpayment calculations . The district court found her “qualified explanation that
[Likness] was not eligible” to be credible and the state’s burden satisfied. The record
supports these findings .
We will not disturb the district court’s findings, including credibility findings, when
there is “reasonable evid ence” to support the m. State v. Evans , 756 N.W.2d 854, 870
(Minn. 2008); see also State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 245 (Minn. 2014) (noting an appellate
court reviews a postconviction court’s credibility determinations under the clearly
erroneous standard’s “high threshold”). The investigator testified she determined
Likness’s eligibility using “the asset limits . . . for the cash program, the food program, and
the medical assistance program.” She also testified Likness was sometimes “under the
income guideline” and some months “over the income guideline” and provided a detailed
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report showing which months Likness was ineligible for each particular program. The
district court also credited the investigator’s 14 years of experience as an eligibility worker.
On these facts, there is reasonable evidence that the investigator used the SNAP and MA
income guidelines to determine Likness’s month-to-month eligibility for the programs and
the district court did not clearly err in crediting the investigator’s testimony. 1
Likness also contends the state did not satisfy its burden because it failed to prove
she had income that rendered her ineligible for SNAP and MA. First, Likness argues the
investigator failed to define what qualifies as income for program ineligibility. This
contradicts the record. The investigator testified that “[a]ny money that you have access
to is income for public assistance .” The investigator also explained that loans and social
security income did not count as income, but regular gifts do count.
Second, Likness contends the investigator failed to explain which of Likness’s cash
deposits were considered income for the ineligibility calculations. At trial, Likness posited
two explanations for the regular, large cash deposits in her account: (1) “leftover” social
security income, or (2) a gift from her child to pay a bill. Likness explained she would take

1 To support her contention that the income guidelines must be specifically stated in the
record, Likness asks this court to compare the investigator’s testimony to the trial testimony
of a county human- services representa tive in State v. Malik , No. A18- 2003, 2020 WL
1845964, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 13, 2020), rev. denied (Minn. June 30, 2020). In Malik,
the representative explained SNAP and MA eligibility depends on the applicant’s income
and specified the income amounts. Id. We note that nonprecedential opinions of this court
are not binding authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Nor do we find Malik
persuasive as it concerned whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s
criminal conviction for wrongfully obtaining public assistance. 2020 WL 1845964, at *8.
While the testimony and evidence set forth in Malik may be better practice for a fully
developed record on the issue, Malik is silent on whether the income guidelines used for
ineligibility determinations must be explicitly stated when determining restitution.
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her social security checks, cash them at a different bank, pa y her expenses, and deposit the
remaining amounts in her accounts. She also testified her daughter gave her cash only one
time to pay a bill. Likness argues the state did not meet its burden of proving that these
cash deposits were income rather than social security income, a loan, or irregular gifts. We
disagree.
In determining that the state satisfied its burden to prove Likness was ineligible for
public assistance , the district court again credited and relied on the investigator’s
testimony. The district court found the investigator “provided a detailed explanation why
the deposits into [Likness’s] bank account qualified as unearned income . . . and would not
be [her] [s]ocial [s]ecurity disbursements.” The investigator explained she reviewed
Likness’s bank statements and “added up all cash deposits, just the cash deposits, each
month” and classified them as income for her calculation rather than “ leftover” social
security income that could not be considered.
While the investigator conceded that some deposits could have been “leftover” from
social security, she also testified that Likness’s social security checks amounted to about
$1,900 per month and Likness had to pay over $1,275 in monthly rent and utility expenses
before she could deposit any cash remainder. Likness’s explanation that these funds were
social security funds conflicts with the amounts she deposited. The state’s exhibit
summarizing Likness’s cash deposits showed her purported “leftover” social security funds
totaled over $1,000 in 25 of the 34 months she received public assistance. On these facts,
we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred” and
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reasonable evidence support s the district court’s finding that Likness’s cash deposits
qualified as income. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 846- 47.
Ultimately, Likness asserts the district court could not rely on the investigator’s
ineligibility conclusions because she “failed to explain her math” and “there is no way to
fact check” her determinations absent information on what income guidelines applied and
absent proof the cash deposits were income. Even if there may not be enough information
in the record to independently perform the investigator’s calculations to confirm their
accuracy, the district court did not err in concluding the state satisfied its statutory burden.
“[T]he record must provide a factual basis for the amount awarded by showing the nature
and amount of the losses with reasonable specificity.” Thole, 614 N.W.2d at 234. The
amount of restitution must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.045, subd. 3(a); see also State v. Garcia, 927 N.W.2d 338, 344 (Minn. App. 2019)
(“A preponderance of the evidence exists when it is more probable than not that a fact
exists.”).
Taking together , the investigator’s (1) credible testimony that she applied SNAP
and MA income guidelines, (2) explanation of what funds constitute income for eligibility
determinations, (3) conclusion that Likness’s cash deposits were income, and (4) detailed
report setting forth the months of ineligibility for each program with corresponding
overpayments, we are satisfied that it is more probable than not Likness was ineligible , at
times, for SNAP and MA benefits. And the investigator’s detailed report on the resulting
overpayments shows each program’s “amount of . . . losses with reasonable specificity.”
Thole, 614 N.W.2d at 234. As a result, the district court did not err in determining the state
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carried its burden and did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution in the amounts set
forth by the state.
Affirmed.