Bradley Lewis, et al., Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0028

Bradley Lewis, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

Alpine Homes, Inc.,
Appellant.

Filed October 9, 2023
Reversed; judgment vacated
Hooten, Judge*

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CV-20-261

Janice S. Jude, Jan Jude Law, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondents)

Kenneth H. Bayliss, Franz J. Vancura, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman , Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant Alpine Homes Inc. appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to
vacate a renewed judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(d), arguing that (1) its motion to
vacate was brought within a reasonable time; (2) the initial judgment had expired; (3) it
had standing to bring its motion to vacate; and (4) collateral estoppel did not apply.
Because Alpine Homes has standing, because the district court misapplied the law in
determining that the motion to vacate was untimely and renewing a judgment that had
expired, and because collateral estoppel does not apply, we reverse and vacate the renewed
judgment.
FACTS
On January 21, 2010, respondents Bradley Lewis, et al., obtained a monetary
judgment against Alpine Homes. The judgment was entered and docketed. None of the
parties dispute the initial judgment. Respondents assigned their rights in the initial
judgment to Family One Homes, Inc. (Family One). In August 2012, Alpine Homes was
administratively dissolved. But, in January 2017, Alpine Homes reinstated its business to
execute a quitclaim deed to Norin Landing Homeowners Association (Norin Landing) for
the transfer of real estate—only to dissolve again in March 2017.
Because Alpine Homes had not satisfied the initial judgment as of January 2020,
Family One filed a summons and complaint for a judgment-renewal action against Alpine
Homes on January 14, 2020—about one week before the statute of limitations expired for
actions on the initial judgment. See Minn. Stat. § 541.04 (2022) (stating that actions upon
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judgments shall not “ be maintained . . . unless begun within ten years after the entry of
such judgment”). Family One listed itself as the plaintiff in the action and sent the
summons and complaint to Alpine Homes’s address via U.S. Mail on that same day. The
district court issued a deficiency notice because the caption on the complaint did not match
the original judgment caption, which listed the respondents as the plaintiffs. An amended
summons and complaint with the corrected caption were sent to Alpine Homes’s address
again by U.S. Mail on January 21, 2020— the last day before the statute of limitations
expired on the initial judgment. But the summons and complaint were returned to sender.
Respondents claim that once they realized that Alpine Homes had dissolved, the amended
summons and complaint were served on the Minnesota Secretary of State via U.S. Mail on
March 26, 2020. But the record contains no affidavit of service on the secretary, and Alpine
Homes denies ever receiving service.
The district court issued two more deficiency notices stating that the renewed
judgment could not be docketed without an “Affidavit of Identification of Judgment
Debtor.” Respondents filed an affidavit listing Alpine Homes as the judgment debtor. On
May 15, 2020, the district court found Alpine Homes in default and entered and docketed
a renewed judgment, thus extending the initial judgment for another ten years. Notice of
the entry of the renewed judgment was sent to Alpine Homes and was subsequently
returned to sender.
In September 2021, Norin Landing filed a motion to intervene in the
judgment-renewal action, seeking relief from the judgment on the ground that it was void
for ineffective service of the summons and complaint on Alpine Homes. In March 2022,
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the district court denied Norin Landing’s motion to intervene on the basis that its motion
was untimely. Norin Landing requested reconsideration, but the district court denied its
request. Norin Landing did not appeal the denial of its motion to intervene.
In July 202 2, after becoming aware of the renewed judgment in May 2022—
according to an affidavit from the former CEO of Alpine Homes — Alpine Homes filed a
motion to vacate the judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(d). Specifically, Alpine
Homes argued that the statute of limitations for renewing the initial judgment had expired
and respondents never effectuated service. Respondents countered that (1) Alpine Homes
did not have standing to bring the motion because it conveyed its interest in the real
property at issue to Norin Landing, (2) Alpine Homes’s motion to vacate was untimely
because it was not brought within a reasonable time from the date the judgment was
renewed, and (3) collateral estoppel barred Alpine Homes from challenging the judgment
because the service-of-process issue was already fully litigated in Norin Landing’s motion
to intervene.
The district court denied Alpine Homes’s motion to vacate because it was untimely,
and, alternatively, because Alpine Homes lacked standing to bring the motion and was
collaterally estopped from having the service-of-process issue decided in light of its
decision on Norin Landing’s motion-to-intervene. The district court also stated that it had
“already addressed the issue of service of process on several occasions.” And it concluded
that Alpine Homes’s motion to vacate was merely “an attempt” by Norin Landing “to
relitigate the previous motions challenging the judgment” because Alpine Homes and
5
Norin Landing were “utilizing the same law firm during this litigation” and “are intimately
involved.”
Alpine Homes appeals.
DECISION
Alpine Homes argues the district court’s determinations that its motion to vacate
was untimely, it lacked standing, and collateral estoppel applied were misapprehensions of
the law and went against both logic and the facts in the record. It asserts that it had standing
as a defendant to challenge renewal of the judgment, its motion to vacate was brought
within a reasonable time, the initial judgment had expired, and collateral estoppel does not
apply because Norin Landing’s motion to intervene did not give Alpine Homes a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the effectiveness of service of process.
We address each argument in turn.
I. Alpine Homes has standing.
Alpine Homes asserts that it has standing in the judgment-renewal action because
of Minnesota Statutes section 302A.783 (2022), and because Minnesota caselaw does not
support that a defendant is prevented from participating in a civil action for lack of
standing. We agree.
“Standing is the requirement that a party have a sufficient stake in a justiciable
controversy.” Sec. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., 916 N.W.2d
491, 496 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). “A party has standing when (1) the party has
suffered an injury-in-fact, or (2) the party is the beneficiary of a legislative enactment
granting standing.” Webb Golden Valley, LLC v. State , 865 N.W.2d 689, 693 (Minn.
6
2015). “Standing focuses on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring a particular
lawsuit.” Stone v. Invitation Homes, Inc., 986 N.W.2d 237, 245 (Minn. App. 2023)
(quotation omitted and emphasis added), rev. granted (Minn. May 16, 2023). Generally,
the existence of standing is reviewed de novo. In re Custody of D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d 509,
512 (Minn. 2011).
The district court’s conclusion that “it is not clear to this court that [Alpine Homes]
has sufficient standing in the judgment renewal matter” was error. Alpine Homes is the
defendant in this matter and the money judgment was entered and docketed against it, so
standing is not a proper basis to exclude Alpine Homes from conte sting this
judgment-renewal action. In fact, Minnesota Statutes section 302A.783 states that “[a]fter
a corporation has been dissolved, any of its former officers, directors, or shareholders may
assert or defend, in the name of the corporation, any claim by or against the corporation.”
Moreover, even though Alpine Homes is dissolved and conveyed real estate—to which the
judgment was attached—to Norin Landing, that status does not remove Alpine Homes from
being reached to satisfy the judgment. See Minn. Stat. § 550.02 (2022) (stating that
“[w]here a judgment requires the payment of money, or the delivery of real or personal
property, it may be enforced in those respects by execution”).
Accordingly, the district court’s conclusion regarding standing was in error, and
Alpine Homes has standing to bring its motion to vacate the judgment.

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II. The district court misapplied the law in determining that Alpine Homes’s
motion to vacate was untimely.

A district court’s “decision whether to grant [r]ule 60.02 relief is based on all the
surrounding facts of each specific case and is committed to” its sound discretion. Gams v.
Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Minn. 2016). Alpine Homes argues that the district court
abused its discretion by denying its motion to vacate for being untimely. Alpine Homes
contends that it brought its motion under rule 60.02(d) within a reasonable time— within
two months of discovering that a judgment had been entered against it—as prescribed by
the rule and Minnesota caselaw.
Under rule 60.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, district courts may
“relieve a party . . . from a final judgment” “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just”
for the following reasons:
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(b) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial . . .
(c) Fraud . . . misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party;
(d) The judgment is void;
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged or
a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or
(f) Any other reason for justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment.

Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 (emphasis added). Motions to vacate for the reasons identified in
subparts (a) through (c) must be brought within one year. Id.
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In Bode v. Department of Natural Resources, 612 N.W.2d 862, 870 (Minn. 2000),
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a 60.02(d) motion to vacate must be brought within
a reasonable time. “What constitutes a reasonable time varies from case to case and must
be determined in each instance from the facts before the court because the very nature of
the exercise of discretionary power in cases of this kind is such as to prevent any absolute
rule being laid down.” Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 870 (quotation omitted). The supreme court
explained that “a reasonable time must be determined by considering all attendant
circumstances” and other relevant factors, with an emphasis on four main factors:
(1) intervening rights, (2) loss of proof by or prejudice to the adverse party, (3) the
commanding equities of the case, and (4) the general desirability that judgments be final.
Id.
Here, the initial judgment against Alpine Homes was entered and docketed on
January 21, 2010, so the statute of limitations for respondents to commence an action to
renew the judgment was January 21, 2020. See Minn. Stat. § 541.04. The district court
renewed the judgment on May 15, 2020, apparently without proof that respondents had
served the summons and complaint on the dissolved corporation within ten years. Then,
Alpine Homes brought a motion to vacate under rule 60.02(d) for void judgments in July
2022—about two years from entry of the renewed judgment and about two months from
when Alpine Homes claims it discovered the judgment was renewed.
In its order denying the motion to vacate, the district court listed the four Bode
factors—(1) intervening rights, (2) loss of proof by or prejudice to the adverse party, (3) the
commanding equities of the case, and (4) the general desirability that judgments be final—
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but did not analyze any of these factors. See i d. The district court stated that the “unique
circumstances” and “the commanding equities ” of the case supported its conclusion that
Alpine Homes’s motion to vacate was untimely. On the record before us, and without the
benefit of any specific findings by the district court, we conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in determining that the time period here was unreasonable.
In Bode, the supreme court held that a motion to vacate under rule 60.02 was
untimely for being filed 12 years after the entry of the initial judgment and 18 years after
the initial appeal of the judgment because to consider it timely would be “inequitable and
contrary to the general desirability that judgments be final . . . after [the opposing party’s]
reliance over such a lengthy period of time.” Id. (quotation omitted). The parties in Bode
took actions in reliance on the judgment for many years before the motion to vacate was
brought. Id. As a result, Bode is distinguishable from this case.
First, Alpine Homes directly attacked renewal of the initial judgment within two
years of its entry and within two months from when it claimed to have discovered the
renewed judgment. Second, unlike Bode, extraordinary circumstances do not exist here.
And third, no litigation occurred between respondents and Alpine Homes between the entry
of the renewed judgment and Alpine Homes’s 60.02(d) motion to vacate. Accordingly, the
district court abused its discretion in its application of Bode to Alpine Homes’s motion to
vacate under rule 60.02(d).
Next, other caselaw support that the motion was brought within a reasonable time.
In Sommers v. Thomas, the Minnesota S upreme Court held that a motion to vacate a
judgment under 60.02 was timely when it was brought over a year after judgment was
10
entered. 88 N.W.2d 191, 196 (Minn. 1958). Likewise, this court held in Lyon Fin. Servs.,
Inc. v. Waddill, that a motion to vacate a judgment filed two years after entry of that
judgment was timely because “[d]efault judgments are to be liberally reopened to promote
resolution of cases on the merits.” 625 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation
omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 19, 2001). This case included a sister judgment in
California, and we relied on that sister judgment to conclude that, since the motion to vacate
was filed “within two months of the denial of [the] appellant’s motion to vacate in
California,” the motion was timely. Id. But it is important to note that none of these cases
involve the renewal of a judgment under Minnesota Statutes section 541.04.
Still, respondents rely on the language in Bode that, “if a judgment remains
indefinitely subject to attack for a defect in jurisdiction, then the principle of finality is
compromised,” to support that the renewed judgment should remain. See 612 N.W.2d at
868 (quotation omitted). We are not persuaded. On this record, vacating the renewed
judgment does not compromise the desirability that judgments be final—rather, it enforces
it. Unlike Bode, this case is not concerning 12 to 18 years passing before challenging an
initial judgment. It involves two months to two years before challenging renewal of a
judgment.
Furthermore, by applying Minnesota Statutes section 541.04’s statute of limitations
for judgments, we are also supporting the principle of finality. We are required to enforce
the statutes as written. State v. Enyeart , 676 N.W.2d 311, 318-19 (Minn. App. 2004)
(“Courts have a duty to uphold legislative enactments as reasonably certain when possible
and should resort to all acceptable rules of construction to discover a competent and
11
efficient expression of the legislative will.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. May
18, 2004). And the legislature, by enacting this statute, intended finality to judgments by
creating such a limitation. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (2022) (stating that there is
presumption when ascertaining the intention of the legislature that “the legislature intends
the entire statute to be effective and certain”). Judgments do not extend for an indefinite
period. And parties should not be concerned that an otherwise expired judgment may
extend past the ten-year period without adherence to procedural requirements. It is the
responsibility of the party seeking enforcement of the judgment to properly initiate an
action to renew, and if that is not done, the judgment expires and cannot be enforced.
Accordingly, we would neither be applying the plain language of the statute nor enforcing
the principle of finality if we permitted the district court’s extension of the ten-year statute
of limitations and allowed renewal of an expired judgment.
In sum, the district court abused its discretion when it ruled that Alpine Homes’s
motion to vacate the renewed judgment was untimely because it misapplied Bode,
Minnesota caselaw supports that such motion was brought within a reasonable timeframe,
and the finality of judgments should be upheld.
III. Respondents did not properly effectuate service of the judgment-renewal
action within ten years, so the district court lack ed authority to extend the
initial judgment.

Alpine Homes also asserts that respondents failed to effectively serve the judgment-
renewal action within the ten-year statute of limitations to renew the initial judgment.
“Whether service of process was effective, and personal jurisdiction therefore exists, is a
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question of law that [this court] review[s] de novo.” Melillo v. Heitland, 880 N.W.2d 862,
864 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
With this de novo standard of review in mind, we look to Minnesota Statutes section
541.04, which states that “[n]o action shall be maintained upon a judgment or decree of a
court of the United States, or of any state or territory thereof, unless begun within ten years
after the entry of such judgment.” This statute is clear and unambiguous. See In re
Individual 35W Bridge Litig., 787 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. App. 2010) (explaining that if
the text in a statute is clear, this court applies the statute’s plain meaning), aff’d , 806
N.W.2d 820 (Minn. 2011).
An action begins with personal service of a summons and complaint on the
defendant in the action. See generally Minn. R. Civ. P. 4. A voluntarily dissolved
business entity is served through the secretary of state. Minn. Stat. § 5.25, subd. 3 (2022);
see Minn. Stat. § 5.25, subd. 5(a)-(b) (2022) (explaining that service must be made on
voluntarily dissolved business entities according to subdivision 3). Sending a summons
and complaint to a defendant by U.S. Mail does not satisfy service requirements unless the
party being served waives personal service of process. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05(a)-(b)
(stating that a corporation subject to service under rule 4.03 can waive service of a
summons in writing that is sent by first-class mail, and if they fail to waive, the delivery of
the waiver by U.S. Mail does not count as service); see also Melillo, 880 N.W.2d at 864-65
(explaining that service under rule 4.05 does not satisfy the personal- service requirements
under rule 4.03, so service by mail is not allowed without the consent of the party to be
served).
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Because there is no evidentiary support in the record that respondents properly
served Alpine Homes with the judgment-renewal summons and complaint within ten years,
the renewed judgment is void. See Zions First Nat. Bank v. World of Fitness, Inc.,
280 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Minn. 1979) (stating that there is a fundamental policy that a judgment
is void absent effective service of process). The initial entry of the judgment was made on
January 21, 2010, so respondents had to bring an action to renew the judgment by January
21, 2020. See Minn. Stat. § 541.04; see also Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wartman, 841 N.W.2d
637, 641 (Minn. App. 2014) (stating that “[i]f no renewal action is brought within that ten-
year period, the original judgment lapses, and becomes unenforceable” (quotation
omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2014). Respondents mailed a summons and
complaint to Alpine Homes’s address on January 14, 2020, and January 21, 2020, which
was ineffective on two counts: (1) there is no record that Alpine Homes waived personal
service under rule 4.05 and (2) Alpine Homes, as a dissolved corporation, could only be
properly served through the secretary of state. See Minn. Stat. § 5.25, subd. 5(b).
Respondents, having access to this public record and knowing that the mailed summons
and complaint had been returned to sender , should have been aware that Alpine Homes
was dissolved and that it had to be served through the secretary of state.
Yet, respondents claim that proper service was made to the Minnesota Secretary of
State on March 26, 2020, via U.S. Mail. But there is nothing in the record, such as an
affidavit, providing that service of process was effectively made on the secretary of state ,
and we are confined to the record on appeal. See Plowman v. Copeland, Buhl & Co.,
261 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. 1977) (stating that “[i]t is well settled that an appellate court
14
may not base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal, and that matters not
produced and received in evidence below may not be considered”). And even if this
claimed March 26, 2020, mailing effectuated service, it was over two months past the
statute of limitations to renew the judgment.
On the undisputed facts in this record, the judgment expired, and the renewal of the
expired judgment by the district court was ineffective. Because respondents did not
effectuate service on Alpine Homes by January 21, 2020, the initial judgment lapsed two
months before respondents allegedly served the secretary of state. When the initial
judgment lapsed, the district court lost the authority to renew it. Without any record of
proper and timely service, the district court’s determination that Alpine Homes was in
default, and its ensuing renewal of the expired judgment, was done in error.
Minnesota’s caselaw provides a foundation that supports this conclusion. It has
long been held that “[a] judgment creditor, who has neglected to exercise reasonable
diligence to enforce his judgment until it has expired by statutory limitation, is not entitled
to equitable relief to enforce the satisfaction of the extinct judgment.” Dole v. Wilson, 40 N.W 161, 161 (Minn. 1888). And Pugsley v. Magerfleisch , 201 N.W 323, 323-24
(Minn. 1924), held that a judgment entered against a defendant without due service of
process is void for want of jurisdiction and will be vacated at any time on reasonable notice.
Finally, DeMars v. Robinson King Floors, Inc., held that “[n]either courts nor
administrative agencies, in the exercise of their legal or equitable powers, possess the
authority to extend or to modify the period of limitation prescribed by statute.”
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256 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Minn. 1977). Accordingly, the district court misapplied the law by
extending the period of limitation prescribed by statute.
Because respondents failed to properly serve Alpine Homes within ten years of the
initial judgment, the renewed judgment was void. The district court abused its discretion
by misapplying section 541.04’s statute of limitations when it renewed an expired
judgment.
IV. Collateral estoppel does not apply.

Finally, Alpine Homes argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar it
from challenging service of process for the judgment-renewal action. Specifically, it
asserts that collateral estoppel cannot apply because it did not have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue of whether it was properly served within Norin Landing’s
motion to intervene because the motion to intervene was denied for being untimely. We
review this issue de novo. See Hauschildt v. Beckingham , 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn.
2004) (“Whether collateral estoppel precludes litigation of an issue is a mixed question of
law and fact that we review de novo.”).
Collateral estoppel does not apply when an issue has not been actually litigated and
decided. In re Tr. Created by Hill, 499 N.W.2d 475, 484 (Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied
(Minn. July 15, 1993); see also Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 837 (explaining that collateral
estoppel cannot apply if the issue was not “necessary and essential to the resulting
judgment in that action”). The doctrine of collateral estoppel:
prevents a party from relitigating issues if (1) the issue is
identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final
judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a party in
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the prior case; and (4) there was a full and fair opportunity to
be heard on the issue.

Hill, 499 N.W.2d at 484.
The district court erred when it concluded that collateral estoppel barred
Alpine Homes from contesting service of process.
1 The issue of whether respondents
effectuated service on Alpine Homes was never decided by the district court. Rather, the
district court, in its order denying Norin Landing’s motion to intervene, stated that the
motion was untimely. It made no conclusions of law on whether service of process by
respondents was proper or timely. It included one finding of fact stating that the summons
and complaint w ere “served on Defendant Alpine Homes, Inc. on or about January 21,
2021, via U.S. Mail. Due to the dissolution of Alpine Homes, [Family One Homes] served
the Amended Summons and Complaint via U.S. Mail on the Minnesota Secretary of State.”
But this statement does not provide support that the effectiveness of service of process was
actually litigated or decided. And the issue of service of process was not “necessary and
essential to the resulting judgment in [the] action” on the motion to intervene.
See Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 837.2

1 Specifically, the district court stated the following: “The court has already addressed the
issue of service of process on several occasions and has found [Norin Landing’s]
contentions to be untimely. Through [Alpine Homes], [Norin Landing] is attempting to
untimely relitigate a matter which has been previously fully litigated and received a final
judgment.”
2 In its reply brief, Alpine Homes argues that the district court should have granted its
motion to vacate the judgment because all four Finden factors weighed in its favor. See
Finden v. Klaas, 128 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. 1964). This was in response to respondents
arguing that Alpine Homes did not satisfy any of the Finden factors. But the Finden factors
were not argued at the district court, the district court did not address them in its order, and
Alpine Homes did not assert them in its principal brief. As such, we do not reach this
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Therefore, collateral estoppel does not bar Alpine Homes’s motion to vacate on the
basis of improper service of process because the district court never decided this issue on
the merits. Finally, we are not persuaded by the district court’s conclusion that, because
Norin Landing and Alpine Homes shared counsel during Norin Landing’s motion to
intervene and Alpine Homes’s motion to vacate, they are in privity.
In sum, the district court erred and abused its discretion when it determined that
(1) Alpine Homes did not have standing to bring a motion to vacate under rule 60.02(d),
(2) its motion to vacate was untimely, and (3) collateral estoppel barred consideration of
the service-of-process argument. And because the district court had no authority to renew
the initial judgment after it expired, the renewed judgment is void.
Reversed; judgment vacated.

argument. See Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 887 (Minn. 2010)
(explaining that, generally, issues not raised or argued in appellant’s principal brief cannot
be raised in a reply brief); see also Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988)
(stating that appellate courts generally address only those questions previously presented
to and considered by the district court). Additionally, the Finden factors generally apply
to motions to vacate under 60.02(a)—not 60.02(d). Finden, 128 N.W.2d at 270- 71.