Jamie Allen Andrews, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1689

Jamie Allen Andrews, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 31, 2023
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File Nos. 02-CR-07-3337, 02-CR-09-2746

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant Jamie Allen Andrews argues that the district court erred by denying his
petition for postconviction relief —based on newly discovered evidence in the form of an
2
alleged victim recantation—without an evidentiary hearing. Because there is no authority
to support Andrews’ requested relief, we affirm.
FACTS
In May 2007, respondent State of Minnesota charged Andrews with one count of
second-degree intentional murder and one count of second-degree murder while
committing a felony for causing the death of his infant daughter. In July 2007, a grand jury
indicted Andrews for first-degree murder based on this same event.
In March 2009, the state charged Andrews with two counts of first- degree criminal
sexual conduct for engaging in sexual penetration with two of his children. Andrews’
daughter, A.M.A., age nine at the time of the charges, provided law enforcement with
statements about Andrews’ criminal sexual conduct.
In July 2009, and with the assistance of counsel, Andrews entered an Alford plea1
pursuant to a global plea agreement. The plea agreement included amended charges of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd.
1(h)(iii) (2006), naming A.M.A. as the only victim, and second- degree manslaughter, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.205, subd. 1 (2006). 2 The district court accepted Andrews’
Alford plea, entered convictions, and sentenced Andrews to 90 months in prison and ten
years of conditional release for the criminal-sexual-conduct conviction and a consecutive

1 In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970), the United States Supreme Court
held that, in some circumstances, a court may constitutionally accept a defendant’s guilty
plea even though the defendant professes innocence. The Minnesota Supreme Court
adopted Alford pleas in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760-61 (Minn. 1977).
2 The first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct charge involving another child of Andrews was
dismissed as part of the global plea agreement.
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57-month term of imprisonment for the second-degree manslaughter conviction. Andrews
did not file a direct appeal.3
In July 2022, Andrews, represented by an appellate public defender , submitted a
petition for postconviction relief, seeking plea withdrawal and a new trial. This followed
the delivery of an affidavit from A.M.A. to the appellate public defender’s office in 2020.
In her affidavit, A.M.A. stated, “my dad never touched us and if he did it was in a normal
way a parent should” and “[n]ever disrespectfully.” A.M.A. explained, “I was pressured
by multiple people and at times words seemed to be put in my mouth.” She also stated that
she “told stories to satisfy the adults,” she believed Andrews was innocent, and he “never
made [her] feel unsafe.”
Andrews sought to withdraw his Alford plea to second- degree manslaughter and
second-degree criminal sexual conduct because , he argued, A.M.A.’s alleged recantation
made his plea inaccurate. In the petition, Andrews asserted that the victim’s recantation
“negates an essential element of the crime to which [Andrews] pleaded guilty and serves
to exonerate him” and, because the criminal-sexual-conduct plea was part of a “global plea
agreement” that was not severable from the second-degree manslaughter plea, the entire
plea agreement must be invalid because it is inaccurate.

3 Prior to his anticipated release from prison in 2015, the district court indeterminately
committed Andrews as a sexually dangerous person. Andrews challenged the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting his civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person and the
district court’s determination that there was no less-restrictive alternative to commitment
to the sex-offender program. In re Civ. Commitment of Andrews, No. A16-0237, 2016 WL
4163180 (Minn. App. Aug. 8, 2016), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 18, 2016). This court
affirmed his civil commitment and the Minnesota Supreme Court denied review. Id.
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The district court, without an evidentiary hearing, denied Andrews’ petition.4
Andrews appeals.
DECISION
Andrews’ sole argument on appeal is that the district court committed reversible
error when it denied his postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. We review
the decision by the district court to grant or deny an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of
discretion. See Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). In doing so, we review
the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See
Martin v. State, 825 N.W.2d 734, 740 (Minn. 2013).
Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2022), a district court must hold an
evidentiary hearing on a petition for postconviction relief “[u]nless the petition and the files
and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court has “interpreted this section to re quire the petitioner to
allege facts that, if proven, would entitle him to the requested relief.” Opsahl v. State, 677
N.W.2d 414, 423 (Minn. 2004).
In denying Andrews’ petition, the district court considered the Larrison standard—
a three-prong test used by Minnesota courts to assess whether to grant a new trial based on

4 In 2019, Andrews filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief that sought similar relief,
which was forwarded by the district court to the appellate public defender’s office. The
postconviction court acknowledged the pro se petition though it did not provide a separate
reason to deny it . We presume, therefore, the district court’s reason for denial applies
equally to his pro se petition. Andrews did not file a pro se supplemental brief on appeal.
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recanted trial testimony.5 See id. at 422-23 (explaining that pursuant to the Larrison
standard, a petitioner must establish the following: “(1) the [di strict] court must be
reasonably well-satisfied that the testimony in question was false; (2) without that
testimony the jury might have reached a different conclusion; and (3) the petitioner was
taken by surprise at trial or did not know of the falsity until after trial”). To receive an
evidentiary hearing in the recantation setting, the petitioner must “present competent
material evidence that, if found to be true following an evidentiary hearing, could satisfy
the Larrison test.” Martin, 825 N.W.2d at 743. “Although an evidentiary hearing is often
necessary, the recantation must still contain sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to warrant
a hearing.” Id. at 740 (quotation omitted). The district court determined that because
A.M.A.’s affidavit did not “bear indicia of trustworthiness,” Andrews failed the first prong
of the Larrison test and he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the purported
recantation.
Andrews argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because A.M.A.’s
purported recantation, if found credible by the district court at an evidentiary hearing,
would entitle him to relief. The relief he requested is withdrawal of his Alford plea which,
he claims, is necessary to avoid a manifest injustice.
However, Andrews pleaded guilty and therefore did not have a trial at which A.M.A.
testified. The Larrison standard only governs our analysis in cases in which there are

5 See State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 584- 85 (Minn. 1982) (adopting test set forth in
Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928), overruled by United States v.
Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2004)).
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allegations that “false testimony was given at trial.” Pippitt v. State, 737 N.W.2d 221, 227
(Minn. 2007) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). Moreover, Andrews has not presented
authority, nor are we aware of any, that substantively applies Larrison in a postconviction
proceeding in which a petitioner seeks relief in the form of plea withdrawal due to a
victim’s recantation. Therefore, the Larrison test is not applicable here.
We recognize that guilty pleas may be withdrawn after sentencing if it is necessary
to correct a manifest injustice. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice
exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). To
be constitutionally valid, “a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.”
Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016). An accurate Alford plea involves the
following: (1) a strong factual basis, (2) an admission from the defendant that the evidence
is sufficient to convict him at trial, and (3) the district court’s independent conclusion that
“there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to
which he pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his claims of innocence.” State v. Theis, 742
N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007).
The accuracy of Andrews’ Alford plea is evaluated on the basis of the evidence
available at the time he entered the plea. See id. at 649-50 (analyzing accuracy of an Alford
plea based on the evidence available at the plea hearing). In addition to the three factors
listed above, the “key consideration” in an Alford plea is “whether the plea is voluntary
and represents a knowing and intelligent choice of the alternative courses of action
available” at the time it was entered. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 761. Andrews does not
provide any authority, and we are aware of none, that allows the accuracy of his plea—or
7
his choice to enter an Alford plea—to be reassessed due to a subsequent change in
evidentiary circumstances in the form of victim recantation.6
Thus, the district court acted within its discretion in denying Andrews an evidentiary
hearing because the record conclusively shows that he is not entitled to relief.
Affirmed.

6 We recognize that the record before us does not include the transcript from the plea
hearing. But this does not impact our conclusion because Andrews’ postconviction filings
only assert a post-guilty plea recantation.