Charles Francis Baumgartner, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0001

Charles Francis Baumgartner, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed October 2, 2023
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Renville County District Court
File No. 65-CV-22-160

Curtis L. Reese, Olivia, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Karthik Raman, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court ’s order sustaining the revocation of his
driving privileges, arguing that the district court clearly erred in making factual findings
underlying its determination that there was reasonable, articulable suspicion to support an
investigative detention of appellant. Because we are not left with a definite and firm
conviction that the district court made a mistake in its factual findings , we affirm.
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FACTS
In the early morning hours of June 18, 2022, Olivia Police Sergeant Aaron Clouse
initiated an investigative traffic stop after observing that a vehicle’s driver’s side brake
light failed to illuminate. After the ensuing encounter with the driver, appellant Charles
Francis Baumgartner, Clouse arrested him for driving while impaired (DWI). Respondent
Commissioner of Public Safety revoked Baumgartner’s driving privileges based on the
arrest. Baumgartner petitioned for judicial review of the revocation, and t he district court
held an implied consent hearing. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 2 (2022). The following
factual summary is taken from the evidence presented at the hearing.
Clouse testified that he saw Baumgartner’s vehicle activate its righthand turn signal
as it approached an intersection. Clouse observed that the vehicle’s turn signal illuminated
but not the driver’s side brake light. Clouse testified that it was “very clear” that the
driver’s side brake light failed to illuminate. Clouse stopped the vehicle for the equipment
violation. Baumgartner testified that his brake lights did not illuminate because he drives
manual transmission and prefers to reduce speed by downshift ing the vehicle rather than
use his brakes.
The district court received the video recording of the stop taken from the camera on
Clouse’s squad car into evidence at the hearing. The video show s the passenger’s side
brake light illuminate for a moment before the vehicle’s turn signal began blinking. The
driver’s side brake light, however, did not illuminate as the passenger’s side light did. The
squad video also depicts Baumgartner and Clouse testing the vehicle’s lights after
Baumgartner pulled over. As Baumgartner pressed on the brakes of his vehicle, the video
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shows that the brake lights did not immediately illuminate. Eventually, however, both the
driver’s and passenger’s side brake lights illuminated as Baumgartner and Clouse tested
the brake lights.
During Clouse’s encounter with Baumgartner, Clouse observed a strong odor of an
alcoholic beverage , bloodshot eyes, unsteadiness, and slurred speech. The squad video
shows Clouse ask Baumgartner if he had been drinking, and Baumgartner responded that
he had consumed two beers prior to driving. In his testimony, Baumgartner state d that he
had three beers that evening and “had a couple of beers” earlier that day. Clouse requested
that Baumgartner perform a field sobriety test and observed four signs of impairment.
Clouse then requested Baumgartner take a preliminary breath test (PBT) , which indicated
that Baumgartner’s alcohol concent ration exceeded the legal limit . Clouse arrested
Baumgartner and transported him to the Renville County jail.
The district court issued an order sustaining the revocation of Baumgartner’s
driver’s license. It found that Clouse initiated the traffic stop based on his observation of
an equipment violation—that the driver ’s side brake light failed to illuminate —and that
this observation provided sufficient suspicion to initiate the investigative detention .
Baumgartner appeals.
DECISION
Baumgartner argues that the district court erred in concluding that the stop of his
vehicle was lawful because he disagrees with the district court’s factual finding that Clouse
observed the brake light s malfunction. We conclude that the district court did not c learly
err in making this factual finding.
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Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect individuals from
“unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn.
Const. art. 1, § 10. 1 “But an officer does not violate the prohibition if []he stops a vehicle
to conduct an investigation based on the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the driver is
engaging in criminal activity.” Soucie v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 957 N.W.2d 461, 463- 64
(Minn. App. 2021) , rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2021). “Reasonable suspicion must be
‘particularized’ and based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” State v. Taylor ,
965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
We review de novo a district court’s determination that an officer had reasonable,
articulable suspicion for an investigative stop, but we review for clear error the district
court’s underlying factual findings. Hoekstra v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 839 N.W.2d 536,
539 (Minn. App. 2013) . “We hold findings of fact as clearly erroneous only when we are
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Jasper v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 642 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Minn. 2002) . In addition, appellate courts
give “due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the district court ,” State v.
Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted) , and we must defer to the
district court’s credibility determinations , State v. Klamar , 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn.

1 Even though revocation of a driver’s license under the implied consent statute is a civil
remedy, the exclusionary rule applies to these proceedings. Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 781 N.W.2d 918, 919- 20 (Minn. App. 2010) .
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App. 2012); see also Wilkes v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 777 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Minn. App.
2010) (“[C]redibility determinations are the province of the district court.”) .
In this case, the district court found that Clouse initiated the stop of Baumgartner’s
vehicle based on the observation that the vehicle’s driver’s side brake light did not
illuminate. “Generally, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how
insignificant the traffic law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and
objective basis for conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823
(Minn. 2004); see also State v. Poehler , 935 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. 2019) (“When an
officer observes a violation of the traffic laws, there is reasonable suspicion to stop the
vehicle.”). Operating a motor vehicle with a nonfunctioning brake light is a traffi c
violation. See Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 1(a) (2020) (stating that a vehicle “shall be
equipped with at least two stop lamps on the rear which shall emit a red or yellow light ”),
subd. 3(a) ( stating that “the lamps must at all times be maintained in good working
condition”) (2020) . Such traffic violations are sufficient to justify an investigative
detention. See , e.g., State v. Beall , 771 N.W.2d 41, 42, 44- 45 (Minn. App. 2009) (“A
vehicle with an inoperable center brak e light is operated unlawfully in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a). Observation of such a violation gives rise to objective,
reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying a traffic stop.”).
Baumgartner argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that Clouse
observed an equipment violation. Challenging Clouse’s credibility, Baumgartner a rgues
that Clouse “did not testify that he observed the brakes on [Baumga rtner’s] vehicle flicker
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briefly or that only one [brake] light was working” and “the squad video clearly shows the
brakes were working/operational.” We are not persuaded .
Clouse’s testimony and the squad video support the district court’s finding. Clouse
testified that he stopped Baumgartner’s vehicle because he “observed that the driver’s side
[brake] light did not illuminate.” Clouse further explained that this it was “very clear” that
the light failed to illuminate as the vehicle slowed down. In addition, t he district court
determined that “the vehicle[’s] . . . driver’s side brake light did not illuminate” but, “[t]he
other taillights, including the passenger’s side brake light, appeared to be in working
order.” Our review of the squad video does not leave us with the firm conviction that the
district court erred in making this finding. Rather, consistent with Clouse’s testimony, the
driver’s side brake light does not appear to ill uminate as the passenger’s side brake light
does before the turn signal begins to blink.
Baumgartner directs us to his testimony that he would routinely downshift the
manual transmission in the vehicle to avoid braking. The district court , however,
discounted Baumgartner’s testimony, determining that Baumgartner’s testimony was
“evasive, inconsistent, and not credible at times.” We must we defer to this credibilit y
determination. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“[D]ue regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”) ; see also Gada v. Dedefo, 684
N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004) (“Based on the findings, we must assume that the
district court found [the petitioner to be] credible.”); Umphlett v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
533 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. App. 1995) (determining that the district court “implicitly
found that officer’s testimony was more credible”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 30, 1995).
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We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its fa ctual finding that
Clouse observed the driver’s side brake light malfunction because we defer to the district
court’s credibility determinations, do not reweigh conflicting evidence , and there is
evidence in the record to support the district court’s findi ng.
Affirmed.