Keegan James Rich Brouillette, petitioner, Appellant,
Also decided on this docket: Minn., July 31, 2024
The holding in the court’s own words
Thus, we hold that the execution of his previously imposed but stayed sentence did not restart the two-year statute of limitations to file a petition for postconviction relief under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a).
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Harvey Ray Dupey v. State of Minnesota 868 N.W.2d 36
- Pageau v. State 820 N.W.2d 271
- Willie Edd Reynolds v. State of Minnesota 888 N.W.2d 125
- 416 N.W.2d 734 not in our corpus
Opinion text
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0020
Keegan James Rich Brouillette, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed July 10, 2023
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge
Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-18-20496
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.
SYLLABUS
If no direct appeal is filed, the two-year statute of limitations for filing a petition for
postconviction relief under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a) (2022),
does not restart when a district court executes an imposed but stayed sentence.
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OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Keegan James Rich Brouillette challenges the district court’s decision to
deny his petition for postconviction relief as time-barred. Following his convictions in a
criminal case, Brouillette was given a stayed 15-month prison sentence and was placed on
probation. More than two years later, his probation was revoked and his sentence was
executed. Within two years of the execution of his sentence, Brouillette filed a petition for
postconviction relief. He argues that, because his petition was filed within two years of the
execution of his stayed sentence, the district court erred by determining that it was time-
barred. We conclude that the two-year limitations period did not restart when his sentence
was executed and that his petition was time-barred. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Following a jury trial, Brouillette was convicted of two counts of felony domestic
assault under Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242, subdivision 4 (2018), based on assaults
against his former girlfriend. On June 24, 2019, the district court sentenced Brouillette to
15 months in prison but stayed the sentence for five years and placed him on probation
with conditions.
On August 26, 2021, after Brouillette admitted to violating his probation conditions,
the district court revoked Brouillette’s probation and executed the 15-month sentence.
On July 19, 2022, Brouillette filed a petition for postconviction relief, asking the
district court to vacate his convictions and grant a new trial. He argued that unobjected-to
prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial, asserting that the prosecutor
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improperly presented evidence of Brouillette’s prior bad acts and probationary status and
elicited testimony about other witnesses’ veracity. In response, respondent State of
Minnesota argued that the petition was time-barred and, in the alternative, that the petition
should be summarily denied because, even if there was prejudicial plain error, failure to
correct the error would not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.
The district court denied Brouillette’s petition, concluding that it was time-barred
and, in the alternative, that failure to correct the asserted errors would not seriousl y affect
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Brouillette appeals.
ISSUE
Under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a), was Brouillette’s
postconviction petition timely when it was filed more than two years after the entry of
judgments of conviction and the imposition of a stayed sentence but within two years of
the execution of that sentence?
ANALYSIS
The timeliness of Brouillette’s petition for postconviction relief presents a question
of law that this court reviews de novo. See Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Minn.
2015).
The postconviction statute authorizes a person convicted of a crime who claims that
the conviction or sentence violates their rights under the constitution or laws of the United
States or Minnesota to file a petition for postconviction relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1
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(2022). A petition’s timeliness is generally governed by Minnesota Statutes section 590.01,
subdivision 4(a):
No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than
two years after the later of:
(1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no
direct appeal is filed; or
(2) an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct
appeal.
Under this subdivision, i f no direct appeal is filed and no exception applies, a defendant
has a period of two years to file a petition, which “commences upon ‘the later of: . . . the
entry of judgment of conviction or sentence.’” Dupey, 868 N.W.2d at 39 (quoting Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)).
Brouillette does not dispute that his petition was filed more than two years after the
entry of judgments of conviction and the imposition of sentence. Nor does Brouillette
allege that an exception to the two-year statute of limitations applies. Instead, relying on
Pageau v. State, 820 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. App. 2012), Brouillette contends that the date of
August 26, 2021 —when the district court executed his sentence —should be used to
determine the timeliness of his petition. We disagree.
In Pageau, we considered whether the defendant’s petition was timely when it was
filed more than three years after the entry of judgments of conviction and sentences but
within two years of the district court modifying the defendant’s sentence. See Pageau, 820
N.W.2d 271. In that case, the district court’s oral pronouncement of sentence included a
17-month prison term stayed for three years and a 15-month prison term stayed for three
years. Id. at 272-73. About three years after the sentence was imposed, the department of
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corrections asked the district court whether the stays of execution were concurrent—
consistent with the department’s and defense counsel’s understanding—or consecutive. Id.
at 273. The district court responded that the stays were consecutive. Id. We determined that
the defendant’s petition, which was filed within two years of the district court’s response
to the department, was timely because the district court modified the stays of execution to
be consecutive rather than concurrent. Id. at 280-81.
Brouillette asserts that the district court modified his sentence by executing his
sentence and that his petition is thus timely under Pageau. We disagree. The district court
imposed a 15-month prison term and stayed execution for five years with conditions. After
Brouillette admitted to violating those conditions, the district court executed that 15-month
sentence. Unlike in Pageau, where the district court’s response to the department of
corrections’ inquiry effectively doubled the length of the defendant’s stay of execution, id.,
here, the district court did not change the length of Brouillette’s prison term by executing
his sentence. Rather, consistent with the plain language of the statute governing revocation
of a stay of execution, the district court “order[ed] execution of the sentence previously
imposed.” Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 3(2) (2022).
Brouillette asserts that, because the district court did not continue the stay and
instead ordered him to prison, the district court modified his sentence. But neither the
possibility that Brouillette could have avoided serving time in prison by complying with
his probation conditions nor the district court’s authority to continue the stay despite the
violations suggests that the district court modified his sentence. See id. To the contrary, his
sentence remained unchanged from the time it was imposed in 2019. As Brouillette knew,
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he faced a 15-month prison term if he did not comply with the conditions of his stay for
five years. Thus, we hold that the execution of his previously imposed but stayed sentence
did not restart the two-year statute of limitations to file a petition for postconviction relief
under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a).
Because executing a previously imposed sentence does not modify that sentence,
the district court did not err by concluding that Brouillette’s petition was time-barred under
Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a).1 As a result, we do not address
Brouillette’s other contentions of error.
DECISION
The district court did not modify Brouillette’s sentence by executing his previously
imposed but stayed sentence. Therefore, Brouillette did not file his petition within the two-
year statute of limitations under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a), and
the petition was properly denied as time-barred.
Affirmed.
1 We clarify that our decision is limited to petitions for postconviction relief under
Minnesota Statutes section 590.01 (2022) and does not preclude Brouillette from bringing
a valid motion to correct his sentence under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03,
subdivision 9, should he have grounds to do so. The two-year statute of limitations in the
postconviction statute does not apply to such motions. Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125,
133-34 (Minn. 2016). If a sentence was unlawful at the time it was imposed, a court may
correct that sentence at any time. Id. at 133; see also State v. Fields, 416 N.W.2d 734, 736
(Minn. 1987).