State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1752

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Stacey Kay Johnson,
Appellant.

Filed December 18, 2023
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CR-21-3095

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for first-degree assault, appellant
Stacey Kay Johnson argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the district court
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prevented her from presenting a complete defense when it excluded two pieces of evidence
offered by the defense. First, Johnson argues that the district court improperly excluded
evidence that, after Johnson’s arrest, the alleged victim—Johnson’s ex-boyfriend, M.D.—
stole money from her, which Johnson offered to challenge M.D.’s credibility. Second,
Johnson argues that the district court improperly excluded testimony from a police officer
that Johnson said “why” when she was arrested, which Johnson offered to show her
reaction to being arrested. Because we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
evidentiary rulings, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts are drawn from the jury trial in this case and the district court
proceedings.
Early in the summer of 2021, Johnson and M.D. ended their seven- or eight-year,
intermittent relationship. But, later in the summer, M.D. allowed Johnson to live in his
apartment again because Johnson had nowhere else to stay.
According to M.D., one night in August 2021 , he fell asleep on the couch with his
keys and wallet on the floor next to the couch. M.D. owned a knife, which he kept inside a
plastic sheath on a side table next to the couch. M.D. did not move, unsheathe, or otherwise
touch the knife that night. Sometime that night, M.D. awoke to go to the bathroom. When
he returned to the living room, M.D. saw Johnson going through his pants pockets and his
wallet and he saw her grab his keys. M.D. walked up behind Johnson, grabbed her by the
shoulders, and asked her what she was doing. Although M.D. did not see exactly what
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happened, he suddenly felt a burning sensation in his arm and felt his arm get wet. When
he looked down, he saw that his arm was covered in blood.
A woman, L.C., was in an apartment across the hall. She heard a voice saying, “No,
no, don’t,” and then heard a “horrific” scream. L.C. knocked on M.D.’s apartment door,
and M.D. came to the door bleeding profusely. Johnson told L.C. to “get the f---” out of
there. L.C. called the police, and an officer arrived shortly thereafter. When the officer
entered M.D.’s apartment, he saw a large amount of blood on the floor and saw M.D.
standing next to the couch with two towels wrapped around his arm as tourniquets. M.D.
told the officer that he needed to go to the hospital. When the officer asked M.D. what had
happened, M.D. said that he fell on a knife. An ambulance arrived on the scene, and M.D.
was taken to the local Brainerd hospital.
The officer checked the apartment and confirmed that Johnson was the only other
person there. After asking Johnson some questions about what had happened, the officer
arrested Johnson and handcuffed her. According to the officer, upon arrest Johnson was
emotional and crying and went limp. The officer did not recall Johnson being “surprised.”
When M.D. arrived at the hospital, he had no pulse in his right arm, and, when his
homemade tourniquets were removed, his arm began to bleed so profusely that a new
tourniquet had to be applied. Because of suspected arterial injuries, arrangements were
made to transfer M.D. to a hospital in St. Cloud.
Before the transfer took place, a second police officer spoke with M.D. This time,
M.D. told the officer that Johnson stabbed him in the arm when he confronted her about
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the keys. In searching the apartment, officers found a knife with blood on it lying on the
floor between the side table and the wall.
M.D. underwent two surgeries to repair a lacerated brachial artery and a nearly
severed median nerve. He was in the hospital for six or seven days, was unable to work for
over a month, and continued to suffer from pain for months thereafter.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Johnson with first- degree assault, in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.221, subdivision 1 (2020), and second-degree
assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.222,
subdivision 2 (2020).
Before trial, Johnson filed a motion in limine asking the district court to permit her
to question M.D. on cross-examination about his stealing funds from Johnson’s bank
account while she was incarcerated following her arrest. Johnson also asked for permission
to introduce extrinsic evidence of the theft. The district court denied Johnson’s motion
under Minnesota Rules of Evidence 608(b) and 403.
At trial, defense counsel cross-examined the arresting officer about Johnson’s
reaction to being arrested. Defense counsel asked, “Didn’t she blurt out ‘why’?” The state
objected on hearsay grounds. The district court initially overruled the objection but, after a
brief sidebar conference, sustained the state’s objection. The following day, the district
court heard additional arguments from the parties on the issue and ultimately decided to
exclude the evidence under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403.
The jury found Johnson guilty of both charges. The district court convicted her of
first-degree assault and sentenced her to 96 months in prison.
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Johnson appeals.
DECISION
Johnson argues that she was prevented from presenting a complete defense when
the district court denied her requests to introduce (1) evidence that M.D. stole money from
Johnson’s bank account after her arrest and (2) testimony from the arresting officer that
Johnson said “why” when she was arrested.
The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect
a criminal defendant’s right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. See
U.S. Const. amend XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. A criminal defendant’s due process right
to present a complete defense generally “yields to the application of an evidentiary rule
unless the rule ‘infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of the accused and [is] arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes [the rule is] designed to serve’” or unless the rules of
evidence “serve no legitimate purpose or . . . are disproportionate to the ends that they are
asserted to promote.” State v. Pass, 832 N.W.2d 836, 841-42 (Minn. 2013) (alteration in
original) (quoting Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324-26 (2006)).
“[Appellate courts] review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion, even when, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived
him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”
State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017). “A district court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 256 (Minn. 2021) (quotation
omitted).
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If an evidentiary ruling reaches the level of a constitutional error, the standard of
review is whether the exclusion of the evidence was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 310, 331 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Evidence of Alleged Theft of Funds

Johnson argues that the district court abused its discretion by precluding her from
introducing evidence that M.D. stole funds from her bank account while she was
incarcerated pending trial. Johnson argues that evidence of M.D.’s alleged theft was
admissible for two reasons: (1) it was probative of M.D.’s credibility and character for
truthfulness and (2) it was relevant to show a motive t o fabricate testimony—namely, to
keep Johnson incarcerated so that M.D. would not face consequences for taking her money.
Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 608(b), a district court may allow a party to
cross-examine witnesses about specific instances of conduct that are probative of a
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. The rule does not require the district court to
admit all evidence that is probative of a witness’s character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness. Rather, evidence of specific acts of conduct that bear on a witness’s
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness is admissible “in the discretion of the court.”
Minn. R. Evid. 608(b).
Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403, a district court may exclude relevant
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay [or] waste of time.”
Here, the district court explained its decision to exclude the evidence as follows:
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My ruling is that this evidence will not be allowed. Under Rule
608(b), I do not find that there is enough information here to
indicate that it ’s particularly probative as to truthfulness or
untruthfulness as the whole issue could just open up a—just a
sideshow of a lot of reasons why if this in fact did happen,
rationalizations he would have for it, I don’t find it particularly
probative as to truthfulness or untruthfulness.

Under 403 of evidence, to the extent there may be some
probative value, I find the probative value to be substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, and inefficiency and undue delay and waste of time.
Therefore, I am not going to allow that evidence.

Johnson argues that the ruling was erroneous because M.D.’s credibility was the
most important aspect of the case and evidence that M.D. stole money from Johnson while
she was incarcerated was relevant to his credibility. Johnson asserts that M.D.’s credibility
was particularly important because M.D. changed his story regarding what happened the
night of the incident several times.
On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling. During
arguments on the issue, defense counsel stated that Johnson had a statement from her bank
showing transfers bringing her account balance from $2,799 down to $.90 during the
months that she was incarcerated before trial. But the state argued that the document did
not indicate who made the transfers or whether Johnson and M.D. had joint use of the
account or the money. Moreover, the state observed that the defense had ample other bases
for impeaching M.D.’s credibility: M.D. had felony convictions, and he changed his story
about the stabbing over the course of the night. We conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it determined that the evidence of the alleged theft of Johnson’s
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funds after her arrest was not particularly probative of M.D.’s character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness and denied admission of the evidence under rule 608(b).
Moreover, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of the
evidence under rule 403. The district court noted that the evidence could open up a
“sideshow” regarding if and why M.D. transferred Johnson’s money. In addition, the state
argued that questioning M.D. about this specific instance of conduct would be highly
prejudicial because he would likely invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it concluded that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed
by other concerns and denied admission of the evidence under rule 403.
Johnson’s Statement of “Why” Upon Arrest

We turn to Johnson’s second challenge. At trial, Johnson’s counsel cross-examined
the arresting officer and the following exchange ensued:
Q: [W]hen [Johnson] was placed under arrest, handcuffed, she
appeared very surprised. Is that not correct?
A: Umm—

Q: Do you recall?
A: I recall arresting her. I don’t recall her being surprised as
much as emotional.

Q: Okay. In what way?
A: Crying and then—and then going limp.

Q: Didn’t she blurt out why?

The state objected to the last question on hearsay grounds, and, after a sidebar, the district
court sustained the state’s objection. Later that day, the district court made a record of its
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ruling and explained that it sustained the state’s objection because Johnson’s statement
could be understood as “meaning why am I being arrested” and “could appear to be a self-
serving hearsay proclamation of innocence.” After further argument, the district court
confirmed its ruling because it did not “discern any [probative] value other than to prove
that [Johnson] was surprised she was being arrested because she was . . . innocent.”
The next day, both parties provided more argument on the issue. Johnson’s trial
counsel argued that Johnson’s statement fell into the state-of-mind hearsay exception under
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 803(3) because the statement expressed her surprise at being
placed under arrest. The district court agreed that the statement “could certainly be” an
expression of state of mind under rule 803(3). But the district court ultimately excluded the
evidence. It ruled not that the evidence was barred by the hearsay rule but that, under
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403, the evidence should be excluded because any relevance
that the statement had was “slight” and the statement’s relevance was “outweighed by the
danger of confusion of the issues and other concerns laid out in Rule 403.”
Johnson asserts that the district court erred when it did not allow her to introduce
the evidence because her statement was relevant, it was not hearsay, and, if it was hearsay,
it fell within the state-of-mind hearsay exception.
Although the district court did not ultimately exclude the evidence based on the
hearsay rule, we address the rule because it informed the district court’s decision under
rule 403. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Absent an exception, hearsay is not admissible . Minn. R.
Evid. 802. Johnson argues that her statement “why” was not hearsay because she was not
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offering it to prove the truth of the matter asserted; rather, she was offering her statement
to establish her reaction to being arrested. The district court, though, reasoned that
Johnson’s statement “why” could reasonably be interpreted to mean “why am I being
arrested,” which would be an assertion that she was surprised and thus innocent. Under
these circumstances, the district court reasonably concluded that the statement could be
offered to prove the truth of the matter implicitly asserted— that Johnson was innocent. But
the district court also later concluded that the statement could fall into the rule 803(3) state-
of-mind exception because it could be interpreted as merely demonstrating Johnson’s
condition of being surprised and upset—not just interpreted as an assertion of innocence.
Even so, the district court ultimately excluded the evidence under rule 403 because
it concluded that the probative value was outweighed by the danger of confusion of the
issues and other concerns outlined in the rule.
Challenging that decision, Johnson emphasizes that her statement was relevant to
her defense because it refuted the state’s theory that she knew that she assaulted M.D. But
the district court did not find that Johnson’s statement had no relevance; rather, it found
that Johnson’s statement had “slight” relevance. The ambiguity of the statement “why,” in
conjunction with the admitted testimony from the officer describing Johnson’s emotional
reaction to being arrested, supports the district court’s finding that Johnson’s statement had
relatively low probative value.
In addition, the record supports the district court’s determination that the statement’s
probative value was outweighed by other concerns in rule 403. “[T]he term ‘prejudice’ in
[r]ule 403 does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate
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probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from
the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” State v. Mosley, 853
N.W.2d 789, 797 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). “Consequently, if relevant evidence
has the effect of persuading the jury through illegitimate means, it must be excluded from
trial.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 299 (Minn. 2019).
The district court explained that, to the extent that Johnson’s statement is interpreted
as a proclamation of innocence, the statement would be a “self-serving” statement. A
criminal defendant’s self-serving out-of-court statements are generally inadmissible
because they allow the “defendant the opportunity to present [their] version of the facts
without ever being subject to cross-examination by the state.” State v. Taylor, 258 N.W.2d
615, 622 (Minn. 1977) ; see also Dolo v. State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 367 n.9 (Minn. 2020)
(concluding that the defendant’s out -of-court statements denying sexual abuse were
inadmissible self-serving hearsay). Although Johnson’s statement may have also had a
non-prejudicial interpretation, the record shows that the district court was concerned about
an interpretation that could persuade the jury by illegitimate means. On this record, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded this evidence
under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403.
Because we conclude that the district court’s evidentiary rulings did not constitute
an abuse of discretion, we need not reach the question whether any error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.