A23-0039 A23-0041 A23-0277

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0038
A23-0039
A23-0041
A23-0277

In re the Estate of: Darlene Legred,
Deceased (A23-0038),

and

Brenda Legred, f/k/a Brenda Godlove,
Respondent,

vs.

Brent Legred,
Appellant (A23-0039),

and

The Estate of Darlene Legred, a/k/a Darlene I. Legred,
Defendant,

Merchants Bank, NA,
Respondent,

and

In re the Credit Shelter Trust Established pursuant to the Last Will and Testament of
Thilmer M. Legred dated November 25, 1996 (A23-0041),

and

Brenda Legred,
Respondent

vs.

2
Brent Legred, et al.,
Appellants (A23-0277).

Filed September 18, 2023
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Faribault County District Court
File Nos. 22-PR-18-444, 22-CV-20-675, 22-PR-20-413, 22-CV-22-337

Michael A. Stephani, Kim Ruckdaschel-Haley, Jennifer Lammers, Best & Flanagan, LLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Brenda Legred)

Adam G. Chandler, Justin P. Weinberg, Amanda N. Juelson, Taft Stettinius & Hollister
LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Mary L. Hahn, Jacqueline A. Dorsey, Hvistendahl, Moersch, Dorsey & Hahn, P.A.,
Northfield, Minnesota (for respondent Merchants Bank, NA)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
This appeal concerns a district court’s judgment resolving matters in an intrafamily
dispute between two siblings—appellant and respondent —over agricultural land inherited
from their parents. Appellant challenges the district court’s judgment in two ways. First,
appellant challenges the district court’s conclusion that it lacked authority to enforce a
purported settlement agreement due to appellant’s then-pending appeal of an earlier
judgment. Second, appellant challenges the district court’s confirm ation of the referees’

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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partition report allocating the farmland. Because the district court lacked authority to
confirm the purported settlement agreement and because the district court did not err in
confirming the referees’ partition report, we affirm.
FACTS
This is the second appeal stemming from a dispute between siblings, appellant Brent
Legred and respondent Brenda Legred, over primarily agricultural land in Faribault County
(the property), totaling slightly over 800 tillable acres. Brent and Brenda’s1 parents owned
and farmed the property for many years. Brent and Brenda’s father died in 2011, and their
mother died in 2018. At the time of their mother’s death, the property was owned partly
by their mother and partly by a trust established by their father’s will. Following mother’s
death, Brent continued to farm the property pursuant to his mother’s will, which provides:
2.4 I give my son Brent Legred a right of first refusal to
purchase any and all interest which I may have at the time of
my death in the following described tracts owned by me and
by the Thilmer Legred Family Trust:
. . . .

2.5 I grant to my son Brent Legred an option to rent all of my
agricultural real estate described in paragraph 2.[4
2] excluding
my building site at 90% of the average fair rental value in
Faribault County.

But the siblings could not agree on how much Brent owed in rent pursuant to their
mother’s will. This disagreement caused the litigation leading to the first set of

1 For clarity, we refer to members of the family by first names only.
2 The parties agree that the will contains a clerical error in the paragraph, stating 2.3 instead
of 2.4.

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consolidated appeals, with Brent as the appellant and Brenda as cross-appellant. Legred v.
Legred, No. A22-0543, 2023 WL 3047794 (Minn. App. Apr. 24, 2023).
Mediation and Requests to Stay First Appeal
During the pendency of the first appeal, the parties appeared for a probate hearing
at which the district court ordered the parties to “attempt ADR” on issues relating to the
parties’ claims involving their mother’s estate. The parties retained a mediator and agreed
that mediation would “be expanded to encompass all outstanding issues in an effort to reach
a global resolution.” The parties attended mediation on July 21, 2022, for more than 13
hours. The mediator made a video recording of the terms discussed, and a transcript was
produced and submitted to the district court. As the meditation session came to a close,
the mediator stated, “So counsel, you have your work cut out for you in terms of drafting
the settlement agreement. I’d like to see the draft before it gets signed because I want to
make sure that it’s got all the magic language that makes it a [proper] settlement
agreement.”
Brent’s counsel prepared the initial draft of a written settlement agreement and sent
it to Brenda’s counsel on August 2, 2022. The parties continued to exchange drafts through
September, when Brent’s counsel circulated a fifth draft. No subsequent drafts were
circulated, and no written agreement was reached.
Between August and November 2022, Brent—or the parties jointly—filed four
requests to extend the briefing schedule or stay the first appeal pending a finalized “global”
settlement agreement. We granted each of the requests.

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On October 11, 2022, Brent filed a motion in district court to enforce the purported
settlement agreement. On December 6, 2022, and following a hearing on Brent’s motion,
the district court issued an order and judgment denying Brent’s motion to enforce the
purported settlement agreement (and, separately, confirming the referees’ partition report,
as explained below). As a result of that judgment, Brent sought another stay of the first
appeal, which our court denied. On April 24, 2023, our court resolved the first appeal by
affirming the district court’s March 21, 2022 order and judgment.
Partition
Brent did not appeal the portion of the district court’s March 21, 2022 order and
judgment granting a partition and does not dispute that the property must be partitioned.
The day after Brent appealed other aspects of the judgment, he stipulated to the
appointment of three partition referees to recommend a partition. The district court
subsequently appointed the referees in the stipulation.
The referees completed their recommendation report on September 15, 2022. On
September 30, 2022, Brenda moved to confirm the report. Brent filed a responsive motion
opposing confirmation. In the December 6, 2022 order and judgment in which the district
court denied Brent’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement, the district court granted
Brenda’s motion to confirm the referees’ partition report, which set forth the partition of
the farmland between Brent and Brenda.
These consolidated appeals follow.

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DECISION
I. The district court properly concluded that it did not have authority to enforce
the purported settlement agreement.

Brent asserts that the district court (1) “retained jurisdiction to enforce the
settlement agreement” consistent with Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2, and (2) erred
in its alternative conclusion “that the parties did not reach a binding agreement during the
July 21 mediation.” Because the district court did not err in determining that it lacked
authority to enforce the purported settlement agreement, we need not address Brent’s
second argument.
The district court determined that it did not have authority to enforce the purported
settlement agreement because it would “necessarily affect [a] prior order which is appealed
from” and, thus, violate Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2. We review the district
court’s interpretation of procedural rules de novo. See Zirnhelt v. Carter, 843 N.W.2d 270,
274 (Minn. App. 2014) (citing Eclipse Architectural Grp. v. Lam, 814 N.W.2d 692, 696
(Minn. 2012)). The procedural rule at issue is Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2, which
states, in relevant part:
Rule 108.01. Effect of Appeal on Proceedings in Trial Court
. . . .

Subd. 2. Suspension of Trial Court’s Authority to Make
Orders Affecting Judgment or Order on Appeal. . . . [T]he
filing of a timely and proper appeal suspends the trial court’s
authority to make any order that affects the order or judgment
appealed from, although the trial court retains jurisdiction as to
matters independent of, supplemental to, or collateral to the
order or judgment appealed from.

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Resolution of the authority issue turns on whether the purported settlement
agreement was an independent, supplemental, or collateral matter with respect to the first
appeal. The district court determined that it was not, because the purported settlement
agreement included “a new mechanism for determining the rent amount that Brent Legred
will be required to pay,” which “figured prominently in the district court trial and resulted
in the determination of a rental amount.”
Brent argues that Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2, did not preclude the district
court from enforcing the purported settlement agreement because (1) “the facts relating to
settlement agreement arose after the [c]onsolidated [a]ppeal was already pending,” and
(2) “its enforcement does not require consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal.”
We are unpersuaded.
Many of the facts relating to the purported settlement agreement are not different
from the then-pending consolidated appeal. The first appeal stemmed, in part, from district
court determinations regarding the appropriate rental amount for Brent to pay the trust and
the estate. This is one of the very issues the parties attempted to mediate. The summary
of the mediation as described in the transcript states that the parties discussed Brent’s
appropriate rental amount, and both parties agreed to dismiss their pending appeals.
Additionally, the subsequent written settlement drafts indicate that the parties
contemplated Brent’s rental option; his lease terms; the rent Brent owed to the estate, the
trust, and Brenda; and dismissal of claims pending in the first appeal. And it is no surprise
that the parties discussed the same facts and issues involved in the first appeal during
mediation because, and as previously noted, the parties agreed that mediation would “be

8
expanded to encompass all issues in an effort to reach a global resolution.” Because the
mediation addressed the very facts and issues involved in the first appeal, determination of
whether the mediation resulted in an enforceable agreement is not “independent of,
supplemental to, or collateral to the order or judgment appealed from.” Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 108.01, subd. 2.
We are also unpersuaded by the caselaw Brent relies on because the cases are easily
distinguished. In Perry v. Perry, we concluded that the district court had authority to
consider a motion to modify child support despite a pending child-support appeal because
the motion to modify “was supplemental and collateral to the issue on appeal.” 749 N.W.2d
399, 401 (Minn. App. 2008). In that case, our analysis of Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01
turned on whether the modification order would “necessarily affect” the previous
child-support order. Id. at 402-03. We concluded that it did not. Id. at 403. We reasoned
that “two principles” assist with this conclusion. Id. “First, an order does not necessarily
affect the order on appeal if it involves a new set of facts and does not require the district
court to consider the merits of the issue on appeal.” Id. And second, “in the family-law
context, the district court’s authority to act should be construed in a way that permits the
courts to respond to changing circumstances and protect the best interests of the children.”
Id.
The circumstances of a family-law case are different from those in this case. A
“proper motion” for modification of child support “must be based on allegations of
changed circumstances” and therefore must necessarily allege “new facts” separate from
the issues relevant to a pending appeal. Id. Here, the facts discussed during the underlying

9
mediation did not involve “changed circumstances” such that new facts were before the
district court when considering whether to enforce the purported settlement agreement. As
we noted above, the order on appeal involved many of the exact same facts and issues as
the purported settlement agreement, which comports with the parties’ desire to reach a
“global settlement” of all of their disputes, apparently including the then-pending appeals.
Brent also directs us to In re Thulin, wherein the district court issued an order
continuing civil commitment while Thulin’s appeal of his initial civil commitment was
pending. 660 N.W.2d 140, 142-43 (Minn. App. 2003). Thulin challenged the district
court’s jurisdiction over matters related to his continued commitment due to his
then-pending appeal. Id. This court applied Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01 and concluded
that, contrary to Thulin’s argument, “a determination of continued commitment is
supplemental to and independent of the initial order of commitment being appealed, and
jurisdiction on that issue remains in the district court.” Id. at 143. As in a modification of
child-support proceeding, continued civil commitment necessarily requires consideration
of facts coming into existence after the initial commitment. See id. at 144 (noting standard
is continued mental illness and safety risk). Thus, Thulin is not instructive.
In sum, the district court properly determined that it lacked the authority to enforce
the purported settlement agreement.3

3 Though we need not reach Brent’s argument that the district court erred in determining
that the parties did not reach a binding agreement during the mediation, we note that “The
existence and terms of a contract are questions for the fact finder.” Morrisette v. Harrison
Int’l Corp., 486 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. 1992). Even a cursory review of the record shows
no clear error in the district court’s determination that the parties did not reach a binding
settlement agreement.

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II. The district court properly confirmed the referees’ partition report.

Brent argues that the district court (1) lacked the authority to confirm the referees’
report and (2) erred in refusing to set aside the report and remand the matter to the referees.
Brent asks this court to reverse and remand “with instructions to allow Brent and Brenda
an opportunity to speak with the referees regarding the partition.”
An action to partition real property is governed by chapter 558 of the Minnesota
Statutes. Chapter 558 and the accompanying caselaw provide multiple ways by which a
partition action may be resolved including, but not limited to, partition in kind, Minn. Stat.
§ 558.01 (2022), partition in kind with compensation, Minn. Stat. § 558.11 (2022), and
partition by private or public sale, Minn. Stat. §§ 558.14, .17 (2022). “Although the
statutory procedure must be followed, once the [district] court has taken jurisdiction of the
case it may exercise its general equitable powers to effect the most advantageous plan
which the nature of the particular case admits. ” Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 255
(Minn. 1977); Swogger v. Taylor, 68 N.W.2d 376, 383 (Minn. 1955). When considering
the referees’ report, a district court “may confirm or set aside the report, and, if necessary,
appoint new referees.” Minn. Stat. § 558.07 (2022).
“A district court’s decisions regarding the division of assets in a partition proceeding
are within its discretion and should not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”
Glenwood Inv. Props., L.L.C. v. Carroll A. Britton Fam. Tr., 765 N.W.2d 112, 117 (Minn.
App. 2009).
On April 20, 2022, the day after Brent filed his notice of appeal in the first
consolidated case, the parties stipulated to the district court’s appointment of three partition

11
referees. The referees and counsel for parties participated in a conference call to discuss
the work of the referees and to determine the information the referees needed to make an
equitable division of the property. Brent’s counsel submitted a letter to the appointed
referees on May 12, 2022, that explained Brent’s position regarding the equitable partition
of the property. Brenda’s counsel did the same.
On September 15, 2022, the referees submitted their partition report explaining the
equitable division of the property between Brenda and Brent and indicating that they
reviewed “county assessment records,” aerial photos, farm records, “private tile maps,
county tile maps, soils maps[,] and productivity indexes along with the 2018 land
appraisal.” The referees also “inspected the property on several occasions during the
growing season to determine the quality of the cropland and if there were any noticeable
drainage issues.” The referees determined the following to be an equitable partition of the
farmland:
4

4 The partition referees developed the graphic shown.

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Brenda filed a motion to confirm the referees’ report. Brent opposed confirmation
of the recommended partition, asserting that the referees’ recommended division was
unequal and failed to consider that he planted the Northwicks Farm with alfalfa, which is
a five-year crop that is expensive to plant due to the costs of seed and fertilizer, in spring
2022.
In the December 6, 2022 order and judgment, the district court determined that it
maintained authority to confirm the referees’ partition report because Brent did not appeal
from the order appointing the referees . The district court further reasoned that, assuming
Brent’s request was interpreted as a request to set aside the report, Brent had “not made a
sufficient showing to justify that relief.”
District Court’s Authority to Confirm Partition Report
Brent argues that the district court lacked authority to confirm the referees’ report
during the pending first appeal based on (1) Minn. R. Civ. P. 108.01 and (2) Minn. Stat.
§ 525.714 (2022) (“The appeal shall suspend the operation of the order, judgment, or
decree appealed from until the appeal is determined or the court of appeals orders
otherwise.”). We are not persuaded.
First, neither party challenged in the first appeal the district court’s directive to
partition the property. Moreover, the referees’ report simply divides the land equitably
between the parties; it does not address how mother’s will impacts the trust’s interest in
the property or the amount of rent owed, which were issues in the first appeal . Therefore,
pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 108.01, the district court retained authority to confirm the

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referees’ report because it was “independent of, supplemental to, or collateral to the order
or judgment appealed from.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 108.01, subd. 2.
Second, the applicability of Minn. Stat. § 525.714, which addresses the operation of
an appealed order in a probate proceeding, is not briefed by the parties with citation to
authority. Because it is inadequately briefed, we decline to reach this argument. See State
Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997)
(declining to address an inadequately briefed issue).
District Court’s Confirmation of Partition Report
Brent next asserts that the district court erred by failing to set aside (or, as articulated
by Brent, remand) the referees’ report. We first consider the extent to which a district court
must defer to referees in a partition action. In Neumann v. Anderson, we quoted A.C.
Freeman, Cotenancy and Partition (2d ed. 1886), for the following guidance:
But where the [district c]ourt is asked to set aside the action of
the [referees], on the ground that they erred in making their
allotments, whereby an unequal partition has been made, it will
not grant the relief asked except in extreme cases—cases in
which the partition is based on wrong principles, or it is shown
by a very clear and decided preponderance of evidence that the
[referees] have made a grossly unequal allotment.

916 N.W.2d 41, 50-51 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. July 17, 2018).
For this reason, “[a]n application to set aside a referees’ report is usually considered
as analogous to a motion for a new trial, and the report as entitled to the same force and
effect as the verdict of a jury or a finding made by the court.” Id. at 51-52 (quoting Robbins
v. Hobart, 157 N.W. 908, 909 (Minn. 1916)). In considering a motion for a new trial, a
district court is not “free to set aside a jury verdict whenever it is displeased or dissatisfied

14
with the result of the jury’s deliberations.” Koenig v. Ludowese, 243 N.W.2d 29, 30 (Minn.
1976). Therefore, a district court should deny a motion for a new trial if “the preponderance
of the evidence fails to suggest clearly jury mistake, improper motive, bias, or caprice” or
if there are “no expressed and articulable reasons, based upon demonstrable circumstances
or events, which support a conclusion that injustice has been done.” Id. at 31. “Likewise,
a referees’ report in a partition action may be set aside if it is shown by a very clear and
decided preponderance of evidence that the [referees] have made a grossly unequal
allotment.” Neumann, 916 N.W.2d at 52 (quotation omitted).
Brent attempts to support his argument that the district court erred by failing to set
aside the referees’ partition report by pointing to (1) the lack of express consideration of
party submissions in the referees’ report, and (2) statements purportedly made by the
referees after the filing of the partition report, as described in the parties’ conflicting
affidavits. Those statements relate to a claimed lack of knowledge by one referee about
Brent’s planting of alfalfa and claimed misunderstanding of two referees as to whether they
were prohibited from contacting Brent and Brenda.
As to Brent’s first point, he cites to no law, and we are aware of none, which
obligates a referee to explicitly reference a party’s submission as part of a final report. See
Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (“It is well to bear in mind that on appeal
error is never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be
reversal.” (Quotation omitted)).
As to Brent’s second point, the district court determined that “[t]here is no indication
the referees acted with improper motive, bias or caprice and the report contains sufficient

15
findings to demonstrate the referees’ reasoning for making their recommendation.”
Specifically, the district court determined that Brent did “not suggest that the referees’
report [had] resulted in a grossly unequal allotment” and, instead, “[h]e simply ha[d] a
different division of property that he believes is more equitable in light of his farming
practices.” The record supports the district court’s determination. Even if we assume
additional facts might change the partition, the possibility of a different partition does not
“show[] by a very clear and decided preponderance of evidence that the [referees] have
made a grossly unequal allotment.” Neumann, 916 N.W.2d at 52 (quotation omitted). The
district court did not err in confirming the report.
Affirmed.