John Robinson, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1678

John Robinson, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

USAA,
Respondent.

Filed July 17, 2023
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CV-17-3046

William L. French, French Law Office, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellants)

Timothy Masterson, Alexandra L. Zabinski, McCollum Crowley P.A., Bloomington,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
In this second appeal related to an appraisal award, appellant-insureds argue that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to grant respondent-insurer’s motion to deposit the
judgment amount into court during the pendency of the first appeal. We affirm.

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FACTS
Appellants John and Marguerite Robinson’s house was damaged by hail in 2014
and their garage sustained fire damage in 2015. At the time of the losses, the structures
were insured under a homeowners’ policy issued by respondent USAA. The policy
provides for a binding appraisal process when the parties dispute the amount of loss. That
is what happened here. Pursuant to this process, the appraisers inspected the damaged
property and issued a unanimous report awarding the Robinsons $82,142.41. After
reducing the award to reflect the Robinsons’ deductible and amounts USAA had previously
paid, USAA moved to confirm the remaining $55,594.94 appraisal award. In a May 2022
order, the district court granted the motion and directed entry of judgment. The Robinsons
appealed, arguing that the district court erred by (1) treating the appraisal award as an
arbitration award, (2) ignoring the scheduling order, and (3) ignoring factual assertions
made in a pro se “declaration.” We affirmed. See generally Robinson v. USAA, No. A22-
1033, 2023 WL 2467898 (Minn. App. Mar. 13, 2023).
In September 2022, while the first appeal was pending, USAA moved the district
court for leave to deposit the $55,594.94 under Minn. R. Civ. P. 67.01 in order to stop
interest from accruing. USAA’s motion noted that the Robinsons “have refused to accept
USAA’s tender of payment” but that correspondence from their attorney indicated they
“do not object to USAA’s paying the funds into the Court.”
Despite this apparent agreement that USAA could deposit the award ed funds, t he
Robinsons opposed USAA’s motion, arguing that their appeal divested the district court of
jurisdiction to consider the motion. The Robinsons did not reference Minn. R. Civ. App.
3
P. 108.01 or address the merits of the motion. At the hearing, the Robinsons’ attorney
stated, “I have nothing to add other than I think it’s pretty clear the Court doesn’t have
jurisdiction to grant this motion.” When he later expressed confusion as to when USAA
wanted interest to stop accruing, the district court noted that the Robinsons did not brief
the issue and that USAA had provided persuasive authority in support of its request.
The district court granted USAA’s motion, and the Robinsons appeal.
DECISION
The Robinsons’ sole argument on appeal is that the district court lacked jurisdiction
to consider and decide USAA’s motion to deposit the funds into court. They do not
challenge the merits of the district court’s decision. USAA contends that this court lacks
jurisdiction because the challenged order is not appealable.
1 Both issues require us to
interpret procedural rules, which present questions of law that we review de novo. Crowley
v. Meyer, 897 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Minn. 2017). We address each argument, beginning with
the question whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal.
I. The district court’s order is appealable.
USAA argues that this appeal must be dismissed because the district court’s post-
judgment order is not appealable under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03 and the Robinsons
did not timely seek discretionary review. See generally Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 105. The
Robinsons assert that the order is appealable under rule 103.03(e), which provides that an
appeal may be taken “from an order which, in effect, determines the action and prevents a

1 USAA did not move to dismiss the appeal under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 127.
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judgment from which an appeal might be taken.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(e). They
contend the order falls within this provision because it “limited the amount recoverable in
the underlying action by repudiating [their] claim for post-judgment interest.” Neither
party’s argument persuades us.
Rule 103.03(g) provides that an appeal may be taken “from a final order, decision
or judgment affecting a substantial right made in an administrative or other special
proceeding.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g). The rule does not define “special
proceeding,” but courts have interpreted it in light of its remedial nature. See In re
GlaxoSmithKline PLC , 699 N.W.2d 749, 756 (Minn. 2005) (“We have preferred an
interpretation that preserves the parties’ right to appeal when appropriate.”). A special
proceeding is a “generic term for any civil remedy in a court of justice which is not of itself
an ordinary action.” Chapman v. Dorsey, 41 N.W.2d 438, 440 (Minn. 1950). A special
proceeding “may be commenced independently of a pending action by petition or motion,
upon notice, in order to obtain special relief.” County of Stearns v. Schaaf, 472 N.W.2d
191, 192 (Minn. App. 1991) (quoting Chapman, 41 N.W.2d at 440).
USAA brought its post-judgment motion under Minn. R. Civ. P. 67.01, which
affords a district court discretion to permit a party, upon notice, to deposit money or other
personal property into court. Rule 67.01 is found in section VII of the Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure, entitled: “Provisional and Final Remedies and Special Proceedings.”
Accordingly, we conclude that USAA’s post-judgment motion to deposit the appraisal
award was a special proceeding. A s such the district court’s order granting the motion is
appealable under rule 103.03(g).
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II. The district court had juri sdiction to consider USAA’s motion while the first
appeal was pending.

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2, provides that “the filing of a timely and
proper appeal suspends the trial court’s authority to make any order that affects the order
or judgment appealed from.” But commencement of an appeal does not fully divest the
district court of jurisdiction. The district court “retains jurisdiction as to matters
independent of, supplemental to, or collateral to the order or judgment appealed from.”
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2.
Resolution of the jurisdiction issue turns on whether USAA’s motion to deposit the
funds into court was an independent, supplemental, or collateral matter. As explained
above, USAA’s rule 67.01 motion did not disturb the $55,594.94 judgment in favor of the
Robinsons, and did not address any of the issues pending in the first appeal. On its face,
USAA’s motion falls within the district court’s retained jurisdiction as a matter collateral
to the appealed-from judgment.
To convince us otherwise, the Robinsons assert that the motion affected the
judgment because the order reveals the district court: (1) considered the merits of the then-
pending appeal (by implicitly assuming the judgment would be affirmed), (2) did not
consider the “legal mess” the order would create if the Robinsons’ appeal was successful,
(3) did not face “changed circumstances” requiring the district court to act, and (4) did not
consider that suspension of post-judgment interest changed the amount of the judgment.
All of these arguments seem more focused on how the district court decided USAA’s
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motion rather than its authority to do so. And none of them otherwise persuades us to
reverse.
The Robinsons do not explain their first contention, and the district court expressly
rejected it, stating that permitting USAA to deposit the appraisal amount would not impact
the pending appeal even if this court reversed and the case was re-litigated. Nor do they
articulate how the cases they cite, Perry v. Perry, 749 N.W.2d 399 (Minn. App. 2008), and
In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. App. 2003), support their assertion that permitting
USAA to deposit the funds would create a “legal mess.” To the contrary, the two cases
support USAA’s argument that its motion involved a “new set of facts”—pertaining only
to its tender of the judgment and interest accrual—and did not require consideration of the
merits of any issue on appeal. See Perry, 749 N.W.2d at 402-03 (citing Thulin, 660 N.W.2d
at 143) (stating that “an order does not necessarily affect the order on appeal if it involves
a new set of facts and does not require the district court to consider the merits of the issue
on appeal”).
Similarly, the Robinsons do not explain how State v. J.C. (In re Welfare of C. Child.)
requires “changed circumstances” before a district court may consider a collateral matter
while an appeal is pending. 348 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. App. 1984) . We see no such broad
holding in that case; it stands for the unremarkable proposition that a district court retains
the authority to consider child-welfare issues that are ancillary to an appeal. Id. at 99. And
save for the citation to Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 2 (2022), which sets out how post-
judgment interest is calculated and applied, the Robinsons provide no authority for their
argument that stopping the accrual of post-judgment interest “changed” the judgment itself.
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We do not assume error on appeal; the appellant has the burden to show error. Waters v.
Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944). The Robinsons have not met this
burden.
In sum, the district court retained jurisdiction over USAA’s post- judgment motion
under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2, as a collateral matter not affecting the merits
of the pending appeal.2
Affirmed.

2 We note that our conclusion is consistent with other rules that vest decision-making as to
matters related to enforcement of a judgment and security with the district court. See Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 108.02 (parties seeking to stay enforcement of a judgment must move first
in the district court); Minn. R. Civ. P. 62.02 (district courts may “suspend, modify, restore,
or grant an injunction during the pendency of an appeal”).