State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1821

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

John Paul Raymond Bye,
Appellant.

Filed October 9, 2023
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-9973

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Segal , Chief Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
In this appeal from a final judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm, a ppellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a downward
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dispositional sentencing departure or, alternatively, a downward durational departure. We
affirm.
FACTS
As described in the complaint, in the early morning hours of May 25, 2021, a
homeowner called to report a suspicious vehicle parked in the homeowner’s driveway with
an unknown person sleeping inside. Police officers were dispatched to the home to
investigate. They saw a parked truck with a person asleep in the driver’s seat. After
approaching the truck, one of the officers observed a handgun lying in plain view on the
driver-side floorboard next to the sleeping person’s feet. The sleeping person was later
identified as appellant John Paul Raymond Bye. A search of the serial number of the
handgun found near Bye’s feet showed that it had been reported as stolen.
Because Bye has a prior conviction for a cri me of violence that disqualifies him
from possessing a firearm, respondent State of Minnesota charged Bye with one count of
unlawful possession of a firearm under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020). In
January 2022, Bye pleaded guilty to the charge with no agreement on sentencing. The
district court accepted the plea, ordered a presentence investigation, and conditionally
released Bye pending sentencing. Bye was eventually released from jail straight to a
chemical-dependency treatment program and his release conditions required him to
complete treatment, remain law-abiding, and appear for all probation appointments and
court hearings, among other conditions.
In April 2022, Bye’s probation officer file d a report stating that Bye had violated
the terms of his conditional release. The report cited as violations Bye’s failures to
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(1) remain law-abiding—Bye was charged a week before the report with fleeing a peace
officer, fifth-degree drug possession, and driving after cancellation; (2) complete the
treatment program—Bye was reported as leaving his treatment program two weeks before
the new charges were filed; and (3) abstain from using unlawful drugs and alcohol— Bye
admitted using methamphetamine and heroin, and methamphetamine was found in his
backpack at the time of his arrest for the new offenses. On the basis of these allegations,
the district court revoked Bye’s conditional release and held him in custody until
sentencing.
At the sentencing hearing, the state sought imposition of the presumptive sentence
of 60 months in prison based on Bye’s criminal-history score. Bye sought a downward
dispositional departure or, in the alternative, a downward durational departure. Bye argued
that a downward dispositional departure was appropriate because he had, on his own
initiative, applied for and been accepted into a chemical -dependency program that could
extend for a full year. Bye stressed that he had a long-term drug-addiction problem but
that he was still young and that treatment outside of prison would be the most beneficial
course to help him overcome that addiction. Bye also pointed out that, when in jail awaiting
sentencing, he had demonstrated a willingness to “turn a corner” because he helped lead a
Bible study group and was participating in a book club that was reading self-help books.
Regarding a downward durational departure, Bye argued that his firearm-possession
offense was less severe than other such cases and that the presentence investigation report
had noted that, “[s]hould the Court determine this offense was less onerous, a durational
departure may be appropriate.”
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The district court denied Bye’s motions for downward departures. The district court
explained that it agreed with probation’s recommendation that Bye was not particularly
amenable to probation. The district court pointed to the number of violations that Bye had
incurred while he was on conditional release, including picking up new offenses, and
concluded that, “based on that,” a dispositional departure was not warranted. As to the
durational departure, the district court acknowledged probation’s comment that a
durational departure might be a possibility but concluded that the offense was not
necessarily less severe than the typical unlawful-possession case. The district court noted
that controlled substances were found in the vehicle with Bye along with the handgun, and
that those circumstances and “how [Bye] w[as] found by the police,” failed to convince the
court that Bye’s offense was less serious. The district court then sentenced Bye to the
presumptive 60-month sentence with credit for time served.
DECISION
On appeal, Bye argues his 60-month sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm
should be reversed because the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for a downward dispositional departure or, alternatively, a downward durational departure.
District courts are afforded broad discretion in sentencing and a sentence will only
be reversed on appeal for an abuse of that discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-
08 (Minn. 2014). But the scope of a district court’s discretion in sentencing is limited, as
the supreme court emphasized in Soto, by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at
308. A sentence that is imposed in accordance with the guidelines is presumed to be
appropriate. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020). A sentencing court must find
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“identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances” to depart from imposing such a
sentence. Id.; see also State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). And even if such
circumstances are present, “[a] departure is not mandatory, and an appellate court will
reverse a sentencing court’s refusal to depart only in a ‘rare’ case.” State v. Walker, 913
N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018) (quoting Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7).
A district court may order a downward dispositional departure upon a determination
that the offender is “particular[ly] amenab[l]e to individualized treatment in a probationary
setting.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). The relevant factors in assessing
amenability include “the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his
attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.” Id.
Bye argues that his background presents a strong case for a downward dispositional
departure. Bye points to the fact, as set out in the presentence investigation report, that he
grew up “surrounded by violence, drug use, and turmoil.” Additionally, while Bye
acknowledges he has a long-term drug-addiction problem , he maintains that he is young
(at the time of the offense, Bye was 20 years old) and, as set out in the presentence
investigation report, “therefore, presents to be someone who would benefit from engaging
in a long-term treatment program.” Bye maintains that his new offenses in April 2022
were merely an understandable relapse of his chemical dependency. But the fact remains
that the district court considered Bye’s argument, exercised its discretion to deny Bye’s
motion for a dispositional departure, and imposed a presumptive sentence. Moreover, it is
undisputed that Bye violated the terms of his conditional release in this case and engaged
in conduct that caused his probation to be revoked in at least three other felony cases in
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2021. Under these circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court.
See State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013) (stating that, if the district
court “carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a
determination,” the district court did not abuse its discretion (quotation omitted)), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
We also reject Bye’s challenge to the district court’s denial of his motion for a
downward durational departure. In assessing a motion for a downward durational
departure, the relevant inquiry is whether a “defendant’s conduct is significantly less
serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” State v. Mattson ,
376 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Minn. 1985) (citing State v. Cox, 343 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn.
1984)). And, as with dispositional-departure motions, even if an offense is less serious,
appellate courts “generally will not interfere with the exercise of [the district court’s]
discretion.” Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
Bye argues that his offense is less serious than the typical unlawful-possession case
based on his claim that he had only borrowed the handgun from a friend for “protection
purposes” because he was traveling to an “unsafe area” in Hennepin County. Bye also
argues that he was not using the handgun in a manner that was threatening to society. The
district court, however, considered Bye’s argument that he “w[asn’t] actively using the gun
or waving the gun around.” The district court also acknowledged the statement in the
presentence investigation report that, “[s]hould the Court determine this offense was less
onerous, a durational departure may be appropriate.” But the district court nevertheless
determined that the offense was not less serious than a typical unlawful-possession case.
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See In re Welfare of S.J.J., 755 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn. App. 2008) (noting unlawful
possession of a firearm by individuals who have committed crimes of violence is a “threat
to society” regardless of whether possession is fleeting or without a threat). The district
court’s determination was within its discretion and we discern no basis to reverse the
denial.
Affirmed.