State of Minnesota v. Elsa E. Segura

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A22-0163

Hennepin County Moore, III, J.
Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Thissen, Anderson, JJ.
Took no part, Procaccini, J.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: January 31, 2024
Office of Appellate Courts
Elsa E. Segura,

Appellant.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

________________________

SYLLABUS

1. Although the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain

defendant’s convictions for both first-degree felony murder while committing a kidnapping

and kidnapping to commit great bodily harm or terrorize, under an aiding-and-abetting

1
theory of liability, it failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s convictions

for first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree premeditated murder,

under an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability.

2. Defendant is not entitled to a new trial based on her unobjected-to claim of

prosecutorial misconduct because the State proved that any error committed by the

prosecutor did not affect defendant’s substantial rights.

3. Although the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying

defendant’s proposed jury instructions, the district court abused its discretion by giving

erroneous jury instructions on accomplice liability, and the error was not harmless because

it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no significant impact on the

verdict.

4. The district court did not err by allowing the State to elicit testimony from

defendant related to her proffer statements because defendant waived the evidentiary

protections of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 410, and the statements were properly admitted

as impeachment evidence.

Reversed and remanded.

OPINION

MOORE, III, Justice.

Appellant Elsa Segura appeals her convictions for first-degree premeditated murder,

attempted first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree intentional murder while

committing a felony (kidnapping), and kidnapping to commit great bodily harm or

terrorize, all premised on aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal liability. Segura argues

2
that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain her convictions under aiding-and-

abetting theories of criminal liability. She further contends that the prosecutor committed

reversible error during closing argument by urging the jury to find her guilty based on a

theory that she believed she was aiding a drug business. Segura also challenges the district

court’s jury instructions on several grounds. Finally, she argues that the district court

admitted evidence in violation of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 410 by allowing the State

to elicit testimony from her regarding her proffer statements.

We conclude that although there is sufficient evidence to sustain Segura’s

convictions for kidnapping to commit great bodily harm or terrorize and first-degree

intentional murder while committing a felony (kidnapping) under aiding-and-abetting

theories of liability, there is insufficient evidence to sustain her convictions for first-degree

premeditated murder and attempted first-degree premeditated murder under aiding-and-

abetting theories of liability. We also conclude that the State established that the alleged

prosecutorial misconduct—which was unobjected to at trial—did not affect Segura’s

substantial rights. We further conclude that the district court abused its discretion by giving

erroneous jury instructions, and that these instructions were not harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. Finally, we determine that the district court did not err in admitting

evidence related to Segura’s proffer statements. Consequently, we reverse all of Segura’s

convictions and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion on the

kidnapping and felony murder charges.

3
 FACTS

This case arises from the fatal shooting of Monique Baugh and the nonfatal shooting

of her boyfriend, J.M.-M. On December 31, 2019, Segura, posing as an interested home

buyer at the direction of her boyfriend Lyndon Wiggins, lured realtor Baugh to a sham

house showing in Maple Grove. Using a fictitious name, Segura scheduled a showing of

a home through multiple phone calls with Baugh as instructed by Wiggins. Segura never

appeared at the “showing,” but Wiggins’s accomplices Cedric Berry and Berry Davis did.

After Baugh arrived at the home in Maple Grove, Berry and Davis bound Baugh’s hands

and neck with duct tape and forced Baugh into the cargo area of a rented U-Haul van. After

about 2 ½ hours, the men eventually drove to Baugh’s home in Minneapolis, where J.M.-

M. was watching the couple’s two children, and shot J.M.-M. several times. Berry and

Davis later shot Baugh in an alley in Minneapolis. J.M.-M. survived his injuries, but Baugh

died from her gunshot wounds. 1

The State’s theory was that Berry and Davis committed these crimes at the direction

of Wiggins, a man who worked for a music company with which J.M.-M. had a recording

contract. Wiggins was also a trafficker of illegal drugs and had connections to Berry and

Davis. In early 2019, Wiggins and J.M.-M. had a falling-out over a dispute involving the

1
The details of the underlying crimes are discussed in more detail in Berry’s and
Davis’s direct appeals. See State v. Berry, 982 N.W.2d 746, 750–54 (Minn. 2022); State
v. Davis, 982 N.W.2d 716, 721–22 (Minn. 2022). Both Berry and Davis were found guilty
by the jury of first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated
murder, first-degree felony murder, and kidnapping. We affirmed their convictions for
first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and
kidnapping on direct appeal. Berry, 982 N.W.2d at 761; Davis, 982 N.W.2d at 729.

4
record label. Around that time, Wiggins texted a contact that he “damn near caught a

murder case” after unexpectedly seeing J.M.-M. Later that year, Wiggins was arrested on

drug charges, and he believed that J.M.-M. was a “snitch” for having provided information

to the police and was therefore responsible for his arrest. Accordingly, the State theorized,

Wiggins directed Berry and Davis to commit the kidnapping, murder, and attempted

murder to take revenge on J.M.-M.

The State also alleged that Segura, who had been in a romantic relationship with

Wiggins for around 3 years and had admitted to scheduling the house showing from which

Baugh was kidnapped, was liable for these crimes as an accomplice. A grand jury indicted

Segura with first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2022);

kidnapping to commit great bodily harm or terrorize, Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3)

(2022); and first-degree intentional murder while committing a felony (kidnapping), Minn.

Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2022), for conduct involving Baugh. The grand jury also indicted

Segura with attempted first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.17 (2022); see

Minn. Stat. 609.185(a)(1) (2022), in connection with conduct involving J.M.-M. All of the

counts alleged aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal liability. Minn. Stat. § 609.05

(2022). Segura pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial.

The evidence at trial showed that Segura began dating Wiggins in 2016 and that

shortly after the beginning of their relationship, she researched Wiggins’s criminal history.

Segura had access to such information through her job as a probation officer. She learned

that Wiggins had been convicted of aggravated robbery and that he was required to register

as a predatory offender because there was, as she described it, a “kidnapping component”

5
to the robbery. In looking up the details of this aggravated robbery, Segura learned that

Wiggins and accomplices had forced a victim into the trunk of a car. 2

In 2017, Segura learned that Wiggins was involved in illicit drug manufacturing and

distribution. Over the course of their relationship, she assisted Wiggins in many ways,

including renting a condominium for him, leasing a truck for him, buying pill presses for

his drug trafficking business, and booking flights, bus tickets, hotel rooms, and Uber and

Lyft rides for him. Segura always used her own name, contact information, and financial

information.

Segura knew that J.M.-M. was a recording artist who worked for the same record

label as Wiggins. J.M.-M. had been to Segura’s home—where Wiggins had set up a

recording studio—several times, and both Segura and J.M.-M. had attended parties hosted

by Wiggins. J.M.-M. testified that people who knew both him and Wiggins would know

that he was dating Baugh. He also testified that there were two parties that both Segura

and Baugh attended and that Segura followed him on Instagram, where he posted about

Baugh and their children. Based on text messages sent to her from Wiggins, Segura knew

that J.M.-M. and Wiggins had a falling-out related to the record label. And when Wiggins

was arrested on drug charges in October 2019, he called Segura from jail and told her that

J.M.-M. was a snitch.

2
On cross-examination, Segura conceded that aggravated robberies often involve
violence and that as a probation officer, she had clients who had been convicted of
aggravated robbery with a firearm.

6
 On December 29, 2019, 2 days before the kidnapping and shootings, Segura met

Wiggins after work, and he showed her a real estate listing. He said that he wanted Segura

to call the realtor and set up a house showing but told her to wait to make the call. Cell-

site location information (CSLI) revealed that Berry, Davis, and Wiggins were in the

vicinity of a cell phone store in North Minneapolis later that day. 3 Video evidence from

the store showed Berry entering to purchase and activate the phone with a number ending

in 2101 that Segura later used to schedule the sham house showing with Baugh (the set-up

phone). Berry initially gave the name “Lisa Prescott” for the account associated with the

set-up phone. However, after a phone call with Davis, Berry changed the name associated

with the set-up phone to “Lisa Pawloski.” While Berry was purchasing the set-up phone,

Wiggins and Segura were in contact via a 19-second Facetime call.

Cell-site location information (CSLI) showed that Wiggins, Berry, and Davis—

along with the newly purchased set-up phone—traveled from the cell phone store to the

area of Segura’s home. All four phones remained in the area of Segura’s home for about

half an hour. Segura testified that Wiggins entered her home and wrote down information

related to the house listing he mentioned to her earlier. The information included the

3
“CSLI refers to the data collected as a cell phone connects to nearby
towers. CSLI from towers can be used to approximate the cell phone’s location using
triangulation—an analysis of the phone’s location based on the towers to which it
connected.” Berry, 982 N.W.2d at 751 n.2 (citations omitted).

7
address of the house, a phone number, 4 and “Monique” 5 as the name of the realtor she

should call. Wiggins gave Segura the set-up phone to make the call, and he told her to use

the name “Lisa Pawloski” and schedule a house showing for the next day. Wiggins also

instructed her to call “Monique” from a place other than her house and to burn the piece of

paper with the information and wash it down the sink once she was finished making the

call. Segura admitted that this request from Wiggins was unlike anything else she had done

for him in the past.

A little after 5 p.m., Segura drove to a mall parking lot, where she used the set-up

phone to call “Monique.” Segura left a voicemail introducing herself as “Lisa Pawloski”

and asking to set up a house showing for the Maple Grove address Wiggins had given her.

Five minutes later, Baugh called back and asked “Lisa Pawloski” to text her to schedule

the house showing. While Segura was driving back to her home, she was in contact with

Wiggins by phone.

CSLI placed the phones of Segura, Berry, and Davis in the vicinity of Segura’s

home from 5:53 to 5:58 p.m. Segura then drove back to the mall, where she used the set-

up phone to exchange text messages with “Monique” to set the time for the house showing

the next day. Once the appointment was scheduled, Segura turned off the set-up phone and

drove back to her home. Segura once again called Wiggins.

4
The phone number was Baugh’s cell phone number.
5
“Monique” was Monique Baugh. Segura testified that, at the time she made the
calls, she was unaware that “Monique” was, in fact, Baugh.

8
 Later that night, Wiggins went to Segura’s home. He advised her to stay away from

her home during the time of the house showing the next day and to leave her personal cell

phone at home. Segura, who was aware of the significance of cell phone data mapping,

admitted that Wiggins likely instructed her to do this because of the possibility of law

enforcement using cell phone data to determine her location. He told Segura to call

“Monique” in the morning to confirm the appointment. Additionally, Wiggins instructed

her to call “Monique” again at the time of the appointment, say that she was running late,

and ask whether the stove in the house was gas or electric.

Meanwhile, Berry and Davis met with another individual, K.W., and asked him to

rent the smallest available U-Haul truck that same day. K.W. agreed to rent the U-Haul

but explained that he could not rent it until December 30. Around 9:30 p.m. that night,

CSLI placed Wiggins, Berry, and Davis together. Video evidence showed Davis

purchasing bleach, ammonia, two-way radios, and a canvas tent from a store in the vicinity

of the CSLI location associated with the three men.

The next morning, Segura followed Wiggins’s instructions, confirming the house

showing with “Monique” and then calling at the time of the appointment to say she was

running late. 6 After making these calls, Segura returned home, where she saw missed calls

6
Baugh had arrived at the Maple Grove house at about 11 a.m., the scheduled time
for the showing. Another real estate agent, who also had an appointment to show the house
at the same time, chatted with Baugh while they were waiting for their prospective clients
to arrive. Baugh received the call from “Lisa Pawloski” in which she asked Baugh whether
the stove was gas or electric. Baugh commented to the other agent that the call was odd
and that she wondered how the prospective client had gotten her personal phone number.
“Lisa Pawloski” never arrived at the house for the showing.

9
on her personal phone from Wiggins. Wiggins later arrived at Segura’s home and

instructed her to call “Monique” to reschedule the house showing for the next day.

Once again, Segura left her home and called “Monique,” but the realtor did not

answer the call. Segura then sent “Monique” text messages asking to reschedule the

showing for the next day. After driving home and remaining there for a few hours, Segura

left her home to check the set-up phone. The realtor had texted her back and suggested a

3 p.m. appointment, which Segura accepted. Segura relayed this information to Wiggins

when he was at her home later that night. K.W.’s wife rented the U-Haul truck at 8:12 p.m.

that night.

The next morning, Segura left her home and texted “Monique” from the set-up

phone to confirm the 3 p.m. house showing. At around 11:40 a.m., Davis and Berry picked

up the U-Haul truck from the parking lot where K.W. left it. At that same time, Wiggins

called Segura and spoke to her for over 2 minutes. At around 2 p.m., Wiggins came to

Segura’s home and took the set-up phone. He stayed there for about half an hour. Phone

records showed that while with Wiggins, Segura searched “Death Row Records,” a record

label she acknowledged is known for representing artists who killed people and whose

founder is in prison for murder. Shortly after 3 p.m., Berry and Davis kidnapped Baugh

from the Maple Grove house where she was lured by Segura’s request for a sham showing

and forced into the cargo area of the U-Haul truck. After driving with Baugh bound by

duct tape for nearly two hours, at about 5:16 p.m. the U-Haul truck was observed circling

around the block near Baugh’s house.

10
 At about 5:40 p.m., Berry and Davis used Baugh’s key to enter her residence where

they encountered and shot J.M.-M., leaving him bleeding on an upstairs bedroom floor.

About an hour later, while still being held hostage by Berry and Davis, Baugh was fatally

shot in the face and chest with the same handgun used to shoot J.M.-M. and her body was

left in an alley. Baugh’s body was found with blood on it, one of her teeth had been broken,

her hands and neck Had been bound with duct tape, and several of her acrylic nails had

been ripped from her fingers. When K.W. and his wife returned the U-Haul truck, it

smelled strongly of bleach and ammonia. Later forensic testing on an acrylic fingernail

and blood found in the U-Haul truck revealed the presence of a major DNA profile that

matched Baugh’s DNA.

That evening, Segura worked a shift at the Juvenile Supervision Center from 6 p.m.

to 10 p.m. 7 While at work, Segura searched the Hennepin County jail roster. Her phone

records revealed that she made searches relating to stress and anxiety. After work, she and

Wiggins spoke on the phone. Most other calls between the two in the days leading to

Baugh’s kidnapping and the shootings were less than 5 minutes long, but this call lasted

for more than 10 minutes.

On January 1, 2020, the day after the kidnapping and shootings, Segura read local

news articles about Baugh’s death. She and Wiggins exchanged multiple calls that day.

During a FaceTime call with Wiggins, Segura saved a photo of Baugh to her phone. In the

7
In addition to her job as a probation officer, Segura also worked part time at the
Juvenile Supervision Center.

11
days that followed, Segura read more articles about Baugh’s death, including one article

that reported the arrest of a suspect. She saved more photos of Baugh to her phone,

exchanged calls with Wiggins, and again searched the Hennepin County jail roster. Her

phone records revealed that in the days before she was arrested, Segura’s internet searches

included the sacrament of confession, the topic of legal immunity, and the term

“incinerator.” The set-up phone Segura used to lure Baugh to her abduction and eventual

murder was never located by law enforcement. Investigators spoke to Segura as part of

their investigation into the crimes. She was later charged, had a proffer meeting 8 with

prosecutors, and proceeded to a jury trial.

At trial, Segura testified in her own defense. Although she admitted to using the

phone given to her by Wiggins to schedule the Maple Grove house showing, she denied

having knowledge of any plan to kidnap Baugh and shoot Baugh and J.M.-M. According

to Segura, she initially thought she was helping Wiggins with his drug business. On cross-

8
As one federal circuit court has explained:

A “proffer agreement” is generally understood to be an agreement between
a defendant and the government in a criminal case that sets forth the terms
under which the defendant will provide information to the government
during an interview, commonly referred to as a “proffer session.” The proffer
agreement defines the obligations of the parties and is intended to protect the
defendant against the use of his or her statements, particularly in those
situations in which the defendant has revealed incriminating information and
the proffer session does not mature into a plea agreement or other form of
cooperation agreement.

United States v. Lopez, 219 F.3d 343, 345 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000). In this case, after Segura
was charged, she met with law enforcement and prosecutors from the Hennepin County
Attorney’s Office to provide information relating to the kidnapping and murder of Baugh
and the attempted murder of J.M.-M.

12
examination, the State impeached Segura’s testimony with statements she had made during

the proffer meeting before trial. During this cross-examination, Segura admitted to lying

to investigators when she claimed she was “just friends” with Wiggins in an effort to

distance herself from him. Segura also admitted to lying to investigators that she was home

when she made the phone calls to Baugh and also by initially telling officers that she did

not know who Baugh was. Segura agreed when investigators asked if she knew something

bad was going to happen to Baugh, but at trial continued to assert she believed they were

only planning something “in relation to the drug business.” Segura never testified,

however, that she thought Wiggins planned to rob Baugh.

Following the close of evidence, the district court instructed the jury on the

substantive offenses with which Segura was charged and provided accomplice liability

instructions for each count. The district court rejected the accomplice liability instructions

that Segura had proposed, and Segura objected to the instructions selected by the district

court. During closing arguments, the parties focused on whether the State proved Segura’s

liability as an accomplice who “intentionally aid[ed]” in the commission of the crimes

committed by Berry and Davis. See Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1.

The jury found Segura guilty as charged. The district court sentenced her to two

concurrent sentences of 200 months in prison for kidnapping to commit great bodily harm

or terrorize and attempted first-degree murder and a consecutive sentence of life in prison

13
without the possibility of release for first-degree premeditated murder. 9 On direct appeal,

Segura makes several arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support her

convictions, the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument, the jury instructions, and

the use of her proffer statements at trial. We address each argument in turn.

ANALYSIS

I.

Segura first argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain her

convictions. The test we use to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence depends on whether

the State relied on direct or circumstantial evidence at trial. When reviewing the

sufficiency of direct evidence, “we painstakingly review the record to determine whether

that evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient to permit the

jurors to reach the verdict that they did.” State v. Hassan, 977 N.W.2d 633, 639–40 (Minn.

2022).

But when a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, as Segura’s convictions

are here, we use a heightened two-step process to review the sufficiency of the evidence.

Id. at 640. The first step is to “identify the circumstances proved.” Id. In doing so, we

winnow down the evidence presented at trial to a subset of facts that are consistent with

the jury’s verdict, and we disregard all evidence that is inconsistent with the verdict. Id.

The second step is to “identify the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the

9
Although the jury convicted Segura of first-degree felony murder, the district court
did not enter an adjudication nor sentence Segura for this offense because it is a lesser
included offense of first-degree premeditated murder.

14
circumstances proved when viewed ‘as a whole and not as discrete and isolated facts.’ ”

Id. (quoting State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 412 (Minn. 2016)). We give no deference to

the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences. Id. “The State’s circumstantial evidence

is sufficient when the reasonable inferences are consistent with the hypothesis that the

accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id.

Here, the jury found Segura guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat.

§ 609.185(a)(1); kidnapping to commit great bodily harm or terrorize, Minn. Stat. § 609.25,

subd. 1(3); first-degree intentional murder while committing a felony (kidnapping), Minn.

Stat. § 609.185(a)(3); and attempted first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat.

§ 609.17; see Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1). The State alleged Segura was guilty of these

crimes—all of which were indisputably committed by others—under aiding-and-abetting

theories of liability. We begin by reviewing our law on aiding-and-abetting liability.

A defendant may be held criminally liable for the acts of others under Minnesota’s

aiding-and-abetting statute. Minn. Stat. § 609.05. “A person is criminally liable for a

crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or

conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” Id., subd. 1. If a

person is liable as an accomplice for a crime under Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1, the person

is “also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime If

reasonably foreseeable by the person as a probable consequence of committing or

15
attempting to commit the crime intended.” 10 Id., subd. 2. Aiding and abetting is not a

separate substantive offense. State v. DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d 837, 846 (Minn. 1999).

Rather, it is “a theory of criminal liability.” Dobbins v. State, 788 N.W.2d 719, 729–30

(Minn. 2010). Thus, “section 609.05 makes accomplices criminally liable as principals.”

State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 407 (Minn. 2020).

The “intentionally aids” element requires that the defendant “knew that [her] alleged

accomplices were going to commit a crime” and that the defendant “intended [her]

presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d

675, 682 (Minn. 2007); see Minn. Stat. § 609.05. The requisite state of mind for

accomplice liability can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the

“defendant[’]s presence at the scene of the crime, [a] close association with the principal

before and after the crime, [a] lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and

defendant[’]s flight from the scene of the crime with the principal.” State v. Hawes, 801

N.W.2d 659, 668 (Minn. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.

Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 659 (Minn. 2006)).

Segura concedes that the State “proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Wiggins,

Davis, and Berry conspired to commit kidnapping and murder and that Davis and Berry

kidnapped and killed Baugh and tried to kill [J.M.-M.].” To be clear, Segura does not claim

that Wiggins, Davis, and Berry conspired to rob Baugh, which is not surprising because

10
“We commonly use the word ‘principal’ when referring to the person who
committed the crime and the word ‘accomplice’ when referring to the person who
intentionally aided the principal’s commission of the offense.” State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d
393, 407 (Minn. 2020).

16
unlike kidnapping, robberies of an individual do not typically require a U-Haul truck,

ammonia, or bleach. Instead, her argument that the State presented insufficient evidence

to convict her of aiding and abetting these offenses centers on the “intentionally aids”

element of accomplice liability. She concedes that her communications with Baugh to

schedule the sham house showing furthered the commission of the kidnapping and murder

of Baugh and the attempted premeditated murder of J.M.-M. But she asserts that the State

failed to prove that she knew of the kidnapping-murder plot or that she intended her actions

to aid in the commission of those crimes. She contends that the circumstances proved do

not exclude a rational hypothesis consistent with her innocence: specifically, that she

believed she was helping Wiggins with his drug business.

A.

We begin our analysis by identifying the circumstances proved. Hassan, 977

N.W.2d at 640. It is undisputed that on December 31, 2019, Segura lured Baugh to a sham

house showing in Maple Grove, where the principals, Berry and Davis, kidnapped Baugh,

transported Baugh to her home where they shot her boyfriend, and then drove Baugh to an

alley in Minneapolis and fatally shot her. It is also undisputed that Berry and Davis planned

and executed these crimes with the help of Wiggins, who had a falling-out with J.M.-M.

and believed that J.M.-M. was responsible for Wiggins’s arrest on drug charges in October

2019.

The central issue is what Segura knew when she scheduled the house showing with

Baugh. The circumstances proved include the following facts. Segura had been dating

Wiggins for several years and knew his criminal history included an aggravated robbery

17
that involved a kidnapping. She also knew he had a falling-out with J.M.-M. Segura

followed J.M.-M. on social media and saw posts about Baugh. Moreover, people who

knew Wiggins and J.M.-M. (such as Segura) would know that Baugh and J.M.-M. were

dating.

Two days before the kidnapping and shootings—shortly after purchasing the set-up

phone—Wiggins, Berry, and Davis were in the area of Segura’s home. Later that day, the

three men were again in the vicinity of Segura’s home before they purchased items used in

the kidnapping-murder plot. Wiggins’s instructions to Segura to schedule a house showing

were unlike other requests Wiggins had made of Segura in the past. He told Segura to call

the realtor using a particular phone he provided, to use a fake name, to leave her house

when calling the realtor, and then to burn the piece of paper with the information and wash

it down the sink once she was finished making the call. Segura knew the realtor she was

calling was named “Monique.” Segura followed J.M.-M. on Instagram, where he posted

about Baugh and their children. Wiggins and Segura were in communication with each

other at the key points in the kidnapping-murder conspiracy, including when the set-up

phone was purchased, after each call Segura made to Baugh, and when Berry and Davis

picked up the U-Haul truck.

B.

In identifying the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances

proved, “we view the circumstances proved as a whole and not as discrete and isolated

facts.” State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 412 (Minn. 2016). The State’s circumstantial

evidence is sufficient when the reasonable inferences are consistent with the hypothesis

18
that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. Id.

Put differently, if the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole, are consistent with

a reasonable inference of innocence, the State’s circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to

support the conviction. State v. Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d 641, 649–50 (Minn. 2019); State v.

Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 603 (Minn. 2017).

We start by considering whether the circumstances proved support a reasonable

inference that Segura knew that Wiggins, Berry, and Davis planned to kidnap Baugh and

murder Baugh and J.M.-M. When the circumstances proved are viewed was a whole, they

support the following reasonable inferences. Segura knew that Wiggins intended to

commit some sort of illicit activity different from his past illegal drug-related business, and

that her actions of calling and texting Baugh furthered that illicit activity. Segura knew of

Wiggins’s motive to get back at J.M.-M. Segura knew Baugh and J.M.-M. were dating.

Wiggins, Berry, and Davis were at Segura’s home two days before the crimes were

committed. While in Segura’s presence, the three men made their plans to kidnap Baugh

from a sham real estate showing using a U-Haul truck and force her to lead them to J.M.-

M. so they could kill him and then kill Baugh to conceal their crimes.

When the circumstances proved are viewed a whole, one could reasonably infer that

Segura knew of the plan to kidnap Baugh and murder Baugh and her boyfriend when

Segura scheduled the sham house showing, and that Segura intended her contacts with

Baugh to further this plan. Thus, the circumstances proved support a reasonable inference

that Segura is guilty of the kidnapping and premeditated murder of Baugh and the

19
attempted premeditated murder of J.M.-M. under aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal

liability.

Because the circumstances proved support the inference that Segura intentionally

aided the kidnapping of Baugh, we conclude that the circumstances proved are also

consistent with Segura’s guilt of felony murder while committing a kidnapping. A person

is guilty of felony murder when they “cause[] the death of a human being with intent to

effect the death of the person or another, while committing or attempting to commit . . .

kidnapping.” Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3). There is no dispute that Berry and Davis

intentionally caused the death of Baugh while kidnapping her. Segura is liable for felony

murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory if she “intentionally aid[ed]” the commission

of a crime or if the commission of that crime was “reasonably foreseeable” to Segura “as

a probable consequence of” another crime she intentionally aided—namely, the kidnapping

of Baugh. Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subds. 1–2. Murder can be a foreseeable consequence of

kidnapping. 11 See State v. Berrisford, 361 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Minn. 1985). The

foreseeability to Segura that the kidnapping in this case would lead to Baugh’s death is

11
Other jurisdictions’ articulations of felony murder support the inference that murder
is often a foreseeable consequence of kidnapping. See Commonwealth v. Bolish, 113 A.2d
464, 475 (Pa. 1955) (explaining that, under the doctrine of felony murder, “[i]f the original
malicious act was arson, rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping, the original actor is guilty
of murder in the first degree”), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth ex rel.
Shadd v. Myers, 223 A.2d 296 (Pa. 1966); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 202(1) (2022) (stating
that a person is guilty of felony murder if, after committing or attempting to commit
kidnapping, the person “in fact causes the death of a human being, and the death is a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of such commission, attempt or flight”); State v.
Anderson, 409 A.2d 1290, 1306 (Me. 1979) (“The Legislature was aware that the crime of
murder is, more often than not, committed in the course of robberies, burglaries,
kidnappings, arsons, rapes and gross sexual misconduct cases . . . .”).

20
supported by the fact that Segura knew of Wiggins’s past conviction of a violent crime.

Thus, the circumstances proved are consistent with Segura’s guilt of felony murder.

We turn to the next step of our circumstantial evidence standard, which requires us

to consider whether the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole, are consistent with

“any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 890 (Minn.

2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Peterson, 910 N.W.2d 1, 7

(Minn. 2018)). The circumstances proved, as a whole, need not exclude all inferences

other than guilt because “[t]he State’s obligation is to exclude all reasonable inferences

other than guilt.” State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 857 (Minn. 2008). A defendant “may

not rely on mere conjecture” to argue that the circumstances proved, as a whole, are

consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of her innocence. Id. at 858. The defendant “must

instead point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than

guilt.” Id. The absence of evidence in the record regarding certain circumstances does not

constitute a circumstance proved from which reasonable inferences may be drawn.

McInnis, 962 N.W.2d at 891 n.6.

Segura contends that it is reasonable to infer from the circumstances proved, as a

whole, that she believed she was assisting Wiggins’s illegal drug trafficking activities, as

opposed to kidnapping-murder, by calling “Monique.” We disagree that it is reasonable to

infer that Segura believed she was merely aiding Wiggins’s illicit drug activities when she

called the realtor. The circumstances proved, as a whole, make it clear that Wiggins’s plans

were different—and more serious—than the drug trafficking Segura knew Wiggins was

involved in. Wiggins told Segura to call “Monique” using a fake name, whereas she had

21
previously done things for Wiggins using her own name and her own financial information.

Moreover, Segura followed Wiggins’s instruction to make the calls and texts from places

other than her house, which shows she did not want the set-up phone being traced to her

home.

But we conclude that the circumstances proved, as a whole, support a reasonable

inference that Segura believed the end goal of Wiggins’s plan was some crime less serious

than the premeditated murder of Baugh and J.M.-M. Again, Segura knew of Wiggins’s

animosity toward J.M.-M., his motivation for revenge, and his violent history. It is

reasonable to infer that Wiggins’s plan could include murder. But it also could have

included a kidnapping of Baugh followed by a serious assault on J.M.-M. Moreover, the

circumstances proved in this case do not inescapably lead to the conclusion that Wiggins,

Berry, and Davis originally planned to kill Baugh after kidnapping her and locating her

boyfriend. 12 If Baugh’s murder was not part of the original plan, then Segura could not

have known of and intended to further a plan to murder Baugh when Segura set up the

sham house showing. The circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole, do not rule out

these reasonable possibilities. Therefore, we conclude that there is a reasonable hypothesis

of Segura’s innocence of the premeditated murder of Baugh and the attempted

premeditated murder of J.M.-M.

12
The State itself appeared to concede this point at trial. In closing argument, while
summarizing the State’s evidence, the prosecutor acknowledged that “[k]illing Monique
Baugh probably wasn’t the original plan” and that “Monique Baugh was a means to an end,
the end being locating and probably killing [J.M.-M.].”

22
 Nevertheless, we conclude that there is no reasonable hypothesis of Segura’s

innocence of the kidnapping and felony murder of Baugh while committing a kidnapping.

When she set up the house showing with Baugh, Segura knowingly carried out Wiggins’s

instructions to isolate Baugh in an untraceable way—by using a set-up phone provided by

Wiggins, scheduling the appointment with a fake name, and never making calls at or near

her residence. These suspicious circumstances unquestionably lead to the conclusion that

this was not a normal house showing. This scheme to isolate Baugh—along with Segura’s

knowledge of Wiggins’s past criminal history—leads us to conclude that when viewed as

a whole, the circumstances proved do not support a reasonable inference that Segura

believed she was aiding a crime other than kidnapping.

Moreover, considering this scheme, we conclude that it is unreasonable to infer that

the possibility of murder was unforeseeable to Segura. See Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2.

Therefore, the circumstances proved do not support an inference of innocence for the

kidnapping and felony murder convictions.

We disagree with the dissent that the circumstances proved, when viewed as a

whole, support a reasonable inference that Segura believed Wiggins planned to rob, but not

kidnap, the realtor she called. Segura concedes that the State proved beyond a reasonable

doubt that Wiggins, Davis, and Berry conspired to kidnap Baugh. And there are two

reasons to reject the dissent’s alternative theory that Segura believed the conspiracy’s goal

was robbery. First, unlike a kidnapping, a robbery of someone’s person does not typically

23
require the use of a U-Haul truck to conceal the victim, 13 or of ammonia or bleach.14

Second, the grand jury indictments against Wiggins, Davis, and Berry do not allege a

conspiracy to rob Baugh. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that during Wiggins’s

communications with Segura at the key points in the kidnapping-murder conspiracy,

Wiggins said or did anything to suggest he was conspiring with Davis and Berry to simply

rob Baugh. Instead, the timing of those communications support a reasonable inference

that Segura knew that as part of the preparation for the offense, a U-Haul truck and bleach

were obtained. Because a jury’s verdict may not be set aside based on mere conjecture,

see Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858, we find the analysis of the dissent unpersuasive.

In sum, we conclude that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain

Segura’s convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree

premeditated murder, under an aiding-and-abetting theory of liability. Therefore, these

convictions must be reversed. But because we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to

13
The dissent’s theory is only that there is a reasonable inference that Wiggins, Davis,
and Berry intended to rob Baugh personally, rather than rob the house Baugh was showing.
A U-Haul is typically not needed to rob someone’s person.
14
Bleach, for example, is commonly used to cover up DNA evidence left at the crime
scene. See, e.g., Crain v. State, 894 So.2d 59, 73–76 (Fla. 2004) (finding sufficient
evidence to show that defendant murdered victim during a kidnapping to facilitate an
assault and observing that “the presence of bleach” in defendant’s bathroom made it
“impossible to tell how much of the luminol ‘glow’—if any—was attributable to blood”);
State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 220-21 (Tenn. 2016) (finding that bleach was sprayed
into victim’s mouth in an attempt to destroy evidence of perpetrator’s DNA); Bates v. State,
750 S.E.2d 323, 326 (Ga. 2013) (finding circumstantial evidence sufficient to support
murder conviction without DNA evidence, in part, because a bottle of bleach and bucket
of bleach water were found in defendant’s apartment, and forensic expert testified that
“washing hands and cleaning with bleach destroys any DNA”).

24
sustain, under an aiding-and-abetting theory, Segura’s convictions for kidnapping to

commit great bodily harm or terrorize and felony murder while committing a kidnapping,

we must consider Segura’s remaining arguments.

II.

Segura contends that she is entitled to a new trial because the State, in closing

argument, improperly urged the jury to find her guilty on the theory that she aided a drug

business—a crime for which Segura was not indicted. Segura did not object to the

prosecutor’s statements at trial.

“When a defendant fails to object at trial, the forfeiture doctrine generally precludes

appellate relief.” State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 784–85 (Minn. 2017). The

forfeiture doctrine plays a vital role in the criminal justice system because it encourages

defendants to object while before the district court so that “any errors can be corrected

before their full impact is realized.” State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. 2015)

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But because a rigid and undeviating

application of the forfeiture doctrine would be out of harmony with the rules of

fundamental justice, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 31.02 provides appellate courts “a limited

power to correct errors that were forfeited.” Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d at 279 (citation

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This limited power is known as the plain-

error doctrine. Id.

Our application of the plain error doctrine is modified when we review unobjected-

to claims of prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Jackson, 773 N.W.2d 111, 121 (Minn.

2009). First, “[t]he defendant must prove an error was made that was plain.” Id. An error

25
is plain if it “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Ramey, 721

N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Prosecutors err when they misstate the law in closing

argument. State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 689–90 (Minn. 2002).

If the defendant establishes an error that is plain, then “the burden shifts to the

prosecution to demonstrate that the error did not affect substantial rights.” Jackson, 773

N.W.2d at 121. “An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights only if there is a

reasonable probability that the error actually impacted the verdict.” Id. Thus, “the State

must show that there is ‘no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in

question would have had a significant effect on the verdict.’ ” State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d

792, 803–04 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302). We may correct a plain

error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights “only if it seriously affect[s] the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 804 (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

While describing the legal standard to find Segura guilty of kidnapping, murder, and

attempted murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability in closing

argument, the prosecutor stated:

Aiding and abetting can be a complicated legal concept. . . . Even if [Segura]
didn’t physically participate in the kidnapping, murder, and attempted
murder here, she is guilty if she knew another person was going to commit or
was committing a crime, and if she acted to aid the other person, so if she
knew there were criminal acts going on and she acted to help. Well, she
admits that. Even if all you want to believe, even if we take her at face value,
which you shouldn’t, she’s saying she thought this was related to the drug
business and that’s what was fishy about it.

26
 She’s also guilty of any other crime the other person commits if it was
reasonably foreseeable. Well, again, let’s take her at face value, which,
again, you shouldn’t. The drug business comes with violence. It comes with
guns. The circumstances under which she’s being told to do this stuff and
the things she’s being told to do suggests very strongly that this is a serious
crime that she’s assisting in.

Segura bears the burden to demonstrate that these remarks constitute an error that is plain.

Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302.

Minnesota Statutes section 609.05 addresses aiding-and-abetting liability. Under

subdivision 1, a defendant “is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the

[defendant] intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise

procures the other to commit the crime.” Id., subd. 1. Subdivision 2, which describes the

“[e]xpansive liability” doctrine, provides that a defendant “liable under subdivision 1 is

also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably

foreseeable by the [defendant] as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to

commit the crime intended.” Id., subd. 2 (emphasis added).

Segura contends that the State was required to charge her with a drug-related offense

in order to argue accomplice liability under subdivision 2 for crimes that were the

foreseeable consequence of a “drug business.” We have never required that a defendant

be charged with a particular “target crime” to be found liable under Minn. Stat. § 609.05,

subd. 2, for crimes committed in pursuance of that [target] crime that are “reasonably

foreseeable . . . as a probable consequence” of committing the target crime.

But even if the State was not required to charge Segura with a drug offense, the

prosecutor’s remarks to the jury improperly expanded the doctrine of expansive liability.

27
It would be improper for a jury to convict Segura for crimes that were reasonably

foreseeable to her as a probable consequence of a “drug business.” Under the plain

language of Minnesota Statutes section 609.05, expansive liability under subdivision 2

does not apply unless the State first proves that a defendant is liable under subdivision 1.

Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2 (“A person liable under subdivision 1 is also liable for any

other crime committed . . . .”). Accordingly, the jury would have to determine that Segura

was criminally liable for a “drug business” under the aiding-and-abetting theory articulated

in subdivision 1. But the criminality of the “drug business” was not identified and

discussed in any detail to allow the jurors to reasonably determine which other crimes, if

any, were reasonably foreseeable as a probable consequence of the “drug business.”

As the California Supreme Court has recognized in the context of its own expansive

liability doctrine, “a conviction may not be based on the jury’s generalized belief that the

defendant intended to assist and/or encourage unspecified ‘nefarious’ conduct.” People v.

Prettyman, 926 P.2d 1013, 1024 (Cal. 1996) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted). We believe that the prosecutor’s view of aiding-and-abetting law, embodied in

the “drug business” remarks, encouraged the jury to do just that—find Segura guilty on the

belief that she intended to aid some unspecified illicit drug activity. 15

15
The State counters that any reference to the “drug business” and liability for crimes
reasonably foreseeable as a result of the “drug business” was merely the prosecutor’s
attempt to respond to Segura’s anticipated defense, i.e., that she only believed that the
phone calls she made were related to Wiggins’s drug business. We have held that
statements made during a prosecutor’s closing argument do not constitute prejudicial
misconduct when the prosecutor counters an anticipated defense argument. See State v.
Starkey, 516 N.W.2d 918, 927 (Minn. 1994); State v. Carter, 289 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Minn.

28
 Nevertheless, even if the prosecutor’s remarks constitute an error that is plain, we

conclude that the State has proved that any error did not affect Segura’s substantial rights.

In assessing whether the State has met its burden to demonstrate that there is no “reasonable

probability that the error actually impacted the verdict,” we consider several factors.

Jackson, 773 N.W.2d at 121. These factors include “the strength of the evidence against

the defendant, the pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, and whether the defendant

had an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions.” State v. Davis,

735 N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn. 2007). “The trial court’s instructions to the jury are also

relevant in determining whether the jury was unduly influenced by the [prosecutor’s]

improper comments.” State v. Washington, 521 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1994).

While we hesitate to characterize the State’s evidence of Segura’s guilt as strong,

the balance of factors leads us to conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the

prosecutor’s remarks actually impacted the verdict. As an initial matter, we note that the

prosecutor’s arguments concerning Segura’s liability stemming from the “drug business”

cannot reasonably be characterized as “pervasive.” These comments are present in just one

page of the 28-page transcript of the State’s closing argument. See Peltier, 874 N.W.2d at

806 (concluding that a prosecutor’s improper remarks were “isolated” when they

“compris[ed] approximately one page of a 39–page closing argument”); State v. Griese,

1979). But here, the prosecutor did more than simply discredit Segura’s defense. The
prosecutor told the jury that it could find Segura guilty of any crimes that were reasonably
foreseeable to her as a result of a “drug business.” As discussed above, this statement
misstated the law by improperly expanding aiding-and-abetting liability under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.05, subd. 2.

29
565 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn. 1997) (concluding that prosecutorial misconduct that “was

limited to a little more than two pages in a more than 50–page closing argument” did not

permeate the entire closing argument).

Moreover, the “drug business” theory was not the primary theory upon which the

State urged the jury to find Segura criminally liable under an aiding-and-abetting theory.

Immediately following the “drug business” comments, the prosecutor said to the jury:

But don’t accept her claims that she thought this was nothing more than
relating to [Wiggins’s] drug distribution business because these are the
actions of people who know that they’re planning and preparing to commit a
violent crime, specifically. And in order to carry out these violent crimes, in
order to accomplish them at all, to make them possible, she made all these
calls and texts and contacts.

. . . [Segura] knew full well her acts were enabling the commission of a crime.
She knew full well that the crimes planned were the kidnapping of Monique
Baugh in order to get to [J.M.-M.].

Accordingly, to prove the kidnapping, murder, and attempted murder charges, the

prosecutor explicitly (and primarily) argued that Segura knew that the goal was not a “drug

business” but to kidnap Baugh.

Segura also had an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s remarks about the drug

business in her own closing argument. Segura contends that this opportunity was

undermined because the district court sustained objections to her argument about the

knowledge requirement. It is true that the district court sustained one objection on the

ground that Segura’s counsel misstated the law. Nevertheless, counsel had other

opportunities to address the significance of Segura’s knowledge of drug-related crimes.

For instance, Segura’s counsel stated:

30
 You heard a lot of evidence about drugs in this case; although, the crimes
Ms. Segura is facing here are not drug related. You do not need to decide if
she is guilty of any drug crimes or any involvement in that. The State is not
asserting that the intended crime here was a drug case, but the history and
evidence you have seen shows that that is the knowledge that Ms. Segura had
about Mr. Wiggins.

Thus, Segura’s one sustained objection did not completely undermine her opportunity to

rebut the prosecutor’s remarks about her involvement in a drug business.

Next, we consider the district court’s jury instructions. The impact of a prosecutor’s

improper remarks during closing argument may be lessened by the district court’s jury

instructions. Washington, 521 N.W.2d at 40. Thus, in Washington, we concluded that a

prosecutor’s improper reference to a defendant’s character in closing argument did not

warrant reversal in part because the district court “instructed the jury that the arguments of

an attorney are not evidence” and “also warned the jury that they should not permit

sympathy, prejudice or emotion to influence their verdict.” Id.

Here, the district court instructed the jurors that they must follow and apply the rules

of law as given to them. Like the district court in Washington, the district court explained

that the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence and that the jury should disregard any

statement of law from attorneys that differed from the jury instructions. Thus, if the jury

were following the district court’s instructions on this point, it would not have convicted

Segura based on her intent to aid a drug business.

Accordingly, we conclude that the State proved that there is no reasonable

possibility that any error on the part of the prosecutor in referencing Segura’s intent to aid

31
a drug business affected the jury’s verdict. Consequently, a new trial is not warranted

because of prosecutorial misconduct.

III.

We next turn to Segura’s argument that she is entitled to a new trial due to erroneous

jury instructions. Segura raises several issues with the district court’s jury instructions,

including that the district court abused its discretion by denying her proposed accomplice

liability instructions and that the instructions it issued were confusing and misleading. “We

review a district court’s jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Huber, 877

N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 2016). “District courts are entitled to considerable latitude when

selecting language for jury instructions, but an instruction that materially misstates the law

is error.” State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 144 (Minn. 2012). While we conclude that

the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Segura’s proposed instructions, we

agree with Segura that the district court’s instructions materially misstated the law.

Because we are not convinced that this error was harmless, Segura is entitled to a new trial.

We therefore reverse Segura’s remaining convictions and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. 16

16
Segura also challenges the district court’s transferred intent instruction.
Specifically, she argues that it was error to include a transferred intent instruction when
instructing the jury on first-degree premeditated murder because there was no evidence that
either Baugh or J.M.-M. were unintended victims. Because we reverse Segura’s conviction
for first-degree premeditated murder on evidentiary sufficiency grounds, we need not
address Segura’s argument concerning the transferred intent instruction. Additionally,
Segura argues that the cumulative effect of the district court’s instructional errors deprived
her of a fair trial. We do not address the merits of this argument in light of our conclusion
that the district court’s material misstatement of the law in its instructions requires reversal
of Segura’s convictions for kidnapping and felony murder.

32
 A.

Segura first contends that the district court committed reversable error by denying

her proposed accomplice liability instruction. A district court’s “[d]enial of a requested

jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293,

302 (Minn. 2015). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision as to whether to give

an instruction is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in

the record.” State v. Thoresen, 921 N.W.2d 547, 553 (Minn. 2019) (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

At trial, Segura requested that the district court add language drawn from Rosemond

v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014), to the accomplice liability instruction recommended

by the jury instruction guides. See 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice—

Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 4.01 (6th ed. 2022) (“CRIMJIG 4.01”).

Specifically, she requested the addition of the following language: “The intent requirement

is satisfied when a person actively participates in a criminal venture with advance

knowledge of the circumstances constituting the elements of the charged offense. Intent

must go to the specific and entire crime charged.” The district court denied Segura’s

request because it concluded that Rosemond concerned accomplice liability under a federal

statute and was therefore inapplicable to Segura’s case.

As Segura concedes, Rosemond is not binding precedent because it involves the

interpretation of a federal statute. At issue in Rosemond was the propriety of a district

court’s jury instructions for a charge alleging aiding-and-abetting liability for a violation

33
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), a two-pronged crime involving (1) the use of a firearm, (2) in

connection with a crime of violence or a drug-trafficking crime. 572 U.S. at 67.

The United States Supreme Court concluded that the district court’s jury instruction

was erroneous because it permitted a finding of guilt based on the defendant’s knowledge

of the presence of a firearm after his participation in the underlying trafficking offense. Id.

at 81–82. Based on its review of the criminal statute, the Court concluded that a proper

instruction should have “explain[ed] that [the defendant] needed advance knowledge of a

firearm’s presence.” Id. at 81. More specifically, the erroneous instruction allowed the

jury to convict based on an intent “to advance some different or lesser offense” (e.g., drug

trafficking), but accomplice liability was predicated upon a finding of intent extending “to

the specific and entire crime charged” (i.e., armed drug trafficking). Id. at 76.

Segura’s proposed language relates to the intent requirement of aiding-and-abetting

liability. We have previously stated that jury instructions must explain that the

“intentionally aiding” element requires that “the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant knew his alleged accomplice was going to commit a crime and the

defendant intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” E.g.,

State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 808 (Minn. 2012). Nevertheless, “we afford the district

courts ‘considerable latitude’ in choosing the language explaining that element.” Id. at 808

n.12 (quoting State v. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 2002)).

The State’s assertion that we have already rejected a Rosemond-like instruction for

accomplice liability instructions is inaccurate. See State v. Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d 334, 354

(Minn. 2016) (declining to address whether Rosemond is “consistent with Minnesota’s

34
accomplice liability law” because the Court’s holding did not help the defendant).

Nevertheless, we have never required that accomplice liability instructions explain that the

“intentionally aiding” element “go to the specific and entire crime” as Segura argues.

Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion when it

denied Segura’s requested instruction.

B.

Segura next argues that the district court committed reversible error by giving a

hybrid instruction that incorporated both principal and accomplice liability concepts.

Specifically, she points to the district court’s use of the language “the defendant or another

(or others)” when describing the elements of the underlying crimes that Segura allegedly

aided and abetted. Segura claims the addition of this language makes the jury instructions

hybrid instructions, and that this language was confusing and misleading.

We review the district court’s jury instructions for abuse of discretion. State v.

Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 816 (Minn. 2017). “A district court abuses its discretion if the

challenged instruction confuses, misleads, or materially misstates the law.” Id. “We

review the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately

explain the law.” Huber, 877 N.W.2d at 522. However, “[a] mistaken jury instruction

does not require a new trial if the error was harmless.” State v. Hall, 722 N.W.2d 472, 477

(Minn. 2006). “An erroneous jury instruction is harmless only if it can be said that, beyond

a reasonable doubt, the error had no significant impact on the verdict rendered.” Id.

Hybrid instructions are “instructions that combine accomplice liability and the

underlying elements.” Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d at 408. The danger of such instructions is that

35
“when the district court conflates the elements of accomplice liability and the underlying

substantive offense, the instruction risks omitting the ‘intentionally aiding’ element of

accomplice liability.” Huber, 877 N.W.2d at 524 n.3. As we stated in Ezeka, “[t]he era of

hybrid instructions has ended,” and now “district courts must separately instruct the jury

on accomplice liability and on the underlying elements of the substantive offenses.” 946

N.W.2d at 408.

We agree with Segura’s contention that the district court issued impermissible

hybrid instructions in this case. Based strictly on form, the district court’s instructions

comported with our case law. Consistent with our rule in Ezeka, the district court

separately instructed the jury on the underlying elements of the four substantive offenses

with which Segura was charged and on accomplice liability. Moreover, the district court

gave a separate accomplice liability instruction after instructing the jury on the elements of

each substantive offense, as recommended by the CRIMJIG on accomplice liability. See

CRIMJIG 4.01; see also Minn. Stat. § 609.05.

However, the practical effect of the district court’s addition of the language “the

Defendant or another” to the instructions was to “combine accomplice liability and the

underlying elements”—the concern that led us to put an end to hybrid instructions. Ezeka,

946 N.W.2d at 408. Not only did this additional language materially misstate the law, but

it also made the instructions confusing and misleading. The district court added this

disputed language to its instructions on the underlying elements of each substantive crime.

Consider, for example, the instruction on kidnapping to commit great bodily harm

or to terrorize. The district court’s instructions for the underlying elements provided:

36
 The elements of kidnapping to commit great bodily harm/terrorize are
first, the defendant or another (or others) confined or removed Monique
Baugh from one place to another without her consent. . . .
Second, the defendant or other persons acted for the purpose of
committing great bodily harm on the person of Monique Baugh or terrorizing
Monique Baugh. . . . It is not necessary that the defendant or that other
person(s) actually caused great bodily harm to Monique Baugh or have
terrorized Monique Baugh so long as the defendant or that other person(s)
intended to do so.
Third, some part of the defendant’s act took place on or about
December 29th through 31st, 2019, in Hennepin County.

(Emphasis added.) The district court then transitioned from the elements of the underlying

crime to the accomplice liability instruction by telling the jurors:

If you find that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, the defendant is guilty of this charge; if you find that any element has
not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant is not guilty of
this charge, unless you find the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is liable for this crime committed by another person
according to the instruction below.

(Emphasis added.) When viewed together, these instructions materially misstate the law

because they—by their plain language—allow the jury to convict Segura of kidnapping for

the actions of others without reaching the issue of her liability under an aiding-and-abetting

theory. 17 The jury could find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

(1) another person confined or removed Monique Baugh from one place to another without

her consent, (2) the other person acted for the purpose of committing great bodily harm on

the person of Monique Baugh or terrorizing Monique Baugh, and (3) that Segura took some

17
This format of instructing on the elements of the underlying crime with the language
“the defendant or another” and then instructing on accomplice liability is repeated for each
count. The district court used this format for both its oral and written instructions.

37
action on December 29–31 in Hennepin County. Under the plain language of the

instructions, the jury could convict Segura of kidnapping based on these findings alone.

Thus, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by providing hybrid

instructions that materially misstated the law.

But this conclusion does not end our analysis. Segura is entitled to a new trial only

if these erroneous instructions were not harmless. “An erroneous jury instruction is

harmless only if it can be said that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error had no significant

impact on the verdict rendered.” Hall, 722 N.W.2d at 477.

We presume that juries follow instructions given by the district court. State v.

Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 151 (Minn. 2011). Given that presumption, and based on the

material misstatement of the law in the jury instructions and the overwhelming evidence

that Berry and Davis kidnapped and murdered Baugh, we cannot say—beyond a reasonable

doubt—that the erroneous instructions had no significant impact on the jury’s verdict.

Therefore, we conclude that the erroneous jury instructions were not harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt and that Segura is entitled to a new trial. We reverse Segura’s convictions

for kidnapping and felony murder and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

IV.

Finally, Segura argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence that she

contends should have been excluded under Minn. R. Evid. 410. Specifically, Segura points

to the testimony that the State elicited from her concerning statements she made during

plea proffers. Segura filed a pretrial motion to prohibit the State from admitting her

recorded proffer statement and transcript into evidence. However, she did not object at

38
trial to the questions the State asked her on cross-examination related to her proffer

statements.

We review an unobjected-to admission of evidence for plain error affecting

substantial rights. State v. Brown, 792 N.W.2d 815, 820–21 (Minn. 2011). Accordingly,

we must first determine whether Segura has established that the admission of her proffer

statements was an error that was plain. See Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356

(Minn. 2022). On the question of whether an error occurred, “[i]n determining whether

admission of evidence violates Minn. R. Evid. 410, we review a district court’s findings of

fact for clear error and review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Brown, 792 N.W.2d

at 821.

Minnesota Rule of Evidence 410 addresses the admissibility of a defendant’s proffer

statements:

Evidence of . . . an offer to plead guilty . . . to the crime charged or any other
crime or of statements made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or
offers, is not admissible in any civil, criminal, or administrative action, case,
or proceeding whether offered for or against the person who made the plea
or offer.

“Rule 410 safeguards the confidentiality of plea negotiations in order to foster meaningful

dialogue between the parties and to promote the disposition of criminal cases by

compromise.” State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 620 (Minn. 2004). But “[t]he evidentiary

safeguards provided for under Rule 410 for statements made in connection with a plea or

plea offer . . . may be waived.” Id. at 617. “Waiver ‘is an intentional relinquishment of a

known right or privilege, and its validity depends . . . upon the particular facts and

39
circumstances surrounding the case.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260,

264 (Minn. 1990)).

We first address whether Segura validly waived the protections of Rule 410. Before

the proffer meeting at which Segura made the statements at issue, she signed a written

agreement. This agreement states in relevant part:

If, during this meeting, Elsa Segura implicates herself in any crime, any
statements Ms. Segura makes during the meeting will not be offered as
evidence in the State’s case-in-chief against her. Statements made by Ms.
Segura during the meeting may only be used to cross-examine . . . her should
she testify at trial.

Both Segura and her counsel signed the agreement, acknowledging that they had reviewed

it together. Segura then attended the proffer meeting with her attorney. Based on this

written agreement, as well as the other surrounding facts and circumstances, we conclude

that Segura validly waived the evidentiary protections of Rule 410.

We turn next to the issue of whether the State permissibly used Segura’s proffer

statements as impeachment evidence on cross-examination. 18 The Minnesota Rules of

Evidence permit the State to impeach a witness’s testimony at trial with evidence of her

bias and with her prior inconsistent statements. Minn. R. Evid. 613 (prior inconsistent

statements); Minn. R. Evid. 616 (evidence of bias); State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 598

(Minn. 2010) (“Evidence of bias of a witness is admissible to attack the credibility of a

18
If the protections of Rule 410 apply, “[t]here is no impeachment exception to the
general rule that statements made in connection with plea negotiations are inadmissible.”
State v. Robledo-Kinney, 615 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Minn. 2000). Here, however, Segura validly
waived her rights under Rule 410. Therefore, the admissibility of her statements for
impeachment purposes are subject to other rules of evidence.

40
witness.”); State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 740 (1976) (“It is well established that proper

impeachment evidence includes prior inconsistent statements.”).

On direct examination, Segura testified that, after she became aware of Baugh’s

death, she told investigators about the calls she had made to Baugh. On cross-examination,

the State questioned Segura about her motive for speaking to law enforcement and

statements she made during the proffer meeting that were inconsistent with her trial

testimony. 19 We conclude that Segura’s proffer statements were admissible as

impeachment evidence as it pertained to her bias and her prior inconsistent statements.

Accordingly, Segura has failed to establish an error. Segura’s argument that the district

court committed reversible error by admitting evidence related to her proffer statements is

without merit.

* * *

We reach our decisions in this difficult case with full recognition of the grievous

loss suffered by Baugh’s family and the communities involved with this case, as well as

the injuries inflicted on J.M.-M. We realize that our opinion may result in another trial

involving these difficult facts and intensify the grief of those affected by the senseless acts

of violence perpetrated on Baugh and her boyfriend. Nevertheless, we are duty-bound to

ensure that a defendant in a criminal trial is not convicted based on insufficient evidence

19
For instance, Segura acknowledged, in response to the State’s questioning, that she
provided information to law enforcement “to get a plea deal.” After Segura testified on
direct examination that J.M.-M. had been at her house “four to five times” and that she
would not characterize him as a friend, the State impeached Segura with a statement she
made during the proffer meeting in which she said she was friends with J.M.-M.

41
or erroneous jury instructions that were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On this

record, we conclude that these standards were not met.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Segura’s convictions and remand for further

proceedings on the kidnapping and felony murder charges consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

PROCACCINI, J, not having been a member of this court at the time of submission,

took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

42
 CONCURRENCE&DISSENT

THISSEN, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).

I concur in the court’s holdings in this case with one exception. I disagree with the

court’s holding that there is sufficient evidence to sustain appellant Elsa Segura’s

convictions for aiding and abetting kidnapping and first-degree felony murder during the

commission of a kidnapping.

Among other things, Segura challenges whether the State presented sufficient

evidence to support, beyond a reasonable doubt, Elsa Segura’s four convictions under

aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal liability: first-degree premeditated murder under

Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2022); attempted murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.17 (2022);

kidnapping under Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3) (2022); and first-degree felony murder

with a predicate act of kidnapping under Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2022). Segura is

challenging the sufficiency of the State’s evidence on all four counts.

The court concludes that insufficient evidence exists to support Segura’s

convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree premeditated

murder under aiding-and-abetting theories of liability. I agree.

The court also concludes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain Segura’s

convictions for aiding and abetting kidnapping and first-degree felony murder during the

commission of a kidnapping. Both crimes require the State to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that Segura knew that the principals in this crime would commit kidnapping and that

Segura intended for her actions to further the commission of the crimes. To reach that

C/D-1
holding, the court states that the facts proved support only one reasonable inference—that

Segura knew that the principals planned to kidnap the victim, Monique Baugh, and that she

intended for her actions to further that crime. In fact, another reasonable inference

exists—that Segura knew that the principals planned some criminal or illicit activity but

not kidnapping and intended her actions to further that other crime or activity. And because

that alternative reasonable inference exists, our precedent and the constitution compel the

conclusion that the State did not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Segura aided

and abetted a kidnapping. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

Kidnapping is defined in Minnesota statute as follows:

Whoever, for any of the following purposes, confines or removes
from one place to another, any person without the person’s consent . . . , is
guilty of kidnapping and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 2:
(1) to hold for ransom or reward for release, or as shield or hostage;
or
(2) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or
(3) to commit great bodily harm or to terrorize the victim or another;
or
(4) to hold in involuntary servitude.

Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1 (2022). A person commits first-degree felony murder when

she “causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of the person

or another, while committing or attempting to commit . . . kidnapping.” Minn. Stat.

§ 609.185(a)(3). Thus, to be convicted of kidnapping or felony murder with a predicate

act of kidnapping, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

engaged in the conduct that qualifies as kidnapping under the statute.

Segura is charged with aiding and abetting kidnapping and felony murder for which

the kidnapping is the predicate crime. Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2022) (“A person is

C/D-2
criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises,

hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.”).

The “intentionally aids” element requires that the defendant “knew that [her] alleged

accomplices were going to commit a crime” and that the defendant “intended [her]

presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d

675, 682 (Minn. 2007) (emphasis added). To convict Segura of aiding and abetting

kidnapping and felony murder while committing a kidnapping, then, the State must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that Segura knew that her accomplices were going to engage in

the conduct described in the kidnapping statute and also “intended [her] presence or actions

to further the commission of” the kidnapping. Id. 1 The question we must answer is

whether the State presented sufficient evidence to meet that burden.

It is not controversial to say that “[o]ur review of the sufficiency of the evidence

proceeds against the fundamental background principle that a person in this country is

innocent until proven guilty on all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State

v. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d 145, 157 (Minn. 2023) (Thissen, J., dissenting). For sufficiency-

of-the-evidence cases, we use two different tests based on the evidence admitted at

1
If a person is liable as an accomplice for a crime under subdivision 1 of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.05, the person is “also liable for any other crime committed in
pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by the person as a probable
consequence of committing or attempting to commit the crime intended.” Id., subd. 2
(2022). The intentional death of a person may be a foreseeable consequence of a
kidnapping. See, e.g., State v. Berrisford, 361 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Minn. 1985). Because I
conclude that the State did not sufficiently prove Segura knew that her accomplices were
going to kidnap Baugh, I do not reach the question of the reasonable foreseeability of
Baugh’s death.

C/D-3
trial—the direct-evidence test and the circumstantial-evidence test. When direct evidence

establishes an element of the crime, we painstakingly review the record “to determine

whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was

sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Ortega,

813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quoting State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430

(Minn. 1989)).

But when a jury must draw inferences from direct evidence to ascertain a fact—that

is, when it uses circumstantial evidence 2—we apply a heightened two-step process.

Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d at 150; State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 474–75 (Minn. 2010)

(stating that the heightened-scrutiny standard applies to any disputed element of the

conviction that is based on circumstantial evidence). At the first step, we identify the facts

proved by direct evidence that are uncontroverted or consistent with the jury’s verdict.

State v. Hassan, 977 N.W.2d 633, 640 (Minn. 2022). It is only at this stage that we defer

to the jury. Id. We accept direct evidence that is consistent with the guilty verdict and

reject any evidence that is inconsistent with the verdict. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d

320, 329 (Minn. 2010) (citing State v. Stein, 217 N.W. 683, 684 (Minn. 1928)). The second

step requires us to independently review the facts proved and assess whether the inference

drawn by the jury from the facts proved is rational and whether any inferences contrary to

2
See Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining circumstantial
evidence as “[e]vidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation”
and direct evidence as “[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and
that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption”); Bernhardt v. State,
684 N.W.2d 465, 477 n.11 (Minn. 2004) (defining direct and circumstantial evidence).

C/D-4
the jury verdict are rational. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473–74. Importantly, as the court

states, we do not defer to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences at this stage.

Here, everyone agrees that the circumstantial-evidence test applies.

With that background, I analyze the sufficiency of the evidence to support Segura’s

convictions for kidnapping and felony murder during the commission of a kidnapping

under aiding-and-abetting theories of liability. No one disputes that the principals (Cedric

Berry and Berry Davis) who committed these tragic crimes kidnapped Baugh, transported

Baugh to her home where they shot her boyfriend, and then drove Baugh to an alley in

Minneapolis and shot her. No one disputes that Lyndon Wiggins helped Berry and Davis

plan and execute these crimes. And everyone agrees that Segura arranged for Baugh to

come to the location where Baugh was kidnapped, but that Segura was not present when

the kidnapping occurred. Rather, Segura is charged with aiding and abetting the crimes of

kidnapping and felony murder with a predicate crime of kidnapping. The question here, as

the court aptly points out, is “what Segura knew when she scheduled the house showing

with Baugh.” Supra at 17.

I start by identifying the facts that are not inconsistent with the jury’s verdict. The

relevant facts proved are as follows: Wiggins had a falling-out with J.M.-M. Segura

followed J.M.-M. on social media and saw posts about Baugh. Wiggins instructed Segura

to call a realtor. Segura knew that she was scheduling a house viewing with a realtor and

she called the realtor under suspect circumstances (she used a fake name, called from a

phone that Wiggins provided, and left her house whenever she used the phone). Segura

C/D-5
had dated Wiggins for several years and she knew that Wiggins had previously committed

an aggravated robbery during which he kidnapped a victim.

I agree with the court that the facts proved support a reasonable inference that

Segura is guilty of the kidnapping under an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability.

As the court appropriately reasons, the suspicious circumstances under which Segura made

the house showing (using a different phone, arranging the house showing under a fake

name, and making calls away from her house) in tandem with Segura’s knowledge that

Wiggins’s criminal history included an aggravated robbery involving a kidnapping, lead to

a rational inference (a very low bar) that Segura knew that Wiggins was planning to kidnap

Baugh. Supra at 19, 22.

I conclude, however, that the facts proved are also consistent with a reasonable

hypothesis that Segura did not know that Wiggins was planning to kidnap Baugh. Rather,

as Segura contends, a reasonable person could infer from the facts proved that she believed

she was assisting Wiggins with some crime less serious than kidnapping.

The court dismisses this alternative inference as unreasonable because Segura knew

Wiggins had previously participated in an aggravated robbery with a “kidnapping

component.” Supra at 5–6. But simply because Segura knew that Wiggins had previously

participated in a crime where a victim was kidnapped does not inevitably mean that Segura

knew that Wiggins planned a kidnapping in this case. Again, that is a reasonable inference

but not the exclusive reasonable inference. That conclusion is apparent on the face of the

assertion; another (but not the only alternative) reasonable inference from Wiggins’s prior

conduct is that Segura thought Wiggins was going to commit robbery. The same facts

C/D-6
could support a more general conclusion that Wiggins was going to assault Baugh or

commit some other crime that would get at J.M.-M. through Baugh. And all the other facts

proved (Segura’s awareness of a relationship between Baugh and her boyfriend, Wiggins’s

dispute with J.M.-M., the suspicious circumstances of Segura’s call to arrange a house

showing where Baugh would be isolated) are also consistent with an alternative reasonable

inference that her accomplices would commit a crime other than kidnapping.

It is also important that the relevant circumstances proved are those that go to the

disputed element; namely, what did Segura know when she scheduled the house showing

with Baugh. There is no direct evidence that Segura knew that Wiggins, Berry, and Davis

were using a U-Haul or that they had ammonia or bleach with them and so those “facts”

cannot be considered circumstances proved concerning Baugh’s knowledge under

the circumstantial-evidence test. The circumstances proved include only those facts

established by direct evidence. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 n.4 (Minn. 2017);

Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d at 159 (Thissen, J., dissenting). The court focuses on the fact that

Wiggins called Segura around the time the U-Haul was rented, but that is not direct

evidence that Segura knew a U-Haul was rented. One reasonable inference is that Wiggins

told Segura that he had just rented a U-Haul. But it is not an unreasonable inference that

Wiggins was, for example, simply checking in on the status of Segura’s role in the crime

with no mention of the U-Haul. And the court makes no effort to show Segura knew about

the ammonia or bleach; it just asserts that fact.

In short, based on all the facts proved, it is reasonable to infer that Segura knew that

her accomplices would commit a different crime (such as robbery or assault) to get back at

C/D-7
J.M.-M. None of this reflects well on Segura, of course. Her conduct in this case was

appalling and the outcome was tragic. But that is not the question before us. Based on

how the State charged the case—and the facts the State proved by direct evidence at

trial—the question is whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Segura knew

that her accomplices intended to kidnap Baugh.

To convict Segura of aiding and abetting kidnapping and felony murder with a

predicate crime of kidnapping, the State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that Segura knew that her accomplices were going to commit kidnapping. Any reasonable

hypothesis that Segura did not know about the kidnapping is thus a reasonable hypothesis

of innocence. The court adopts a much too constricted view of what constitutes a rational

inference; it is in essence deferring to the jury’s choice of inferences. Because it is

reasonable to infer that Segura knew that she was aiding Wiggins in a crime other than

kidnapping, it follows that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Segura

intentionally aided in the kidnapping of Baugh. Therefore, under our case law and the

constitution, the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of the

crimes of kidnapping or felony murder with kidnapping as a predicate offense and her

convictions must be reversed.

ANDERSON, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).

I join in the concurrence in part and dissent in part of Justice Thissen.

C/D-8