Merido Mazariegos, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1847

Merido Mazariegos,
Appellant,

vs.

Herminio Mazariegos, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed July 3, 2023
Reversed
Larson, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-CV-19-613

William J. Wetering, Hedeen, Hughes & Wetering, Worthington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Jeffrey L. Flynn, Flynn Law Firm, PLLC, Worthington, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Merido Mazariegos appeals from the district court’s decision to grant an
attorney-fees sanction against him pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 3 (2022)
and Minn. R. Civ. P . 11.03. Because the district court awarded this sanction after
appellant’s claims survived summary judgment, we reverse.
2
FACTS
This appeal from an attorney -fees sanction arises after a three-year defamation
litigation regarding a family real -estate dispute over land in Guatemala (the Guatemalan
parcel). Appellant is a pastor. Respondents include appellant’s mother, Flora Agustin1
(Agustin), and appellant’s siblings and their spouses (co-respondents).2 Respondents are
congregants at appellant’s church.
For context, we briefly describe the real -estate dispute underlying this defamation
action. Agustin claimed she purchased the Guatemalan parcel in full before moving to the
United States in 2011, though Agustin admit ted she never received formal documentation.
In 2016, appellant traveled to Guatemala , paid a sum of money to the supposed seller, and
received documentation purporting to convey the Guatemalan parcel to appellant.3 Upon
appellant’s return to Minnesota, appellant met with respondents to discuss how to divide
the Guatemalan parcel’s cost.
Respondents disputed that appellant held title to the Guatemalan parcel. In
accordance with their religion’s dispute -resolution process , Agustin petitioned church
leadership in March 2017 to resolve the dispute, stating that she owned the Guatemalan
parcel and requesting that church leaders require appellant to convey the property to her

1 The record includes various ways to spell Agustin’s surname. For consistency, we adopt
the spelling in respondents’ brief.
2 For this appeal, the only co-respondent we separately identify is appellant’s brother
Herminio Mazariegos (Herminio). We refer to Hermin io by his first name because he
shares a surname with appellant.
3 The parties did not brief to the district court or on appeal whether the documentation
appellant received in Guatemala constituted a valid deed. The parties agreed that the deed’s
validity presents a question of Guatemalan law that a Minnesota court could not decide.
3
(the petition). Agustin and co -respondents signed the petition. Thereafter, relations
between appellant and respondents deteriorated.
Appellant filed a complaint in district court in June 2019, bringing claims for
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Appellant alleged that: (1) the petition falsely claimed Agustin owned
the Guatemalan parcel and that appellant obtained documentation to the Guatemalan parcel
fraudulently; (2) respondents submitted those false claims to church leadership; and
(3) respondents “instituted a public campaign” to disseminate the petition’s contents “to
the church community” and the “community at large.”
Respondents moved for summary judgment on all claims in June 2020. Alongside
appellant’s response memorandum, he submitted an affidavit and exhibits. In addition to
reiterating claims about the petition, appellant averred that respondents “defamed [him] on
or about April 8, 2017 during our church service by declaring in front of the entire
congregation, that [he] was a ‘thief a pickpocket and a swindler.’” Appellant also stated
that respondents declared appellant should be arrested. Appellant further attached a text
message from Hermino to a third party that stated: “[Appellant] rip ped away the land,
people know this in Guatemala or internationally. So what he calls attack that is not from
the family, that is consequences of such behavior.”
In October 2020, the district court denied summary judgment . The district court
determined that “[i]f plaintiff’s cause of acti on against [respondents] rested solely on the
[petition,] summary judgment would be proper.” However, it found that the petition,
appellant’s affidavit, and the accompanying text message when “[c]onsidered as a whole,”
4
presented sufficient evidence to cre ate a material issue of fact for appellant’s claims to
survive summary judgment . After the summary-judgment order, this matter was
reassigned to a different district court judge.
A bench trial began in February 2022. The first three days of trial took pl ace in
February 2022, while the fourth day of trial occurred in April 2022. On that date, appellant
moved to voluntarily dismiss his case with prejudice pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(b).
Respondents did not oppose appellant’s motion. But respondents requested confirmation
that they could seek an attorney -fees sanction, to which the district court replied in the
affirmative.
Respondents filed a motion for costs, attorney fees, and disbursements, which the
district court granted in August 2022. The district court relied on Minn. Stat. § 549.211
(2022) and Minn. R. Civ. P. 11 to impose the attorney- fees sanction. The district court
reasoned that appellant “had a rational basis to pursue a claim against [Agust in,] . . . [so]
her 1/10 of the expenses shall not be awarded[,]” but that “based on the files, records, and
evidence presented in these proceedings [,] . . . the claims against [co-respondents] were
frivolous.”
Appellant appeals, challenging only the distr ict court’s decision to impose an
attorney-fees sanction.
DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to impose an attorney-fees
sanction against him pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.211 and Minn. R. Civ. P. 11. Appellant
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded the attorney -fees
5
sanction because his claims survived summary judgment. We review a sanctions award
for an abuse of discretion. Radloff v. First Am. Nat. Bank of St. Cloud, 470 N.W.2d 154,
156 (Minn. App. 1991) , rev. denied (Minn. July 24, 1991) . Here, b ecause the district
court’s decision to impose an attorney-fees sanction did not comply with existing law, we
conclude the district court abused its discretion and reverse. See Uselman v. Uselman, 464
N.W.2d 130, 145 (Minn. 1990), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in
Radloff, 470 N.W.2d at 159.
An attorney presenting pleadings or motion papers to a court certifies that the claims
are not being pre sented for an improper purpose, such as harassment; the claims are
supported by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument to change the law; and factual
allegations or their denials have evidentiary support. Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 2; Minn.
R. Civ. P. 11.02; Collins v. Waconia Dodge, Inc., 793 N.W.2d 142, 145 (Minn. App. 2011),
rev. denied (Minn. Mar . 15, 2011) . A district court may impose sanctions against an
attorney or a party who violates these requirements. Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 3; Minn.
R. Civ. P. 11.03; Collins, 793 N.W.2d at 145. 4
The supreme court has held that “ [a] party who survives [summary judgment] with
the major claims intact should not be subject to sanctions after trial predicated on these
surviving claims.” Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 144. The supreme court reasoned that :

4 Both the statute and rule require notice and an opportunity to dismiss an offending
pleading, also known as the “safe harbor” requirement. Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 4(a);
Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a)(1); Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 726 N.W.2d 516, 518-
19 (Minn. App. 2007) . Appellant does not challenge the sanctions on the ground that
respondent failed to comply with these requirements.
6
The interest in the early disposition of meritless cases is
not served . . . when post -trial motions for Rule 11 sanctions,
based on the filing of a frivolous complaint, are granted when
the moving party previously lost a summary judgment motion.
Such rulings only encourage a “never say die” attitude toward
sanctions motions and increase the burden of satellite
litigation. . . . A party who has survived a summary judgment
motion or a motion to dismiss certainly has no reason to believe
that the court considers its claim or defense frivolous; indeed,
the opposite is the case.

Id. at 144-45 (quoting Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot?
Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 Hastings L.J. 383, 390- 91
(1990)). We have concluded an exception to this general rule exists when the district court
“did not address at summary judgment the issue on which [sanctions are] later
awarded.” Collins, 793 N.W.2d at 145-46. But in cases where the issues raised at
summary judgment mirror the bases for imposing sanctions, we have concluded a district
court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions after trial . See, e.g. , Thuma v.
Kroschel, 506 N.W.2d 14, 21 (Minn. App. 1993) , rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 1993).
Here, appellant’s claims survived summary judgment, yet the district court imposed
an attorney-fees sanction after appellant voluntarily dismissed the action . Pursuant to
Uselman, 464 N.W.2d at 144-45, the district court erred when it imposed this attorney-fees
sanction, unless the sanction fit s within the exception articulated in Collins, 793 N.W.2d
at 145-46.
In Collins, the district court only decided summary judgment on the basis that a fact
issue remained for whether plaintiff served the complaint within the statute of limitations.
Id. at 146. After trial, the district court imposed an attorney-fees sanction on the basis that
7
plaintiff failed to show any documentation or persuasive evidence supporting his
substantive claim for breach of contract . Id. In affirming the district court, w e reasoned
that, under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion because the
district court “did not address at summary jud gment the issue on which it later awarded
sanctions.” Id.
Here, the district court’s sanctions order does not fit within the Collins exception.
At summary judgment, co-respondents argued that appellant failed to allege defamation
with specificity. The district court disagreed. While the district court found the petition
did not supply an independent basis to support a defamation claim, the district court found
appellant’s affidavits and exhibits, coupled with the petition, met the specificity standard
and, thus, the defamation claim against co-respondents survived summary judgment. The
district court also determined the intentional -infliction-of-emotional-distress and
negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims survived summary judgment as to all
respondents.
When reviewing the sanctions order, the district court only based its decision to
impose an attorney- fees sanction on its finding that the claims against co -respondents
“were frivolous.” The district court reasoned that appellant “ did not have a rational basis
to pursue a claim against [co-respondents]; therefore, [appellant] shall be ordered to pay
9/10 of the expenses incurred.” The sanctions order is directly at odds with the district
court’s earlier decision to deny respondents’ motion for summary judgment. We, therefore,

8
conclude the district court abused its discretion when it imposed an attorney- fees sanction
after appellant voluntarily dismissed this case. See Thuma, 506 N.W.2d at 21.
Reversed.