State of Minnesota v. Sheldon James Thompson

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A22-1277

Carlton County Chutich, J.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: February 28, 2024
Office of Appellate Courts
Sheldon James Thompson,

Appellant.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul,
Minnesota, and

Lauri A. Ketola, Carlton County Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
________________________

SYLLABUS

1. Because the State has met its burden to show that appellant’s substantial

rights were not affected by any plain error alleged to have occurred in the prosecutor’s

closing argument, the defendant is not entitled to a new trial.

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 2. Appellant has not shown that speculative statements are a rampant form of

prosecutorial misconduct and therefore a prophylactic reversal under our supervisory

power is not warranted.

Affirmed.

OPINION

CHUTICH, Justice.

Following the brutal murders of 27-year-old Jackie Defoe, her 20-month-old son,

Kevin Lee Shabaiash, Jr., and her unborn child, a grand jury indicted appellant Sheldon

James Thompson for eight offenses, including first-degree premediated murder for each

victim. During closing arguments in the ensuing jury trial, the prosecutor made

statements—without objection—concerning Thompson’s motive for the murders and his

activities before, during, and after the murders. The jury found Thompson guilty as

charged, and the district court imposed three consecutive sentences of life without the

possibility of release.

On appeal, Thompson claims that he is entitled to a new trial, asserting that during

closing argument, the prosecutor committed unobjected-to misconduct that was plain and

affected his substantial rights. Alternatively, he contends that we should use our

supervisory powers to order a new trial because prosecutors continue to disregard the

prohibition against making speculative statements in closing arguments. Because

respondent State of Minnesota has shown that there is no reasonable likelihood that the

absence of the alleged misconduct would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict,

2
and because Thompson has not shown that there is a widespread pattern of prosecutors

engaging in improper speculation during closing argument, we affirm.

FACTS

A Carlton County grand jury indicted Thompson for eight offenses, including three

counts of first-degree premeditated murder for the killing of his girlfriend, 27-year-old

Jackie Defoe, her 20-month-old son, Kevin Lee Shabaiash, Jr., and her unborn child.

Thompson pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial.

At trial, the State presented the following evidence. On March 6, 2020, while giving

his cousin a ride, Thompson told her that “he killed [Defoe] and her son.” When his cousin

asked what happened, Thompson repeated that he had killed Defoe and Kevin and that he

needed his cousin to “drive him out of Minnesota.” He told her “something about [Defoe]

stabbing him” and that he took the knife from Defoe and stabbed her. Thompson also made

a choking gesture but did not specifically say how he killed Defoe and Kevin.

The next day, police searched Defoe’s Locke Lane home in Cloquet. Officers

discovered the dead body of Defoe in her bedroom closet under a pile of clothes. She had

a “very large slash mark on her throat,” and it was later determined that she had been

stabbed over 30 times. Police discovered Kevin’s body under blankets on his bed in his

bedroom. His skull had been fractured, as well as two bones in his right leg.

Police suspected that Thompson was responsible for the murders. Thompson and

Defoe began dating in the fall of 2019, and he sometimes lived in her home on Locke Lane.

Thompson is not Kevin’s father and, according to Defoe’s mother, he was “kind of cold”

3
toward the child. Defoe was 18–20 weeks pregnant with Thompson’s child, and Defoe’s

mother testified that she heard him say that “he wanted to get rid of the baby.”

During the investigation of the murders, police found physical evidence that

corroborated Thompson’s confession,1 including a partial bloody palm print in Defoe’s

bedroom that was made with Defoe’s blood and matched Thompson’s palm print. DNA

testing revealed that Thompson could not be excluded as the source of DNA found under

the fingernails of Defoe’s right hand. In addition, Thompson’s blood was found on the

wall above Kevin’s body and on the bathroom faucet.2

Eyewitness testimony placed Thompson at Defoe’s home at various times between

March 3 and March 6, in three different vehicles. A surveillance camera from a nearby

clinic captured the traffic entering and leaving Locke Lane, a dead-end street with only five

homes on it. The images captured on the surveillance footage corroborated witness

testimony describing Thompson’s activities before and after the murders. The footage

showed that on March 5, the day before Thompson made his confession to his cousin, his

Buick drove onto Locke Lane for 1 minute in the early morning from 4:45 a.m. until

4:46 a.m. The Buick then returned and remained at Defoe’s home for almost 2 hours

1
The term “confession” encompasses statements made to friends and acquaintances
after the commission of the charged offense in which the defendant acknowledges guilt of
the crime. State v. Heiges, 806 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 2011), abrogated on other grounds,
State v. Holl, 966 N.W.2d 803, 813–14 (Minn. 2021) (clarifying that Minn. Stat. § 634.03
(2020) does not include a trustworthiness standard). Thompson made other incriminating
statements at the time of his arrest and during recorded jail calls. For example, at the time
of his arrest, Thompson said that “he had messed up and he was going to go away for a
long time.”
2
When the police arrested Thompson, they observed a cut on his right pinky finger.

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beginning at 8:17 a.m. and ending at 9:58 a.m., before returning for about another hour,

4 minutes later.

The State presented medical testimony about the brutal nature of the murders. Dr.

Quinn Strobl, the chief medical examiner at the Midwest Medical Examiner’s Office,

testified that Defoe’s neck wound was fatal. The doctor described numerous other injuries,

including bruising on the left side of her face and neck; blunt and sharp-force injuries to

her left upper arm and shoulder; and more than 30 stab wounds in her neck and back which

caused internal injuries: both lungs were punctured, and her diaphragm and one of her ribs

was cut. Dr. Strobl explained that it takes “significant force” to penetrate a person’s skin

and then cut a bone. One wound had markings around the stab wound consistent with a

“hilt mark,” showing “that the knife went all the way in and impacted the skin on that

guard.” Dr. Strobl also identified “defensive-type wounds” on Defoe’s hands and fingers.

The doctor concluded that Defoe’s death was the result of a homicide, and the cause was

“[m]ultiple sharp and blunt-force injuries.”

Dr. Strobl also described the injuries inflicted on Kevin. These included many

blunt-force wounds on the right side of his head, neck, and shoulder; a skull fracture; a jaw

fracture; internal bleeding under the scalp and over the brain; and fractures in his right tibia

and right femur, which caused displacement of these bones and additional internal

bleeding. Kevin had a small, dotted pattern of “spray” around his mouth, consistent with

blood from his mouth that was either coughed or breathed out. According to Dr. Strobl,

blunt-force trauma wounds like these can be caused by car crashes, punches, and kicks.

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The doctor concluded that Kevin’s death was the result of a homicide, and the cause was

“[m]ultiple blunt-force injuries.”

Four witnesses testified to Thompson’s pattern of domestic abuse, including in his

relationship with Defoe. Thompson does not contest the validity of this testimony on

appeal. First, Defoe’s mother testified that Thompson was controlling—accusing Defoe

of cheating on him, going through her cellphone, taking her debit card from her,

transferring title to her Buick in his name, and preventing her from seeing her mother—

and explained that Defoe seemed “[j]ust a little scared of him.” She cited one instance in

early January 2020, when Defoe drove to her mother’s house, upset, and her mother

accompanied her back to Locke Lane because Defoe “was scared to go home by herself.”

Second, a domestic abuse advocate testified that in late January 2020, Defoe

contacted her, and the locks of the Locke Lane home were changed for her safety. The

advocate also provided Defoe a prepaid cellphone.

Third, on January 31, Defoe called a close friend sounding “stressed out really bad.”

She told her friend that she did not feel safe and did not want to be home alone. Defoe

asked her friend to bring her a cellphone charger because Thompson had taken her chargers

and her phone’s SIM card, making her cellphone usable only on Wi-Fi. When her friend

arrived at the home, she noticed a bruise on Defoe’s cheek. Thompson arrived shortly after

and pounded on the door. Defoe told her friend not to let him in because a DANCO3

prohibited her from contacting him. Defoe told her friend that she had Thompson’s “stuff

3
A DANCO refers to a Domestic Abuse No Contact Order issued by a court. See
Minn. Stat. § 629.75 (2022).

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packed up.” When Defoe’s friend opened the door and tried to “give him his stuff,”

Thompson pushed past her, into the house, telling Defoe, “F**k you, b*tch. I want my

sh*t.” He also pushed Kevin down saying, “get out of the way, little mother f**k*r.”

Fourth, the jury heard testimony from Thompson’s ex-wife that Thompson violently

assaulted her three times between 2013 and 2017. She described a time when Thompson

choked her until she lost consciousness. When she regained consciousness, Thompson

punched her repeatedly and bit one of her arms as she tried to protect herself. In another

assault, Thompson grabbed the steering wheel while she was driving and punched her in

the face repeatedly until the car crashed. Before crashing, Thompson had threatened to

take her to “Ditch Banks” where “no one would find [her].” She further testified about

another time when Thompson tried to “stomp [her] head into the concrete floor in the

garage,” breaking her jaw. While he attacked her, Thompson told her, “You’re done. This

is what you wanted.” The district court gave cautionary instructions before Thompson’s

ex-wife testified and again before jury deliberation to mitigate any prejudicial impact of

her testimony.

The State presented additional evidence of Thompson’s activities on March 5, 2020.

Thompson’s cousin saw personal items from Defoe’s home, including a television, “a

bunch of tools, a Michael Kors bag,” and other items in Thompson’s Buick. That

afternoon, Thompson called H&R Block Emerald, which was significant because Defoe

had received a tax refund of $5,067.05 on an Emerald card in late February. After the call,

someone in a white stocking cap withdrew most of Defoe’s remaining tax refund on her

Emerald card. The withdrawal was captured on surveillance video. About 3½ hours after

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the withdrawal, a “jittery” Thompson arrived at G.W.’s house wearing a white stocking

cap. G.W. knew Thompson and ran a car business from his home. G.W.’s girlfriend

testified that Thompson told her, “I got cash in my pocket. I need a car.”

Thompson waived his right to testify, and the defense did not call any witnesses.4

Before closing arguments began, the district court instructed the jury:

Attorneys are officers of the court. It is their duty to make objections
they think proper and to argue their client’s cause. However, the arguments
or other remarks of an attorney are not evidence.

If the attorneys or I have made or should make any statement as to
what the evidence is which differs from you[r] recollection of the evidence,
you should disregard the statement and rely solely on your own memory. If
an attorney’s argument contains any statement of the law that differs from
the law I give you, disregard the statement.5

The prosecutor’s closing argument spanned 36 pages of the trial transcript, later

followed by a 15-page rebuttal argument. The prosecutor summarized the evidence and

the reasonable inferences that the jury could draw from that evidence as it pertained to the

4
Although Thompson did not call witnesses or testify on his own behalf, on appeal
he posited alternative inferences from the admitted evidence that contradicted the
prosecutor’s arguments. First, he challenged the State’s theory that the murders were
committed between 8:19 a.m. and 9:58 a.m. and that Thompson returned 4 minutes later to
steal Defoe’s valuables and screw the bedroom doors closed. Thompson offered an
alternative inference that he had left the Locke Lane home at 9:58 a.m. to grocery shop,
returned when he realized that he forgot his wallet, and then argued with Defoe who pulled
a knife on him. In another instance, Thompson offered a second inference to contradict
the State’s theory that his blood was found above Kevin’s bed because his pinky finger
was bleeding when he killed the child. He noted that because there was no blood tracked
on the carpet in Kevin’s room, it is possible that he sustained the cut on his pinky any time
during the 3 days between the murders and his arrest.
5
Likewise, the prosecutor stated in rebuttal: “Now, ladies and gentlemen, you are
entitled to rely on your common sense but also on your own recollection of the evidence,
not on what I say or [the defense] says. What we say is not evidence.”

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State’s theory of Thompson’s motive for the murders, his premeditation and “planning

activity,” and his activities during and after the murders. Defense counsel did not object

to the prosecutor’s statements in the quotes that follow, including those statements that are

italicized:

The defendant was sick and tired of Jackie Defoe. Sick of her needs, sick of
her trying to keep tabs on him, sick of her keeping him tied down. The
relationship deteriorated quickly. He accused her of cheating, even though
he was the only man in her life. He wanted to be free from her. She was
pregnant with his child, but he said he wanted to get rid of the baby. He
didn’t want that baby, he didn’t want to be tied to Jackie forever. He wanted
a way out for good.
. . .

He toyed with her emotions, he put her down, made her feel less, but
even though he didn’t want her anymore, he wasn’t going to let anybody else
have her. He wanted to keep that control; control of her body, control of her
20 month-old son, control of the baby in her belly, and control of her money.

He knew that Jackie Defoe had gotten her taxes back in late February
of 2020, and that was a big, big payday; $5,000 in a tax refund. And he took
what was hers as his own. And once her tax refund came back, he had no
more use for her or her toddler son for that matter. He saw them as his
property like they were his play things to use or to discard as he saw fit. And
he was done being tied down. He wanted them out of his life. He wanted
them gone.

So, on March 5, 2020, what did he do? He murdered them both and
his unborn baby to be rid of them once and for all. . . .

. . .

The duration of the attack is another thing to consider. The condition
of the kitchen may signal that there was some sort of a pursuit of some kind.
Drawers were open, fridge was turned sideways. But either way, with or
without a pursuit, [Thompson] continued to stab [Defoe] when she no longer
had a blood pressure.
. . .

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 During this time period, the defendant is at the house for
approximately one hour and 41 minutes. We don’t have to prove to you the
exact time he murdered [Defoe] and [Kevin] but I’d submit to you that this
is a window where there’s plenty of time for him to kill them, clean up a bit,
and hide the bodies in a closet where he stuffed [Defoe’s] body, and under
the blankets where he put [Kevin’s] body.

. . . he leaves at 9:58 and he comes back immediately four minutes
later. He returns to Locke Lane, and this time he stays for about an hour and
one minute. Again, we don’t have to prove to you exactly what he was doing
in each of these moments of time, but I’d submit that this is when he goes
back in and loads up the car with everything he can carry, anything of value
he can grab, and then seals up the doors from the hallway side, takes a drill
and screws those doors shut to the bedroom of [Defoe] and [Kevin], and
covers his tracks so no one can open the doors to see what he’s done.

. . .

[On March 6] at 5:06 p.m., the Diamante is seen on surveillance
coming down Locke Lane. Now, the defendant drives that Mitsubishi into
Locke Lane and he’s there for 16 minutes. Again, we don’t have to prove
exactly what happened in this time frame, but I submit that the defendant,
having screwed the door shut from the outside, tries to get into [Defoe’s]
bedroom window because he knows he can’t get in through the hallway side.
And when he can’t get in that way, he goes in the front door, which is
unlocked, like [J.C.] told you. And then he kicks in or forces in the bedroom
doors from the outside to get in and grab any remaining items of value that
he may have left behind.

Defense counsel had an opportunity to rebut the italicized statements in the

prosecutor’s closing argument. He decided to argue that there were problems in the State’s

case, summarizing them as follows: “And that is unclear forensics, that there is mistaken

timing, and there’s actually a lack of motive, that there is no real confession, and that this

is actually a bad investigation.”

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 The State’s rebuttal spanned another 15 pages of the trial transcript. The prosecutor

discussed the forensic evidence and the timeline of events and reiterated the State’s theory

of Thompson’s motive and the premeditation element.

The jury found Thompson guilty on all eight counts. The district court entered a

judgment of convictions for three first-degree premeditated murder offenses and imposed

three consecutive life sentences without the possibility of release. Thompson appealed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Thompson claims that he is entitled to a new trial, asserting that during

closing argument, the prosecutor committed unobjected-to misconduct that was plain and

affected his substantial rights. More specifically, he contends that the prosecutor’s

statements italicized in the quotes above are improper speculation. Alternatively, he asserts

that we should use our supervisory powers to order a new trial because prosecutors

continue to disregard the prohibition against making speculative statements in closing

arguments. We consider Thompson’s arguments in turn.

I.

Because Thompson did not object to the relevant parts of the prosecutor’s closing

argument at trial, he forfeited appellate relief based on this alleged misconduct. See State

v. Smith, 932 N.W.2d 257, 271 (Minn. 2019). The forfeiture doctrine plays a vital role in

the criminal justice system because it encourages defendants to object before the district

court so that any “errors can be corrected before their full impact is realized.” State v.

Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 278–79 (Minn. 2015) (citation omitted) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The modified plain-error analysis announced in State v. Ramey,

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721 N.W.2d 294, 299–300 (Minn. 2006), however, provides a limited exception to the

harsh consequences of the common law forfeiture rule.

“Under [a modified plain error analysis], the defendant must establish the existence

of an error that was plain, and then the burden shifts to the State to establish that the plain

error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.” State v. Epps, 964 N.W.2d 419, 423

(Minn. 2021). To meet its burden, the State must show “that there is no reasonable

likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant

effect on the verdict of the jury.” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302 (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted). To determine whether the State has satisfied its burden, we

consider, among other things: “(1) the strength of the evidence against [the defendant];

(2) the pervasiveness of the erroneous conduct; and (3) whether [the defendant] had an

opportunity to rebut any improper remarks.”6 State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 805–06

(Minn. 2016).

Here, our analysis begins and ends at the third Ramey prong. Even if we assume,

without deciding, that Thompson established the existence of an error that was plain, we

conclude that the State has satisfied its burden to show that there is no reasonable likelihood

6
Thompson’s analysis of prejudice is unavailing because it does not follow the
Peltier framework. Thompson argues that the State’s imagined motive for the killings
caused the jury to believe that Thompson was the killer. He argues that without this false
motive, the jury would have “undoubtedly question[ed] why Thompson, who had only
been dating Defoe for a matter of months, who had no history of physically assaulting
Defoe, and who benefitted financially from living with Defoe, would kill her and,
especially, her 20-month-old son.” This argument fails to acknowledge that Thompson
confessed to the murders and his confession was corroborated by independent evidence.

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that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the

verdict of the jury.

First, the evidence of Thompson’s guilt is very strong. Thompson confessed to his

cousin that he killed Defoe and Kevin, and he made other incriminating statements when

apprehended. Forensic evidence, including Thompson’s partial palm print in Defoe’s

blood, his blood right above Kevin’s bed and on the bathroom faucet, and DNA under the

fingernails of Defoe’s right hand corroborated his conviction. In addition, at least two

people saw Thompson with Defoe’s valuable belongings right before and just after the

killings and he withdrew nearly all the remaining balance of Defoe’s tax refund hours after

the killings.

Second, although the challenged misconduct is not de minimis, it was limited to

20 statements scattered throughout 41 pages of trial transcript. Moreover, the statements

allegedly misdescribed the evidence presented at trial, rather than the law, and the jury was

repeatedly instructed to disregard counsel’s statements if they differed from the juror’s

recollection of the evidence.

Third, Thompson had the opportunity to rebut these speculative statements because

almost all were made before defense counsel’s closing argument. Although three of the

statements were repeated during the prosecutor’s rebuttal, they reiterated earlier points

made in the prosecutor’s closing argument, so no new allegedly speculative arguments

were made during rebuttal. During defense counsel’s closing argument, he decided to

argue that there were problems in the State’s case, summarizing them as follows: “And

13
that is unclear forensics, that there is mistaken timing, and there’s actually a lack of motive,

that there is no real confession, and that this is actually a bad investigation.”

Having considered the strength of the evidence, the pervasiveness of the alleged

misconduct, and defense counsel’s opportunity to rebut the allegedly speculative remarks,

we conclude that the State has satisfied its burden to show that there is no reasonable

likelihood that the absence of the allegedly speculative statements would have had a

significant effect on the verdict of the jury. This is especially true because Thompson

confessed to the murders, his confession was corroborated by independent evidence, the

jury was repeatedly instructed that it should disregard the statements of counsel if the

statements differed from the juror’s recollection of the evidence,7 and defense counsel had

an opportunity to rebut the allegedly speculative statements during his closing argument.

Because the State satisfied its burden that there is no reasonable likelihood that the

absence of the alleged misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the

verdict of the jury, Thompson is not entitled to any relief from the harsh consequences of

the common law forfeiture rule, which precludes appellate relief for unobjected-to errors.

II.

In the alternative, Thompson argues that prosecutors have repeatedly disregarded

the prohibition against speculative arguments and therefore this court should use its

supervisory powers to reverse his convictions prophylactically and order a new trial.

7
We must assume that the jury follows the court’s instructions. State v. Ferguson,
581 N.W.2d 824, 833 (Minn. 1998).

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The State counters that most of the complained of arguments were not pure speculation

and that this type of prosecutorial misconduct is not rampant.

We will exercise our supervisory powers to order a new trial only in “exceptional

circumstances.” Anderson v. State, 982 N.W.2d 448, 456 (Minn. 2022) (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Even in cases in which misconduct was not clearly

prejudicial to the defendant’s substantial rights, we may exercise our supervisory powers

to order a new trial prophylactically. See State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn.

1993) (ordering a new trial because prosecutors persisted in employing tactics condemned

by this court); State v. Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Minn. 1992) (ordering a new trial to

underscore the importance of compliance with discovery obligations); State v. VanWagner,

504 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Minn. 1993) (ordering a new trial to ensure prosecutors comply

with evidentiary rules, even when the evidence of guilt was overwhelming).

Even assuming that the prosecutor here made improperly speculative statements,

Thompson has failed to show that speculative statements are a repeated problem across

cases. Nor has he shown that this case presents exceptional circumstances requiring this

court to exercise its supervisory powers. At most, Thompson has shown that during that

the last 25 years, speculative statements by a prosecutor have been alleged in five prior

appellate cases. State v. Thompson, 578 N.W.2d 734, 742–43 (Minn. 1998); State v.

Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 798–800 (Minn. 2000); State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 326–

28 (Minn. 2005); State v. Pearson, 775 N.W.2d 155, 162–64 (Minn. 2009); Peltier,

874 N.W.2d at 803–05. This showing does not suggest rampant prosecutorial misconduct

warranting a prophylactic reversal under our supervisory power.

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 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.

Affirmed.

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