Lashazo Reese, Jr.,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A22-1817

Ramsey County Chutich, J.

Lashazo Reese, Jr.,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: June 28, 2023
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

________________________

Lashazo Reese, Jr., Rush City, Minnesota, pro se.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant Ramsey County
Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. The court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal because good cause exists to
grant a 30 -day extension to the statutory time limit under Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29.03, subdivision 3(f).
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying
appellant’s second petition for postconviction relief because his claim fails on the merits.
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Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
O P I N I O N
CHUTICH, Justice.
This case involves a pro se appeal from the district court’s summary denial of
appellant Lashazo Reese, Jr.’s second petition for postconviction relief. In 2003, a jury
convicted Reese of first -degree premeditated murder, first -degree felony murd er, and
attempted second-degree intentional murder. On direct appeal, we vacated Reese’s felony
murder conviction as a lesser -included offense but affirmed his two other convictions.
State v. Reese, 692 N.W.2d 736, 737–38 (Minn. 2005).
Reese filed his first postconviction petition in 2007, which was denied by the district
court and not appealed. Reese filed this second postconviction petition in 2022, asserting
that two other first-degree murder decisions of this court created a change in the law that
requires a new trial. The district court denied relief without holding a hearing. Reese
appealed, but his notice of appeal was filed after the 60-day postconviction appeal deadline.
For the following reasons , we first con clude that good cause exists to extend the
deadline to file the notice of appeal as permitted by the governing rule, and we therefore
have jurisdiction to hear his case on the merits. Second, we hold that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by summarily denying Reese’s claims because his claims fail on
the merits. Accordingly, we affirm.
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FACTS
In the early morning hours of August 29, 2002, appellant Lashazo Reese, Jr. was at
the apartment of Juanita de la Rosa to sell drugs.1 Jermaine Talley arrived at de la Rosa’s
apartment with a large amount of cash and asked to buy drugs from Reese. Reese declined,
but gave Talley his phone number. Talley then fell asleep on a couch in the apartment with
the cash in his hand.
De la Rosa followed Reese to the bathroom and asked him to leave her apartment.
Reese responded by pulling out a gun, hitting de la Rosa on the back of the head, and then
shooting her three times after she had fallen to the floor. De la Rosa survived the shooting,
but laid face down on the bathroom floor and pretended to be dead. Reese left the
bathroom, and de la Rosa heard the sound of another gunshot coming from the living room.
After Reese exited the apartment, de la Rosa left the apartment to find help. Tal ley was
found dead on the couch from a gunshot wound, and the cash in his hand was gone. Reese
was later arrested by law enforcement.
A grand jury indicted Reese with first -degree premediated murder, first -degree
felony murder, second -degree intentional murder, attempted first -degree premediated
murder, and attempted second-degree murder. After a jury trial, the district court convicted
him of first -degree premediated murder, felony murder, and attempted second -degree
murder. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions for first-degree premediated

1 For a more complete recitation of the facts, see Reese, 692 N.W.2d at 738–40.
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murder and second -degree attempted murder but vacated the first -degree felony murder
conviction as a lesser-included offense. Reese, 692 N.W.2d at 737–38.
In 2007, Reese filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, alleging claims of
judicial bias, vindictive prosecution, attorney-client conflicts, and constitutional violations.
The district court denied the request for postconviction relief, and Reese did not appeal.
On June 17, 2022, Reese filed this second pro se petition for postconviction relief.
In the second petition, Reese contended that our court’s decisions in the first-degree murder
cases State v. Cox, 779 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 2010) (Cox I), and State v. Cox , 820 N.W.2d
540 (Minn. 2012) (Cox II), created a change in the law that requires a new trial in his case.
The State asked the district court to deny Reese’s petition, arguing that the referenced
opinions are inapplicable and do not warrant a new trial. The State did n ot object to the
timeliness of Reese’s petition.
The district court , in an order filed October 18, 2022, summarily denied Reese’s
second postconviction petition on the merits, finding that the Cox decisions do not
represent a change in the law and do not require a new trial. The register of actions reflects
that a copy of the district court’s order denying postconviction relief was sent to Reese and
then returned by mail on October 24, 2022. The register of actions also shows that a copy
of the order was sent to a private defense attorney, even though Reese was not represented
by counsel, and then returned by mail on October 31, 2022. Reese maintains—and the
State does not refute—that he did not receive the district court’s order denying his second
request for postconviction relief until December 15, 2022. Reese then filed a notice of
appeal on December 21, 2022.
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ANALYSIS
I.
Before we can review an appeal of a postconviction petition in a first-degree murder
case, we must first determine if the appeal is timely. “The time to appeal is jurisdictional.”
Hohenwald v. State , 875 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Minn. 2016). Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29.03, subdivision 3(d), states that the appeal must be filed within 60 days after
the entry of a district court order denying postconviction relief. Rule 29.03, subdivision
3(f), however, allows this court to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal in a
first-degree murder case by up to 30 days without requiring the defendant to file a motion
or providing notice to the parties. Ford v. State, 690 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Minn. 2005). We
may grant the 30-day extension on our own accord, but we must have good cause to do so.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 29.03, subd. 3(f). If we find good cause, appeals filed within the 30-day
grace period are not jurisdictionally barred. See Hohenwald, 875 N.W.2d at 846 (holding
that we lacked jurisdiction over a postconviction appeal that was filed nearly 5 months
late); see also For d, 690 N.W.2d at 709 (holding that we lacked jurisdiction over a
postconviction appeal that was filed almost 11 months late).
Here, Reese claims that he had until February 14, 2023, to file a notice of appeal
because he did not receive a copy of the district court order denying him postconviction
relief until December 15, 2022. Because he filed a notice of appeal on December 21, 2022,
less than 1 week after he claims to have received a copy of the district court’s order, Reese
contends that his filing of the notice of appeal was timely. The State takes no position on
the timeliness of Reese’s filing of the notice of appeal.
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We disagree with Reese and conclude his notice of appeal in this case was untimely
under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.03, subdivision 3(f) . The district court
filed its order denying postconviction relief on October 18, 2022. Reese’s notice of appeal
needed to be filed 60 days later. Minn. R. Crim. P. 29.03, subd. 3(d) (“An appeal by a
defendant from an adverse final order in a post -conviction proceeding in a first -degree
murder case must be filed within 60 days after its entry.”); Hohenwald, 875 N.W.2d at 845.
Day 60, December 17, 2022, fell on a Saturday, so the notice of appeal was due the
following Monday, December 19, 2022. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 29.01, subd. 2 (“the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure govern appellate procedure unless thes e
rules direct otherwise”); Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 126.01 (cross-referencing Minn. R. Civ. P.
6.01 as governing the computation of time); Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.01(a)(1)(C) (rule for
computing time when the last day is a Saturday or Sunday). Consequently, the notice of
appeal was filed 2 days late.
We find good cause, however, to extend the time for filing this appeal under
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.03, subdivision 3(f). Reese did not receive a
copy of the district court’s order denying his request for postconviction relief in a timely
manner. According to the register of actions, a copy of the district court’s order was mailed
to Reese on October 19, 2022, a nd then returned by mail to court administration on
October 24, 2022. Reese claims that he did not receive a copy of the district court order
until December 15, 2022, and then he filed the notice of appeal on December 22, 2022.
Under these specific circu mstances, it is reasonable for us to find good cause and apply
Rule 29.03, subdivision 3(f) to extend the deadline. A 30-day extension as permitted under
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the rule means Reese had until January 16, 2023, to file his notice of appeal. Because he
filed the notice of appeal well within the extension period, we have jurisdiction over this
case.
II.
Now we turn to the substance of Reese’s request for postconviction relief. We
review a district court’s summary denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of
discretion. Martin v. State, 969 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. 2022). “A district court abuses
its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based
its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). Legal conclusions are reviewed de
novo and factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Caldwell v. State, 976 N.W.2d 131,
137 (Minn. 2022). A petition for postconviction relief may be summarily denied “if the
petition, the files, and the records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner
is entitled to no relief.” Griffin v. State , 883 N.W.2d 282, 285 (Minn. 2016); Minn. Stat.
§ 590.04, subd. 1 (2022). In deciding whether to summarily deny a petitio n, the district
court “presumes the facts alleged in the petition to be true.” Griffin, 883 N.W.2d at 285.
When a petitioner has previously filed a direct appeal, as here, Minnesota Statutes
section 590.01, subdivision 4(a)(2) (2022), requires the petitioner to file for postconviction
relief within 2 years of the appellate court’s disposition of the direct appeal. The
limitations period, however, is not jurisdictional, but rather an affirmative defense for the
State. Munt v. State, 984 N.W.2d 242, 250 (Minn. 2023). The State must raise the defense
before the district court “or the argument is forfeited.” Id.
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On appeal, the State asks us to dismiss Reese’s claim as untimely, but the State did
not raise a timeliness objection to the district court. Accordingly, the State’s timeliness
defense is forfeited, so we consider the merits of Reese’s claims.
Reese contends that a change in our court’s jurisprudence means that he is eligible
for a new trial on the murder charges. Specifically, he asserts that the Cox decisions offer
a new and novel interpretation of law regarding the proper application of Minn esota
Statutes section 609.04 (2022) (providing that a defendant may be “convicted of either the
crime charged or an included offense, but not both”) and the Double Jeopardy Clause.
According to Reese, the Cox I and Cox II decisions clarified that when a conviction is
vacated or overturned for reasons other than insufficient evidence, Double Jeopardy may
not prevent a defendant from being eligible for a new trial. Reese believes that because we
dismissed his felony murder conviction as a lesser-included offense, he is entitled to a new
trial. He asserts that at minimum, a hearing must be held to determine if, under this new
interpretation of law, he qualifies for retrial.
The State responds, by contrast, that Reese’s claims fail on the merits because
neither Cox decision “established any new interpretation of law that could apply to
[Reese’s] convictions.” Instead, the State maintains that the Cox decisions relied on
established Confrontation Clause precedent and rules of criminal procedure that do not
apply to Reese. We agree with the State.
In Cox I, this court granted the defendant a new murder trial based on a
Confrontation Clause violation that occurred during his first trial. 779 N.W.2d at 852–53.
In granting a new trial, this court relied on well -established precedent regarding a
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defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation. Id. (holding that the grand jury testimony
of a potential witness, who later did not testify at trial, was “testimonial,” so the district
court violated the Confrontation Clause by admitting the testimony during trial). But even
if our decision in Cox I had involved a new legal interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause—which it did not — Cox I is irrelevant here because Reese’s claim is not based on
a violation of the Confrontation Clause.
Our decision in Cox II is also not applicable here. In Cox II, we affirmed the
defendant’s first-degree felony murder conviction after the case was remanded for a new
trial and the defendant was convicted of first -degree felony murder for a second time.
820 N.W.2d at 542. On appeal, we vacated the defendant’s second -degree intentional
murder conviction as a lesser -included offense. Id. at 552 –53; see also Minn. Stat.
§ 609.04, subd. 1 (“Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the
crime charged or an included offense, but not both.”). We did not, however, grant the
defendant another new trial based on the improper conviction for a lesser-included offense
because well -established precedent requires only that the court vacate that conviction.
Cox II, 820 N.W.2d at 54 2–43 (citing Spann v. State , 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 –74
(Minn. 2007)); see also Reese, 692 N.W.2d at 743 (citing State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502,
517 (Minn.1984) ). Cox II was simply an application of existing precedent —the same
precedential principle we relied upon in Reese’s direct appeal to vacate his lesser-included
offense—and shows that Reese is not entitled to a new trial here.
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Because our decisions in Cox I and Cox II did not create a change in the law
requiring a new trial in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily
denying Reese’s request for postconviction relief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.