In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: D. R. L. and J. L. D., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1815

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: D. R. L. and J. L. D., Parents.

Filed June 26, 2023
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Koochiching County District Court
File No. 36-JV-22-547

Kimberly A. Wimmer, Wimmer Law Office, PLLC, Littlefork, Minnesota (for appellant
D.R.L.)

Erica Austad, Austad Law Office, Baudette, Minnesota (for appellant J.L.D.)

Jeffrey Naglosky, Koochiching County Attorney, Molly J. French, Assistant County
Attorney, International Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Koochiching County Public
Health and Human Services)

Brittany Stolt, International Falls, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

G.M., Rochester, Minnesota ( self-represented respond ent intervenor)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this appeal following the termination of their parental rights, appellants challenge
the district court’s determinations that statutory bases for termination exist , termination is
in the best interests of the child , and the county provided reasonable efforts to reunify the
family. In addition, appellants argue that the district erred in denying their alternative
petitions to transfer custody. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-father and appellant-mother are the parents of one child, born in 2017. In
January 2022, respondent Koochiching C ounty Public Health and Human Services (the
county) filed a CHIPS petition against mother and father alleging that the child was in need
of protection or services (the CHIPS petition) after mother was arrested for driving under
the influence of methamphetamine. The child was placed in emergency protective care
and later placed in the care of his maternal aunt. At the time that the CHIPS petition was
filed, father was in custody awaiting sentencing for possession of methamphetamine.
Father was subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment and he is eligible for release
in September 2024. Mother and father entered admissions to the CHIPS petition, and the
district court adjudicated the child in need of protection or services on January 26, 2022.
Two months after the child was removed, the county filed an out of home placement
plan (“case plan”) setting forth reunification requirements for mother and father. The case
plan required mother to obtain a chemical use assessment, start individual therapy, obtain
chemical health services, abstain from using any illegal or unprescribed drugs, submit to
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random drug tests, and avoid spending time with people that us e illegal substances. The
case plan also allowed for mother to visit with the child three or mor e times a week under
supervision. The case plan was later updated to require that mother maintain stable housing
and enroll the child into therapy. The case plan required that father obtain an updated
chemical use assessment, follow the recommendations o f the assessment, comply with all
conditions of probation, abstain from using any illegal or unprescribed drugs, and submit
to random drug tests. Mother signed the case plan, but father did not.
On August 16, 2022, the county petitioned to terminate mother and father’s parental
rights. A month later, the district court relieved the county of its duty to provide reasonable
efforts towards reunification under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.012 (2022). The case
proceeded to trial, and on November 7 and 8, 2022, the district court heard testimony from
mother, father, the social worker, four counselors who worked with mother in various
therapy programs, the child’s maternal grandparents, the child’s maternal aunt, the child’s
former foster parent, and the chi ld’s guardian ad litem (GAL). The following factual
summary is based on the evidence presented at trial.
The child’s maternal grandfather testified that mother had a long history of chemical
dependency issues and continues to surround herself with “the wrong crowd.” He believed
that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child, and he
expressed concern about the child going back to mother’s care and her ability to remain
sober. The child’s maternal grandmother agreed tha t termination of parental rights was in
the best interests of the child. Additionally, the child’s maternal aunt and child’s former
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foster parent testified that they supported the termination of mother and father’s parental
rights given their concerns tha t the child would not be safe in mother’s care.
Father testified that after he learned of the CHIPS petition proceedings, he
immediately reached out to the social worker to determine what he needed to do to reunify
with the child. The social worker provid ed him with a draft case plan and specific goals
for father to accomplish. In his testimony, father acknowledged that he had direct contact
with the social worker and that the social worker gave him a “rough draft of things [he]
really needed to work on.” The social worker testified that she emailed father with a draft
case plan and discussed what father would need to work on, but because the outcome of
father’s criminal case remained uncertain—including whether father would be referred to
treatment court—she did not “want to give [father] an exact plan.” Father was not referred
to treatment court and was sentenced to prison until his anticipated release in 2024.
After sentencing, father was not provided with and did not sign the final, written
case plan that the county filed with its CHIPS petition. However, both father and the social
worker testified that they remained in contact and that they discussed father’s enrollment
in parenting classes, inpatient treatment, and college courses while incarcerated . In
addition to maintaining direct contact with father, the social worker provided father with
parenting materials—including a book to assist father with a parenting course —and an
outline of programming. The social worker testified that father was compl ying with the
terms laid out in the case plan while incarcerated, despite not having signed the case plan.
The social worker also acknowledged that she had minimal contact with the detention
facility but explained that this was because she was communicating directly with father.
5
The social worker testified that , after the child was removed from mother’s care in
January 2022, mother obtained a chemical use assessment, which recommended outpatient
treatment. Mother enrolled in a treatment program at Rainy River Recovery, a n addiction
treatment center. On February 3, mother tested positive for methamphetamine use, but she
continued participating in programing at Rainy River . The county began allowing her
unsupervised visits with the child on the weekends. In June, mother spent time with an
individual who was known by the social worker to abuse drugs. Shortly after, mother
tested positive for marijuana use and admitted using marijuana to her social worker. In
June, mother planned a weekend camping trip with the child and a nother person who was
known by the county to abuse methamphetamine. The social worker testified that she
asked mother to have this person submit a drug test before the trip. Mother and this person
went to the county offices to submit to the requested drug test, but ultimately, this person
did not take a drug test. Mother went camping with the child and this person anyway and
initially denied that she did so to the social worker. The social worker testified that mother
did not seem to think that the people with whom she associated was an issue for her or a
barrier to her sobriety.
Between February and summer 2022, mother began experiencing strokes leading to
bouts of hospitalization. The social worker testified that she suspected mother of misusing
her prescription medication, but mother denied doing so. In July, mother had an approved
visit with the child at a county fair. Afterward, a law enforcement officer stopped mother’s
vehicle under suspicion of driving while impaired. The matter had not been formally
charged and test results remained pending with the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
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Apprehension as of the time of the termination trial . In September 2022, mother admitted
to relapsing and using methamphetamine. Mother completed an updated chemical use
assessment and began an inpatient treatment program at Recovery Hope Treatment Center.
The program offered medication management , mental health therapy, and other services.
Mother’s counselor at R ecovering Hope testified that, as of the start of trial, mother had
taken advantage of services and active ly participated in the program. She testified that
although mother missed some programing due to health issues, mother regularly attended
programs and had almost progressed into needing a lower level of care.
Mother also provided testimony regarding her immediate future. When asked what
mother’s plans were outside of treatment, mother testified, “I haven’t gotten that far in
planning yet.” Mother tes tified that she currently had an apartment but that she did not
know how long she would have it for as she was not up to date on her rent. Mother did not
know where she would live after finishing treatment but wanted to move away. Mother
also testified that she had a vehicle but admitted that her license was revoked due to driving
under the influence in January and that she had picked up additional charges for driving
after the revocation of her license. Finally, mother testified that she was looking to move
and had an option for employment, but it is unclear from the record whether mother had
secured employment after treatment.
Ultimately, the social worker opined that it would not be in the best interests of the
child to be reunified with or continue to have a relationship with either parent. She testified
that mother failed to maintain sobriety, failed to remain law abiding, and did not complete
7
the recommended therapy. She testified that father had remained sober while incarcerated,
but he was not available to parent in the foreseeable future.
On December 12, 2022, the district court terminated mother and father’s parental
rights. The district court determined that the county proved —by clear and convincing
evidence—the facts necessary to show the existence of the following three statutory bases
for terminating the parental rights of mother and father : (1) mother and father failed to
satisfy their parental duties; (2) mother and father were “palpably unfit” to parent the child;
and (3) reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the out of home
placement. The district court also determined that the county made reasonable efforts to
reunify the family but that those efforts were unsuccessful . Final ly, the district court
determined that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interests, but a transfer
of custody was not . Mother and father appeal the se decisions.
DECISION
First, mother and father contest the district court’s decision t o terminate their
parental rights. Second, they contest the denial of their alternative permanency petition s,
which would have transferred legal custody to the maternal aunt without terminating the
parents’ rights.1 We are not persuaded to reverse these decisions.

1 Father also argues that the district court erred in failing to order a contact agreement
between himself and the child. Although the relevant statute allows for an adopting parent
to enter into an agreement with the birth parent regarding contact, such an agree ment must
be approved in writing by the adoptive parents and the social services agency, and the
district court must first find that the agreement is in the child’s best interests. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.619 (2022). In this case, father submitted a proposed contact agreement, but neither
the adoptive parent nor the county approved the proposal. On appeal, father does not
provide relevant legal authority or analysis to support his position that the district court
8
I. Decision To Terminate Mother’s and Father’s Parental Rights
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). A district court may terminate a person’s
parental rights when at least one statutory condition under Minnes ota Statutes section
260C.301, subdivision 1(b) (2022), exists to support termination, termination is in the
child’s best interests, and reasonable efforts toward reunification were either made or not
required. In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008) ; see Minn.
Stat. § 260.012(a) (2022) (identifying circumstances in which reunification efforts are not
required). The county bears the burden of proving a statutory ground for termination and
must do so by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 2(a); In
re Welfare of Child of H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d 861, 873 (Minn. 2021).
When reviewing termination decisions, appellate courts give “[c]onsidera ble
deference” to the district court due to its “superior position to assess the credibility of
witnesses.” In re Welfare of Child of S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d 723, 733 (Minn. App. 2009)
(quotation omitted); see also Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). We
review the district court’s findings of the underlying facts for clear error (taking into
account the clear -and-convincing evidence standard of proof), but we review the
determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental

need not follow the provisions of section 260C.619, and we decline to address this
argument. See State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d
480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an inadequately briefed question); In re Child
of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 586 n.1 (Minn. App. 2003) (applying Wintz in a n appeal
regarding termination of parental rights ), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2003).
9
rights is present for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d
895, 900-02 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). A fa ctual finding is
clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750
N.W.2d 656, 660- 61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). When reviewing factual findings
for clear error, we do not reconcile conflicting evidence or “weigh the evidence as if trying
the matter de novo.” In re Civil Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn.
2021) (quotation omitted); In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn.
App. 2021) (applying Kenney in a juvenile protection appeal) , rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6,
2021). “When the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is
immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings
to the contrary.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223 (quotation omitted). When reviewing a
decision for an abuse of discretion, we determine whether the district court’s decision is
against logic or the factual findings. In re Welfare of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 660 (Minn.
App. 2018).2

2 We note that neither mother nor father identif ies any specific factual finding s that they
believe w ere clearly erroneous. Nor do they a rgue that the factual findings made by the
district court do not support the district court’s determination. Instead, they argue that the
evidence presented is consistent with alternative findings that the district court should have
made and that, based o n these alternative findings, the district court should not have
terminated their parental rights. Because it is immaterial that the record might provide a
basis for these alternative findings, Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223, we do not accept mother
and father’s argument. Nevertheless, we proceed to review the district court’s underlying
factual findings for clear error and review for an abuse of discretion the determinations that
a statutory basis for termination exist s, termination is in the child’s best interests, and the
county made reasonable efforts toward reunification.
10
A. Statutory Basis for Termination
Mother and father first argue that the county did not present sufficient evidence that
a statutory basis for termination exists. We conclude that the district court’s factual
findings are supported by the record and its determination that a statutory basis for
termination exists is consistent with logic and the factual findings.
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301 provides nine bases for termination, including
if “the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply
with the duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship.” Subd.
1(b)(2) (2022). Parental duties include “providing the child with necessary food, clothing,
shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for the child ’s physical, mental, or
emotional health and development, if the parent is physically and financially able.” Id. To
determine that this statutory basis exists, the “district court must also determine that, at the
time of termination, the parent is not presently able and willing to assume [their]
responsibilities and that the condition will continue for the reasonably foreseeable future .”
A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 655; see also In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn.
1996). Here, the district court determined the county proved by clear and convincing
evidence that both mother and father failed to comply with the duties and responsibilit ies
imposed on them as a parent and that they would not be able to assume their parental duties
in the reasonably foreseeable future. We address the district court’s findings with respect
to mother and father in turn.
As for mother, the district court found that mother “faile[d] to complete multiple
treatment programs for her addiction and remain sober,” and that mother did not have stable
11
housing, a driver’s license, or verified employment. The district court found that mother
had “been to at least four or five in- patient chemical dependency treatment programs and
at least two out-patient programs over the last ten years” and that, at the time of trial, mother
“had only maintained a short period of sobriety in a controlled and supervised setting.”
The district court also found that mother had not established a sober network to help her
remain sober outside of a controlled setting. In addition, the district court reasoned that
mother’s choice to have continued relationships with people using illegal substances
“call[ed] into question the testimony of all of Mother’s treatment providers that indicated
she was learning concepts and applying them to her life.” The district court found that
these factors established that mother could not offer the child safety and stability.
The record supports the district court’s findings. The county established a case plan
for mother which required her to abstain from illegal and nonprescribed substances and
avoid associating with people who were know n to abuse substances . The record shows
that mother tested positive for methamphetamine in February 2022, tested positive for
marijuana in June 2022, and admitted to using methamphetamine again in September 2022.
The record also shows that mother spent time with people that the county believed were
abusing drugs, including going on a weekend camping trip with the child and one such
person, and later denying that she did so. Mother conceded that she was discharged without
completion of an outpatient treatment program in 2022, and at the time of trial, mother was
enrolled in inpatient treatment , but she had only participated in the program for three
weeks. Mother’s father, mother, and sister testified that mother ha d a long history of
substance abuse and had been through numerous inpatient treatment programs before.
12
Along with the county social worker, mother’s family expressed concerns about mother’s
ability to remain sober in the future and each testified that the y supported the county’s
termination petition. Additionally, mother could not provide details regarding her living
situation after completion of her inpatient treatment program, testifying that she “ ha[d]n’t
gotten that far in planning yet ,” did not know how long she would have her current
apartment because she was behind on rent payments, and could not legally drive because
her license was revoked for driving under the influence . Finally, while mother testified
that she had an option for employment in the future, the record at trial was unclear whether
mother had secured employment.
Mother argues that other evidence presented indicates that she complied with her
case plan. Under our standard of review, however, we do not reweigh conflicting evidence
and we do not consider whether th is evidence might provide a reasonable basis for
inferences and findings contrary to the factual findings that the district court made.
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223. For these reasons, we conclude that substantial e vidence in
the record before us clearly and convincingly supports the district court’s factual findings
regarding mother’s ability and willingness to comply with the duties of a parent and child
relationship. In addition, given these findings of fact, we conclude that t he district court’s
determination that a statutory basis for termination exists under subdivision 1(b)(2) is
consistent with these factual findings and logic.
With respect to father, the district court found that father had not been present in the
child’s life, did not have a strong bond with the child, and had not exercised parenting time
in the past due to incarceration and a difficult relationship with mother. The district court
13
found that father had not provided regular care for the chil d in the past and that he will be
unable to in the foreseeable future based on his “ongoing issues with chemical dependency
and the legal system.” The district court noted that father w ould be incarcerated until
September 2024 and had been unable to demon strate sobriety when not incarcerated.
These findings are also supported by the record. Father testified that he did not
“have the greatest bond” and was “locked up through a lot of [the child’s] life.” He testified
that he helped mother care for the chi ld during the first 10 months of the child’s life but
that after they separated, he “didn’t really see [the child] very much.” Both the child’s
daycare provider and child’s maternal aunt testified that the child did not refer to father as
“dad” but instead referred to father by his first name. In his testimony, father agreed that
he would not be able to reunify with the child due to his incarceration status. F ather also
testified that he first abused substances when he was around seven years old and had been
addicted to methamphetamine since he was 19 years old. Although father was attending
treatment and had been sober since his incarceration, father had not demonstrated ongoing
sobriety outside of that secured setting.
Father argues that conflicting evidence indicates that he provided financial support
to the child, had lived with and cared for the child at one point in time , and expressed a
desire to remain in contact with the child. But, as stated above, our role is not to reweigh
evidence. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223. Thus, we conclude that substantial evidence in the
record before us clearly and convincingly supports the district court’s factual findings
regarding father’s ability and willingness to comply with the duties of a parent and child
14
relationship. We also conclude that the district court’s determination that a statutory basis
exists under subdivision 1(b)(2) is consistent with these factual findings and logic. 3
B. Best Interests Factors
Mother and father next challenge the district court’s determination that termination
of their parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
In termination proceedings in which at least one statutory basis to terminate parental
rights exists, the best interests of the child is the paramount considerati on. Minn. Stat .
§ 260C.301, subd. 7 (2022); see also J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 902. The district court “must
balance three factors: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship;
(2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; and (3) any competing
interest of the child.” In re Welfare of Child of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Minn. App.
2004) (quotation omitted ); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (requi ring the district
court to make findings addressing these three factors in proceedings to terminate parental
rights). Competing interests of the child “include a stable environment, health
considerations, and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of M. A.H., 839 N.W.2d 730,
744 (Minn. App. 2013).
Mother reiterates the arguments made regarding whether a statutory basis for
termination exists, asserting that the evidence presented is consistent with factual findings
that the district court did not make, including findings that mother was capable of caring

3 Based on our determination regarding subdivision 1(b)(2), we need not address the
remaining statutory bases for termination. See A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 654 (recognizing
that only one statutory ground must be proven to support termination of parental rights).
15
for the child, loved the child very much, established a bond with the child, and was taking
steps in the right direction to be able to at some point provide a safe home. Father similarly
directs our atten tion to evidence indicating that the child knew that he was the child’s
father, he loved the child, worked hard while incarcerated, and called the child frequently.
Both parents argue that, in light of this evidence, the district court abused its discreti on
when it weighed the three best interests factors.
We are not convinced for two reasons. First, as before, adopting this argument
requires us to reweigh conflicting evidence and make factual findings, something appellate
courts do not do. Kenney, 963 N .W.2d at 223; see also In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D.,
771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App. 2009) (recognizing that best interests findings must be
made by the district court and that a best -interests determination “is generally not
susceptible to an appellate court’s global review of the record” (quotation omitted)).
Second, the district court duly balanced the three best interests factors. The district
court reasoned that the child had “some interest in maintaining a parent-child relationship”
but that beca use he was only five years old, it was “difficult to determine a preference.”
The district court also determined that both mother and father had a n interest in preserving
their parental rights and maintaining a relationship with the child. In its analysis regarding
the third factor, the district court considered the degree to which the child had been affected
by multiple transitions in a short amount of time and had been placed in dangerous
situations by mother. The district court emphasized that the child needed a “stable, loving,
structured childhood going forward” which could only occur if mother and father’s parental
rights were terminated. The district court also relied on testimony from the social worker ,
16
GAL, and the child’s maternal relatives , which supported the termination of mother and
father’s parental rights. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court ’s best
interests factors analysis or the weight given to each factor .
C. Reasonable Efforts4
Father contends that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that
the county provided reasonable reunification efforts. Again, we are not persuaded.
For the county to satisfy its burden to provide reasonable efforts, the county’s efforts
must reasonably serve to prevent placement of children outside the home, to rehabilitat e
the family, and to reunify the family. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2022). Reasonable
efforts are “services that go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real genuine
assistance.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). In determining whether the
county’s efforts are reasonable, the court should consider whether the services provided
were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the children’s family and the
children;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the children and the
children’s family;
(3) relevant to the safety and protection of the child;
(4) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

4 Mother does not contest this aspect of the district court’s termination decision.
17
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2022). Whether a county has satisfied this burden depends on
the facts of each case. See A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 663. Incarceration of a parent can
change what is considered “reasonable,” but incarceration alone does not excuse a coun ty
from making reasonable efforts. In re Welfare of A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d 894, 899 (Minn.
App. 2018).
In addition to the statutory requirement that the county make reasonable efforts, a
case plan shall be prepared within 30 days after any child is removed from the home and
placed in foster care. Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 1(a) (2022). Further, subdivision 1(b)
(2022) defines a case plan as “a written docum ent . . . that is prepared by the responsible
social services agency jointly with the child’s parents [and others].” These statut ory
provisions can be considered together with the provisions mandating the county to make
reasonable efforts , meaning that fa ilure to follow the statutory requirements regarding
written case plans can, in certain circumstances, amount to a failure to make reasonable
efforts to reunify the family. See A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d at 900 (“Because the county did not
provide D.T.R. with a w ritten case plan . . . or even attempt to determine whether any
prison programming might have been available to D.T.R. and suitable to include in a case
plan . . . , the county failed to make reasonable efforts.”).
Father argues that the district court abu sed its discretion when it concluded that the
county made reasonable efforts, contending that the county’s failure to strictly comply with
the case plan requirements in section 260C.212 amounts to a failure to make reasonable
efforts. Father asserts that the county did not develop a case plan with father within 30
days of the child’s removal, failed to obtain father’s signature on the case plan , and failed
18
to identify programs in which father could participate while incarcerated . In support of
this argument, father analogizes these allegation s of statutory noncompliance to those
discussed in A.R.B. , 906 N.W.2d at 899, and In re Welfare of A.D.B., 970 N.W.2d 725,
733-34 (Minn. App. 2022). The county does not dispute that it failed to satisfy certain
provisions of section 260C.212. However, the county argues that such deficiencies do not
automatically or necessarily preclude a determination that the county made reasonable
efforts. We agree with the county .
Neither this court nor the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted a rule requiring
strict compliance with section 260C.212 in order to satisfy the statutory obligation to
provide reasonable efforts. We decline to do so here, observing that s uch a rule would
conflict with previous decisions in which we have upheld a determination of reasonable
efforts despite similar deficiencies and failure s to strictly comply with section 260C.212.
E.g., In re Welfare of R.M.M ., 316 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Minn. 1982) (concluding that an
absence of a written case plan does n ot necessarily warrant reversal or preclude a finding
that the county made reasonable efforts); In re Welfare of J.J.B. , 390 N.W.2d 274, 280
(Minn. 1986) ( concluding that the failure of the social worker to read the case plan word
for word to the parent di d not preclude a determination that the county made reasonable
efforts where the terms of the plan were known to that parent ); In re Welfare of J.J.L.B.,
394 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding that the lack of a written case plan
was not reversible error because the parent clearly knew what was required of her under
the plan), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 1986).
19
Instead of requiring strict compliance with section 260C.212, we have emphasized
the circumstances of each case and the nature of the county’s noncompliance in the context
of how and whether the county’s conduct prejudiced the parent or otherwise constituted
something more than a harmless error. E.g., In re Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d 170, 176
(Minn. App. 1997) (refusing to reverse termi nation of parental rights for harmless error) ;
In re Welfare of S.R.A., 527 N.W.2d 835, 839- 40 (Minn. App. 1995) ( refusing to reverse
termination for harmless error ) (implicitly overruled on other grounds by In re Welfare of
D.D.G., 558 N.W.2d 481, 485 (Minn. 1997)), rev . denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 1995).
Here, we conclude that , unlike in A.R.B. and A.D.B., the county’s failure to strictly
comply with section 260C.212 in this case does not preclude a determination that the
county made reasonable efforts to reunify. In A.R.B., the county never prepared a written
case plan, even after the incarcerated parent requested one. A.R.B., 906 N.W.2d at 895.
Furthermore, the county in A.R.B. made no attempt to help the incarcerated parent identify
available programs. Id. at 895, 899. In fact, this court emphasized that the social worker’s
own testimony revealed that the social worker was unable to articulate at trial the steps that
the incarcerated parent needed to take. Id. In A.D.B., this court reversed a postt rial
determination that reasonable efforts would have been futile, reasoning in part that the
county’s failure to comply with section 260C.212 amounted to a failure to provide
reasonable efforts because the county made no effort to identify potentially sui table
20
programming for the incarcerated parent and did not even attempt to contact the
incarcerated parent’s case manager at the detention facility. A.D.B., 970 N.W.2d at 732. 5
In contrast with the facts of both A.R.B. and A.D.B., father in this case received a
draft and final written case plan. In addition, father testified after he learned of the CHIPS
petition, he immediately called the social worker to see what he needed to do to reunify
with the child . Father further testified that the social worker gave him a “rough draft of
things [he] really needed to work on.” Although the social worker did not have much
contact with the detention facility, unlike A.R.B. and A.D.B., the social worker explained
that this was because she was in direct communication with father. Father’s testimony also
showed that he and the social worker remained in direct communication throughout the
CHIPS proceeding, and that they discussed father’s programming. In addition, the social
worker provided father with parenting materials to assist him in a parenting course and an
outline of items for father to work on. Finally, the social worker also testified that father
was complying with the terms laid out in the case plan even though he had not si gned the
final case plan that the county filed with the district court.
Given these facts, father has not identified how he was prejudiced by the county’s
failure to strictly comply with the provisions of section 260C.212. Absent more, we
conclude that th e district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the

5 We note that here, unlike in A.D.B., the district court made a pretrial determination of
futility and relieved the county of its statutory obligation to provide reasonable efforts.
Father does not challenge this decision and only argues that the county failed to make
reasonable efforts prior to the date of the district court’s pretrial determinati on of futility.
21
county provided reasonable efforts to father , despite not strictly complying with the
provisions of 260C.212.
II. Decisions Denying Alternative Petitions to Transfer Custody
Finally, mother and father argue that the district court erred in denying their
petitions to transfer custody of the child to the child’s maternal aunt. We are not convinced
to reverse this decision.
The Minnesota legislature has created various alternatives to termination petitions,
including petitions to transfer legal custody to a relative. Prior to 2022, Minnesota law
stated a preference for “termination and adoption,” without specifying whether that
included non- relative adoptions: “[t]ermination of parent al rights and adoption or
guardianship to the commissioner of human services through a consent to adopt, are
preferred permanency options for a child who cannot return home .” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.513(a) (2021 Supp.) (amended 2022) . This provision also stated that if the district
court determines that these options are “not in the child’s best interests, the court may
transfer permanent legal and physical custody of the child to a relative.” Id . In 2022,
however, the Minnesota Legislature amended this provision to make clear that termination
of parental rights and adoption by a non-relative is no longer a preferred placement option:
For a child who cannot return home, a permanency placement
with a relative is preferred. A permanency placement with a
relative includes termination of parental rights and adoption by
a relative, guardianship to the commissioner of human services
through a consent to adopt with a relative, or a transfer of
permanent legal and physical custody to a relativ e. The court
must consider the best interests of the child and section
260C.212, subdivision 2, paragraph (a), when making a
permanency determination.
22
2022 Minn. Laws ch. 98, art. 8, § 23; Minn. Stat. § 260C.513(a) (2022) .
Mother and father argue that the district court erred by not granting their alternative
petitions for transfer of legal custody to the maternal aunt. Specifically, mother cites to the
current version of section 260C.513(a) ,6 arguing that the district court erred because
transfer of leg al custody was preferred to termination of parental rights. We are not
convinced to reverse the district court’s denials of mother and father’s petitions for three
reasons. First, contrary to the parents’ argument, section 260C.513(a) includes termination
of parental rights as a preferred permanency placement option if the termination is
accompanied by a relative adoption: “[a] permanency placement with a relative includes
termination of parental rights and adoption by a relative.” Id. After the termina tion
decision, the district court proceeded with adoption of the child by the maternal aunt as the
permanency placement option and did not move forward with adoption by a non- relative.
Second, the district court determined that the alternative transfer of legal custody
was not in the child’s best interests. Under both versions of the statute, the district court
can grant a petition for transfer of legal custody if it determines that the transfer is in the
best interests of the child. Here, the district court found that a transfer of legal custody was

6 The county filed its petition prior to the amendment’s effective date, but the district court
filed its decision after the amendment’s effective date. For purposes of this opinion, w e
assume without deciding that the current version of section 260C .513(a) applies. Cf.
Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles County Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000)
(noting that, generally, appellate courts apply the law in effect at the time they file their
decision, unless doing so will alter vested rights or result in manifest injustice); McClelland
v. McClelland, 393 N.W.2d 224, 226- 27 (Minn. App. 1986) (making a similar observation
about district courts), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1986).
23
not in the child’s best interests because it would not result in the necessary stability and
permanency that could only occur upon termination of the parties’ parental rights.
Third, to the extent that mother and father’s argument can be construed as
challenging this determination, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in
making its underlying factual findings and its ultimate determination was not against logic
or these facts. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Minn. App.
2015) (reviewing the facts underlying a decision to transfer legal custody for clear error
and the ultimate decision for an abuse of discretion), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015). 7
The record includes the social worker ’s testimony that a continued relationship with the
parents would cause harm to the child. In addition, the evidence presented shows that both
parents struggled with sobriety, the child lack s a significant bond with father, several
relatives supported termination of mother and father’s parental rights , and the child was
negatively affected by multiple transitions and instability. This evidence clearly and
convincingly supports the underlying factual findings made by the district court and based
on these findings, we discern no abuse of discretion in the decision to deny mother and
father’s alternative petitions to transfer legal custody.
Affirmed.

7 As before, neither mother nor father identif ies specific factual findings that they believe
were clearly erroneous. Nevertheless, we review both the underlying findings and the
ultimate decisions made by the district court.