Timothy Richard Gilles, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0045

Timothy Richard Gilles, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed September 25, 2023
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-11-3318

Zachary A. Longsdorf, Longsdorf Law Firm, PLC, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney Ge neral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm the district court’s denial of appellant’s challenge to his sentence because
the district court did not err by treating appellant’s motion to correct his sentence as a time-
barred petition for postconviction relief.
FACTS
On April 15, 2011, appellant Timothy Gilles was driving in St. Cloud, Minnesota,
when police attempted to stop him due to an active warrant. When the officers activated
their lights and sirens, Gilles made an evasive left -hand turn around a vehicle, crossed the
center median of the road he on which he was driving, and fled at high speed into oncoming
traffic. Gilles struck another vehicle, killing the driver and seriously injuring a pregnant
passenger. The passenger’s baby had to be prematurely delivered and died two days la ter
due to injuries from the collision. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Gilles with two
counts of fleeing a peace officer resulting in death (counts 1 and 3), two counts of third -
degree murder (counts 2 and 4), and one count of fleeing a peace offic er resulting in
substantial bodily harm (count 5) because of these events. 1 The state also moved to
introduce Blakely evidence to establish a basis for an upward durational departure. See
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303, (2004) (explaining that facts supporting an
enhanced sentence must be found by a jury or admitted by the defendant).

1 Counts 1 and 2 corresponded to the death of the driver, counts 3 and 4 corresponded to
the death of the child, and count 5 corresponded to the injury of the passenger.
3
Before trial, the state sent Gilles a letter containing two alternative settlement offers.
Under both offers, Gilles would plead guilty to counts 1, 3, and 5, and the state would
dismiss the two third -degree murder charges. The state also proposed that count 5 would
be sentenced first, count 1 would be sentenced second, and count 3 would be sentenced
third, because of the chronological order of events —the passeng er was injured upon
impact, the driver died shortly after impact, and the child died later in the hospital. The
state’s first settlement offer was for a joint sentencing recommendation of 360 months.
Under its second offer, Gilles would enter “a straight up plea” to counts 1, 3, and 5, and
admit to the state’s Blakely motion, but the state “would agree that this matter would be
sentenced within the range outlined in the sentencing guidelines.” The state also explained
that it “would agree to cap its argu ment at 432 months, which is the most the State could
ask for without the Blakely enhancement,” and that the guidelines range for counts 1, 3,
and 5 was a minimum of 204 months and a maximum of 432 months.
Gilles accepted the state’s second offer and plead ed guilty to counts 1, 3, and 5.
Gilles signed a written plea petition which described the agreement as follows :
Plead guilty to counts 1, 3, 5

Admit to State’s Blakely motion

State agrees this matter would be sentenced within the range
outlined in the sentencing guidelines

State also agrees to cap argument at 432 months, which is the
most the state could ask for without the Blakely enhancement,
D cannot be sentenced to more than 432 months

4
At the plea hearing, the parties further explained the agreement to the district court:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s a partial plea agreement.
Specifically, [Gilles is] pleading guilty to Counts I, III and V.
He has agreed to admit to the State’s [Blakely] Motion. The
State agrees that this matter would then be sentenced within the
range outlined in the Sentencing Guidelines. They’ve agreed
to cap their argument at 432 months, which is the most the
State could ask for without the [Blakely] enhancement. And so
the Defendant could not be sentenced to more than 432 months.
But we are free to argue anything below that.

THE COURT: Okay. And 432 months would be top of the
box?

[PROSECUTOR]: It would be top of the box, Your Honor,
assuming consecutive sentences, that’s correct.

THE COURT: All right. So even though there would be an
admission to facts to support a departure, the sentence would
still be within the limits of the Guidelines?

[PROSECUTOR]: That is a correct statement, Your Honor.
And the Sentencing Guidelines range then would be 204
months which would be a bottom of the box with concurrent
sentences again up to the 432.

Later during the plea hearing, defense counsel confirmed Gilles’s understanding of the plea
agreement:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you understand that the plea
agreement that you’re entering into today basically caps your
sentence at 432 months, but that there is no guarantee as to how
many months you’re actually going to have to sit, or that you’re
actually going to have to serve other than it cannot be more
than 432 months?

[GILLES]: Yes.

5
Finally, the prosecutor also asked Gilles about the plea agreement:
[PROSECUTOR]: And Mr. Gilles, you understand again as
has been discussed, the Guideline Sentence range here is
anywhere from 204 months to 432 months; you understand
that?

[GILLES]: Yes.

Gilles provided a factual basis for counts 1, 3, and 5, as well as admitted the facts in the
state’s Blakely motion. The district court accepted Gilles’s plea and schedu led the matter
for sentencing.
A pre -sentencing investigation (PSI) recommended the maximum 432- month
sentence allowed by the plea agreement. At the sentencing hearing, t he state argued for
the 432-month sentence recommended by the PSI, while Gilles arg ued for a 288-month
sentence. The district court adopted the PSI’s recommendation of a 432- month sentence.
First, the district court imposed a stayed 21- month prison sentence on count 5, reflecting a
severity level of 4 and a criminal history score of 3. Second, the district court imposed an
executed 252-month sentence on count 1, reflecting a severity level of 10 and a criminal
history score of 4—including one additional felony point for Gilles’s conviction on count
1. Third, the district court imposed a consecutive executed 180 -month sentence on count
3, reflecting a severity level of 10 but a criminal history score of 0 due to the consecutive
sentencing.

6
On June 17, 2022, approximately ten years after his sentencing, Gilles filed a motion
to correct h is sentence pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03,
subdivision 9. He argued that the district court should not have included a criminal-history
point from count 5 when sentencing Gilles on count 1 because count 5 was not one of the
two highest-severity offenses. He also argued that, upon resentencing, the district court
should impose a further-reduced aggregate sentence because a top -of-the-box sentence
would unfairly exaggerate his criminality and because he had shown “a great deal of
remorse and growth” since his conviction.
The district court determined that while Gilles’s motion was labeled as a motion to
correct sentence, it was properly construed as a petition for postconviction relief. In
reaching this decision, the district court reasoned that “the State refrained from seeking an
upward departure precisely in exchange for Gilles’ agreement to the 204- 432 sentencing
range,” and that Gilles’s proposed relief would “effectively change[] the plea agreement
exclusively in his favor” by modifying the agreed -upon maximum 432- month sentence.
Thus, the district court determined that Gilles’s motion implicated the plea agreement and
would therefore require a postconviction remedy. Because Gilles filed his motion more
than nine years after t he voluntary dismissal of his direct appeal, the district court
concluded that this postconviction request was untimely and denied the motion.

7
DECISION
On appeal, Gilles argues that the district court erred when it treated his motion to
correct his sentence as a time-barred petition for postconviction relief. Then, assuming his
motion was timely, he argues that his sentence was not authorized by law beca use it was
based on an incorrect criminal-history score. We disagree.
An offender may collaterally attack their sentence by filing a motion to correct
sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, or by filing a petition for postconviction
relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2020). Washington v. State , 845 N.W.2d
205, 210 (Minn. App. 2014). These “two alternative means of challenging a sentence are
subject to different procedural requirements.” Id. As relevant here, a petition for
postconviction relief may not be filed more than two years after a judgment of conviction
becomes final if the offender should have known of the claims at the time of direct appeal.
Id.; Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2020). However, this two-year time limit does not apply
to a motion to correct sentence properly filed under rule 27.03. Reynolds v. State , 888
N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2016); Vazquez v. State, 822 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. App. 2012).
Instead, a district court “may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 (emphasis added).
Although a motion brought under rule 27.03 is not subject to a time limit, t he scope
of the relief available is narrower. “In contrast to the comprehensive language of section
590.01, the plain language of rule 27.03 is limited to sentences, and the court’s authority

8
under the rule is restricted to modifying a sentence.” State v . Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477, 480
(Minn. 2015). Because of this, “courts in some circumstances have the authority to treat a
request to correct a sentence purportedly brought under rule 27.03 as a petition for
postconviction relief.” Id.; see also Washington, 845 N.W.2d at 212 ( stating that “an
offender may not avoid the requirements of the postconviction act by simply labeling a
challenge as a motion to correct sentence”). One of these circumstances is when a
challenge to the sentence “involves more than sim ply the sentence” because it implicates
the terms of a plea agreement. Coles , 862 N.W.2d at 480-82.
“The standard for reviewing a district court’s decision to treat a motion to correct a
sentence under rule 27.03 as a postconviction petition under Minnesota Statutes Chapter
590 remains an open question.” Bolstad v. State, 966 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Minn. 2021) . In
Coles, the supreme court reviewed the issue de novo, reasoning that “[t]he parties’
arguments present[ed] issues regarding the interpretation of a procedural rule and statute.”
862 N.W.2d at 479; see also Johnson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn. 2011) (Johnson
I). But in other cases, the supreme court has “declined to adopt a definitive standard of
review” because, regardless of the applicable standard, the district court did not err.
Bolstad, 966 N.W.2d at 242 (quotation omitted); see also Wayne v. State, 870 N.W.2d 389,
391 n.2 (Minn. 2015); Johnson v. State, 877 N.W.2d 776, 779 n.3 (Minn. 2016) (Johnson
II). Similarly, we need not resolve this issue here because regardless of whether we review

9
the district court’s decision de novo or for an abuse of discretion, we conclude that the
district court did not err.
Gilles does not dispute that his motion would be untimely if construed as a petition
for postconviction relief. Instead, he ar gues that the district court should have considered
his motion under rule 27.03 because the relief he seeks—correction of his criminal -history
score—does not conflict with the terms of the plea agreement. We are not persuaded
because the state agreed to f orgo its argument for an aggravated sentence in exchange for
the ability to argue for the 432- month sentence that Gilles received.
In Coles, the supreme court explained that when a d istrict court imposes a sentence
pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, a subsequent attempt to modify that sentence that
changes the benefit of the bargain struck essentially amounts to rejection of the terms of
the plea agreement. 862 N.W.2d at 480- 82. Coles pleaded guilty and agreed to two
consecutive 48- month sentences —an upward durational departure —in exchange for
dismissal of a higher-severity charge . Id. at 478. Coles later challenged his sentence,
arguing that the district court had not cited valid grounds for the departure. Id. at 479. The
supreme court reasoned that this was more than a challenge to the sentence because Coles’s
“sentence and conviction were part of a negotiated package in which both Coles and the
State received a significant benefit.” Id. at 481-482. The supreme court observed that in
such cases, “[i]f [a] defendant succeeds in reducing his or her sentence, he or she retains

10
the benefit of the reduced criminal charge , but the State no longer receives the benefit of
the longer sentence.” Id. at 481. Because Coles’s motion “involve[d] the plea agreement
itself” rather than “simply the sentence,” the supreme court concluded that it was properly
viewed as a petition for postconviction relief. Id.
Not every sentencing modification implicates the terms of the underlying plea
agreement. In deciding Coles, the supreme court distinguished its previous opinion in State
v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Minn. 2007). Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 481 n.4. In
Maurstad, the parties agreed that the defendant would “be sentenced accordi ng to the
Minnesota sentencing guidelines.” 733 N.W.2d at 143. The supreme court eventually held
that Maurstad could obtain review of his criminal -history score under rule 27.03 because
“a defendant may not waive review” of that calculation. Id. at 147. The supreme court
emphasized in Coles that the plea agreement in Maurstad was for a guidelines sentence,
whereas Coles agreed to a specific sentence. Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 481 n.4. Based on this,
the supreme court reasoned that “[u] nlike Coles ’ requested relief, adjusting Maurstad ’s
sentence to the correct sentence under the guidelines did not deprive either side of the
benefit of the bargain reached in the plea agreement. ” Id.
Similarly, Gilles argues that modification of his sentence would not implica te his
plea agreement because his agreement was for a guidelines sentence , and he merely seeks
correction of his criminal-history score. He relies on three nonprecedential opinions in
which this court, citing Coles, concluded that modification of a sentence would not

11
implicate the terms of the plea agreement. See State v. Gustafson, No. A20- 0877, 2021
WL 1846581, at *2-4 (Minn. App. May 10, 2021) (concluding that where the parties agreed
to a top-of-the-box sentence, modifying defendant’s criminal -history score “would not
change the foundation of the plea agreement”); Bilbro v. State , A17- 1566, 2018 WL
3340453, at *2 (Minn. App. July 9, 2018), rev’d on other grounds, 927 N.W.2d 8 (Minn.
2019) (concluding that challenge to sentence did not “attack the substance of the plea
agreement” because defendant “agreed to submit a ‘straight plea to the court,’ which
contained no agreement as to any of the terms of the sentence”); Barnes v. State, No. A16-
0983, 2017 WL 1628501, at *4 (Minn. App. May 1, 2017), rev. denied (Minn. July 18,
2017) (concluding that “[b]ecause the parties bargained for a bottom-of-the-box sentence,”
correcting defendant’s criminal -history score would not be “rejecting the terms of the
plea,” but instead would be “giving effect to” them); but see generally Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (stating that nonprecedential opinions of this court are not binding
authority).
The facts in this case, however, are distinguishable from the cases that Gilles ci tes.
Gilles did not simply agree to a guidelines sentence like the defendants in Gustafson and
Barnes, nor did he enter a “straight plea” with no agreement as to the sentence like the
defendant in Bilbro. Instead, the record indicates that the parties assigned independent
significance to the 432- month cap.2 Although the state’s settlement offer, the signed plea

2 The determination of “what the parties agreed to in a plea bargain” is a fact question for
the district court to resolve. State v. Rhodes , 675 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Minn. 2004) . But
“interpretation and enforcement of plea agreemen ts involve issues of law” that this court
reviews de novo. Id. Here, because the plea offer, plea petition, and plea transcript are all
12
petition, and the plea hearing transcript all reference the sentencing guidelines, each of
these documents also make separat e reference to a maximum sentence of 432 months.
First, the state specifically offered to “cap its argument at 432 months, which is the most
the State could ask for without the Blakely enhancement,” if Gilles would plead guilty and
admit to the state’s Blakely motion. Second, the signed plea petition noted the state’s
agreement to a guidelines sentence, but separately stated that the “State also agrees to cap
argument at 432 months” and that Gilles “cannot be sentenced to more than 432 months.”
(Emphasis added.) Finally, at the plea hearing, the parties referenced both the guidelines
and a maximum sentence of 432 months, and Gilles confirmed his understanding that his
agreement “basically caps [his] sentence at 432 months.”
In short, the record indicates the state made clear that it would be seeking a 432-
month sentence in exchange for forgoing a possible Blakely enhancement. While 432
months was framed as the maximum available sentence under the sentencing guidelines,
the parties emphasized a specific 432-month cap, and the terms of their agreement indicate
a mutual understanding that 432 months was the correct maximum sentence. This stands
in contrast with Gustafson, for example, where the parties agreed to “a guidelines sentence,
high end of the box” and the plea agreement simply stated the parties “ believe[d]” that
Gustafson had a certain criminal -history score and sentence. 2021 WL 1846581 at *1

consistent in their descriptions of the plea agreement, we discern no remaining question of
fact as to what the partie s agreed to and therefore interpret the parties’ agreement as a
matter of law . See generally State v. Spraggins, 742 N.W.2d 1, 3- 4 (Minn. App. 2007)
(noting that “principles of contract law are applied to determine the terms and enforcement
of plea agreements”).
13
(alteration in original). Like the sentence in Coles, the 432-month cap here was “ part of a
negotiated package in which both [appellant] and the State received a significant benefit.”3
862 N.W.2d at 481-82. Because modification of this sentence would deprive the state of
the benefit of this bargain, we conclude that Gilles’s motion implicates his plea agreement
and is beyond the scope of rule 27.03. The district court therefore properly construed the
motion as a time-barred petition for postconviction relief. 4
Affirmed.

3 Gilles also argues that, because other defendants who committed similar offenses have
received lower sentences than he did , the state did not “g [i]ve up anything in not seeking
an aggravated sentence.” We are not persuaded by this alternate reasoning; regardless of
whether the state would have been successful in seeking an upward departure, the benefit
that Gilles bargained for was the state forgoing the ability to argue for a one.
4 Moreover, even if Gilles could obtain relief under rule 27.03 and we were to reach the
merits of his motion, we would conclude that Gilles’s sentence was correctly calculated.
We review the interpretation of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidel ines de novo using
principles of statutory interpretation and beginning with the plain language of the
guidelines. State v. Scovel, 916 N.W.2d 550, 554- 55 (Minn. 2018). Under the applicable
guidelines provision, when calculating a person’s criminal -history score, “[o]nly the two
offenses at the highest severity levels are considered for prior multiple sentences arising
out of a single course of conduct in which there were multiple victims.” Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines II.B.1.d (2010); see also Minn. Sent’g Guidelines cmt. II.B.108 (2010) (noting
that “[t]his limit . . . also applies when such sentences are imposed on the same day”).
Gilles asserts that because his three offenses occurred as part of a single course of conduct
and counts 3 and 5 were the most severe offenses, it was an error to include a criminal -
history point from count 1—the least severe offense —in his criminal- history score for
count 5. But section II.B.1.d applies only to “prior multiple sentences.” (Emphasis added.)
Here, Gilles was sentenced first on count 1, then on count 5, and then on count 3; when
Gilles was sentenced on count 5, count 1 was the only prior sentence arising out of the
applicable course of conduct. Because nothing in the plain language of the guidelines
suggests that convictions which have yet to be sentenced are considered prior sentences,
we discern no error in the calculation of Gilles’s criminal-history score.