State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1709

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chace Jeffrey Boggs,
Appellant.

Filed August 28, 2023
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Brown County District Court
File No. 08-CR-22-411

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Joan Eichhorst, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Lacy Schumacher, Flaherty & Hood, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Zachary S. Webster, Jacob M. Birkholz, Michelle K. Olsen, Birkholz & Associates, LLC,
Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
John P., Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of domestic assault—fear , arguing that the
evidence insufficiently proved that he intended to cause the victim fear of immediate bodily
harm or death. Appellant also argues that it was legally inconsistent for the jury to find
him guilty of domestic assault—fear while acquitting him of domestic assault—harm and
disorderly conduct. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Chace Jeffrey Boggs with
domestic assault—fear, domestic assault—harm, and disorderly conduct. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.2242, subds. 1(1), (2), .72, subd. 1 (2020).
At trial, M.G. testified that she and Boggs had a romantic relationship and a son,
W.B. After Boggs and M.G.’s romantic relationship ended, they continued cohabitating to
coparent W.B.
Boggs and M.G. “fought a lot.” After one argument, Boggs “punch[ed] a hole in
the wall” in M.G.’s presence. On another occasion while Boggs and M.G. were in bed,
Boggs “punched the bed near” M.G.
On February 21, 2022 —when W.B. was approximately eight months old—M.G.
was sleeping on the living room couch. M.G. “awoke to the baby monitor going off.”
M.G. removed W.B. from his crib and fed him in the living room until he fell asleep.
M.G. heard Boggs calling her name. She did not respond. Boggs then “came into
the living room upset because his dog needed to be let out.” Boggs let the dog outside and
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then “slammed the door when the dog came back in,” waking W.B. M.G. tried to get W.B.
back to sleep. Boggs stated “angrily,” “No, it’s okay, [W.B]. You can be awake. Everyone
else is awake; you might as well be.” “[T]hat fully woke up” W.B. Boggs returned to the
bedroom to go back to sleep.
M.G. entered the bedroom and gave W.B. to Boggs, who was lying in bed. M.G.
stated to Boggs, “If you want [W.B.] to be awake, you can be awake together. I’m going
back to sleep.”
M.G. lay back down on the living room couch. M.G. heard Boggs calling her name
repeatedly. Boggs “then came out into the living room holding” W.B. in one arm. Using
his free hand, Boggs “picked [M.G.] up either by [her] arm or by the sleeve of [her] shirt,”
“lifted [her] over” the ottoman next to the couch, and “dropped [her] on the floor.” M.G.’s
arm hurt and was “red for a while.” Boggs returned to the bedroom with W.B.
M.G. called 911 because she did not know “if [Boggs] would continue to act
violent.” Officers arrived around five minutes after M.G. called 911. They found M.B.
crying and upset. The first officer on scene testified that M.G.’s shirt had “a twist in it
. . . like somebody had grabbed it.” The second officer spoke to Boggs, who was holding
W.B. Boggs told the officer that he and M.G. had an argument but that nothing “physical
happened.” The officer testified that Boggs and W.B. were both “very calm.”
M.G. obtained an order for protection (OFP) against Boggs and moved out shortly
after the incident.
Boggs testified and denied most of the aspects of M.G.’s testimony. Rather, Boggs
claimed that he remembered waking up to a “hysterical” M.G. handing him W.B. before
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Boggs followed M.G. into the living room. Boggs testified that M.G. said, “‘I’m calling
the police’ and . . . that [Boggs] had hit her.”
Boggs— who is six feet six inches tall and 180 pounds— suggested that he could not
have picked up M.G. because he had “[p]ins and plates in [his] left arm” and “sternum
reconstruct[ion].” Boggs testified that he had “limited mobility” in his left arm and that it
was “very painful” to lift “anything over 10 or 15 pounds” “long-term.” M.G.— five feet
three inches tall and 140 pounds during the incident—testified that Boggs’s ability to lift
seemed unaffected. M.G. testified that Boggs worked in “trades jobs” that required lifting
and that he often worked out and lifted weights.
The jury found Boggs guilty of domestic assault—fear but acquitted him of
domestic assault—harm and disorderly conduct. The district court sentenced Boggs to 90
days in jail stayed for one year. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Sufficiency of the evidence of intent
Boggs argues that the circumstantial evidence of his intent was insufficient to prove
him guilty of domestic assault—fear. Whoever commits an act against a family or
household member “with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or
death” is guilty of domestic assault—fear. Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1). The intent
element requires the defendant to have the “purpose” of causing fear of immediate bodily
harm or death or to “believe[] that the act, if successful, will cause” such fear. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2020); see State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 308-09 (Minn. 2012)
(stating that assault—f ear is a specific-intent crime, which requires a showing of intent to
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cause a particular result). “Bodily harm” includes “physical pain or injury” and “any
impairment of physical condition.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 (2020).
“Intent is . . . generally proved . . . by drawing inferences” from the evidence such
as the victim’s reaction, the type of crime, the events surrounding the crime, the
relationship between the defendant and the victim, the defendant’s words and actions, and
“the idea that a person intends the natural consequences of his or her actions.” Stiles v.
State, 664 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Minn. 2003); State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 236 (Minn.
1999 (relationship evidence important to show intent)); State v. Smith, 825 N.W.2d 131,
136-37 (Minn. App. 2012) (victim’s reacti on is circumstantial evidence showing intent),
rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2013); In re Welfare of T.N.Y., 632 N.W.2d 765, 769 (Minn.
App. 2001) (character of and events surrounding crime relevant to show intent). Here, the
state proved intent using circumstantial evidence.
When the state uses circumstantial evidence to prove an element of a crime, a
reviewing court applies “a heightened two- step standard” of review to the sufficiency of
the evidence. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). We first “identify the
circumstances proved, ” disregarding evidence inconsistent with the verdict. State v.
Harris, 895 N.W.2d 5 92, 601 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). We then “ determine
whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643 (quotation omitted); see
also State v. Collins, 580 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Minn. App. 1998) (“[F]or a conviction requiring
specific intent to stand, such intent must be the only reasonable inference when the
evidence as a whole is viewed in the light most favorable to the state.”), rev. denied (Minn.
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July 16, 1998). We “give no deference to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences.”
Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
The circumstances proved include (1) Boggs lifted M.G. by her arm or her shirt and
dropped her; (2) Boggs was holding W.B.; (3) Boggs is significantly larger than M.G.;
(4) M.G.’s arm hurt and was “red for a while”; (5) M.G. called 911 because she did not
know “if [Boggs] would continue to act violent”; (6) responding officers found M.G. crying
and upset; (7) an officer observed that M.G.’s shirt had “a twist in it . . . like somebody had
grabbed it”; (8) M.G. moved out after the incident; and (9) M.G. got an OFP protecting her
from Boggs.
We conclude that an inference of intent is the only reasonable one to be drawn from
the circumstances proved. Given the character of Boggs’s acts, especially with the size
disparity between him and M.G., the natural and probable result of Boggs’s acts was
causing M.G. fear of immediate bodily harm from being grabbed, lifted, and dropped, and
of potentially further violence. In fact, M.G. described Boggs’s conduct as “violent.”
Moreover, M.G.’s reaction of calling 911, subsequent move-out, and OFP against
Boggs lead only to the inference that Boggs actually caused M.G. to fear immediate bodily
harm. Relationship evidence of Boggs’s frequent anger toward M.G., including the
wall- and bed-punching incidents, also support the inference that Boggs would have
expected to cause M.G. fear of immediate bodily harm from lifting and dropping M.G. but
did so anyway, even while holding W.B.
Boggs asserts that based on his words, his demeanor, and the circumstances before
and after the incident, there are reasonable hypotheses that he “was trying to wake up M.G.
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or . . . discuss their joint child.” But Boggs fails to show a reasonable inference that he did
not intend to cause fear of immediate bodily harm to M.G. If anything, Boggs’s argument
demonstrates that he tried forcing M.G. to get up and take W.B. by causing her fear of
immediate bodily harm so that Boggs could return to sleep. As such, the circumstantial
evidence of intent is sufficient.
Legal consistency of verdicts
Alternatively, Boggs argues that the guilty verdict of domestic assault—fear is
legally inconsistent with acquitting him of domestic assault—harm and disorderly conduct.
“Whether verdicts are legally inconsistent is a question of law reviewed de novo.” State v.
Laine, 715 N.W.2d 425, 434-35 (Minn. 2006).
Boggs specifically argues that because the jury acquitted him of domestic assault—
harm, it must have rejected evidence that Boggs lifted and dropped M.G. Boggs claims
that if the jury credited M.G.’s testimony that he committed this act, it “would have had to
find that this act was committed with intent and convict” Boggs of domestic assault—harm.
Boggs is incorrect.
An acquittal on one count and a finding of guilty on another count can be logically
inconsistent, but cannot be legally inconsistent. Id. at 435. “Legal inconsistency occurs
only when proof of the elements of one offense negates a necessary element of another
offense.” State v. Christensen, 901 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Minn. App. 2017) (quotation
omitted). “A legally inconsistent verdict requires that two guilty verdicts be mutually
exclusive.” Id.
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Here, even if the guilty verdict of domestic assault—fear w as logically inconsistent
with acquitting Boggs of domestic assault—h arm and disorderly conduct, the jury found
Boggs guilty of only one charge. The jury could have done this under its power of lenity
to limit his punishment. See State v. Newman, 408 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Minn. App. 1987)
(stating jury has power of lenity to return verdict of not guilty despite law and facts of the
case), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 1987). Because the jury did not render multiple guilty
verdicts, its verdicts are legally consistent. See State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 326 (Minn.
2005) (holding that logical inconsistency—between a verdict of acquittal on one count and
a verdict of guilty on another count—does not warrant new trial).
Affirmed.