Kristie Kollmann, et al., Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1843

Kristie Kollmann, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

Joseph M. Garding, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed August 7, 2023
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-20-8402

Gerald W. Von Korff, Rinke Noonan, Ltd., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondents)

Sarah R. Jewell, River Valley Law, P.A., Waite Park, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M ., Presiding Judge; Reilly , Judge; and
Jesson, Judge .
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this dispute over a contract for deed for the sale of a family farm, appellant -
vendors argue that the district court (1) erred by granting partial summary judgment for
respondent-vendees; (2) erred by denying appellants’ summary-judgment motion; (3) erred
in making factual findings about the treatment of excess sale proceeds from the sale of
2
equipment following a trial on this issue; and (4) abused its discretion in awarding attorney
fees. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellants Joseph and Janice Garding are the members of Garding Family Farm
LLC. Garding Family Farm LLC is the fee owner of a 161- acre family far m in Stearns
County, Minnesota. Respondents Kristie and Jeremy Kollmann are the Gardings’ daughter
and son-in-law.
Before 2018, the Kollmanns expressed interest in purchasing the farm. 1 The
Gardings contemplated selling the farm to the Kollmanns for $3,250 per acre , or $523,250
total. The parties met with an accountant who recommended that the Gardings sell the
farm to the Kollmanns on a contract for deed and file gift tax returns to reduce the balance
due on the contract so that the Gardings would not have to pay capital gains tax on the
transaction. The parties agreed to a listed contract price of $1,040,000 and a tax strategy
was used to reduce the amount of payments received under the contract for deed to
$413,250. This reduction was accomplished b y a $626,750 gift , in the form of debt
forgiveness, from the Gardings to the Kollmanns. In addition, the Kollmanns gifted a
tractor and baler to the Gardings, which the parties agreed was worth $110,000. The sale
proceeds from the tractor and baler would be applied to the purchase price o f the farm.
This resulted in a total consideration from the Kollmanns to the Gardings of $523,250. The

1 These facts are derived from the summary-judgment record and are presented in the light
most favorable to the Gardings . See STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P ., 644
N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002).
3
tractor and baler ultimately sold for $140,000, which was $30,000 over the expected sales
price.
The parties signed a purchase agreement, contract for deed, and lease. The
Kollmanns agreed to buy the farm from the Gardings for a contract price of $1,040,000.
The Kollmanns agreed to pay the Gardings $110,000 as a down payment financed by the
sale of the tractor and baler. The Kollmanns also agreed to lease back to the Gardings the
homestead and one acre of land surrounding the home for so long as either of the Gardings
wanted to live on the property. The lease contained an indemnity provision, under which
the Gardings agreed to “pay, and to protect, indemnify, and save [the Kollmanns]
harmless” for any liabilities, losses, damages, costs, expenses, or suits “of any nature
whatsoever.”
After the closing, the Gardings filed federal gift tax returns documenting their gift
of $626,750 to the Kollmanns as credit on the contract for deed. This eliminated the
Gardings’ capital gains tax on the sale and left a principal balance of $413,250 due under
the contract for deed. The Kollmanns later made several payments on the contract for deed,
which the Gardings accepted .
In 2020, the parties’ relationship began to deteriorate. The Kollmanns decided to
pay off the contract for deed early. The payoff amount as of October 1, 2020, was
$257,012.82. The Kollmanns made a payment in this amount by delivering a check to the
Gardings’ attorney’s office. The Gardings refused to accept the check and disputed the
payoff amount.
4
A short time later, the Kollmanns filed a co mplaint against the Gardings seeking a
declaration of the rights and responsibilities of the parties under the contract for deed and
the lease. The Kollmanns sought an order requiring the Gardings to accept the payment
and deliver a deed to the property to the Kollmanns. The Kollmanns asserted claims for
breach of contract for deed, breach of lease, nuisance , and tortious interference with
business relationships. The Kollmanns sought monetary and declaratory relief, as well as
attorney fees.
The Gardings filed an answer generally denying the allegations and asserting
counterclaims for breach of contract for deed and breach of lease. The Gardings claimed
that the contract for deed should be cancelled or rescinded. The Gardings later sought to
rescind the $626,750 gift to the Kollmanns by amending their tax returns . The Gardings
contended that the Kollmanns were liable for the full contract price of $1,040,000, which
excluded the gift . In March 2021, the Gardings served the Kollmanns with a notice of
cancellation of contract for deed. The cancellation notice stated that the Kollmanns owed
$754,954.60 under the contract for deed to pay off the debt.
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The Kollmanns sought an order
compelling the Gardings to accept the balance due on the contract for deed and convey title
to the Kollmanns, subject to the Gardings’ lifetime lease. The Gardings argued that the
Kollmanns materially breached the contract for deed and sought an order permitting t he
Gardings to rescind the parties’ contract for deed, purchase agreement, and lease.
Following a hearing, t he district court issued an order partially granting the Kollmanns’
summary-judgment motion. The district court determined that the Kollmanns “tendered to
5
[the Gardings] the balance due on the Contract of $257,012.82,” and that the Gardings were
required “to accept that payment and deliver title to [the Kollmanns] according to the terms
of the Contract for Deed, subject to [the Gardings’] home lease .” The district court also
“permanently enjoined and extinguished” the Gardings’ attempt to cancel the contract for
deed. But the district court determined that there was a disputed material fact as to whether
the excess sales proceeds of $30,000 from the $140,000 tractor and baler sale should be
applied to the contract for deed, or whether those excess funds were meant as a gift to the
Gardings. As a result, the district court denied the Kollmanns’ summary-judgment motion
related to that issue . The dis trict court also denied the Gardings’ summary -judgment
motion on their breach-of-contract and breach -of-lease counterclaims.
Later, the district court held a two -day court trial on the outstanding issues,
including: (1) how to properly apply the excess $30,000 from the sale of the tractor and
baler; (2) the validity of the lease ; and (3) the Kollmanns’ claim for attorney fees.
Following trial, the district court issued an order determin ing that the $30,000 in excess
sales proceeds should be applied to the balance on the contract for deed. The district court
ordered that the lease agreement would remain in effect according to its terms. Finally, the
district court found that the Kollmanns were entitled to attorney fees of $80,491.12. The
district court later issued an amended order reflect ing that the correct amount of attorney
fees was $70,591.12, because of a clerical error.
The Gardings appeal.
6
DECISION
I. The district court did not err in its summary-judgment determinations.
a. Standard of review
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01.
“A genuine issue of material fact exists if a rational trier of fact, considering th e record as
a whole, could find for the nonmoving party.” Leeco, Inc. v. Cornerstone Bank , 898
N.W.2d 653, 657 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2017). We review a
grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing “the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party and resolv[ing] all doubts and factual inferences against the moving
part[y].” Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868, 874 (Minn. 2019) (quotation
omitted).
b. The district court did not err in granting the Kollmanns’ summary-
judgment motion.
The Gardings argue the district court erred by granting the Kollmann’s motion for
summary judgment and ordering the Gardings to accept the balance due on the contract for
deed and convey title to the Kollmanns.
In its summary-judgment order, the district court included a statement of undisputed
material facts. Among other things, the district court determined it was undisputed that:
(1) the Ko llmanns agreed to buy the farm from the Gardings for a contract price of
$1,040,000; (2) a tax strategy was used to reduce the amount of payments received to
$413,250, which was accomplished by the Kollmanns’ gift to the Gardings of a tractor and
7
baler, valued at $110,000, and the Gardings ’ gift of $626,750 to the Kollmanns; (3) the
Gardings stated they wanted $3,250 per acre, equaling $523,250; (4) the Gardings issued
a tax form showing gross proceeds from the sale of the property of $413,250; (5) sales
proceeds of $110,000 from the sale of the tractor and baler were applied to the contract for
deed as a down payment; (6) the Kollmanns made additional principal and monthly
payments; and (7) the remaining balance was $257,012.82.
In oral arguments to this court, counsel for the Gardings acknowledged that these
facts are uncontested. Even so, the Gardings claim they did not give a gift of $626,750 to
the Kollmanns to reduce the remaining balance on the contract for deed. The Gardings
claim the existence of the gift is a disputed fact question that should have precluded
summary judgment. A factual dispute is material for summary -judgment purposes “if its
resolution will affect the outcome of [the] case.” O’Malley v. Ulland Bros ., 549 N.W.2d
889, 892 (Minn. 1996) (citation omitted ). “The substantive law identifies which facts are
material.” Bond v. Comm’r of Revenue , 691 N.W.2d 831, 836 (Minn. 2005) ( citation
omitted). A voluntary payment from a parent to a child is generally presumed to be a gift.
Stahn v. Stahn, 256 N.W. 137, 137 (Minn. 1934). Yet the presumption of donative intent
may “be overcome by proof that the intention of the parent was not to make an absolute
gift, as by declarations or acts of the parties inconsistent wi th the idea that a gift was
intended.” Id.
Here, t he unrebutted evidence establishes that the Gardings made a gift to the
Kollmanns. The Gardings said they wanted to sell the farm to the Kollmanns for $3,250
per acre. Joseph Garding testified in his dep osition that the contract for deed reflected a
8
purchase price of $1,040,000. Counsel for the Kollmanns and Joseph Garding then
engaged in the following exchange:
Q: And then you would reduce [ the balance of $1,040,000] by
the gifts and you get the same am ount of money?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And that’s how much you wanted for the property?
A: No, I didn’t want $1,040,000 for the property. Not at all.
Q: You wanted $523,000?
A: That’s what I said, yes.

The parties’ accountant recommended that the Gardings sell the farm to the
Kollmanns on a contract for deed and file gift tax returns to reduce the balance due on the
contract. The accountant explained that the purpose of structuring the sale in this way was
to alleviate the Gardings’ obligation to pay capital gains taxes on the transaction. It is
uncontested that the Gardings filed federal gift tax returns in 2018 reflecting each parent’s
share of the gift. These tax returns reflect that each parent made a gift to t he Kollmanns of
$313,375 for a total of $626,750.
The Gardings contend they did not make an absolute gift because they filed
amended tax returns revoking the gift. The Gardings argue the gift should not be
considered final until the time for lawfully amen ding the tax return has passed. The
Gardings do not cite any precedential caselaw for this proposition.
2 And caselaw instructs
that a completed gift is nonrevocable. See, e.g., Brennan v. Carroll, 111 N.W.2d 229, 242
(Minn. 1961) (Otis, J., dissenting) (collecting caselaw stating that once a gift is delivered,

2 The Gardings cite a nonprecedential case from another jurisdiction, which is not binding
on this court. See Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2022) (recognizing that unpublished
decisions are not precedential); see also Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856,
861 (Minn. 1984) (noting that cases from other j urisdictions are not binding).
9
such delivery may not be revoked); Larkin v. McCabe, 299 N.W. 649, 655-56 (Minn. 1941)
(noting that a gift, once completed, cannot later be revoked). Here, the Gardings testified
they intended to sell the farm for $3,250 per acre, or $523,250 total. This gift was reflected
in the Gardings’ 2018 tax returns. We acknowledge that “[t]he non-moving party does not
need to produce clear and convincing evidence to defeat a su mmary judgment motion.”
Anderson v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res ., 693 N.W.2d 181, 191 (Minn. 2005). Even so, the
nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt
as to the material facts.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ , 566 N.W.2d 60, 70 (Minn. 1997) (quotation
omitted). T he Gardings have not presented facts sufficient to survive a motion for
summary judgment on the purchase price of the farm because they stated they only wanted
to receive $523,250 for the 161- acre farm.
The Gardings also argue the district court erred in determining the payoff amount
of the farm. Again, the undisputed facts do not support this argument. The Kollmanns
agreed to buy the farm for a contract price of $1,040,000. Following the $626,750 gift
from the Gardings to the Kollmanns, the remaining balance was $523,250. Joseph Garding
acknowledged that the Kollmanns made several payments to the Gardings , which t he
Gardings accepted. The payoff amount as of October 1, 2020, after these payments were
applied to the $523,250 balance, was $257,012.82. The Kollmanns delivered a check in
this amount to the Gardings’ attorney. Because the district court did not err in determining
that the Gardings made a gift to the Kollmanns of $626,750 and intended to receive
$523,250 from the sale of the farm, the district court likewise did not err in determining
that the payoff amount was $257,012.82. As a result, we conclude t he district court did
10
not err in granting summary judgment because there was not a genuine issue of m aterial
fact about the remaining balance of $523,250, following the Gardings’ gift, or the payoff
amount of $257,012.82.
c. The district court did not err by denying the Gardings’ summary-judgment
motion and dismissing their counterclaims.
The Gardings argue the district court erred by denying their motion for summary
judgment on their counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of lease. The Gardings
urge this court to reverse the district court’s order and instead order that the contract for
deed be cancelled as a remedy for the Kollmanns’ purported breach.3
The Gardings asserted counterclaim s for breach of contract and breach of lease ,
alleging that the Kollmanns materially breached the contract for deed by removing trees
from the proper ty in violation of the contract terms. The contract for deed included a
provision in which the Kollmanns agreed not to cut down live trees without written
permission from the Gardings. The Gardings contend that the Kollmanns had trees
removed from the pr operty without first obtaining written permission to do so. In their
reply to the counterclaim, the Kollmanns asserted as a defense that “the parties settled the
tree cutting dispute by an agreement drafted by [the Gardings’] attorney. Any trees cut

3 The Gardings assert the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the
counterclaims on its own initiative and without a properly filed summary-judgment motion.
Even so, Minnesota recognizes a district court’s inherent authority to grant summary
judgment sua sponte. See Bell v. St. Joseph Mut. Ins. Co., 990 N.W.2d 504, 509-10 (Minn.
App. 2023) (discussing procedures district court must follow in granting summary
judgment on its own initiative); Septran, Inc. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 271, 555 N.W.2d 915,
920 (Minn. App. 1996) (“A district court may, sua sponte, grant summary judgment if,
under the same circumstances, it would grant summary judgment on motion of a party.”
(quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 1997). We therefore reject this argument.
11
thereafter were by consent.” In its summary-judgment order, the district court determined
that it was a matter of undisputed fact that “[the Gardings’] previous counsel reached a
settlement regarding the tree cutting” with the Kollmanns. The district court r easoned that
because these claims were settled by Gardings’ previous counsel, there was no longer a
factual dispute on this issue. We agree.
Reaching a settlement without trial is “greatly favored, and such agreements will
not lightly be set aside by Minnesota courts.” Beach v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d 709, 711-
12 (Minn. App. 1988), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 23, 1988); see also Skalbeck v. Agristor
Leasing, 384 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn. App. 1986) ( “Settlement agreements are presumed
to be valid in Minnesota.”). The intent of the parties is determined by examining the plain
language of the contract. Dykes v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 781 N.W.2d 578, 581-82 (Minn. 2010).
The district court must first determine whether the language of the settlement agreement is
clear and unambiguous . See id. at 582. If the language is found to be clear and
unambiguous, then the settlement agreement will be enforced by giving the language its
plain and ordinary meeting. Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the settlement agreemen t provide d: “On this day, January 30th, 2020, an
agreement between Joe and Janice Garding and Jeremy and Kristie Kollmann [was
reached, regarding] the removal of trees/brush that are marked and circled as indicated on
[the] map attached.” This document wa s signed by the Gardings and the Kollmanns on
January 30, 2020. The document also included a map showing which trees could be
removed. On February 10, 2020, the parties signed a second document clarifying which
trees could be cut down on the property. To successfully oppose summary judgment, the
12
Gardings must present the district court with a “genuine issue as to any material fact”
showing that the parties’ agreement is not enforceable. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. The
Gardings have not done so. For these reasons, the district court did not err by granting
summary judgment for the Kollmanns on the Gardings’ counterclaims.4
The Gardings and the Kollmanns signed a document that, in plain and unambiguous
language, settled their dispute about the trees. The district court properly gave effect to the
parties’ agreement and determined that there were no outstanding issues related to the
Gardings’ counterclaims. Given the parties’ settlement agreement, we conclude the district
court did not err by enforcing the agreement and dismissing the Gardings’ counterclaims.5
II. The district court did not clearly err in its findings related to excess proceeds
from the sale of equipment, following a trial on this issue .
The Gardings challenge the district court’s findings, following a court trial, about
the proper treatment of excess proceeds from the sale of the tractor and baler. The Gardings
did not file a motion for a new trial. When an appellant does not move for a new trial i n
the district court, we will not consider a new-trial argument for the first time on appeal.

4 The Gardings rely on a nonprecedential case, Woodard v. Krumrie, No. A19-0800, 2020
WL 996746, at *1 (Minn. App. Mar. 2, 2020), rev. denied (Minn. May 19, 2020), in support
of their argument that the Kollmanns breached the contract for deed. We do not consider
this case to be persuasive in the context of this case. See also Kuhn v. Dunn, 990 N.W.2d
491, 493 (Minn. App. 2023) (determining that Woodard lacked persuasive value in the
context of the intestate transfer at issue in Kuhn).
5 The Gardings also argue the district court erred by permanently enjoining cancellation of
the contract for deed and ordering specific performance in favor of the Kollman ns. As
discussed, the district court did not err in determining that there are no material facts in
dispute about the remaining contract balance following the gift , or the payoff amount of
the contract. The district court also did not err in determining that the Kollmanns tendered
payment in full. Thus, we do not reach these arguments.
13
Sauter v. Wasemiller, 389 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Minn. 1986). With no post-trial motion for a
new trial, an appellant may obtain only limited appellate review concern ing whether the
evidence sustains the findings of fact and whether the findings sustain the conclusions of
law and the judgment. Gruenhagen v. Larson, 246 N.W.2d 565, 569 ( Minn. 1976).
The Kollmanns gifted a tractor and a baler to the Gardings. The parties anticipated
this equipment was worth around $110,000. The parties agreed to apply t he sale proceeds
from this equipment to the purchase price o f the farm. The equipment eventually sold for
$140,000. In its summary- judgment order, the dist rict court determined there was a
disputed question of material fact as to whether the $30,000 in additional sales proceeds
should be applied to the contract for deed, or whether it was meant as a gift to the Gardings.
Following a two-day court trial, the district court determined the $30,000 should be applied
to the balance on the contract for deed. On appeal, the Gardings argue the district court
erred by determining the excess sales proceeds were intended to be applied to the principal
balance of the parties’ contract for deed. The Gardings claim the money should have been
allocated directly to the Gardings.
On review, we conclude that the district court’s verdict is justified by the evidence.
The Kollmanns and their accountant testified that the part ies agreed that if the equipment
sold for more than $110,000, the extra money would be applied to the balance due on the
contract for deed. The equipment sold in July 2019 for $140,000. The check was made
payable to Garding Family Farm LLC and was delivered to Joseph Garding. The district
court, serving as fact -finder, found that Joseph Garding told the Kollmanns not to make
payments on the contract for deed balance until after the sale of the equipment. According
14
to the district court, “[t]his indicate s that Mr. Garding knew the Contract for Deed
payments would change depending on the sale price of the equipment.” The district court
also found that “[a]ll parties understood the equipment sale price would change the
amortization and payments under the C ontract for Deed.” The new amortization schedule,
prepared in October 2020, included the extra $30,000 received from the sale. The district
court noted there was “no testimony or evidence disputing the Kollmanns’ and [the
accountant’s] testimony that the pre-closing agreement was that any money received
beyond the $110,000 assumed sale price of the tractor and baler would be credited to the
Contract for Deed.” The district court also found the Kollmanns would be “entitled to
apply the extra $30,000 to the balance due on the Contract for Deed.”
The Gardings argue there is other testimony supporting a conclusion that the
$30,000 should have been a direct gift to the Gardings, rather than a payment on the
contract for deed. But the district court evidently credited the testimony presented by the
Kollmanns and did not credit the testimony presented by the Gardings. The district court,
acting as fact -finder, was permitted to judge the credibility of the witnesses and we d efer
to those credibility determinatio ns. See City of Minnetonka v. Carlson, 298 N.W.2d 763,
767 (Minn. 1980) (noting a district court sitting without a jury “is the sole judge of the
credibility of witnesses and may accept all or only part of any witness’ testimony”).
The Gardings a lso a rgue the district court improperly intervened at trial by
questioning the accountant. The district court asked the accountant about the amortization
schedule. The district court then gave counsel a chance to ask any follow -up questions
they would like to ask, based on the district court’s line of questioning. The Gardings di d
15
not object to the di strict court’s questions. We note, first, that a judge is expressly
authorized to question witnesses. Minn. R. Evid. 614(b). Further, a party must object to
the district court ’s questioning to preserve the issue for appeal. Minn. R. Evid. 614(c) .
Because this issue was not presented to or considered by the district court , we decline to
reach it. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) ( declining to consider issues
raised for the first time on appeal).
In sum, we conclude that the record sustains the findings of fact , and the findings
sustain the conclusions of law and judgment. We therefore affirm the district court on this
issue.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees .
The Gardings urge this court to rever se the district court ’s order awarding the
Kollmanns attorney fees. Generally, “attorney fees are not recoverable in litigation unless
there is a specific contract permitting or a statute authorizing such recovery.” Dunn v. Nat’l
Beverage Corp ., 745 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “We will not
reverse the district court’s decision on attorney fees absent an abuse of discretion.” Carlson
v. SALA Architects, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 324, 331 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Aug.
21, 2007).
The Kollmanns sought contract -based attorney fees. Contract interpretation is a
question of law that we review de novo. St. Jude Medical, Inc. v. Carter, 913 N.W.2d 678,
682-83 (Minn. 2018) . “Because the intent of the parties is typically determined from the
plain language of a written contract we generally enforce the agreement o f the parties as
expressed in the language of the contract.” Id. at 683 (citation and quotation omitted). If
16
the contract’s language is unambiguous, we enforce the agreement as written. Dykes, 781
N.W.2d at 582. Here, the lease agreement provided for an award of attorney fees and costs.
The lease agreement permits the Gardings to maintain their homestead on one acre of land.
The lease contains an indemnity provision in which the Gardings
agree[d] to pay, and to protect, indemnify, and save [the
Kollmanns] harmless from [a]nd against, any and all liabilities,
losses, damages, costs, expenses (including all reasonable
attorney’s fees and expenses of [the parties]), causes of action,
suits, claims, demands, or judgments of any nature whatsoever
arising from . . . violation by [the Gardings] of any contract or
agreement to which [the Gardings are] a party . . . affecting the
Leased Premises or any part thereof, or the ownership,
occupancy, or use thereof.
The Gardings claim the indemnification clause in the lease agreement relates
exclusively to the one-acre portion of the farm where the Gardings’ house is located. The
district court disagreed and, relying on the plain language of the lease agreement,
determined that “the plain language of the lease is writ ten broadly enough to allow [the
Kollmanns] to recover attorney’s fees in this action. The indemnification clause allows
[the Kollmanns] to recover attorney’s fees arising from violation by [the Gardings] of any
contract or agreement affecting the leased premises.” The district court supported its
determination:
It is undisputed that the Gardings refused to accept the payoff
check of $257,012.82. [The Kollmanns] retained [an] attorney
. . . and incurred legal fees attempting to convince the Gardings
to accept the full payment under the Contract for Deed. [The
Kollmanns] then retained [additional counsel] and commenced
this action to enforce their right to pay off the Contract for
Deed. As such, the fact that [ the Kollmanns] sued based upon
[the Gardings’] violation of the Contract for Deed is covered
by the lease’s broad language.
17
We agree. The right to seek attorney fees and costs is clearly and unambiguously
provided for in the parties’ lease agreement. The lease agreement refers to “any and all
liabilities” arising from the Gardings’ violation of “any contract or agreement to which
[they] are a party.” Although found in the lease agreement, the attorney- fee provision is
broadly worded and contemplates an award of attorney fees for a breach of any agreement
related to the property. The undisputed facts show that the Kollmanns tried to deliver a
check to the Gardings to pay off the contract for deed and the Gardings refused to accept
it, requiring litigation. Thus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding attorney fees and costs to the Kollmanns based on the plain language of the
parties’ agreement.
Affirmed.