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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A23-0020

Court of Appeals Thissen, J.
Took no part, Hennesy, J.
Keegan James Rich Brouillette,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: July 31, 2024
Office of Appellate Courts
State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

________________________

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant State
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney,
Shakopee, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S
An order executing a previously imposed sentence without chang ing its substance
is not a new “sentence” triggering the 2 -year limitations period for filing of a petition for
postconviction relief under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a) (2022).
Affirmed.

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O P I N I O N
THISSEN, Justice.
This case requires us to determine whether , under Minnesota Statutes
section 590.01, subd ivision 4(a) (2022), a postconviction petition is timely when filed
more than 2 years after a district court imposed and stayed the execution of a defendant’s
sentence, but within 2 years of that same sentence being executed without alteration.
Appellant Keegan Brouillette contends that his postconviction petition was timely because
he brought it within 2 years of a district court order executing his previously stayed
sentence. Because we find that the order executing the previously imposed sentence was
not a new sentence, we conclude that Brouillette’s petition was not timely and affirm.
FACTS
In February 2019, a jury found Brouillette guilty of two counts of felony domestic
assault arising out of a single incident. At the sentencing hearing o n June 24, 2019, the
district court convicted Brouillette and imposed a prison sentence of 15 months on one of
the counts. The district court stayed the execution of that sentence for a period of 5 years
and placed Brouillette on supervised probation with numerous conditions. The imposed
sentence and probation conditions were documented in a written sente ncing order (a
warrant of commitment) filed on that date. Brouillette did not pursue a direct appeal of his
conviction or sentence.
While he was on probation , Brouillette’s probation officer filed a report alleging
that he had violated the terms of his probation . At an August 26, 2021 , probation
revocation hearing, Brouillette admitted the alleged probation violations. The district court

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then found Brouillette had violated the terms of his probation , revoked his probation, and
executed his previously imposed 15-month sentence. The district court filed an amended
sentencing order (a warrant of commitment), executing the previously imposed 15-month
sentence. Thereafter, Brouillette served his sentence.
On July 19, 2022, after having served his sentence, Brouillette filed a petition for
postconviction relief seeking vacatur of his conviction and a new trial on account of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct. Brouillette contended that his petition satisfied the timing
requirement for postconviction petitions under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01,
subdivision 4(a), even though more than 2 years had elapsed since the entry of judgment
on June 24, 2019. He primarily argued that the Legislature had tolled all statutory
deadlines because of the COVID-19 pandemic for a portion of that time such that 2 years
had not yet elapsed. 1 Alternatively, he contended the petition was timely as it was filed
within 2 years of the August 26, 2021 , order executing his sentence at the probation
revocation hearing.
The district court denied Brouillette’s petition as untimely .2 As to his alternative
timeliness theory, the district court concluded that the August 26, 2021, sentencing order
was not a new sentence. The district court stated that the “execution of a previously stayed
sentence following a probation violation does not result in a new sentence and therefore

1 The district court rejected that argument and Brouillette did not challenge that
determination on appeal.

2 The district court also concluded that Brouillette’s petition was unavailing on the
merits. The court of appeals did not reach that part of the district court’s decision and it is
not before us.

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does not result in a new final judgment of conviction.” Accordingly, the district court
concluded that the August 26, 2021, order did not restart the 2-year deadline for Brouillette
to bring a postconviction claim under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a).
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision that the petition was
untimely. It concluded that the August 26, 2021 , order did not modify Brouillette’s
sentence, but rather “ ‘order[ed] execution of the sentence previously imposed.’ ”
Brouillette v. State , 994 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Minn. App. 2023) (quoting Minn. Stat.
§ 609.14, subd. 3(2) (2022) (alteration in original)). We granted review.
ANALYSIS
In this case we must address when the 2 -year time limit for the filing of a
postconviction relief petition begins to run under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01,
subdivision 4(a), which provides that when a person convicted of a crime seeks to
challenge the legality of his conviction or sentence but has not pursued a direct appeal,
“[n]o petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later
of: . . . the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence[.]” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a).
“This question requires us to interpret the language of Minnesota’s postconviction
statute, an issue of law, which we review de novo.” Aili v. State , 963 N.W.2d 442, 446
(Minn. 2021).
Brouillette argues that his petition was timely because it was filed within 2 years of
the district court’s August 26, 2021 , order, which executed the previously imposed
15-month sentence. He contends that the August 26, 2021, order was a “sentence” under
section 590.01, subd ivision 4(a), such that the 2 -year limitations period to petition for

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postconviction relief began to run when the order was filed. He argues that, in light of this
court’s exposition on the plain meaning of “sentence” in Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36,
40–41 (Minn. 2015), the August 26, 2021, order was a “sentence” because it ostensibly
imposed a different punishment than the June 24, 2019 , sentencing order. Flowing from
that basic contention, Brouillette argues that the court of appeals overlooked the
unambiguous definition of “sentence” in Dupey and implicitly found the term ambiguous
as applied. In response, the State generally contends that the August 26, 2021 , order
executing the 15 -month sentence was unambiguously not a new “sentence” under
section 590.01, subd ivision 4(a), and that the 2 -year time limit began to run when the
15-month sentence was imposed and stayed on June 24, 2019.
Evaluating the parties’ arguments requires a close reading of our opinion in Dupey,
in which we previously interpreted the word “sentence” in the postconviction statute. The
question before us in Dupey was whether a stay of adjudication under Minnesota Statutes
section 152.18, subdivision 1 (2014), was a “judgment of conviction or sentence” that
triggered the 2-year limitations period under the postconviction statute. The State claimed
that a stay of adjudication was a disposition that triggered the 2-year limitations period
upon entry of the stay of adjudication. We rejected that argument and concluded the
postconviction limitations period was not triggered because a stay of adjudication is neither
a judgment of conviction nor a sentence. Dupey, 868 N.W.2d at 41.
As relevant here, in arriving at our conclusion, we observed that “[b]oth the common
and technical definitions of ‘sentence’ refer to the imposition of punishment following a
criminal conviction or adjudication of guilt.” Id. at 40 (emphasis omitted). We then

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determined that this definition of “sentence” unambiguously applied to section 590.01,
subdivision 4(a), such that the postconviction limitations period did not begin to run upon
the filing of an order staying adjudication because such an order does not result in an
adjudication of guilt or a conviction. Id. Thus, we held that a defendant’s postconviction
petition to withdraw a guilty plea was timely even though it was brought more than 2 years
after he entered a guilty plea that resulted in a subsequently revoked stay of adjudication.
Under the definition of “sentence” we set forth in Dupey—imposition of punishment
following a criminal conviction or adjudication of guilt —Brouillette’s June 24, 2019 ,
sentence is a sentence that triggers the 2 -year limitations period in Minn esota Statutes
section 590.01, subdivision 4(a). At that time, the court convicted Brouillette and imposed
a 15-month sentence. The sentence that the district court executed in 2021 was precisely
the same sentence that the district court imposed in 2019 . Therefore, under the plain
language of Minn esota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(a), and Dupey, the 2 -year
limitations period runs from 2019 and did not restart in 2021.
Brouillette argues, however, that Dupey’s analysis of the meaning of “sentence” is
more complicated. Brouillette focuses on the portion of our analysis in Dupey that rejected
the State’s argument for why the word “sentence” in section 590.01, subdivision 4(a)(1),
could not be limited to situations where a conviction has first been entered. In Dupey, the
State looked to the statutory language, which provides that “[n]o petition for postconviction
relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: . . . the entry of judgment of
conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed ,” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)
(emphasis added). Dupey, 868 N.W.2d at 40. It then argued that by using the word “or”

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between “judgment of conviction” and “sentence,” the Legislature intended the two terms
to mean different things. Id. Further developing this argument, the State contended that
the definition of “sentence” ultimately adopted by the court would improperly treat the
terms “sentence” and “conviction” as interchangeable. Id. Thus, according to the State in
its arguments in Dupey, our conclusion that a sentence is limited to punishments imposed
after a conviction could not be correct.
Notably, our analysis of this argument came after our conclusion that “sentence”
under section 590.01, subd ivision 4(a), unambiguously means “the imposition of
punishment following a criminal conviction or adjudication of guilt.” Dupey, 868 N.W.2d
at 40 (emphasis omitted). We dismissed the State’s argument in Dupey by first noting that
the statute refers to the relevant trigger as “entry of judgment of conviction,” not
“conviction,” and that “even though there cannot be a ‘sentence’ within the meaning of
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a)(1), without a conviction, the entry of ‘judgment of
conviction’ may be temporally separated from sentencing proceedings —providing
alternative points in time for triggering the 2 -year statute of limitations.” Dupey,
868 N.W.2d. at 41. In other words, we concluded that the phrase “entry of judgment of
conviction or sentence” makes sense because the sentence could be entered at a later date
than the entry of judgment of conviction and the Legislature wanted to give the
postconviction petitioner the benefit of a longer period within which to bring a petition in
that circumstance.
Brouillette freights this statement in Dupey—that entry of judgment of conviction
and imposition of a sentence may provide alternative points in time for triggering the 2-year

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statute of limitations—with great meaning. His argument is contingent on the acceptance
of three assumptions. First, he assumes that this statement forms part of what the court
determined was the unambiguous meaning of “sentence” in the postconviction timeliness
provision. Second, he argues that Dupey’s reference to “alternative points in time”
establishes that “sentence” under section 590.01, subdivision 4(a), encompasses more than
just the original sentence imposed. And third, he contends that Dupey’s definition of
“sentence” includes a subsequent action by the district court affecting the sentence, such
as execution of an imposed sentence previously stayed, when the subsequent action has a
different immediate effect than the sentence upon imposition. For example, the immediate
effect when Brouillette’s sentence was imposed with its execution stayed was that he was
on supervised probation, whereas the immediate effect of the district court’s execution of
the previously imposed sentence was incarceration.3
We need not address Brouillette’s first two assumptions, because the third
assumption he derives from Dupey is clearly unsupported by that case. Dupey did not
opine or suggest that the question of whether a subsequent action triggers a new 2 -year
limitations period under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subd ivision 4(a), turns on
whether the immediate effect of the sentencing action differs from the immediate effect of
the original sentence. Instead, the definition of “sentence” settled in Dupey indicates that
the relevant consideration is whether the new action taken by the district court imposes a

3 Although Brouillette refers to the difference in these orders’ immediate punitive
consequence to him as “different punishment[s],” there is no dispute that the punishment
of 15 months in prison was imposed by the sentencing order dated June 24, 2019.

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new punishment or whether it merely implements a previously imposed punishment. See
Dupey, 868 N.W.2d at 40 (explaining that common and technical meanings of “sentence”
refer to the imposition of punishment). This point is fatal to Brouillette’s position because
all aspects of the punishment he received in the August 26, 2021, order had been imposed
by the sentence he received on June 24, 2019. Just because he did not immediately feel
the full effect of the punishment in June 2019 does not mean that the punishment was not
imposed at that t ime. Instead, as in Dupey, “ ‘sentence’ refer[s] to the imposition of
punishment following a criminal conviction or adjudication of guilt,” which for Brouillette
occurred contemporaneously with the entry of judgment of conviction on June 24, 2019.
See id. (emphasis omitted). That the district court in its August 26, 2021, order vacated the
stay, executed the sentence, and omitted reference to the probationary conditions that had
been incident to that stay, did not mean that it imposed a new sentence. Accordingly, as it
is used in Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subd ivision 4(a), the term “sentence”
unambiguously does not include an order executing a previously imposed but stayed
sentence, and such an order therefore does not trigger the 2 -year limitations period to
petition for postconviction relief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.

HENNESY, J., not having been a member of the court at the time of submission,
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.