Tokvan Ly, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1826

Tokvan Ly,
Respondent,

vs.

Jodi Harpstead, Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services,
Appellant.

Filed January 6, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Frisch, Chief Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CV-22-13781

James P. Conway, Kevin J. Wetherille, Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille, P.A., Shakopee,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Brandon Boese, Scott H. Ikeda, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge;
and Schmidt, Judge.
SYLLABUS
1. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022), the Minnesota
Commissioner of Human Services has a clear legal duty to admit covered patients to a
state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of a district court’s issuance of an order
of commitment.
2
2. A district court is without authority to compel the Minnesota Commissioner
of Human Services to create and submit monthly reports of the commissioner’s statewide
compliance regarding all individuals covered by Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022).
3. The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply to mandamus proceedings to
the extent the rules do not conflict with Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12 (2022).
4. Upon issuance of an alternative writ of mandamus, the defendant in a
mandamus proceeding may elect to move to dismiss or answer the petition. If the defendant
moves to dismiss and that motion is denied, the defendant may then answer in accordance
with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent those rules do not conflict with
Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12.
5. In evaluating a motion to dismiss in a mandamus proceeding, a court may
properly consider whether the petition and alternative writ, taken together, state a claim for
relief.
6. Minnesota’s notice-pleading standard for civil actions applies to mandamus
proceedings.
7. Minnesota law does not require that a petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus
specifically plead the existence of adequate funding to state a claim for relief.
OPINION
FRISCH, Chief Judge
Respondent Tokvan Ly suffers from chronic and severe mental illness that led to
his arrest and subsequent commitment to the care of appellant Jodi Harpstead, in her
official capacity as the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services. Although Ly
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qualified for prioritize d admission to a state- operated treatment program, he remained in
jail for weeks after the district court ordered his commitment. Ly petitioned the district
court for a writ of mandamus to compel the commissioner to immediately admit him to a
state-operated treatment program, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022)
(priority-admission statute). The district court issued an alternative writ of mandamus, and
the commissioner moved to dismiss the mandamus proceeding , arguing that she was
neither required nor able to immediately admit Ly to such a program . The district court
denied the motion to dismiss, did not allow the commissioner an opportunity to answer the
mandamus petition, issued a peremptory writ of mandamus granting Ly’s requested relief,
and on its own initiative, ordered the commissioner to create and submit to the district court
periodic reports of statewide compliance with the priority-admission statute in all cases to
which it applies.
The commissioner seeks reversal of the district court’s order granting a peremptory
writ of mandamus, arguing that (1) she did not have a clear legal duty to admit Ly to a
state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of his commitment, (2) there was no
specific allegation that the commissioner had adequate funding to accomplish the requested
relief, (3) the district court’s issuance of the peremptory writ was procedurally improper,
and (4) the district court was without authority to impose a statewide reporting requirement
upon the commissioner.
We conclude that the commissioner had a clear legal duty to admit Ly to treatment
within 48 hours of the district court’s issuance of the order of commitment, that she violated
that duty, and that Ly was not required to allege the adequacy of funding with specificity
4
to state a claim for mandamus relief. But because we also conclude that the district court
erred by imposing a statewide compliance-reporting requirement upon the commissioner
and committed procedural errors, including not allowing the commissioner to answer the
mandamus petition after denying her motion to dismiss, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTS
On September 27, 2022, pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.0 1, the district court
declared Ly incompetent to proceed to trial on three pending criminal charges due to mental
illness. On October 21, following civil-commitment proceedings, the district court filed
an order stating that Ly “poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness” and is “in need of
commitment.” The district court determined that Ly suffered from schizoaffective disorder
and had “an extensive mental health history inclusive of multiple ps ychiatric
hospitalizations, residential placements, and civil commitments.” Given Ly’s “high level
of need” requiring “involuntary long-term care,” the district court ordered him committed
to the care of the commissioner. But Ly remained in jail, awaiting prioritized admission to
one of the commissioner’s treatment programs pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.10,
subd. 1(b). At the time, the priority- admission statute provided in relevant part that “the
Commissioner shall prioritize patients being admitted from jail or a correctional
institution,” and that covered patients “must be admitted to a state-operated treatment
program within 48 hours.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b).
On November 5, Ly petitioned the district court for writs of mandamus and habeas
corpus. Ly alleged that he “remain[ed] incarcerated in Scott County Jail, following his
5
commitment, in violation of the 48-hours statute” and that the commissioner had “failed to
comply with a clear and unequivocal legal duty imposed by law.” He further alleged that
the jail had denied him “necessary care for his mental illness” and that his condition was
deteriorating. As relevant here, Ly sought relief in the form of (1) a writ of mandamus to
compel the commissioner to “immediately admit [Ly] to a sta te-operated treatment
program,” (2) damages pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 586.09 to compensate Ly “for the
Commissioner’s failure to provide adequate treatment” and for “unlawful deprivation of
liberty,” and (3) fines to be assessed against the commissioner for failing to perform
statutorily mandated duties, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 586.10.
On November 9, the district court issued an alternative writ of mandamus ordering
the commissioner to “immediately admit [Ly] to a treatment facility or a state-operated
treatment program,” and in the interim, provide Ly with proper treatment and care. In the
alternative, the district court ordered the commissioner to
fil[e] either an answer to show cause why [Ly] has not been
admitted to a treatment facility or a state-operated treatment
program as required under [Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1
(2022)], and provided treatment as required by [Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.03, subd. 7 (2022)], or file a demurrer, at least 24 hours
before the return hearing. If [the commissioner] answers rather
than filing a demurrer, the Court will set a jury trial on
contested facts at a time and date to be determined, provided
that the parties may waive a jury trial.

The alternative writ did not recite any facts.
1

1 “The writ of mandamus is either alternative or peremptory.” Minn. Stat. § 586.03.
Among other things, an alternative writ “shall state concisely the facts showing the
obligation of the defendant to perform the [legally prescribed] act” and the defendant’s

6
On November 16, the commissioner filed a “Motion to Dismiss/Demurrer,” seeking
dismissal of the alternative writ and denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The
commissioner argued for dismissal of the alternative writ because (1) the district court
failed to set forth the factual basis for the alternative writ as required by Minn. Stat.
§ 586.03, (2) Ly failed to specifically allege that a medically appropriate bed was available
or that the commissioner had “adequate funding to provide the relief requested by the
petition,” and (3) the priority-admission statute did not impose a clear legal duty requiring
the commissioner to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the
district court’s issuance of the commitment order. The commissioner expressly reserved
“any and all defenses to the Petition and Alternative Writ of Mandamus.” That same day,
the court administrator scheduled a “review hearing” for November 30. In advance of the
review hearing, Ly responded to the commissioner’s filings.
At the review hearing, the district court directed the commissioner to argue her
motions on the merits. The commissioner objected because no motion hearing date had
been scheduled, the issues presented by the commissioner’s submissions had not been fully
briefed, and the commissioner had not received adequate notice that she would be required
to argue on the merits at the review hearing. The district court nevertheless required the
parties to proceed with merits arguments. After hearing argument from both parties, the

failure to do so, and command the defendant to either perform the required act “or show
cause before the court . . . why the defendant has not done so.” Id. A peremptory writ
“may be allowed in the first instance” in which “the right to require the performance of the
act is clear, and it is apparent that no valid excuse for nonperformance can be given.”
Minn. Stat. § 586.04.
7
district court took the motion to dismiss under advisement and gave the commissioner 48
hours to submit a reply brief.
On December 21, the district court issued an order captioned: “Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Demurrer, Ordering a Peremptory Writ of
Mandamus and Judgment for the Petitioner.” The district court issued the peremptory writ
based on the facts alleged in Ly’s petition and determined that there were no contested
issues of fact as to the commissioner’s liability because she had not shown cause or filed
an answer. The district court found that Ly had been committed to the care of the
commissioner on October 21, 2022, but remained in jail even though the commissioner
operated programs that could provide treatment and had the power to “effect [Ly’s] transfer
out of Scott County jail” and admit him into such a program. The district court determined
that the priority-admission statute unambiguously provides that the commissioner has a
clear legal duty to transfer Ly to a state-operated treatment program “within 48 hours of
[his] commitment” and failed to do so. It also rejected the commissioner’s funding
argument, determining that “the legislature ha[d] clearly appropriated funds” for the
commissioner to provide the treatment and care ordered for Ly.
The district court ordered the commissioner to (1) “immediately admit [Ly] to a
treatment facility or a state-operated treatment program” and provide him with the
necessary care, and (2) provide the district court with “30-day reports concerning all cases
. . . to which the 48-hour rule applies,” along with supporting documentation
“demonstrating the resources utilized with regard to these cases.” The district court then
8
set the case for a damages trial and scheduled a review hearing to assess the commissioner’s
compliance with the peremptory writ.2
On December 23, Ly was admitted to a state-operated treatment program. 3
The commissioner filed an appeal from the order issuing the peremptory writ. A
special-term panel of this court dismissed the appeal as premature, concluding that the
district court’s December 21 order was not an appealable order because it “did not
conclusively terminate the matter or fully adjudicate [the mandamus] petition.” We
explained that the commissioner could seek review of the December 21 order in an appeal
from a final judgment. The supreme court subsequently granted review.
The supreme court first determined that the case was not moot because, although
Ly had been transferred to a treatment facility and subsequently discharged, the
commissioner was still subject to the district court’s monthly compliance reporting
requirement and damages had not been resolved. Ly v. Harpstead, 7 N.W.3d 560, 568- 69
(Minn. 2024). The supreme court next determined that, “[b]ecause the district court’s order
directing issuance of the peremptory writ reserves determination on the issue of damages,
it is not final,” and the proper appeal is from a final judgment. Id. at 574. The supreme
court nevertheless concluded that it would exercise its inherent authority to suspend the
final-judgment requirement because the case “raises potentially complex, unaddressed

2 The district court also reserved decision on the petition for writ of habeas corpus and
directed the parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution. That petition is not at issue
in this appeal.

3 The commissioner asserted that Ly was not admitted to comply with the peremptory writ,
but rather, because a bed had become available at a state-operated treatment center.
9
questions of procedural law in mandamus” and “ implicates weighty separation of powers
concerns.” The supreme court remanded the matter to this court to consider the merits of
the commissioner’s appeal. Id. at 576-77.
ISSUES
I. Does the commissioner have a clear legal duty under Minn. Stat. § 253B.10,
subd. 1(b) (2022), to admit covered patients to a state-operated treatment program
within 48 hours of the district court’s issuance of an order of commitment?

II. Did the district court have the authority to compel the commissioner to create and
submit monthly reports of the commissioner’s statewide compliance regarding all
individuals covered by Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022)?

III. Did the district court otherwise err in issuing the peremptory writ of mandamus?

ANALYSIS
On remand from the supreme court, the commissioner argues that the
priority-admission statute does not impose a clear legal duty upon the commissioner to
admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of commitment or
authorize a district court to compel the commissioner to submit monthly compliance
reports, and that the district court otherwise erred in issuing the peremptory writ of
mandamus. A district court’s interpretation of statutes and procedural rules raises
questions of law subject to de novo review. Heilman v. Courtney, 926 N.W.2d 387, 392
(Minn. 2019). And we review de novo a district court’s issuance of a writ of mandamus
based on a legal determination given “the record at the time that the writ issued.” Spann
v. Minneapolis City Council, 979 N.W.2d 66, 78 (Minn. 2022).

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I. The commissioner has a clear legal duty to admit covered individuals to a state-
operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court’s issuance of
an order of commitment pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b), and the
commissioner violated that clear legal duty.

The commissioner argues that the district court erred in issuing the peremptory writ
of mandamus because Minnesota law did not impose on her a clear legal duty to admit Ly
to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the issuance of the order of
commitment. A primary use of a writ of mandamus is “to compel the performance of an
official duty clearly imposed by law.” Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708
N.W.2d 162, 171 (Minn. 2006); see also Minn. Stat. § 586.01 (“The writ of mandamus
may be issued . . . to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.”). The availability of mandamus relief
here is therefore dependent upon whether Minnesota law imposes such a clear legal duty
upon the commissioner.
We review de novo whether the priority-admission statute imposes a clear legal duty
on the commissioner. See Minn. Voters All. v. County of Ramsey, 971 N.W.2d 269, 275
(Minn. 2022). The purpose of statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate the
intent of the Legislature.” Roberts v. State, 945 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. 2020) (quotation
omitted). The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine “whether the language,
on its face, is ambiguous.” Id. (quotation omitted). A statute is ambiguous when the
disputed language “is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Spann, 979
N.W.2d at 73 (quotation omitted). To determine whether a statute is ambiguous, we “read
the statute as a whole and interpret each section in light of the surrounding sections.” Id.
11
(quotation omitted). “If the statute is unambiguous, our analysis ends, and we interpret the
statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to the canons of statutory
construction.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The relevant statutory scheme related to priority admission provides in pertinent
part:
(a) When a person is committed, the court shall issue a
warrant or an order committing the patient to the custody of the
head of the treatment facility, state-operated treatment
program, or community-based treatment program. The
warrant or order shall state that the patient meets the statutory
criteria for civil commitment.

(b) The commissioner shall prioritize patients being
admitted from jail or a correctional institution who are:
(1) ordered confined in a state-operated
treatment program for an examination under Minnesota Rules
of Criminal Procedure, rules 20.01, subdivision 4, paragraph
(a), and 20.02, subdivision 2;
(2) under civil commitment for competency
treatment and continuing supervision under . . . rule 20.01,
subdivision 7;
(3) found not guilty by reason of mental illness
under . . . rule 20.02, subdivision 8, and under civil
commitment or are ordered to be detained in a state-operated
treatment program pending completion of the civil
commitment proceedings; or
(4) committed under this chapter to the
commissioner after dismissal of the patient’s criminal charges.

Patients described in this paragraph must be admitted to
a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours. The
commitment must be ordered by the court as provided in
section 253B.09, subdivision 1, paragraph (d).

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Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(a)-(b) (2022).4 The parties agree that the statute imposes a
clear legal duty on the commissioner to admit covered individuals “to a state -operated
treatment program within 48 hours.” Id. , subd. 1(b). But the parties disagree as to the
event triggering the beginning of the 48-hour period. The commissioner argues that she
did not have a clear legal duty to admit covered patients within 48 hours of the district
court’s issuance of the order of commitment because the priority-admission statute “was
ambiguous as to when the 48-hour period began to run.” According to the commissioner,
because the legislature did not appropriate sufficient funds to enable the admission of all
qualifying individuals within 48 hours of the issuance of a district court’s order of
commitment, we must interpret the statute to mean that the 48-hour period commences
when a medically appropriate bed becomes available. Ly argues that the statute is “clear”
and susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation: “that the 48 -hours begins to run on
commitment,” and that issuance of an order of commitment “is the tr iggering event.” Ly
also argues that we must read the priority-admission statute together with Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.10, subd. 1(a), which provides that “[w]hen a person is committed, the court shall
issue a warrant or an order committing the patient to the custody of the head” of a state-
operated treatment program.

4 During the pendency of this appeal, the legislature amended the statute by adding that
covered patients “must be admitted to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours”
of a determination “that a medically appropriate bed is available.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.10,
subd. 1(e) (Supp. 2023); 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 61, art. 4, § 7, at 2393. The amendment
went into effect on May 25, 2023, and expires on June 30, 2025. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 61,
art. 4, § 7, at 2393, ch. 61, art. 9, § 12, at 2452; Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(e) (Supp.
2023).
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We conclude that Ly’s reading of the statute as requiring the admission of covered
individuals to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court’s
issuance of an order of commitment is grounded in the plain language of the statute. The
commissioner must prioritize admission when the individual (1) is incarcerated in a jail or
correctional institution, (2) qualifies under Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b)(1)-(4), and
(3) is subject to an order of commitment as provided by Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(d)
(2022).5 Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b). Stated differently, the legislature expressly
tied the commissioner’s legal duty to act to the district court’s issuance of a commitment
order. See id. (requiring issuance of the order of commitment to trigger the commissioner’s
legal duty to effectuate prioritized admission for a covered individual). Indeed, throughout
the civil-commitment chapter, the legislature repeatedly connects the issuance of the order
of commitment to the commissioner’s obligations. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.09,
subd. 5 (providing that “[t]he initial commitment begins on the date that the court issues
its order or warrant under section 253B.10, subdivision 1,” and that for certain classes of
individuals, “the initial commitment shall not exceed six months”), .12, subd. 1(b)
(requiring “the head of the facility or program that has custody of the patient” to provide a
treatment report “at least 60 days, but not more than 90 days, after the date of the order [of
commitment]”) (2022). We therefore conclude that the plain language of the priority -
admission statute imposes a clear legal duty upon the commissioner to admit a covered

5 Minnesota Statutes § 253B.09, subd. 1(d), provides that “[i]f a person is committed to a
state-operated treatment program as a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental
illness[,] . . . the court shall order the commitment to the commissioner.”
14
individual to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court’s
issuance of an order of commitment.
The commissioner argues that the statute is ambiguous because it does not explicitly
set forth the event triggering the 48-hour period, the legislature could not have intended to
designate the order of commitment as the triggering event, and such a reading would lead
to absurd results. But the commissioner’s arguments that the statute is somehow flawed in
its application do not demonstrate that the statutory language is ambiguous. Rather, we
must determine whether an alternative interpretation grounded in the plain language of the
statute is sufficiently reasonable to render the statute ambiguous. See Spann, 979 N.W.2d
at 73.
The commissioner has not offered an alternative reasonable interpretation grounded
in the plain language of the statute. The commissioner’s position that the 48-hour period
should commence when a medically appropriate bed becomes available may reflect
practical realities given the commissioner’s resources, but such a reading is not supported
by the statutory language. The version of the priority-admission statute in effect at the time
of Ly’s commitment did not reference medically appropriate beds, much less indicate that
the “availability” of such beds triggers the commissioner’s duty to act within 48 hours.
The statute likewise does not set forth any criteria for determining when an “appropriate”
bed would “become available” or who would make such a determination. It is not
reasonable to deduce from the plain language of the statute that the availability of a
medically appropriate bed triggers the commissioner’s duty to act within 48 hours. We
therefore conclude that the statute is unambiguous in the absence of an alternative
15
reasonable reading of the statutory language. Accordingly, we hold that pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022), the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services has a
clear legal duty to admit covered patients to a state- operated treatment program within
48 hours of the district court’s issuance of an order of commitment.
Having determined that the priority-admission statute imposed a clear legal duty
upon the commissioner to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours
of the district court’s issuance of an order of commitment, we reject the commissioner’s
argument for reversal on this groun d. And, as explained further below, we also conclude
that the commissioner violated that legal duty by failing to admit Ly to a state-operated
treatment program within 48 hours of the district court’s issuance of the order of
commitment in his case. We next turn to the commissioner’s remaining challenges to the
district court’s issuance of the peremptory writ.
II. The district court exceeded its authority and otherwise erred in ordering the
commissioner to create and submit monthly compliance reports to the district
court.

The commissioner challenges that portion of the peremptory writ commanding the
commissioner to provide the district court “with 30-day reports concerning all cases in the
State of Minnesota in which the 48-hour rule applies,” including “updated capacity issues
of all relevant treatment centers.” The commissioner argues that the district court exceeded
its authority to compel such action and that the commissioner “does not have any clearly
established legal duty to write and submit these reports.” Ly concedes that the
priority-admission statute “does not itself include a reporting obligation.”
16
Mandamus relief “is available only to compel a duty clearly required by law.”
N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Metro. Council, 684 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn. 2004). The
parties agree that the priority-admission statute does not impose a reporting obligation on
the commissioner or authorize the district court to order periodic reporting of the
commissioner’s statutory compliance. We also agree. A district court is without authority
to order mandamus relief commanding the commissioner to perform an act that is not “an
official duty clearly imposed by law.” See Mendota Golf, LLP, 708 N.W.2d at 171. We
therefore hold that a district court was without authority to compel the Minnesota
Commissioner of Human Services to create and submit monthly reports of her statewide
compliance regarding all individuals covered by Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022).
Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the district court’s order commanding the
commissioner to submit monthly reports regarding all persons covered by the priority -
admission statute.
III. The district court erred in issuing the peremptory writ of mandamus.

The commissioner raises several procedural and substantive challenges to the
district court’s issuance of the peremptory writ of mandamus. “Mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy that is available only to compel a duty clearly required by law.”
N. States Power, 684 N.W.2d at 491 (citation omitted). To obtain a writ of mandamus, a
petitioner must show: “(1) [that the defendant] failed to perform an official duty clearly
imposed by law; (2) that, as a result, the petitioner suffered a public wrong specifically
injurious to the petitioner; and (3) that there is no other adequate legal remedy.” Id.
(citations omitted). Additionally, “in order to effect a valid issuance” of the writ, a district
17
court must follow proper mandamus procedure. State v. Anderson, 58 N.W.2d 257, 259
(Minn. 1953) . The commissioner argues that the peremptory writ should be reversed
because she did not violate a clear legal duty, the district court’s issuance of the writ was
procedurally improper, and there was no specific allegation that the commissioner had
adequate funding to accomplish the requested relief. We address each challenge in turn.
A. The commissioner violated a clear legal duty.
We have already concluded that the priority-admission statute imposed a clear legal
duty on the commissioner to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48
hours of the district court’s issuance of the order of commitment. Ly qualified for priority
admission as an incarcerated individual who was “under civil commitment for competency
treatment and continuing supervision.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b)(2). The district
court issued the order committing Ly to the care of the commissioner on October 21, 2022.
But by the time the district court granted the peremptory writ of mandamus on
December 21, 2022, Ly had not yet been admitted and remained in jail. The commissioner
therefore violated a clear legal duty imposed by law by failing to admit Ly to a state-
operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court issuing the October 21
order of commitment.6

6 Although we conclude that the commissioner violated a clear legal duty, it appears from
the record that the commissioner has interposed several defenses to liability and may
identify additional defenses on remand. The merits of these defenses are not the subject of
this appeal and may be further developed by the parties on remand.
18
B. The district court committed procedural errors requiring reversal of the
peremptory writ.

The commissioner advances two independent bases for reversal of the peremptory
writ resulting from the district court’s procedural errors: (1) the district court erred by
issuing the peremptory writ without allowing the commissioner to present evidence
contesting the allegations against her, and (2) the district court erred by awarding Ly a
peremptory writ before entering judgment.
1. The district court erred by denying the commissioner an
opportunity to answer after denying the motion to dismiss.

The commissioner contends that “once an alternative writ is issued, the mandamus
statute instructs that the case is to proceed, and the pleadings are construed, as an ordinary
civil action,” guided by the rules of civil procedure. The commissioner argues that the
district court erred in issuing the peremptory writ after denying the motion to dismiss
without allowing the commissioner to answer, as provided by Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.01. Ly
argues that the commissioner was required to choose between moving to dismiss or
answering the petition, claiming that there are “no instances in the history of Minnesota
case law” where a defendant in a mandamus action was given an opportunity to answer
after a district court denied their motion to dismiss.
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether, and how, the Minnesota Rules
of Civil Procedure apply in mandamus proceedings. These rules “govern the procedure”
in all civil matters “with the exceptions stated in Rule 81.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule
81.01(a) provides that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure “do not govern pleadings,
practice and procedure in the statutory and other proceedings listed in Appendix A insofar
19
as they are inconsistent or in conflict with the rules.” And Minn. R. Civ. P. App. A lists
mandamus proceedings as a type of special proceeding that “will be excepted from [the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure] insofar as they are inconsistent or in conflict with the
procedure and practice provided by these rules.” (Emphasis added.) In other words, when
there is a conflict between the procedural directives of the mandamus statute and the rules
of civil procedure, the mandamus statute controls. But when the mandamus statute is silent
on a procedural matter, we apply the rules of civil procedure. The express language of the
mandamus statute supports this reading. See Minn. Stat. §§ 586.06 (providing that a
mandamus defendant “may show cause by answer made in the same manner as an answer
to a complaint in a civil action”) , .08 (providing that pleadings and written allegations
“shall be construed and amended, and the issues tried, and further proceedings had, in the
same manner as in a civil action”). Accordingly, we hold that the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure apply to mandamus proceedings to the extent the rules do not conflict with Minn.
Stat. §§ 586.01-.12.
Against the backdrop of this procedural framework, we must determine if Minn.
Stat. §§ 586.01-.12 addresses whether a mandamus defendant may file an answer upon
denial of their motion to dismiss and, if not, whether such procedure is authorized by the
rules of civil procedure. The commissioner argues that the mandamus statute does not
address this circumstance, that the rules of civil procedure control, and that those rules
authorize the commissioner to answer after a motion to dismiss is denied. See Minn. R.
Civ. P. 12.01. We agree and conclude that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply
under these circumstances for two reasons.
20
First, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure do not conflict with the mandamus
statute with respect to the procedural circumstances presented here. See Minn. R. Civ.
P. 81.01(a); Minn. R. Civ. P. App. A. The mandamus statute provides that “[i]f no answer
is made, a peremptory mandamus shall be allowed against the defendant.” Minn. Stat.
§ 586.07. But that provision does not address the situation in this case, in which the
commissioner moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
in the first instance and then sought to file an answer upon denial of the motion. 7 Nor is
there any provision of the mandamus statute that is otherwise inconsistent with a defendant
in a mandamus matter filing an answer after the district court denies that defendant’s
motion to dismiss the proceeding.
Second, Minn. Stat. § 586.08 provides that a writ, answer, or demurrer “shall be
construed and amended, and the issues tried, and further proceedings had, in the same
manner as in a civil action.” This provision indicates that mandamus proceedings in the
motion-to-dismiss posture are subject to the rules of civil procedure, which allow

7 We note that while the mandamus statute provides a defendant with the option to file an
answer, it does not explicitly provide that a defendant may move to dismiss or demur. We
observe that the meaning of “demurrer” has shifted over time and has come to be
understood as a legal challenge to the sufficiency of a complaint—the functional equivalent
of the modern motion to dismiss. See Nostdal v. Watonwan County, 22 N.W.2d 461, 464
(Minn. 1946) (explaining that “[a] demurrer raises an issue of law only” and “[n]o fact
question is involved”). And over a century ago, the supreme court approved the filing of
a demurrer by defendants in a mandamus action to challenge the legal sufficiency of a
plaintiff’s claim. State v. Cook, 138 N.W. 432, 433 (Minn. 1912). Additionally, when
Minnesota adopted the rules of civil procedure, “[t]he demurrer was replaced by the motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Pederson v. Am. Lutheran Church, 404 N.W.2d
887, 889 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. June 30, 1987). Thus, Minnesota caselaw
permits a mandamus defendant to challenge the legal sufficiency of a mandamus claim by
filing a motion to dismiss.
21
defendants an opportunity to answer following the denial of a motion to dismiss. See Minn.
R. Civ. P. 12.01.
Ly relies on State v. Jack for the proposition that a defendant is “not entitled to
answer as a matter of right” upon denial of a demurrer. 148 N.W. 306, 307 (Minn. 1914).
Jack is inapposite for two reasons. First, in Jack, the supreme court never reached the
merits of this question because the defendant did not apply for leave to file an answer, and
consequently, the question was not before the court. Id. Second, Jack long predates
implementation of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Those rules, together with the
mandamus statute, control our decision on this issue. We therefore hold that upon issuance
of an alternative writ of mandamus, the defendant in a mandamus proceeding may elect to
move to dismiss or answer the petition. If the defendant moves to dismiss and that motion
is denied, the defendant may then file an answer in accordance with the Minnesota Rules
of Civil Procedure to the extent those rules do not conflict with Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12.
Here, the district court denied the commissioner’s motion to dismiss and granted the
peremptory writ in the same order.
8 The district court therefore erred by granting
mandamus relief at the same time it denied the motion to dismiss, without permitting the
commissioner to file an answer in accordance with the Minnesota Rules of Civil

8 Despite the district court’s order, the commissioner subsequently answered the alternative
writ of mandamus 13 days after the district court denied the motion to dismiss and issued
the peremptory writ.

22
Procedure.9 Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order granting a peremptory writ
of mandamus.
2. The district court erred by granting mandamus relief before
entering judgment.

The commissioner also argues—and Ly concedes—that the district court erred by
issuing a peremptory writ before the entry of judgment. The mandamus statute provides:
“A plaintiff who is given judgment, shall recover the damage sustained, together with costs
and disbursements, and a peremptory mandamus shall be awarded without delay.” Minn.
Stat. § 586.09. We recently interpreted this provision and concluded that “[a] plain reading
of section 586.09” establishes that the successful plaintiff in a mandamus action “must first
obtain a judgment” before they can claim mandamus relief in the form of a peremptory
writ, damages, or costs and disbursements. 14 Cherrywood, LLC v. City of North Oaks,
993 N.W.2d 287, 292 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. granted (Minn. Sept. 19, 2023) and ord.

9 We recognize the imperative nature of mandamus as an extraordinary remedy that issues
under “conditions of necessity or exceptional circumstances, where there would otherwise
be a failure of justice.” State ex rel. Hathorn v. U.S. Express Co., 104 N.W. 556, 557
(Minn. 1905). Our rules afford district courts faced with situations in which the failure to
perform a clear legal duty might perpetuate grievous harm to an individual or the public
interest with the discretion to implement appropriate procedural tools to expedite
mandamus proceedings and swiftly determine whether relief is warranted. See Minn. R.
Gen. Prac. 115.07 (providing that a district court “may waive or modify the time limits”
prescribed for civil motions “[i]f irreparable harm will result absent immediate action by
the court, or if the interests of justice otherwise require”).

We also note that, in requiring the commissioner to argue its motion to dismiss on
the merits at a “review hearing” without notice and before the completion of briefing, the
district court did not follow the provisions set forth in Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115 with respect
to dispositive motions. And the district court did not provide notice to the parties or make
any findings under Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.07 to alter the prescribed time limits.
23
granting rev. vacated (Minn. July 9, 2024). Here, although the district court’s order issuing
the peremptory writ included the word “judgment,” the record does not reflect the entry of
judgment. The district court therefore also erred by issuing the peremptory writ before the
entry of judgment. But because we reverse the peremptory writ in its entirety to allow the
commissioner the opportunity to answer, we conclude that this error is now moot.
C. Specific allegations as to the availability of adequate funding are not
required to state a claim for mandamus relief.

The commissioner argues that, notwithstanding any statutory duty to admit Ly to a
state-operated treatment program, the district court erred in issuing the peremptory writ
because “the lack of evidence, or even allegation, that the Commissioner had funding to
admit [Ly] to a [state-operated] treatment facility within forty -eight hours of his
commitment” is fatal to Ly’s claim for mandamus relief. The commissioner argues that a
petition and alternative writ must specifically allege the existence of adequate funding to
accomplish the requested relief and that because neither Ly’s petition nor the face of the
alternative writ contained specific allegations as to the existence of adequate funding, the
district court was required to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. We disagree.
As an initial matter, we recognize the ambiguity in our mandamus caselaw regarding
what constitutes the operative pleading in a mandamus action. Compare Cook , 138 N.W.
at 433 (“The petition and alternative writ in mandamus cases constitute, in legal effect, the
complaint.”), with Gunther v. Bullis, 217 N.W. 119, 119-20 (Minn. 1927) (“In mandamus,
the petition and writ constitute the information on the part of the relator, the writ standing
24
in place of a complaint in an ordinary civil action.”), and State v. Youngquist, 227 N.W.
891, 892 (Minn. 1929) (“The writ, not the petition, constitutes the complaint.”). This
question has not been substantively addressed since the adoption of the modern rules of
civil procedure. We observe that limiting the operative pleading in a mandamus
proceeding to the alternative writ carries significant procedural risks and would deprive the
party that initiated the mandamus proceeding from framing the basis or nature of its own
claim for relief. For example, such a construction may allow a defendant to achieve
dismissal based on a facially deficient alternative writ— such as the alternative writ here—
even if the petition initiating the action included allegations sufficient to state a claim and
fairly notify the defendant of the nature of the claim and requested relief. Dismissal of an
action would not be appropriate when the initiating party is not the source of a deficiency
and has no ability to correct that deficiency. We therefore hold that, in evaluating a motion
to dismiss in a mandamus proceeding, a court may properly consider whether the petition
and alternative writ, taken together, state a claim for relief.
We have already concluded that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply to
mandamus proceedings to the extent the rules do not conflict with Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-
.12. In a civil action, we traditionally assess whether a party has stated a claim for relief
under a notice-pleading standard. See Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 604-05
(Minn. 2014) (reaffirming that “Minnesota is a notice- pleading state,” where “short and
general statements of fact in complaints” that “fairly notify the opposing party of the claim
against it” are adequate to state a claim (quotation omitted)). We discern no principled
basis for deviating from that standard in mandamus proceedings, especially given the
25
express directive in the mandamus statute that pleadings and written allegations “shall be
construed and amended . . . in the same manner as in a civil action.” Minn. Stat. § 586.08.
We therefore hold that Minnesota’s notice -pleading standard applies to mandamus
proceedings. Accordingly, we apply this standard to determine whether the petition and
the alternative writ together state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Minnesota Rule of Civil of Procedure 8.01 sets forth the pleading requirements in
Minnesota courts and “reflects a ‘preference for non-technical, broad-brush pleadings.’”
Demskie v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 7 N.W.3d 382, 387 (Minn. 2024) (quoting Walsh, 851
N.W.2d at 605). Accordingly, “the Minnesota pleading standard requires only information
sufficient to fairly notify the opposing party of the claim against it, with a focus on the
underlying incident rather than on the specific facts of the incident.” Id. (quotations
omitted).
The commissioner argues that a different pleading standard should apply, citing two
cases in support of her position that specificity in pleading the adequacy of funding is
required to state a claim for mandamus relief. First, the commissioner relies on Powell v.
Carlos Township, in which the supreme court held that an alternative writ must
demonstrate that there is adequate funding to accomplish the requested relief. 225 N.W.
296, 297 (Minn. 1929).
We conclude that Powell is inapposite because it predates the modern rules of civil
procedure. The adoption of these rules was intended “to permit the pleading of events by
way of a broad general statement which may express conclusions rather than, as was
required under code pleading, by a statement of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
26
action.” Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 605. Under the rules, “[a] claim is sufficient against a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if it is possible on any evidence which might
be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” Id. at 603.
Put differently, “a claim should be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts,
which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting
the relief demanded.” Demskie, 7 N.W.3d at 388 (quotation omitted). The current rules
also provide that in pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, such
as the adequacy of funding, “it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent
have been performed or have occurred.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 9.03. The commissioner’s
interpretation of Powell therefore conflicts with Minnesota’s modern pleading standard,
which rejects the notion that specificity in pleading is required to state a claim for relief,
and the rules of civil procedure, which set forth the pleading standard for conditions
precedent. See Demskie, 7 N.W.3d at 388; Minn. R. Civ. P. 9.03. Moreover, we emphasize
that the mandamus statute itself does not articulate a heightened pleading standard or
otherwise include a pleading requirement regarding the adequacy of funding.
The commissioner also relies on State ex rel. Traeger v. Carleton , in which—after
a trial on the merits—the supreme court affirmed the denial of mandamus relief because
the defendant municipal corporation did not have adequate funds to accomplish the
requested relief. 64 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Minn. 1954). We conclude that Traeger is
inapposite. In Traeger, petitioners brought a mandamus action to compel the municipality
to complete a proposed project after the municipality ran out of funds to complete
construction. Id. at 777-78. After hearing evidence, the district court dismissed the action,
27
finding that the municipality had “discretionary power” to use the funds as it saw fit. Id.
The supreme court disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning , but affirmed on different
grounds, holding that “[b]efore [a writ of mandamus] is issued to compel a municipal
corporation to act in a matter of this kind, it must appear from the writ that the municipality
has the funds with which to proceed.” Id. at 779.
Unlike this case, in Traeger, the district court held a trial on the merits where the
evidence established a lack of adequate funding. Based on that evidence, the supreme court
determined that lack of funds precluded mandamus relief. Traeger therefore stands for the
proposition that the existence of adequate funding is necessary to prevail on a claim for
mandamus relief; Traeger does not stand for the proposition that to state a claim for
mandamus relief, a petitioner must specifically plead the existence of adequate funding.
And the rule in Traeger does not extend to the issuance of an alternative writ because an
alternative writ is not a judgment and therefore does not represent a grant of relief. See
14 Cherrywood, LLC, 993 N.W.2d at 293, 295 (concluding that an alternative writ—unlike
a peremptory writ—is not a judgment) . Rather, “[a]n alternative writ . . . functions
essentially like a summons in a typical civil proceeding, allowing a defendant to respond
to the mandamus petitioner’s allegations.” Id . at 293. We reject the commissioner’s
argument suggesting that specificity in pleading the existence of adequate funding is
required to state a claim for mandamus relief. And we therefore hold that Minnesota law
28
does not require that a petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus specifically plead the
existence of adequate funding to state a claim for relief.10
Ly’s mandamus petition contained allegations sufficient to state a claim for
mandamus relief. The petition set forth allegations that the commissioner had violated a
clear legal duty by failing to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program within
48 hours of the district court’s issuance of the order of commitment in violation of the
priority-admission statute, and that because the commissioner failed to perform her legal
duty, Ly suffered a public wrong injurious to him because he remained incarcerated
without access to critical medical care. Ly also alleged in the petition that the
commissioner operated treatment facilities that could provide the necessary care, and that
the commissioner “can and must, create a treatment plan for Ly that involves him receiving
treatment in a non-jail setting.” (Emphasis added.) And Ly filed a memorandum of law
in support of his petition, specifically alleging that he had no adequate legal remedy other
than the requested mandamus relief. These allegations sufficiently notified the
commissioner of the nature of the cause of action, the existence of any condition precedent,

10 We emphasize that a district court must still take care to follow the procedural directives
of the mandamus statute, including the requirement that an alternative writ “state concisely
the facts showing the obligation of the defendant to perform the act, and the defendant’s
omission so to do.” Minn. Stat. § 586.03. And we note that a defendant in a mandamus
proceeding confronted with vague or defective pleadings may seek clarification using the
tools provided by the rules of civil procedure, to the extent they do not conflict with the
mandamus statute. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.05 (allowing a party to move “for a more
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading”).
29
and the requested relief. We therefore conclude that Ly stated a claim for mandamus
relief.11
DECISION
We hold that pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022), the Minnesota
Commissioner of Human Services has a clear legal duty to admit covered patients to a
state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of a district court’s issuance of an order
of commitment. And the commissioner violated that clear legal duty by failing to admit
Ly to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the district court’s issuance of
the order of commitment. We further hold that a district court is without authority to
compel the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services to create and submit monthly
reports of the commissioner’s statewide compliance regarding all individuals covered by
Minn. Stat. § 253B.10, subd. 1(b) (2022). The district court therefore erred in compelling
the commissioner to deliver to the district court monthly compliance reports of the
commissioner’s statewide activities under the priority-admission statute.
We hold that, in evaluating a motion to dismiss in a mandamus proceeding, a court
may properly consider whether the petition and alternative writ, taken together, state a
claim for relief. We also hold that Minnesota’s notice-pleading standard applies to
mandamus proceedings and that Minnesota law does not require that a petitioner seeking a

11 We note that several of the commissioner’s arguments for reversal—including
inadequate funding and lack of notice concerning Ly’s commitment to the commissioner’s
care—are defenses that the commissioner may pursue in the normal course of mandamus
proceedings. See Winnetka Partners Ltd. P’ship v. County of Hennepin, 538 N.W.2d 912,
915 (Minn. 1995) (explaining that mandamus relief “will be denied where it is obvious that
it will prove to be futile, unavailing, and ineffective” (quotation omitted)).
30
writ of mandamus specifically plead the existence of adequate funding to state a claim for
relief. We therefore conclude that Ly stated a claim for mandamus relief, and that the
commissioner was fairly notified of the nature of the claim and requested relief.
We hold that the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure apply to mandamus
proceedings to the extent the rules do not conflict with Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12. And
we hold that, upon issuance of an alternative writ of mandamus, the defendant in a
mandamus proceeding may elect to move to dismiss or answer the petition. If the defendant
moves to dismiss and that motion is denied, the defendant may then answer in accordance
with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent those rules do not conflict with
Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in issuing
the peremptory writ of mandamus without affording the commissioner an opportunity to
answer.
Accordingly, we reverse the peremptory writ and remand to the district court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.12
Reversed and remanded.

12 We note that since this appeal was taken, Ly was admitted for treatment and subsequently
discharged. At oral argument before this court, the parties acknowledged that the scope of
requested and available relief on remand is unclear. But because liability has not yet been
determined and the issue of what relief is available is not before us on appeal, we express
no opinion on these or other considerations that may arise before the district court on
remand.