State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1750

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Paul Scott Seeman,
Appellant.

Filed January 16, 2024
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-20-3077

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Jessica A. Bierwerth, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that his conviction of second-degree test refusal must be reversed
because the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to modify the pattern
jury instruction to include a definition of “under the influence.” In a pro se supplemental
brief, appellant also argues that probable cause did not support his arrest and that law
enforcement violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. We affirm.
FACTS
On December 17, 2020, just after 1:00 a.m., a sheriff’s deputy observed a pick-up
truck traveling without illuminated taillights and initiated a stop after observing it touch
the fog line at least once. The deputy spoke with the lone occupant, appellant Paul Scott
Seeman, who had the driver-side window down when the deputy approached. After
checking appellant’s driver’s license, the deputy learned of an active Rice County warrant
for appellant’s arrest, reapproached appellant’s vehicle, and asked appellant if he knew
about the warrant. A ppellant said “no.” The deputy asked appellant to step out of the
vehicle until they learned whether Rice County wanted appellant held. The deputy patted
appellant down, handcuffed him, and patted him down again before placing him in the back
of the deputy’s squad car.1 Appellant stopped answering the deputy’s questions after the
second pat-down.

1 The parties do not dispute that appellant was arrested at this point.
3
Two other officers arrived on-scene to assist. After talking to the officers, the
deputy asked appellant to step out of the squad car. The deputy smelled an “alcoholic
beverage” coming from the back passenger seat of the squad car. Once outside, the deputy
smelled alcohol coming from appellant and noticed that appellant’s eyes were bloodshot,
watery, and that his pupils were constricted. The deputy patted appellant down again and
asked him if there was anything in his truck that the officers should know about. Appellant
asked if he was under arrest, and the deputy responded, “right now, for the warrant, yeah.”
Rice County then informed the deputy by radio that they did not want appellant held. 2
The deputy then asked whether appellant had anything to drink that night and shined
his flashlight towards appellant’s eyes. Appellant asked the deputy, “Am I under arrest, or
no?” The deputy responded that he was not under arrest for the warrant and again asked
appellant how much he had had to drink. Appellant did not answer the question but stated,
“so, you can take these handcuffs off right f--king now.” The deputy repeated the question,
and appellant repeated his response. After the deputy repeated the question a third time,
appellant asked if the deputy was going to remove the handcuffs. The deputy responded,
“not right now, with the attitude, no.” The deputy asked appellant if he would perform
field sobriety tests (FSTs) and informed appellant that he was now being investigated for

2 In appellant’s pro se supplemental brief, he alleges that Rice County radioed the deputy
before the deputy removed appellant from the squad car . This rendition of facts is
consistent with appellant’s version of the facts in his memorandum in support of his motion
to dismiss and with the district court’s findings of fact in its order denying appellant’s
motion to dismiss. However, the record and the facts set out in both appellant’s principal
brief and the state’s brief support that the deputy had already removed appellant from the
vehicle when Rice County radioed. Despite these inconsistencies, neither party seems to
dispute the facts on appeal, and they do not impact our analysis.
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drinking and driving, and that appellant would not be under arrest until the deputy was
done investigating. Appellant then indicated that he wanted to speak with an attorney
immediately.
The deputy placed appellant back in the squad car and informed him that he was
under arrest for driving while impaired (DWI). The deputy then told the other officers, “I
can smell it . . . once I brought him back out again.” The deputy took appellant to the
Dakota County Jail, where the officer read appellant a breath-test advisory, and appellant
attempted but was unable to contact an attorney. Appellant continued to refuse to answer
questions or take a breath test.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with second-degree DWI-test
refusal under Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2(1) (2020), and 169A.25, subds. 1(b) and 2
(2020).3 Appellant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing in part that the state lacked
probable cause to arrest him for DWI and that the deputy’s conduct during the encounter
violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. After a contested omnibus hearing, the
district court denied appellant’s motion, determining that both his initial arrest based on
the Rice County warrant and his subsequent arrest for DWI were supported by probable
cause with only a temporary detention between arrests.
In September 2022, the district court held a three-day jury trial. Prior to trial,
appellant requested the district court incl ude the definition of “under the influence” in its

3 The state also charged appellant with driving while impaired under Minn. Stat.
§§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2020), and 169A.26, subds. 1(a) and 2 (2020), which it dismissed
before trial.
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jury instructions. The district court denied appellant’s request, reasoning that the standard
instruction does not define “under the influence” and including the definition may cause
jury confusion regarding the state’s burden of proof.
At trial, the jury found appellant guilty, and the district court entered judgment of
conviction and sentenced appellant to 121 days in jail, with 121 days of credit for time
already served. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request
to define “under the influence” when instructing the jury.

Appellant argues that the district court’s failure to define “under the influence” in
the jury instructions prejudiced his right to a fair trial. We are not persuaded.
“The district court has broad discretion in determining jury instructions and
[appellate courts] will not reverse in the absence of [an] abuse of discretion.” Hilligoss v.
Cargill, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 142, 147 (Minn. 2002). “A district court abuses its discretion
when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). A jury instruction
must fairly and adequately explain the law governing the case and is erroneous if it
materially misstates the applicable law. State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn.
2011).
When an officer has probable cause to believe a person was driving while impaired
and lawfully arrests the person for that reason, a chemical test may be required of the
person. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1 (2020). Under those circumstances, it is a crime
6
for a person to refuse to submit to a chemical test. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1).
Driving while impaired includes driving a motor vehicle while the person is “under the
influence of alcohol.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1).
Here, the district court instructed the jury regarding the crime of refusal to submit
to testing and each element of that crime, consistent with the criminal statute and jury-
instruction guide. See 10A Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 29.21 (Supp. 2021); 10A
Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 29.22 (Supp. 2021). Although the district court did not
define “under the influence,” that is not an element of the crime of refusal to submit to a
chemical test.
Appellant relies on Koppi and State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 2001), to
support his argument that the district court improperly instructed the jury. Both cases are
distinguishable. In Koppi, the supreme court held that the district court abused its
discretion by issuing a jury instruction that erroneously articulated a subjective standard of
probable cause. 798 N.W.2d at 362-64. Probable cause is an element of test refusal. Id.
at 362. Unlike in Koppi, appellant does not claim here that the district court misstated the
law, only that it failed to include a definition that is not in the pattern jury instruction for
the crime and is not an element of the crime. In Kuhnau, the supreme court held that “the
district court abused its discretion by refusing the defendant’s request to include within the
jury instruction on the conspiracy charge all the elements of the substantive crime that was
the object of the conspiracy.” 622 N.W.2d at 553 (emphasis added). The “omission of an
element of the [substantive crime] did not fairly and adequately explain the law of the case
and was error.” Id. at 558. Unlike Kuhnau, the district court did not omit a required
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element of the crime here because the jury did not need to find that appellant was “under
the influence” to find him guilty of test refusal.
State v. Moore, 863 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 21,
2015), also cited by appellant, is particularly instructive here. In Moore, this court held
that a district court must instruct the jury on the statutory definition of “force” when a
defendant is charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct and the state seeks to prove
that the defendant used force to accomplish the crime. 863 N.W.2d at 113-14. This court
reasoned that the jury instruction did not accurately state the applicable statutory definition
under which Moore was charged because the statute defined “force” more narrowly than
the lay definition. Id. at 121-22.
Unlike Moore, Chapter 169A does not define “under the influence.” Further, “under
the influence” has a common, ordinary meaning, which the district court instructed the jury
to apply. See 10A Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 3.29 (2015). As the supreme court stated
in upholding the state’ s DWI statute in State v. Graham , “[t]he expression ‘under the
influence of intoxicating liquor’ is in common, everyday use by the people. It is older than
this law. When used in reference to the driver of a vehicle on the public highways, it
appears to have a well-understood meaning.” 222 N.W. 909, 911 (Minn. 1929).
Because the district court provided an instruction regarding test refusal and its
elements, and because “under the influence” has a common, ordinary meaning, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to include its
definition in the jury instructions.
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II. The district court did not err by determining that the deputy had probable
cause to arrest appellant and that appellant’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights were not violated.

In his pro se supplemental brief , appellant appears to challenge the district court’s
pretrial determination that the deputy had probable cause to arrest him and did not violate
his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.4 We address each issue in turn.
When considering a pretrial motion, appellate courts “review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.” State v. Sargent, 968
N.W.2d 32, 36 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). In applying the clear-error standard, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings, will not
reweigh the evidence, and will not reverse unless we are “left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963
N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). When applying a de novo standard,
the appellate court will not defer to the analysis of the district court but will exercise
independent review. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d at 36.
A. The deputy had probable cause to arrest appellant for DWI.

“Probable cause to arrest exists when, under the totality of [the] facts and
circumstances, a person of ordinary care and prudence would entertain an honest and strong

4 Within his pro se brief, appellant cites to proceedings outside the scope of the record on
appeal. Because our review is limited to documents filed in the district court, the exhibits,
and the transcripts of the district court proceedings, we refuse to address these portions of
appellant’s pro se argument. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01; State v. Maidi , 520 N.W.2d
414, 419-20 (Minn. App. 1994) (“Generally, we may not base our decision on matters outside
the record on appeal, and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence
below.”), aff’d, 537 N.W.2d 280 (Minn. 1995).
9
suspicion that a crime has been committed.” State v. Prax, 686 N.W.2d 45, 48 (Minn. App.
2004) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004). Probable cause is something
more than mere suspicion, but less than the evidence needed for conviction. Id.
At the omnibus hearing, the deputy testified to observing appellant driving just after
1:00 a.m. without illuminated taillights and seeing appellant’s vehicle touch the fog line at
least once. Although the deputy did not initially investigate for evidence of appellant
driving while impaired, he did so as soon as he smelled alcohol co ming from appellant.
The deputy then flashed his light in appellant’s eyes, asked appellant if he had been
drinking, and observed that appellant’s eyes were bloodshot, watery, and his pupils were
constricted. We conclude that the totality of the evidence reasonably supports the district
court’s determination that the deputy had probable cause to arrest appellant for DWI.
B. The district court did not err by determining that the deputy did not
violate appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
10, of the Minnesota Constitution protect the “right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend.
IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Appellate courts analyze an alleged violation in two steps:
(1) determining whether the officer’s cond uct constituted a search or seizure and
(2) determining whether the officer engaged in unreasonable conduct. Sargent, 968
N.W.2d at 37. For the second step, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that “each
incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [must] be tied to and justified by . . . (1) the
original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or
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(3) reasonableness.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn. 2004). To determine
whether an officer’s conduct is reasonable, courts must apply an objective standard and ask
whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, “the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure [would] warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the
action taken was appropriate.” Id. at 364 (quotation omitted).
Here, appellant challenges whether the deputy had probable cause to arrest him for
DWI and whether it was reasonable for the deputy to keep him handcuffed throughout the
encounter. As noted above, the record supports the district court’s determination that the
deputy had probable cause to arrest appellant. Further, the deputy ’s decision to keep
appellant handcuffed was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances. The
deputy had only just learned that Rice County did not want appellant held, it was late at
night, and appellant appeared hostile immediately upon the deputy asking about drinking.
Under the circumstances, the deputy’s conduct did not violate appellant’s Fourth
Amendment rights.
C. Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated because
appellant was not “in custody” when the deputy initiated the DWI
investigation.

Appellant did not raise his Fifth Amendment argument as a separate issue, but
instead mentioned it within the purview of his Fourth Amendment arguments before the
district court and now on appeal.
“[U]nder the Fifth Amendment, a criminal defendant has a right against self-
incrimination and [must be] informed of that right.” State v. Mellett, 642 N.W.2d 779, 787
(Minn. App. 2002) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)), rev. denied
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(Minn. July 16, 2002). However, “[t]he right to a Miranda warning attaches only during
custodial interrogation.” Id. Whether a person is in custody is an objective inquiry that
requires a district court to determine “whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation
would have understood that [they were] in custody.” Id. “If a suspect is not under arrest,
a district court must consider all of the surrounding circumstances and assess whether a
reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have believed [they were] in custody to
the degree associated with arrest.” Id.
State v. Werner, 725 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. App. 2007), is instructive here. In Werner,
the defendant was lawfully stopped, handcuffed, and arrested for an outstanding felony
warrant. 725 N.W.2d at 769. While discussing the warrant with the defendant, officers
noticed he had bloodshot, glassy eyes and smelled of alcohol. Id. An officer asked the
defendant if he had been drinking, and appellant indicated that he had. Id. While the
defendant was handcuffed, the officer administered two verbal FSTs and then uncuffed the
defendant for the physical tests. Id. The officer then told the defendant that, based on the
tests, he believed the defendant was impaired, and the only way to avoid being arrested for
suspicion of DWI was to take and pass a preliminary breath test. Id. This court concluded
that, because the defendant was under no additional restraint beyond those imposed on him
for arrest on the warrant, he was not in custody. Id. at 771. This court stated that merely
because a person is arrested on an unrelated warrant and not free to leave is not dispositive
of whether an interrogation occurred for Miranda purposes. Id.
Considering Werner, although appellant’s unrelated warrant arrest had ended before
the deputy’s questions regarding drinking began, the record supports the district court’s
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determination that appellant was no longer “in custody” for Miranda purposes. The deputy
repeatedly told appellant that he was no longer under arrest for the warrant, but that the
deputy was investigating drinking and driving, and that appellant wouldn’t be under arrest
until after the investigation. See State v. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2012)
(noting that an officer expressly informing suspect they are not under arrest is factor
indicating that suspect is not in custody). Although appellant remained handcuffed, it was
because he had just previously been lawfully arrested. So long as the deputy’s actions are
reasonable, handcuffing does not per se transform an investigatory detention into an arrest.
State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Minn. 1999). Here, appellant’s hostile demeanor
in response to the deputy’s questions about drinking supported the reasonableness of the
deputy keeping appellant handcuffed. Further, appellant did not answer the deputy’s
questions about drinking. Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated.
Appellant argues briefly that the deputy’s actions were coercive and implicate the
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, citing Frost v. R.R. Comm’ n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583
(1926) (invalidating statute that required petitioner to give up a constitutional right as a
condition to enjoyment of a privilege). Because appellant did not raise these arguments to
the district court, they are not properly before us, and we decline to address them. See
Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (stating that appellate courts generally
do not decide issues not raised before the district court).
Appellant further contends that there is sufficient evidence in the record for this
court to conclude that appellant ultimately remained arrested for the Rice County warrant.
Because we have concluded that appellant’s arrest for the Rice County warrant en ded
13
before his arrest for DWI began, and because appellant again seeks our review of
information outside the appellate record, we do not address his argument. Maidi , 520
N.W.2d at 419-20; Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01.
Affirmed.