Tanya Mae Wagner, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0031

Tanya Mae Wagner, et al., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Respondents,

vs.

Minnesota Department of Corrections,
Appellant.

Filed September 11, 2023
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-22-4459

JaneAnne Murray, Clemency Clinic, University of Minnesota Law School, Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and

Elizabeth G. Bentley, Civil Rights Appellate Clinic, University of Minnesota Law School,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Daniel Schulman, Teresa Nelson, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Bradford Colbert, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners, Mitchell Hamline School of
Law, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Corinne Wright, Joseph Weiner, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) challenges the district
court’s denial of its motion to dissolve a temporary restraining order (TRO) that bars the
DOC from requiring respondents Tanya Mae Wagner, DeAndre Barnes, Michael Doering,
and Robert Rosas— who are incarcerated individuals on conditional medical release
(CMR)—from returning to prison pending their lawsuit against the DOC. The DOC argues
that the district court lacked authority to continue the TRO because the issues in the
underlying lawsuit are now moot and because the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction. Alternatively, the DOC contends that the district court abused its discretion
in considering the motion to dissolve the TRO. Because the district court had authority to
continue the TRO, and it did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the continued need for
the TRO, we affirm.
FACTS
During the summer of 2020, the DOC implemented a process to temporarily release
on CMR incarcerated individuals at increased risk of medical complications due to
COVID-19. At-risk inmates were released into the community to serve their sentences on
home confinement. Respondents Wagner, Barnes, Doering, and Rosas were among the
incarcerated individuals who were placed on COVID-19 CMR.
Two years later, the DOC notified COVID-19 CMR participants who remained in
the community, including respondents, that the DOC was terminating their CMR. The
DOC ordered these CMR participants to turn themselves in by August 15, 2022, to serve
3
the balance of their prison sentences in custody. According to the notices that these CMR
participants received from the DOC, “effective vaccines have become widely available and
there has been significant reduction in active COVID-19 infections, both in DOC facilities
and in Minnesota at large.” The notices further stated, “Because the reasons you were
granted early release are no longer applicable, the DOC is now rescinding your COVID-
19 CMR.”
Days before the turn-in date provided by the DOC, Wagner and another plaintiff
who is no longer participating in this action, filed suit against the DOC in the district court
on their own behalf and on behalf of similarly situated individuals. The complaint alleged
that the DOC’s revocation of plaintiffs’ CMR did not comply with the CMR statute,
Minnesota Statutes section 244.05, subdivision 8 (2022),
1 which required the DOC to
individually assess CMR participants and determine whether continued CMR would
present a more serious risk to the public. 2 Additionally, the complaint alleged that the

1 We note that section 244.05, subdivision 8, was amended in 2023 to address CMR during
an epidemic. 2023 Minn. Laws. Ch 52, art. 11, § 18. Because the DOC’s attempt to revoke
respondent’s CMR occurred before the amendment, we review the district court’s decision
under the former version of the statute.

2 The CMR statute provides, in relevant part:

the commissioner may order that any offender be placed on
conditional medical release before the offender’s scheduled
supervised release date or target release date if the offender
suffers from a grave illness or medical condition and the
release poses no threat to the public. . . . Conditional medical
release is governed by provisions relating to supervised release
except that it may be rescinded without hearing by the
commissioner if the offender’s medical condition improves to
4
DOC’s revocation of CMR violated the plaintiffs’ due-process rights under the Minnesota
Constitution. See Minn. Const. art. I , § 7 (providing that no person shall be “deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law”). The complaint sought “a temporary
restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting [the DOC]
from enforcing the cancellation of their CMR.”
After an emergency hearing on August 11, 2022, the district court issued the
requested TRO. Observing that “there is no evidence, at this time” that the DOC had
determined that “the continuation of [CMR] presents a more serious risk to the public ” as
required by the CMR statute, the district court found that an injuncti on was necessary to
prevent irreparable harm and that the plaintiffs had otherwise satisfied their burden for
obtaining injunctive relief. The TRO temporarily barred the DOC “from terminating the
Conditional Medical Release of Plaintiffs and all other persons still on Conditional Medical
Release pursuant to its COVID-19 protocol and/or requiring their surrender and return to
[the DOC]’s Correctional Facilities pending hearing and decision on Plaintiffs’ Motion for
a Temporary Injunction.” But the district court’s order authorized the DOC to “terminate
a person’s Conditional Medical Release if there is a specific finding that they are in
violation of their supervised release conditions.”
After the district court issued the TRO, the parties agreed to indefinitely stay the
proceedings in the case. By letter, the DOC advised the named plaintiffs and the remaining

the extent that the continuation of the conditional medical
release presents a more serious risk to the public.

Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 8 (emphasis added).
5
CMR participants that it would be reviewing their CMR status based on the following
questions:
1. Does your current medical condition continue to
put you at an increased risk of grave harm from COVID-19
(e.g. death or other severe outcomes) in light of currently
available treatments, including vaccines and antivirals?

2. Given any improvement in your medical
condition relative to the risks posed by COVID-19, and your
current status and activities in the community, does
continuation of your CMR now present a more serious risk to
the public?

The DOC also stated that it would consider “any timely and relevant information” from
CMR participants, “including your current medical condition and any medical limitations
on your ability to receive vaccination, antiviral, or other treatments for COVID-19” as well
as “current medical guidelines on COVID-19 risk factors, your criminal and institutional
history, and information from your supervision agent about your activities and adjustment
under community supervision, including your compliance with release conditions and
agent instructions.” The DOC ordered CMR participants to submit any supplemental
information by September 27, 2022.
Following the communication from the DOC, the plaintiffs moved the district court
to order the DOC to extend the deadline for submission of supplemental information, but
the district court denied the motion. The district court clarified, however, that “[u]nless
there is a specific finding that a [CMR participant] violated a term of his or her conditional
release, the [DOC] is temporarily restrained from terminating the Conditional Medical
6
Release granted pursuant to its COVID-19 protocol and/or requiring surrender and return
to [the DOC]’s Correctional Facilities.” And the district court further explained:
[The DOC] is not, however, prohibited from conducting an
individual evaluation and assessment of whether the
continuation of the conditional release presents a “more serious
risk to the public.” The [DOC] has the authority and discretion
to design and conduct such individual evaluation as it sees fit,
and the Court would, upon proper argument and briefing,
ultimately decide whether [the DOC]’s procedures comply
with the statute as well as Constitutional due process at a future
hearing.

On October 19, 2022, the DOC notified Wagner and the other CMR participants in
writing that it had performed “individualized assessments, ” and, based on those
assessments, made decisions regarding their CMR status. As to four of the remaining CMR
participants—respondents Wagner, Barnes, Doering, and Rosas
3—the DOC had decided
to revoke their CMR and return them to prison. The DOC notified Wagner, who had been
granted COVID-19 CMR due to pregnancy, that she would be allowed to remain in the
community for one year postpartum pursuant to a conditional release program for new
mothers. See Minn. Stat. § 244.065, subd. 2 (2022) (allowing the release of pregnant
inmates for the duration of the pregnancy and up to one year postpartum). In the notices
that Barnes, Doering and Rosas received, the DOC explained that revocation of their CMR
was now warranted given their specific medical conditions “relative to the risks posed by
COVID-19” and improvement in their medical conditions due to “currently available

3 Respondents Barnes, Doering, and Rosas were not yet plaintiffs in the lawsuit against the
DOC when the DOC notified them that their CMR would be revoked. They were included
as plaintiffs in the lawsuit by amended complaint, which was filed approximately one week
later.
7
vaccines, antivirals, and other treatments for COVID-19, which did not exist when [they]
were granted [COVID -19] CMR.” Additionally, the notices that Barnes, Doering, and
Rosas received alleged that these individuals had violated some of the conditions of their
CMR and identified the alleged violations.4
On the same day that the DOC notified the CMR participants of their
“individualized assessments,” the DOC moved the district court to dissolve the TRO. The
DOC asserted that, because it had individually assessed the CMR participants, the TRO
was no longer necess ary. In support of its motion, the DOC provided a sworn affidavit
from its policy director explaining some of the information and reasoning that the DOC
relied on when conducting the “individualized assessments.”
Following these developments in the case, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.
The complaint added respondents Barnes, Doering, and Rosas as plaintiffs. But the
amended complaint did not modify the substance of the claims against the DOC. As
asserted in the original complaint, the amended complaint alleged that the DOC violated
the plaintiffs’ due-process rights by revoking their CMR:
(1) without considering individual circumstances and physical
conditions; (2) in violation of its authority under [the CMR
statute]; (3) on an improper pretextual basis, the alleged
availability of effective COVID-19 vaccines; (4) contrary to
the public interests in healthy childhood development,
rehabilitation of offenders, and reducing overcrowding and the

4 As of the date of respondents’ appellate brief, the DOC had not commenced revocation
proceedings against Rosas, Doerring, and Barnes, as was authorized by the district court’s
TRO. At oral argument, the DOC explained that some of the respondents were
“restructured” rather than revoked in order to keep the prison population down during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Additional information about the process of being “restructured”
while on CMR is not in the record.
8
effects of COVID-19 in prisons; (5) without providing
plaintiffs and others similarly situated individual hearings; and
(6) without providing plaintiffs . . . due process protections,
including, but [not] limited to, a revocation hearing conducted
by a neutral and detached decisionmaker, written notice of the
alleged violation, disclosure of the evidence against the
individual, and an opportunity to appear, present evidence, and
question any adverse witnesses.

The amended complaint reiterated the plaintiffs’ original request for a TRO and requested
permanent injunctive relief. Alleging that the plaintiffs and their dependents would suffer
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage if plaintiffs were forced to return to
prison, the amended complaint requested the district court to issue “[a] Permanent
Injunction prohibiting [the DOC] from attempting to revoke CMR without fully complying
with [the CMR statute] and the Due Process Clause of the Minnesota Constitution, Article
I, § 7.”
The plaintiffs also responded to the DOC’s motion to dissolve the TRO. They
asserted that the DOC had not established that it “followed the appropriate procedure or
that the released individuals were afforded due process in the agency’s revocation actions.”
The district court held a hearing on the DOC’s motion to dissolve the TRO.
Following that hearing, the district court denied the DOC’s motion.
The DOC appeals the district court’s order denying the motion to dissolve the TRO.
5

5 Weeks after the DOC filed its appeal, and pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the
district court stayed the district court proceedings pending the appeal.
9
DECISION
I. The district court had authority to continue the TRO.

As a threshold issue, the DOC argues that, for two reasons, the district court lacked
authority to allow the TRO to remain in effect. First, the DOC contends that its
individualized assessments satisfied the CMR statute and due- process requirements, and
therefore rendered the issues in respondents’ lawsuit moot. According to the DOC, because
there is no longer a justiciable issue before the district court, the district court had no
authority to continue the TRO. Second, the DOC argues that the district court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction “to review the DOC commissioner’s final agency decision[s].”
Thus, “the propriety of the [DOC’s] final administrative decisions [was] not properly
before the district court.” We address these two issues separately below.
A. Mootness

A claim is moot “when a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award
of effective relief is no longer possible.” State ex rel. Young v. Schnell, 956 N.W.2d 652,
662 (Minn. 2021). The mootness doctrine “implies a comparison between the relief
demanded and the circumstances of the case at the time of decision in order to determine
whether there is a live controversy that can be resolved.” In re Application of Minnegasco,
565 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 1997). Whether a claim is moot is a matter of law that we
review de novo. In re Civ. Commitment of Breault, 942 N.W .2d 368, 374 (Minn. App.
2020).
We disagree with the DOC’s argument that its individualized assessments rendered
respondents’ claims moot for two reasons. First, the claims in respondents’ amended
10
complaint are broader than the DOC represents. The amended complaint does not merely
assert that the DOC violated the CMR statute and due-process guarantees by providing no
individualized assessments to respondents. It also leaves room for respondents to argue
that any assessments actually performed did not satisfy the CMR statute and due-process
requirements.
Second, accepting the DOC’s mootness argument would require us to prematurely
resolve the merits of respondents’ legal claims, which we decline to do in the context of
this appeal. See Minnegasco, 565 N.W.2d at 710 (“[T]here is a real and continuing
controversy[,] . . . . [and] accepting the Commission’s ‘mootness ’ argument requires
resolution of the merits of [the public utility’s] legal claim.”). As noted, the DOC’s
implementation of individualized assessments does not entirely resolve respondents’
claims. Because the district court can still consider whether the DOC has complied with
the statute and due process, a decision on the merits and an award for effective relief remain
possible. See Young, 956 N.W.2d at 662. Thus, we reject the DOC’s argument that the
claims in respondents’ lawsuit are moot.
B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

“Subject matter jurisdiction is a court’s statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case.” State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
omitted). Specifically, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction has been defined as not only authority
to hear and determine a particular class of actions, but authority to hear and determine the
particular questions the court assumes to decide.” Cochrane v. Tudor Oaks Condo. Project,
529 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn. App. 1995) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. May 31,
11
1995). Appellate courts review questions of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. 6 Minn.
Ctr. Env’t Advoc. v. Metro. Council, 587 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn. 1999).
The DOC argues that “[t]o the extent the respondents attempted to orally expand
their claims to challenge the results of the [DOC’s] final decisions,” the district court did
not have subject-matter jurisdiction based on separation-of-powers principles. According
to the DOC, the CMR statute provides the commissioner of corrections with broad
authority to administer CMR, including the authority to decide when and how to rescind
CMR. See Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 8 (providing that “the commissioner may order that
any offender be placed” on CMR and CMR “may be rescinded without hearing by the
commissioner”). Because a decision regarding CMR is a “final administrative decision,”
the DOC contends that the district court has no power to review such a decision.
Minnesota district courts are courts of general jurisdiction that, with limited
exceptions, “have the power to hear all types of civil and criminal cases.” Schnagl, 859
N.W.2d at 301. Article VI, section 3, of the Minnesota Constitution provides that “[t]he
district court has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases,” and “[s]uch original
jurisdiction includes a claim by a citizen against a public official.” State v. Emerson (In re
Leslie), 889 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Minn. 2017).

6 The DOC challenged the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction in connection with its
motion to dissolve the TRO, but the district court did not address this issue. Because “lack
of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including for the first time on
appeal,” Cochrane, 529 N.W.2d at 432 (citing Minn. R. Civ. P 12.08(c)), and given our de
novo standard of review, we consider this issue even in the absence of a decision by the
district court.
12
But separation-of-powers principles necessitate that no branch of government “can
control, coerce or restrain the action or nonaction of either of the others in the exercise of
any official power or duty conferred by the Constitution, or by valid law, involving the
exercise of discretion.” State ex rel. Birkeland v. Christianson, 229 N.W. 313, 314 (Minn.
1930). “Constitutional principles of separate governmental powers require that the
judiciary refrain from a de novo review of administrative decisions,” absent an express
statutory grant. Dokmo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 459 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. 1990).
The DOC’s specific challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction is unclear. It may be
arguing that the individualized assessments divested the district court of subject-matter
jurisdiction as to respondents’ lawsuit, thus invalidating the TRO, which was an order made
in connection with the lawsuit. Or the DOC’s challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction may
be limited to the district court’s authority to continue the TRO in light of the individualized
assessments. In any event, we determine that, notwithstanding the individualized
assessments, the district court had authority to allow the TRO to remain in effect while
respondents’ lawsuit is pending.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Leslie is instructive on this issue.
There, during a first appearance in a criminal prosecution, the defendant moved the district
court to bar the sheriff from collecting the defendant’s DNA. Leslie, 889 N.W.2d at 14.
The district court granted the motion, and the sheriff filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition, arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the
defendant’s motion because it was an improper request for judicial review of a public
official’s decision. Id. at 14. The supreme court concluded that the district court had
13
subject-matter jurisdiction because its “original jurisdiction includes a claim by a citizen
against a public official.” Id. at 15. However, the supreme court also concluded that
subject-matter jurisdiction “is not enough; a district court must still use a proper procedure
to decide any issue raised during a case.” Id . (emphasis omitted). The supreme court
decided that to obtain the requested relief—na mely, to challenge the constitutionality of
the DNA collection statute—the defendant should have filed a civil action. Id. at 16.
In a civil action, and following the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure, [the defendant] could have served and filed a
complaint, made the Sheriff a defendant, and challenged the
constitutionality of the DNA-collection statute. In a civil
action, [the defendant] could have sought a speedy remedy,
such as a temporary restraining order under Rule 65.01 or a
temporary injunction under Rule 65.02, to restrain the Sheriff
from taking his DNA.

Further, in a civil action, the Minnesota Attorney
General and the Sheriff would have had a full and fair
opportunity to defend the constitutionality of the statute.

Id.
Here, respondents followed the process prescribed by Leslie. They brought a civil
action, named the DOC as a defendant, challenged the constitutionality of the DOC’s
policy rescinding CMR, and sought a TRO to enjoin the DOC from depriving respondents
of their constitutional rights.
The DOC argues that respondents’ civil action is the wrong procedure for
challenging the DOC’s individualized assessments. According to the DOC, once the
individualized assessments were completed, respondents should have petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus. The DOC points out that habeas relief is the only appropriate remedy
14
for a prisoner “attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement.” Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973); see Minn. Stat. §§ 589.01 (“A person imprisoned or
otherwise restrained of liberty . . . may apply for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief
from imprisonment.”), .02 (“A person may apply for a writ of habeas corpus . . . to the
district court of the county where the petitioner is detained.”) (2022).
But respondents’ lawsuit does not seek release from confinement or a shorter stay
in prison. See Wilkinson v. Dotson 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005) (concluding that habeas review
was inappropriate because the respondents did not seek an injunction ordering their
“immediate or speedier release into the community,” but instead, challenged the state’s
procedures used to determine parole eligibility and suitability). Rather, collectively,
respondents seek review of the process that the DOC used to revoke their CMR. Because
respondents challenge the procedure used to revoke their CMR and not the underlying
individual administrative decisions, habeas is not a more appropriate procedure than the
pending lawsuit.
Alternatively, the DOC contends that respondents should have challenged the
DOC’s final agency decisions by appeal to this court through a writ of certiorari. See Minn.
Stat. §§ 606.01-.06 (2022); Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 414 (Minn.
1981) (explaining that the writ of certiorari is used “to review the proceedings of a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions”). Insofar as the DOC argues that the district
court lacks jurisdiction to review the individualized assessment decisions themselves, we
agree. Certiorari review would be the appropriate procedure for reviewing the validity of
the individualized assessments themselves. Zweber v. Credit River Township, 882 N.W.2d
15
605, 611 (Minn. 2016) (“[C]ertiorari review is exclusive when a claim requires an inquiry
into the validity of a quasi-judicial decision.”).
Again, however, the district court has not been asked to review the propriety of the
individual assessment decisions. Respondents are challenging the process by which the
DOC revoked CMR and whether that process complies with the CMR statute and the
Minnesota Constitution. “If resolution of [a] claim does not depend on the validity of the
quasi-judicial decision, then the party may raise the claim by filing an action in a district
court.” Id. at 610 (citing County of Washington v. City of Oak Park Heights, 818 N.W.2d
533, 542 (Minn. 2012)). If respondents prevail, the DOC may still exercise its discretion
to administer and revoke CMR, but in compliance with the statutory requirements and due
process. To the extent that the DOC is arguing that, once the DOC completed its
individualized assessments, the district court was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction
and respondents were limited to certiorari review, we disagree.
We are not persuaded that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
reject the DOC’s motion to dissolve the TRO. Because we conclude that the district court
had authority to continue the TRO, we next consider the DOC’s challenge to the district
court’s exercise of its authority.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the DOC’s motion
to dissolve the TRO.

The DOC argues that, even if the district court had authority to issue the TRO in the
first instance, it abused its discretion when it refused to dissolve the TRO after the DOC
16
complied with the C MR statute by individually assessing whether respondents should
remain on CMR. Accordingly, the DOC asks us to reverse the TRO.
Rule 65 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure provides a procedure for a party
to obtain a temporary restraining order or temporary injunction. The purpose of such relief
is to preserve the rights of the parties “pending an adjudication on the merits.” Metro.
Sports Facilities Comm’n v. Minn. Twins P’ship, 638 N.W.2d 214, 220 (Minn. App. 2002),
rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 4, 2002). A party seeking an injunction must demonstrate that
there is no adequate legal remedy and that the injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable
harm. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 92 (Minn. 1979).
If there is a finding of irreparable harm, the district court must then weigh five factors to
determine whether to order injunctive relief. Dahlberg Brothers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (Minn. 1965). These factors, which we refer to as the Dahlberg
factors, are: (1) the nature and background of the preexisting relationship between the
parties, (2) the comparative harm to the parties if relief is or is not granted, (3) public policy
considerations, (4) the likelihood that the movant will prevail on the merits of the claim,
and (5) the administrative burdens involved in judicial supervision and enforcement of an
injunction. See id. The applicant for injunctive relief has the burden of proving all five
Dahlberg factors. N. Cent. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Village of Circle Pines, 224 N.W.2d 741, 746
(Minn. 1974).
Because a district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a TRO, a
reviewing court will not reverse the district court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion.
Eakman v. Brutger, 285 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Minn. 1979); see Cherne Indus., 278 N.W.2d at
17
91 (“The granting of an injunction generally rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless, based upon the whole record,
it appears that there has been an abuse of such discretion.”). A district court abuses its
discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying
the law, or making a ruling that is against logic and the facts in the record. Woolsey v.
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). “On review, we consider the facts in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Minn. Twins P’ship, 638 N.W.2d at 220.
In addressing the DOC’s motion to dissolve the TRO, the district court found that
lifting the injunction would cause respondents to suffer irreparable harm. The district court
then considered each of the Dahlberg factors and determined that they weighed in favor of
denying the DOC’s motion.
Before this court, the DOC argues that the district court abused its discretion in
addressing two of the Dahlberg factors: the public interest and consideration of public
policy and the likelihood of success on the merits. We consider the DOC’s arguments in
turn.
A. Public Interest and Consideration of Public Policy

The DOC contends that the district court’s analysis of the public interest and public
policy was not supported by the record or respondents’ amended complaint. In addressing
this Dahlberg factor, the district court stated:
From a public interest and public policy perspective,
taxpayers should not pay to incarcerate individuals who were
deemed by the [DOC] to pose no threat to the public when
initially granted CMR and have and are now abiding by their
supervised release conditions, not committing any new crimes,
18
and do not otherwise present “a more serious risk to the
public.”

Based on the submissions, it remains unclear how the
process proscribed in the [DOC]’s submissions moves from
Point A to Point B to Point C and ultimately to the conclusion
that the individual poses a “more” serious risk to the public
than when the CMR was initially granted. . . . [T]he issue
before the Court is the revocation process itself and whether it
satisfies the Constitutional requirements of due process. Even
though the statute may allow the revocation of CMR without a
hearing, there is also an argument as to whether the statute is
unconstitutional and a hearing is, in fact, required.

According to the DOC, the record, which shows that three respondents either
violated the conditions of their release or committed new crimes while on release, directly
contradicts the district court’s finding that respondents had abided by their release terms
and did not pose a more serious risk to the public now than when they were granted CMR.
But even if the district court’s statement was not entirely accurate, we disagree with the
DOC that an error of this nature constitutes an abuse of discretion sufficient to invalidate
the TRO. See Cherne Indus., 278 N.W.2d at 91 (stating that the reviewing court considers
the whole record in reviewing a district court’s decision to grant an injunction). Moreover,
when it submitted its appellate brief, the DOC had not commenced revocation proceedings
against any of the respondents under the exception to the TRO for violations of conditions
of release. Given this fact, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion
in finding that respondents do not now pose a more serious risk to the public.
The DOC also contends that the district court’s analysis of the public-interest-and-
public-policy factor overstated the actual claims raised in respondents’ amended
complaint. For example, the DOC notes that the amended complaint does not acknowledge
19
the DOC’s individualized assessments of CMR participants. Yet, the district court’s
findings on the Dahlberg factor suggests that respondents are attacking the DOC’s
individualized-assessment process. And the DOC observes that the amended complaint
does not directly challenge the constitutionality of the individualized- assessment process.
But the district court’s findings assume that respondents are making a constitutional
challenge to the process.
We disagree that the district court’s findings go beyond the scope of respondents’
legal claims. In the amended complaint, respondents requested “[a] Permanent Injunction
prohibiting [the DOC] from attempting to revoke CMR without fully complying with
Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 8, and the Due Process Clause of the Minnesota Constitution,
Article I, § 7.” The district court’s statements about respondents’ claims mirrored the
language in the amended complaint. And given Minnesota’s liberal notice-pleading
standard, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in characterizing
respondents’ claims. See Halva v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 503
(Minn. 2021) (“A pleading is sufficiently detailed when it gives fair notice to the adverse
party of the incident giving rise to the suit with sufficient clarity to disclose the pleader’s
theory upon which his claim for relief is based.” (quotation omitted)). We also observe
that, at the hearing on the DOC’s motion to dissolve the TRO, respondents’ attorney stated,
“we are raising a constitutional due process claim to the DOC’s implementation of the
CMR statute.”
20
The record largely supports the district court’s findings regarding the public interest
and public policy factor. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
analysis of this Dahlberg factor.
B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The DOC argues that the district court “functionally ignored the most important
Dahlberg factor,” the likelihood of success on the merits. See Softchoice, Inc. v. Schmidt,
763 N.W.2d 660, 666 (Minn. App. 2009) (“Of [the Dahlberg] factors, the most important
is a party’s likelihood of prevailing on the merits at trial.”). “If a plaintiff can show no
likelihood of prevailing on the merits, the district court errs as a matter of law in granting
a temporary injunction.” Minn. Twins P’ship, 638 N.W.2d at 226. “But if a plaintiff makes
even a doubtful showing as to the likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a district court
may consider issuing a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo until trial on the
merits.” Id. (citing Dahlberg, 137 N.W.2d at 321 n.13).
In arguing that the district court’s analysis of this factor was inadequate, the DOC
focuses on the district court’s concluding remarks:
Here, Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits is not clear.
The circumstances have changed since the initiation of this
lawsuit. Defendant has now created an individualized review
process for the revocation of Conditional Medical Release for
persons receiving this benefit/privilege. Nevertheless, this
factor weighs slightly in Plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff has made a
doubtful showing of likelihood of prevailing on the merits, and
the consequence for not maintaining the status quo is
significant to the individuals who are currently released with
CMR.

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The district court’s concluding remarks did not constitute the entirety of its analysis,
however. Initially, the district court observed that principles of due process apply to the
revocation of CMR. And the district court recognized that there was a continuing dispute
as to whether the DOC’s individualized assessments complied with the CMR statute and
satisfied respondents’ right to due process. Although the district court postulated that the
DOC’s individualized assessments weakened respondents’ claims, it also recognized that
dissolving the TRO at this juncture in the litigation would significantly disrupt the status
quo for individuals on CMR. The district court concluded that the factor weighed just
slightly in favor of respondents. Considering the district court’s order as a whole, we
disagree with the DOC that the district court “functionally ignored” the Dahlberg factor
that required it to consider the likelihood of success on the merits.
The DOC also argues that the district court abused its discretion because its view of
the law was erroneous. Specifically, the DOC alleges that in considering the likelihood
that respondents would succeed on the merits, the district court “overlooked what the CMR
statute requires,” failed to recognize that the DOC “complied with the CMR statute,” and
“erroneously analyzed whether the respondents received adequate process under the
Minnesota Constitution.” However, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
summary of the legal issues in the litigation. And we decline the DOC’s invitation to decide
legal issues that are still pending before the district court in the case.
As noted, a plaintiff may obtain a TRO by making “even a doubtful showing as to
the likelihood of prevailing on the merits.” Minn. Twins P’ship, 638 N.W.2d at 226. The
22
district court was within its discretion in determining that respondents made such a
showing.
In sum, we are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in
considering the Dahlberg factors. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in
applying these factors, we will not reverse the district court’s decision to deny the DOC’s
motion to dissolve the TRO.
Affirmed.