David Carl Hepfl, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1706

David Carl Hepfl,
Respondent,

vs.

Jodine Patrice Meadowcroft,
Appellant.

Filed August 21, 2023
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Waseca County District Court
File No. 81-CV-20-801

Perry A. Berg, Patton, Hoversten & Berg, P.A., Waseca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jacob M. Birkholz, Michelle K. Olsen, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Jodine Meadowcroft and David Hepfl twice married each other and twice divorced
each other before reuniting, building and furnishing properties together, and again
separating. Hepfl sued Meadowcroft for unjust enrichment based on his having paid to
build and furnish a cabin on Meadowcroft’s lakefront property and having made the down
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payment on and furnished the parties’ dual-purpose residence and bed-and-breakfast. The
district court ordered Meadowcroft to reimburse Hepfl for his expenditures. W e affirm
because the district court acted within its equitable discretion.
FACTS
This dispute concerns money spent during the latest leg of the on-and-off romantic
relationship between appellant Jodine Meadowcroft and respondent David Hepfl. They
twice wed and twice divorced, and they rekindled their relationship in 2016. The most
recent segment lasted about four years, until October 2020. The following factual account
resulted from litigation that Hepfl commenced soon after the relationship ended.
During the 2016–2020 romance, the parties were involved in two real-estate projects
that lie at the center of this dispute : a cabin on Norcross Lake in Becker Cou nty (the
Norcross property) and a residence in Waseca. Hepfl had purchased an unimproved
lakefront parcel on Norcross Lake during the parties’ first marriage, and Meadowcroft was
awarded that parcel during their first divorce and re-awarded it during their second divorce.
After Hepfl and Meadowcroft reunited in 2016, they engaged a contractor to build a cabin
at the Norcross property. Hepfl paid the entire construction and improvements cost of
$56,633. He also paid $8,344.40 for a dock, $1,200 for an outhouse, and $15,350 for
furniture. Hepfl asked Meadowcroft to devise the cabin to him in her will, but she declined.
He testified that she told him he could nevertheless use the property as if it were his own:
Q: So if you’re divorced, why are you getting together with
her and discussing building a cabin on her property?
A: We had talked and we had said come thick or thin we are
going to make this happen, and I believed her that we would
go the distance. That when we were at that property she said
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that she wanted me to enjoy this property and treat it as my
own, as our property, and I did, and I did.
. . . .
Q: When did Ms. Meadowcroft say that it was a joint property
to you?
A: She said treat it as your own on numerous occasions.

Meadowcroft kept all the furnishings that Hepfl purchased for the cabi n, and she
exclusively possesses the cabin.
Hepfl and Meadowcroft jointly purchased the Waseca house during the same post-
2016 segment of their relationship. Meadowcroft contributed the earnest-money payment
of $1,000. Hepfl otherwise covered the costs. He paid $45,045.98 to cover the down
payment, closing costs, and other fees. They moved into the house and began operating a
bed-and-breakfast in it. Hepfl intended the bed-and-breakfast income to supplement his
retirement income and support Meadowcroft if he predeceased her. Hepfl executed the
documents to establish the business as Pine Gardens LLC, but he listed Meadowcroft as its
sole owner. Hepfl paid $40,889.84 to furnish the house with antiques and other household
items, and he added some of his personal furniture and decor items. Tax filings completed
on behalf of Pine Gardens listed most of this personal property as belonging to Pine
Gardens. Hepfl paid the mortgage on the house until the October 2020 breakup, when
Meadowcroft began making the mortgage payments. The parties executed no written
agreement delineating their interests in any of the personal or real property or in the value
of funds expended regarding it.
Meadowcroft successfully petitioned the district court to issue an order for
protection against Hepfl when the relationship ended, and Hepfl sued Meadowcroft for
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breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The district court conducted a bench trial in April
2022 and concluded that Hepfl is entitled to damages for unjust enrichment. It ordered
Meadowcroft to reimburse Hepfl $56,633 for cabin construction and other improvements
on the Norcross property. It also ordered her either to reimburse Hepfl or allow him to
remove personal property related to the Norcross property, as follows: $8,344.40 for the
dock system; $1,200 for the outhouse ; and a reduced $9,750 award for furniture,
appliances, and decor. Regarding the Waseca home, the court ordered Meadowcroft
similarly to pay Hepfl $40,889.84 or allow him to remove the personal property he
purchased. It ordered that when the Waseca property is sold, $45,045.98 must be allocated
from the sale proceeds to reimburse Hepfl and $1,000 to reimburse Meadowcroft for their
respective contributions toward the purchase, with any additional equity equally divided
between them. Meadowcroft appeals.
DECISION
Meadowcroft asserts that the district court erroneously decided that she was unjustly
enriched by Hepfl’s contributions to the Norcross property, by Hepfl’s down payment on
the Waseca home, and by Hepfl’s furniture purchases for the bed-and -breakfast. She also
contends that the district court erroneously a warded Hepfl his out-of-pocket damages and
failed to credit her contribution for her mortgage payments on the Waseca home. None of
Meadowcroft’s arguments prevails.
I
Meadowcroft challenges the district court’s conclusion that she was unjustly
enriched by Hepfl’s contributions to the Norcross property. Unjust enrichment is an
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equitable remedy, Southtown Plumbing, Inc. v. Har-Ned Lumber Co., 493 N.W.2d 137,
140 (Minn. App. 1992), and we review a district court’s order granting equitable relief for
an abuse of discretion, see Nadeau v. Ramsey County, 277 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Minn. 1979).
The district court did not abuse its discretion.
The record supports the district court’s determination that Meadowcroft was
unjustly enriched. To prove that Meadowcroft was unjustly enriched by his contributions,
Hepfl had to establish that a benefit was conferred on Meadowcroft, that she appreciated
and accepted the benefit, and that her retaining the benefit was unjust. See Schumacher v.
Schumacher, 627 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. App. 2001). Someone receiving a benefit does
so unjustly when she acts illegally or in a way that is morally wrong. Id. Morally wrong
conduct can include conduct that induces an unconscionable result. Park-Lake Car Wash,
Inc. v. Springer, 394 N.W.2d 505, 514 (Minn. App. 1986). The record adequately
evidences Meadowcroft’s inducing Hepfl to expend funds to improve the property. Hepfl
testified that he improved the Norcross property after Meadowcroft told him that he could
use the property as his own. Although the district court did not expressly refer to
Meadowcroft’s inducement as the basis for its unjust-enrichment decision, the district court
implicitly credited Hepfl’s testimony:
[Hepfl] testified he agreed to build the cabin on the Norcross
property because he believed he and [Meadowcroft] would
remain together in the future and [Meadowcroft] told him to
use the Norcross property as if it were his property. [Hepf l]
asked [Meadowcroft] to sign a Will leaving the cabin property
to him but ultimately [Meadowcroft] did not sign a Will.

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Meadowcroft does not dispute that she made this representation to Hepfl. And the record
does not suggest that she conditioned her representation on the parties’ romantic
relationship enduring. We are satisfied that Meadowcroft’s inducement supports the
district court’s discretionary decision to deny Meadowcroft an inequitable windfall.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Meadowcroft’s argument that her refusal to
leave the Norcross property to Hepfl in her will should have informed him that he had no
ownership interest. It is true that this refusal would likely foreclose a finding that Hepfl
reasonably believed that she had promised him an ownership interest. But it does not
foreclose a finding that he reasonably believed that Meadowcroft had promised him a
lifelong possessory interest.
II
Meadowcroft frames her challenge to the order relating to the Waseca home as a
challenge to a holding that she was unjustly enriched by Hepfl’s contribution to the home
through his down payment. Although the district court addressed the issue within the
section of its order discussing unjust enrichment, we do not read this component of the
district court’s order as holding that Meadowcroft was unjustly enriched. We instead
understand the order to be dividing the property as an asset jointly owned by the parties
based on their different contributions. The district court reasoned, “[T]he Court finds it fair
and equitable for [Hepfl] to be awarded $45,045.98 and [Meadowcroft] to be awarded
$1,000 of the home sale proceeds before the parties equally share any remaining equity in
the Waseca property.” It did not app ly the doctrine of unjust enrichment as the basis for
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this determination. Because the district court was not applying the doctrine of unjust
enrichment, we of course cannot analyze whether it was applying the doctrine improperly.
Meadowcroft argues that an equitable remedy was inapt because Hepfl had an
adequate legal remedy to resolve the Waseca home issues —namely, partition.
Meadowcroft’s argument is not properly before us because she raises it for the first time
on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). And we add that any
claim to the down payment that Hepfl would have had in a partition action would also
likely be equitable in nature because the parties undisputedly had no contract for the
division of their shared assets. We hold that the district court acted within its discretion
when it determined how to divide the proceeds from the eventual sale of the Waseca
property.
III
Meadowcroft contends that the district court abused its discretion by holding that
she is liable under an unjust-enrichment theory regarding Hepfl’s purchases of personal
property for the bed-and-breakfast business because Pine Gardens, not she, owns the
business and its property. The argument fails. Regardless of whether Meadowcroft or Pine
Gardens owned the personal property, the property benefited Meadowcroft as sole owner
of Pine Gardens. Meadowcroft does not argue that a benefit must be directly rather than
indirectly received to support an unjust-enrichment remedy. Nor does she develop any
argument challenging the district court’s holding that any benefit she received was unjust.

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IV
Meadowcroft contends that the district court misapplied the law by awarding Hepfl
his out-of-pocket expenses instead of awarding him the amount of the benefit Meadowcroft
received. We review the proper measure of damages de novo and the district court’s award
for an abuse of discretion. Herlache v. Rucks, 990 N.W.2d 443, 449–50 (Minn. 2023). The
measure of unjust-enrichment relief centers on what the person enriched has received rather
than what the opposing party has lost. Georgopolis v. George, 54 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Minn.
1952). This may require proof that the property held by the person enriched increased in
value. Marking v. Marking, 366 N.W.2d 386, 387 (Minn. App. 1985). But money given by
one party to or on behalf of the other can also approximate the enriched person’s gain ,
obviating the need to further prove the increased property value. See Herlache, 990 N.W.2d
at 450. Hepfl’s out-of-pocket expenses appropriately indicated damages.
V
Meadowcroft also contends that the district court failed to credit her for her
contributions to the Waseca home’s mortgage after Hepfl left the home. The contention
ignores Hepfl’s contributions to the mortgage before then. The district court found that
“[Hepfl] paid the mortgage payments on the Waseca home from the date of purchase in
March 2019 to October 2020. [Meadowcroft] has paid the mortgage payments on the
Waseca home since November 2020 .” Meadowcroft offers no analysis or authority to
support her contention. Arguments not supported by argument or authority are forfeited.
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Scheffler v. City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 26, 2017). We therefore decline to consider the conclusory assertion further.
Affirmed.