State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1816

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jacob Ronald Shea,
Appellant.

Filed August 21, 2023
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-21-531

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Pamela L. Foss, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Dane DeKrey, Ringstrom DeKrey PLLP, Moorhead, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal following his conviction for possession of child pornography,
appellant challenges the district court’s order denying suppression of evidence seized in a
warranted search of the residence in which he rented a room. Appellant claims that the
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search of his room and the search of his computer exceeded the scope of the warrant.
Because the search of appellant’s room was within the scope of the warrant, and because
he failed to preserve a challenge to the search of his computer, we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2020, Moorhead police received a report that an IP address associated
with a residence owned by appellant Jacob Ronald Shea’s brother (brother) had accessed
child pornography. Officers obtained a warrant which described the residence as “[a] white
or light colored duplex with a white two stall garage door attached to each unit and grey
brick on the lower portion of the exterior of the building.” The warrant authorized the
seizure and search of “[e]lectronic devices capable of storing digital media . . . primarily
owned or accessible by [brother]” found at the residence.
Officers executed the warrant in January 2021. Officers observed that the residence
was a “normal home, effectively a family residence” with three bedrooms. During an
interview with brother at the start of the search, officers learned that Shea had a room in
the residence. Brother also told officers that he had access to Shea’s room and the
electronics inside. Based on that information, officers seized electronic devices from
Shea’s room. A subsequent forensic search of the devices found in Shea’s room, including
a computer and a yellow USB drive, revealed child pornography.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Shea with eight counts of possession of
child pornography in violation of Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4 (2020). Shea moved to
suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the warranted search , arguing that law
enforcement exceeded the scope of the warrant by entering Shea’s room. The district court
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denied Shea’s motion, concluding that the warrant “authorized the search of the residence,
including . . . Shea’s bedroom, a room accessible by [brother], the primary target of the
[w]arrant.”
As part of the Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, stipulated-evidence trial, the parties
agreed that the district court’s order denying Shea’s motion to suppress was dispositive of
the case and a full trial would be unnecessary if Shea succeeded on appeal. The district
court found Shea guilty and convicted him of eight counts of possession of child
pornography. Shea appeals.
DECISION
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the
district court’s legal determinations de novo.’” State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149
(Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). When a defendant stipulates to the evidence against him
pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, this court’s review is further limited to the
pretrial order denying the motion to suppress. Id.
I. The district court properly concluded that the search of Shea’s bedroom d id
not exceed the scope of the search warrant.

“A search pursuant to a warrant may not exceed the scope of that warrant.” State v.
Soua Thao Yang, 352 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Minn. App. 1984). “The test for determining
whether a search has exceeded the scope of the warrant is one of reasonableness . . . .” Id.
This court looks to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether officers acted
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reasonably in executing the search warrant. State v. Thisius, 281 N.W.2d 645, 645-46
(Minn. 1978).
The warrant in question here authorized law enforcement to search the entire
residence for electronic devices “owned or accessible by [brother],” and brother told
officers that he had access to Shea’s room and the electronics inside. Given brother’s
statement, it was reasonable for the officers to conclude that Shea’s room might contain
electronic devices capable of storing child pornography and that the search of Shea’s room
was reasonable under the circumstances. Id.
Shea argues that, because he rented his bedroom and was not the warrant’s primary
target, the search of his bedroom exceeded the scope of the warrant. We disagree.
Separate search warrants are not required in situations of “community occupation”
when two or more peo ple “occupy the premises in common rather than individually, as
where they share common living quarters but have separate bedrooms.” State v. Lorenz ,
368 N.W.2d 284, 286-87 (Minn. 1985) (quotations omitted). In contrast, “a search warrant
for a multiple occupancy building is invalid unless it describes the particular unit to be
searched with sufficient definiteness.” Id. at 286 (quotation omitted).
The living arrangement here is the type of “community occupation ” that is not
subject to the “multiple-occupancy” rule. Id. Still, Shea claims our decision in State v.
Marsh suggests that a separate search warrant was required to search his room. 931
N.W.2d 825, 831 (Minn. App. 2019) (holding “the validity of the search of a rented room,
pursuant to a warrant authorizing the search of the entire house, depends on whether
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officers reasonably knew or should have known that it was a multiple-occupancy building
at the time of the search”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2019).
Marsh discussed whether “[o]bjectively available facts” signaled to law
enforcement that the single-family residence was really a multiple- occupancy dwelling,
such that a separate search warrant was necessary. Among the facts which led to Marsh’s
conclusion that no such signal was present were “a single mailbox, no separate entrances,
open access to all areas of the house including the second floor, and no unit numbers or
signs.” Id. at 831-32. Here, testimony during the evidentiary hearing established that the
residence was a single-family home with three bedrooms. Residents shared common living
areas, including the kitchen, living rooms, and bathrooms, but the residents had separate
bedrooms. Shea’s bedroom was not locked or numbered, nor did it bear any other markings
suggesting that it was a separate unit in the house. The facts available to law enforcement
at the time of the search were insufficient to signal to the officers that this was a
multiple-occupancy building, such that the search of Shea’s room required a separate
warrant. Under the totality of the circumstances, officers acted reasonably in executing the
warrant and searching Shea’s room. The search of Shea’s room was valid, and the district
court did not err by denying Shea’s motion to suppress.1

1 Shea also argues that the “community-living exception to the warrant requirement,” as
announced in Lorenz, 368 N.W.2d at 286, “should be overturned .” We first note that
Lorenz does not announce an “exception.” Instead, Lorenz simply concludes that “the
multiple occupancy rule does not apply when two or more people or families occupy a
single residence in common, . . . but have separate bedrooms.” Id. In any event, we decline
to consider Shea’s request. We are an error-correcting court, and our role is to decide cases
consistent with existing law. State v. Grigsby, 806 N.W.2d 101, 114 (Minn. App. 2011)
(stating that “[a]s an error-correcting court, this court is not in a position to overturn
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II. Shea did not preserve his right to challenge the search of his computer.

Shea argues that officers exceeded the scope of the warrant by searching his
personal computer. The state contends that the issue was not preserved for appellate
review. We agree with the state.
The parties’ stipulation stated that the dispositive pretrial issue was the “Order dated
May 12, 2022, denying [Shea’s] motion to suppress evidence.” See Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.01, subd. 4 (outlining the procedure for preserving a pretrial issue for appellate review,
including “agree[ing] that the court’s ruling on a specified pretrial issue is dispositive of
the case”). The district court’s order focused solely on the search of Shea’s bedroom,
concluding that “the [w]arrant properly authorized the search of the residence,
including . . . Shea’s bedroom, a room accessible by [brother], the primary target of the
[w]arrant.” Because the parties agreed that the district court’s order denying Shea’s motion
to suppress addressed the sole dispositive issue, which was limited to whether the search
warrant authorized the search of Shea’s bedroom, the issue of whether the search of Shea’s
computer exceeded the scope of the warrant is not before this court. See Ortega, 770
N.W.2d at 149 (“Because Ortega stipulated to the evidence against him . . . our review is
further limited to the pretrial order that denied Ortega’s motion to suppress.”); see also
Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (stating appellate courts will not decide
issues first raised on appeal).
Affirmed.

established supreme court precedent” (quotation omitted)), aff’d, 818 N.W.2d 511 (Minn.
2012).