In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. R. G. and D. A. S., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1699

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
A. R. G. and D. A. S., Parents.

Filed May 15, 2023
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-JV-22-158

Viet-Hanh Winchell, United Rivers Law Firm PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant-father D. A. S.)

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Aimee S. Cupelli, Assistant County Attorney,
Center City, Minnesota (for respondent Chisago County Health & Human Services)

Ashley Nyen, Stillwater, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant-father challenges a district court order terminating his parental rights to
his minor child and the district court’s denial of his request to amend his
transfer-of-custody petition. The record supports the district court’s determinations that a
statutory ground for termination exists, respondent-county made reasonable efforts to
reunify the family, and termination of father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
2
And we see no error in the district court’s refusal to allow father to amend his
transfer-of-custody petition. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises from the termination of father’s parental rights to K.S.V., born
August 2019. Mother and father have never been married, and the Indian Child Welfare
Act does not apply in this case.1
First CHIPS Petition
Respondent Chisago County Health and Human Services (the county) opened a
child-protection assessment in September 2019 following a report that K.S.V. tested
positive for methamphetamine at birth. Mother initially agreed to cooperate with the
county to receive services and abstain from the use of controlled substances. Following
mother’s continued use of methamphetamine, the county filed a child in need of protection
or service (CHIPS) petition in December 2019. The child was placed out of mother’s home
and the district court adjudicated K.S.V. in need of protection or services. The child was
returned to mother’s home in August 2020 and the first CHIPS matter was dismissed .
K.S.V. had been in out-of-home placement for 206 days when he was returned to his
mother.
Second CHIPS Petition
Father did not learn that he was the father of K.S.V. until the spring of 2020. At
that time, father was serving a jail sentence for fifth- degree possession of a controlled

1 Mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights to the child at the start of trial and is not
a party to this appeal.
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substance. Father was released from custody in April 2021 and remained subject to
probationary conditions. He was adjudicated K.S.V.’s father in May of 2021.
Father was then residing at his father’s home and began visiting K.S. V. “as much
as [he] could,” including parenting the child “five days a week while his mom worked.”
By July 2021, mother and K.S.V. joined father (residing at the house of father’s father).
Father and mother jointly cared for K.S.V. the remainder of the summer. Father continued
to use methamphetamine during this time.
Father participated in outpatient treatment in August 2021 but continued to use
methamphetamine. Father’s probation agent determined father needed a higher level of
care and , in October 2021, father entered inpatient treatment. Father was successfully
discharged to a sober living facility the following month. Father left the sober living
facility in December 2021, and, by January 2022, father was again testing positive for
methamphetamine.
In February 2022, K.S.V. was placed on a 72-hour hold and taken into custody
because father failed to pick him up from a sleepover with his half -sisters. The county
arranged an interview with father during which he submitted to a drug test, which showed
a positive result for methamphetamine.
The county commenced the second CHIPS action, and the district court placed the
child out of the parental home. Father was arrested in early March 2022 because he
violated the probationary condition to abstain from controlled-substance use. The county
case manager first met with father in April 2022, while he was in custody, to discuss his
case plan.
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In May 2022, following admissions by mother and father, the district court
adjudicated K.S.V. in need of protection or services and approved case plans for both
parents. Father’s court-approved case plan required him to remain law abiding, maintain
contact with his case manager, demonstrate sobriety, complete a mental-health assessment
and follow the recommendations, and find suitable housing for himself and K.S.V.
Father completed the Chisago County jail treatment program while serving his
sentence and, in July 2022, he was released to a sober living facility and continued
outpatient treatment. Also in July 2022, the county petitioned the district court to
involuntarily terminate father’s parental rights to K.S.V. (the TPR petition). In response,
father filed a petition seeking to transfer custody of K.S.V. to his maternal grandparents.
In September of 2022, father completed a parenting assessment, which determined
that it was “not appropriate [for father] to independently parent his child[] at this time”
because he had not yet had sufficient time to demonstrate sobriety. The assessment
recommended that father demonstrate ten months of sobriety before being allowed to
independently parent. Father was successfully discharged from treatment on October 27,
2022, and again resided with his father. He has passed all drug tests since being taken into
custody in March 2022.
The district court held a two-day trial on the TPR petition beginning on October 31,
2022. At the start of trial, father moved to amend his transfer-of-custody petition to seek
transfer of the child to his sister because his maternal grandparents were no longer willing
to be legal custodians. The district court denied the amendment and dismissed father’s
transfer-of-custody petition.
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During trial, the district court heard testimony from 12 witnesses and received 25
exhibits. The district court issued an order terminating father’s parental rights. It
concluded that the county proved by clear and convincing evidence four statutory grounds
for termination, and that reasonable efforts had failed to rehabilitate father and reunite the
family. The district court also concluded that terminating father’s parental rights was in
the child’s best interests.
Father appeals.
DECISION
A district court may terminate parental rights if (1) at least one statutory ground for
termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the county made reasonable
efforts to reunite the family; and (3) termination is in the child’s best interests. In re
Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b) (2022 ) (setting forth statutory grounds for involuntary termination of parental
rights). Appellate courts review an order terminating parental rights “to determine whether
the district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” S.E.P., 744
N.W.2d at 385. Although “[p]arental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty
reasons,” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990), this court gives
“considerable deference to the district court’s decision to terminate parental rights,” S.E.P.,
744 N.W.2d at 385. As a result, an appellate court must “fully and fairly consider the
evidence, but so far only as is necessary to determine beyond question that [the evidence]
tends to support the findings of the factfinder.” In re Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d
6
214, 223 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen the record reasonably supports
the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide a
reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. (quotation omitted).
When the prerequisites for an involuntary termination are present, appellate courts review
a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights for an abuse of discretion. In re
Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136-37 (Minn. 2014).
First, father argues that the district court abused its discretion by terminating his
parental rights. Second, father argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying
his request to amend his transfer-of-custody petition.
I. The district court acted within its discretion to terminate father’s parental
rights.
Father challenges the district court ’s determination that (1) the four statutory
grounds for termination were met, (2) the county made reasonable efforts to reunify him
with his child, and (3) termination is in the child’s best interests.
The district court concluded that four statutory base s exist to terminate father’s
parental rights: (1) father neglected or failed to comply with his parental duties; (2) father
is palpably unfit to be a parent; (3) reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions
leading to the child’s out-of-home placement; and (4) father has been adjudicated
delinquent for an offense requiring registration under section 243.166, subdivision 1b,
paragraph (a) or (b). See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (9). We consider
the third statutory basis. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
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Statutory Basis
The district court may terminate a parent’s rights if “reasonable efforts, under the
direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement”
out of the home. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). We apply a clear-error standard
of review to a district court’s findings of historical fact and an abuse-of-discretion standard
of review to a district court’s ultimate determination of whether a statutory basis for
involuntary termination exists. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901
(Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
The district court found that despite father completing chemical-dependency
treatment, following his case plan, and remaining sober, he “has not had adequate time to
demonstrate that he can maintain sobriety and stability outside of the structured living
environment of the jail or sober living facility .” The district court observed that “[a]t the
time of trial, Father had only been outside of a structured living environment for
approximately four days.” Based on these findings, the district court concluded there was
clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts had failed to correct the conditions
leading to the child’s out-of-home placement.
The record reasonably supports the district court’s findings. The child wa s not
returned to father’s home due to father’s continued methamphetamine use. Though father
made substantial progress on his case plan, his substance abuse has prevented him from
providing a stable environment for the child. Father’s substance abuse long precedes the
second CHIPS petition—father admitted to using methamphetamine for many years,
acknowledged that he had been incarcerated several times for possessing
8
methamphetamine, and he admitted that, historically, he has returned to using
methamphetamine each time he has been released from custody. Father continued to use
methamphetamine after becoming involved in K.S.V.’s life, including on his mother’s
birthday, when he was grieving her death, and immediately after K.S.V. was placed on a
72-hour hold. Father was discharged from treatment just four days before the TPR trial,
which supports the district court’s finding that his only periods of extended sobriety have
been while father has been in custody on criminal offenses.
Father argues he has not had adequate time— due to the compressed timeline from
filing of the CHIPS petition to the TPR trial—to demonstrate sobriety outside of a
structured environment. Father testified that he expected to remain sober and expressed
regret for his past mistakes, noting that this time is different because he finally understands
“the consequences of [his use] and how [it] . . . affect[ed] [his] life with [K.S.V.].” The
district court observed that K.S.V. had been in out-of-home placement for 462 days at the
start of trial, and the court determined that father had not demonstrated sobriety outside of
a structured environment. Together these findings indicate that the district court implicitly
found not credible father’s testimony that his recent sobriety will, in the future, allow him
to parent. See Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting that
appellate courts defer to the district court’s explicit and implicit credibility determinations).
We defer to the district court’s findings. In re Welfare of Child of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548,
555 (Minn. App. 2007) (citing In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996)),
rev. denied (Minn. July 17, 2007).
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Because the record supports the district court’s finding that the conditions that led
to K.S.V.’s out-of-home placement have not been corrected and, as we explain below, this
is despite the county’s reasonable efforts, the district court acted within its discretion to
conclude that this statutory basis for termination has been proved. Only one statutory
ground for termination need be proved. In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49,
55 (Minn. 2004). Therefore, we need not consider father’s arguments with respect to the
other three statutory grounds.
Reasonable Efforts
In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the district court must “make specific
findings . . . that reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and
the parent were made including individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature
and extent of efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and
reunite the family.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2022). In determining whether a
county made reasonable efforts, the district court “shall consider” listed statutory factors.
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2022). The reasonable efforts required of a county social service
agency depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C.,
920 N.W.2d 648, 663 (Minn. App. 2018). Determining whether efforts are reasonable
“requires consideration of the length of time the county has been involved with the family
as well as the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of M.G., 407 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Minn.
App. 1987) (citation omitted). We apply a clear-error standard of review to the finding
that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite a parent and a child. See S.E.P., 744
N.W.2d at 387.
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The district court found that the county made reasonable efforts to “rehabilitate the
parents, reunify the [family], and finalize a permanency plan for the child” because “[t]he
services offered were relevant to the safety and protection of the child, adequate to meet
the needs of the child and family, culturally appropriate, available and accessible,
consistent and timely, and realistic under the circumstances.” See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h).
The services the district court found were:
a. Communication with Mother, Father, and the foster
placements;
b. Referrals for chemical use assessments;
c. Referrals to CORE Professional Services for
psychological/parenting assessments;
d. Communication with Father’s probation officer;
e. Coordination of supervised visits between Father and
[K.S.V.], and transportation of [K.S.V.] to visits;
f. Help Me Grow and public health referrals for [K.S.V.];
g. Coordination with [K.S.V.]’s siblings’ care providers to
coordinate sibling visitation;
h. Coordination of medical care for [K.S.V.], including
vaccinations;
i. Provided [K.S.V.] overnight care through a hospital stay;
j. Enrolled [K.S.V.] in daycare with developmentally
appropriate learning and social interactions;
k. Communication with the Guardian ad Litem.

The record supports the district court’s findings, and the findings support the district
court’s conclusions. K.S.V. was removed from the parental home due to father’s continued
methamphetamine use. The record shows that K.S.V. was provided with foster placement,
medical care, childcare, and visits with his half-sisters. These efforts support the district
court’s finding that the county’s efforts were relevant to the protection and safety of K.S.V.
To address father’s chemical use, t he county remained in contact with his jail
treatment team as well as with his counselor from outpatient treatment to monitor his
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progress. The county’s efforts specific to father were reasonable under the circumstances.
See A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 663 (concluding that the county’s efforts, including
communication and offering services, “although imperfect, were reasonable under the
circumstances” as “efforts that the county made or attempted were disrupted by father’s
repeated periods of incarceration”). The county also: maintained contact with father’s
probation agent; referred father for his parenting assessment; coordinated supervised visits
between father and K.S.V.; and offered father gas cards for his parenting assessment, drug
tests, and visits with K.S.V. The county’s efforts were reasonable under the circumstances
of father’s incarceration for the majority of the time the TPR petition was pending. Id.
Thus, the district court’s finding that the county’s efforts were adequate to meet the needs
of K.S.V. and the family was not clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, the district court acted within its discretion by determining that the
county made reasonable efforts to reunify father and K.S.V.
Best Interests
Even if a statutory basis for termination is present, the child’s best interests are the
“paramount consideration” in a termination proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7
(2022); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a) ( 2022). The district court balances
three factors when considering the child’s best interests: (1) the child’s interest in
preserving the parent -child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interests of the child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot.
P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii); see also J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (“Competing interests [of the child]
include such things as a stable environment, health considerations and the child’s
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preferences.” (quotation omitted)). We review the district court’s best-interests
determination for an abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. “[D]etermination of
a child’s best interests is generally not susceptible to an appellate court’s global review of
a record, and . . . an appellate court’s combing through the record to determine best
interests is inappropriate because it involves credibility determinations.” In re Welfare of
Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotations omitted).
When finding that termination of father’s parental rights was in K.S.V.’s best
interests, the district court observed that, at the time of trial, K.S.V. had been placed out of
the home for 462 days —nearly one-half of his life. The district court then balanced the
competing interests of father and K.S.V. and found that “the interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship is outweighed here by [K.S.V.]’s interest in finally having a
permanent, safe, stable home.” See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii); J.R.B., 805
N.W.2d at 905 (directing district courts to balance three factors when considering a child’s
best interests). The district court’s findings are supported by the record.
In addition to considering the amount of time K.S.V. had spent outside of the home,
the district court credited the testimony of the case manager. The case manager testified
that terminating father’s parental rights is in K.S.V.’s best interests because K.S.V. “is in
need of services and care that his parents have not demonstrated they are able to provide
to him.” The case manager added that “[t]hey have been offered services and have not
remedied the conditions that brought this child into child protection.”
Additionally, the district court identified K.S.V.’s unique medical needs when
considering best interests. K.S.V. has an enlarged kidney due to pre-natal exposure to
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methamphetamine, which requires annual checkups and attentive supervision. K.S.V. also
has a seizure disorder which requires medication to regulate.
The district court determined that, though father has an interest in maintaining the
parent-child relationship, his chemical-use history prevents him from forming “the kind of
bond and attached where a child can expect that their parent will consistently meet their
needs for food, shelter, medical care, and emotional support.” Father argues such a finding
is unsupported by the record. We disagree. The family services aid testified that she
believes K.S.V. formed an insecure bond with father because “his earlier years may have
been a little more unstable.” Consistent with the aid’s testimony, the district court found
that although father and K.S.V. “have a bond, it does not appear to be a parent-child bond.”
Again, we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations, including implicit
credibility determinations, Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 99, and, thus, the district court acted
within its discretion by finding that the bond father and K.S.V. share is not a parent-child
bond. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
Because the district court identified the best interests of father and K.S.V., weighed
those interests, and determined that termination was in K.S.V.’s best interests, the district
court acted within its discretion. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii); see also J.R.B., 805
N.W.2d at 905.
II. The district court acted within its discretion by denying father’s request to
amend his transfer-of-custody petition.
Minnesota law and the rules of juvenile protection procedure allow parties to
petition to transfer custody of a child to a relative. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4(6)
14
(2022) (stating that “another party to the permanency proceeding . . . may file a petition to
transfer permanent legal and physical custody to a relative”); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 54.03,
subd. 1 (stating that a “party . . . shall file a permanent placement petition if the party
disagrees with the permanent placement determination set forth in the petitions filed by the
other parties”). These petitions “may be amended after the trial has commenced if the court
finds that the amendment does not prejudice a party and all parties are given sufficient time
to respond to the proposed amendment.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 54.04, subd. 2.
We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion by denying father’s
request to amend the transfer-of-custody petition because father’s request came at the
commencement of trial, which did not afford the county sufficient time to respond to his
proposed amendment.2
Affirmed.

2 Our ruling does not preclude father’s sister from seeking relief on her own behalf during
future proceedings.