In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: C. R. H., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1766

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: C. R. H., Parent.

Filed June 12, 2023
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-22-459

Anne Morris Carlson, Anne M. Carlson Law Office, P.L.L.C., St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant C.R.H.)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mary M. Lynch, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services and
Public Health Department)

Paula Brummel, Assistant Hennepin County Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
children)

Sandy Zarembinski, Minneapolis, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
The district court terminated a woman’s parental rights to six children. We conclude
that the district court did not err by finding that the county made reasonable efforts to
reunite her with the children. Therefore, we affirm.

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FACTS
C.R.H. is the biological mother of six children who, at the time of trial, were
between the ages of 6 and 17 years of age. For ease of reference, we will refer to the
children as Child 1, Child 2, Child 3, Child 4, Child 5, and Child 6.
Between 2000 and 2017, C.R.H. was the subject of multiple reports to county social-
service agencies in the metropolitan area. The first report was made in Hennepin County
in 2000 concerning an older child who is not a subject of this appeal. In 2006 , Hennepin
County made a finding of maltreatment after C.R.H. refused to allow a surgery for an injury
to Child 1. In 2011, C.R.H. was referred to Hennepin County after an incident of domestic
violence in the presence of Child 1. In 2012, Dakota County became involved after Child 4
was born with a low birth weight. In 2013, Ramsey County placed Child 1, Child 2,
Child 3, and Child 4 on a 72-hour welfare hold after C.R.H. experienced hallucinations and
received emergency psychiatric care. In 2014, Hennepin County received a report of
educational neglect of three of the children. Also in 2014, Hennepin County received a
report that seven-year-old Child 2 had smoked cigarettes and marijuana that he found in
C.R.H.’s home. In 2015, Hennepin County filed a CHIPS petition after one-year-old
Child 5 was treated at a hospital for first- and second-degree burns and Child 2 was
observed to have an untreated cut that required stitches.
Multiple reports in 2021 led to these court proceedings. In February 2021, Hennepin
County received a report that the six children were being neglected. According to the
report, C.R.H. had experienced hallucinations, and her home was in disarray, with multiple
people living there, food rotting in the refrigerator, and water pooling in the basement.
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C.R.H. admitted to not taking her schizophrenia medication, and she was placed on a
mental-health hold. The report also indicated that C.R.H. had withdrawn the children from
school, explaining that they could teach themselves without a curriculum. Hennepin
County developed a case plan, which required C.R.H. to take her medication and to enroll
the children in school. In May 2021, Hennepin County received a report that C.R.H. left
the three younger children alone at night. Hennepin County created a safety plan for the
children and referred C.R.H. to an adult rehabilitative mental-health services (ARMHS)
worker. In August 2021, Hennepin County received a report that residents of a
Minneapolis homeless encampment where C.R.H. lived had expressed concern for her
children. According to the report, the children were seen walking through the homeless
encampment unaccompanied, often with little to no clothing, and were left unattended at
night. The report also stated that C.R.H.’s van, which the children sometimes occupied,
was “hazardous.”
In early September 2021, Hennepin County filed a CHIPS petition, in which both
C.R.H. and the children’s biological father were named as respondents. The district court
issued an emergency protective-care order that directed the county to take custody of the
six children and later ordered their out-of-home placement. The three older children moved
to the home of R.M., who is the father of one of C.R.H.’s adult children, and the three
younger children were placed in foster care.
In November 2021, the county referred C.R.H. to a parenting assessor. After a six-
week delay, C.R.H. completed the assessment, which recommended that she complete a
psychological and psychiatric assessment, attend individual therapy, complete an ARMHS
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assessment, attend parenting-education classes, participate in family therapy, submit to
random home-safety checks, and participate in random drug tests to show her sobriety.
C.R.H. completed a psychological assessment, but the assessor indicated that C.R.H.
lacked candor. The county also conducted a safety-check at C.R.H.’s apartment, but a
social worker determined that the apartment was not in a condition suitable for children.
C.R.H. did not submit to the random drug tests, and the record does not reveal whether she
participated in parenting-education classes or family therapy sessions.
In January 2022, the district court adjudicated the children as being in need of
protection or services, and the district court transferred legal custody to the county. The
district court ordered C.R.H. to comply with the county’s case plan, which required her to
complete a psychological evaluation, psychiatric assessment, parenting assessment,
chemical-use assessment, and to follow the recommendations of the evaluators and
assessors. The plan also required C.R.H. to submit to random drug tests, to maintain
communication with the county, to commit to meeting the children’s mental, educational,
and physical needs, and to find and maintain safe and suitable housing. The order also
allowed supervised visitation between C.R.H. and the children.
In early March 2022, the county petitioned to terminate C.R.H.’s parental rights to
the children on four statutory grounds: that C.R.H. failed to comply with her parental
duties, that she is palpably unfit to be a parent, that reasonable efforts have failed to correct
the conditions leading to the out-of- home placement, and that the children are neglected
and in foster care. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8) (2022).
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In late March 2022, C.R.H. completed a psychological evaluation. The evaluator
concluded that C.R.H. suffered from longstanding delusions consistent with schizophrenia
and recommended that C.R.H. continue therapy, work with a provider to manage her
medication, and maintain stable housing, among other things. C.R.H. also completed a
chemical-use assessment, but C.R.H. gave evasive answers, and the assessor could not
provide a complete recommendation. In June 2022, shortly after she completed the
chemical-use assessment, C.R.H. tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine.
The case was tried on four days in October and November 2022. S even witnesses,
including C.R.H., testified. In December 2022, the district court filed a 36-page order in
which it concluded that the county had proved each of the four statutory grounds for
termination. The district court ordered the termination of all parental rights of both C.R.H.
and the children’s biological father. C.R.H. appeals. The children’s biological father is
not a party to the appeal.
DECISION
C.R.H. argues that the district court erred by granting the county’s petition and
terminating her parental rights. Specifically, she argues that the district court erred by
finding that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite her with the children.
This court reviews an order terminating parental rights “to determine whether the
district court ’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” In re
Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). “Parental rights are
terminated only for grave and weighty reasons,” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370,
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375 (Minn. 1990), but this court gives “considerable deference to the district court’s
decision to terminate parental rights,” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
After a CHIPS adjudication, the district court “shall ensure that reasonable efforts
. . . by the social services agency are made to prevent placement or to eliminate the need
for removal and to reunite the child with the child’s family at the earliest possible time.”
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2022). In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the district
court “shall make specific findings . . . that reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency
plan to reunify the child and the parent were made including individualized and explicit
findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts made by the social services agency to
rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2022).
In making those findings, the district court “shall consider” various statutory factors. Minn.
Stat. § 260.012(h) (2022). The reasonable efforts that are required of a county social-
services agency depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. See In re Children of
T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 710 (Minn. 2005); In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d
648, 663 (Minn. App. 2018). This court applies a clear-error standard of review to a district
court’s findings of the underlying facts relevant to whether a county has made the required
reasonable efforts. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 387; In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865
N.W.2d 315, 321-23 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015); see also In re
Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 899-902 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied
(Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). We apply an abuse-of -discretion standard of review to a district
court’s ultimate finding as to whether a county has made the required reasonable efforts.
D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 321-23 (citing J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 899-902).
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In this case, the district court made extensive findings concerning the county’s
efforts to reunite the children with C.R.H. The district c ourt found that the county
“exercised due diligence to prevent foster care placement and to offer services that were
timely, available, relevant, and culturally appropriate for the children and family, to remedy
the circumstances requiring the foster care placement and permit reunification.” The
district court also found that the county “developed a case plan for [C.R.H.] to address the
concerns for which the case opened,” which included C.R.H.’s “mental health, chemical
dependency, housing instability, and educational neglect of the children.” Based on that
case plan, the county made referrals for several services to “address [C.R.H.’s] many
needs.” The district court further found that, “[d]espite the services offered, [C.R.H.] made
minimal progress on her case plan.” The district court found that C.R.H. used alcohol and
other chemicals during the CHIPS case, that C.R.H. was “inconsistent in taking her
medication,” that C.R.H. “attended three therapy appointments, but did not attend any other
mental health therapy appointments,” and that C.R.H. “obtained housing during the case,
but preferred to continue living and spending time at the encampment.” The record
supports the district court’s findings.
C.R.H. argues that the district court erred for three specific reasons.
First, C.R.H. contends that it is “unclear” whether the county “assisted [her] in
addressing her inadequacies as a homeschool education provider.” The record shows that
the county sought to address the children’s educational needs by ensuring that they attended
public schools, not by accommodating C.R.H.’s preference for what she described as
homeschooling. In the spring of 2021, the county observed no evidence that C.R.H. was
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actually homeschooling the children; no textbooks, educational materials, or school work
were present at her home. The county prepared a case plan that required C.R.H. to re-
enroll the children in public schools, and she agreed in the summer of 2021 to do so. When
the children were removed from C.R.H.’s care near the beginning of the 2021-2022
academic year, all of them were significantly lagging in their educational progress: 17-
year-old Child 1 performed at a fourth-grade level; Child 2 and Child 3 were significantly
behind in their learning; nine-year -old Child 4 had “barely attended school”; eight-year -
old Child 5 had to “start[] from scratch” in Math and E nglish; and six-year-old Child 6
“had not attended school at all.” The county ensured that the children were enrolled in
public schools and helped facilitate the implementation of individual educational plans. A
social worker testified that, despite inconsistent attendance, the children made educational
progress since being removed from C.R.H.’s care. The county’s efforts to ensure that the
children are educated in a structured school setting were reasonable, and the county was
not required to train C.R.H. to be an effective homeschool teacher.
Second, C.R.H. contends that it is unclear whether the county made reasonable
efforts with respect to her “need for respite care, daycare, [and] after-school activities.”
“The nature of the services which constitute ‘reasonable efforts’ depends on the problem
presented.” In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1996). C.R.H. does not
explain how the services she identifies would have addressed the significant issues that led
to the children’s out- of-home placement, which were her mental-health issues, her
chemical dependency, housing instability, and educational neglect. C.R.H. also does not
explain how additional services relating to respite care, daycare, and after-school activities
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would have benefitted her between September 2021, when the children were removed from
her home, and October 2022, when the termination case went to trial. During the first
seven months of that period, C.R.H. had a right to only supervised visitation. After April
2022, when C.R.H. left a visitation center with Child 6, she had no right to visitation. The
county’s obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunite C.R.H. with the children does not
require the county to provide daily, routine care for the children.
Third, C.R.H. contends that the county “failed to present evidence that it ever
assisted [C.R.H.] in obtaining suitable clothing by o ffering her clothing vouchers prior to
removing the children.” Again, C.R.H. does not explain how the county’s obtaining
clothing for the children would have addressed the significant issues that led to the
children’s out-of-home placement. Nonetheless, the record shows that the county provided
vouchers to the foster parents for purchases of clothing for the children. The county’s
obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunite C.R.H. with the children does not require
the county to do more with respect to the children’s need for clothing.
Thus, the district court did not err by finding that Hennepin County made reasonable
efforts to reunite C.R.H. with the children. Therefore, the district court did not err by
granting the county’s petition and terminating her parental rights to the six children.
Affirmed.