In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: T. M. B. and S. E. C., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0071

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
T. M. B. and S. E. C., Parents.

Filed June 26, 2023
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Dodge County District Court
File No. 20-JV-22-170

James McGeeney, Doda McGeeney, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant-father S.E.C.)

Anthony J. Moosbrugger, Moosbrugger Law Office, P.A., Kasson, Minnesota (for
respondent-petitioners A.B. and J.B.)

Renae Streich, West Concord, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant-father S.E.C. challenges the district court’s decision to terminate his
parental rights to his seven-year -old child following a court trial. Father argues that the
district court erred by finding that clear and convincing evidence established that he
abandoned the child, that he is palpably unfit to parent the child, and that termination of

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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his parental rights serves the child’s best interests. Because substantial evidence in the
record supports the district court’s factual findings, the district court addressed the statutory
criteria for terminating parental rights, and clear and convincing evidence supports at least
one statutory ground for termination of father’s parental rights , we discern no abuse of
discretion and affirm.
FACTS
This appeal concerns a child born in January 2016. T.M.B. is the child’s biological
mother. While pregnant with the child, mother began residing with respondent A.B., her
aunt.
1 Because mother was struggling with drug addiction, she asked aunt to consider
adopting the child.
Aunt has cared for the child since the child’s birth. Aunt married her current
husband, respondent J.B., in September 2019. Since the marriage, husband has developed
a paternal-type relationship with the child.
Father has never met the child. When the child was born, father was serving a 60-
month prison sentence. Father took a DNA test in prison, which established his paternity.
About s ix months after the child’s birth, father filed a pro se petition to adjudicate his
paternity of the child and moved to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court denied
the motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Father did not appeal the denial of his motion ,
and there were no further proceedings to adjudicate his paternity.

1 The record shows that aunt is mother’s aunt and the child’s great-aunt. In the interest of
simplicity, we refer to this individual as “aunt.”
3
Father was released from prison in 2019. Upon his release, he made several requests
to mother and aunt to meet the child. Aunt refused these requests because she was
concerned about father’s criminal activity and drug use. She informed father that any
visitation would have to be established through mediation or legal action. Father stopped
contacting aunt around February 2019 and made no further efforts to visit the child.
In March 2022, aunt and aunt’s husband, who wish to adopt the child, filed a petition
in the district court to terminate father’s parental rights. The petition alleged two grounds
for involuntary termination: that father abandoned the child and that father is palpably
unfit to parent the child.2 Father opposed the petition, and the district court presided over
a court trial in October 2022.3
At trial, the district court heard testimony from mother, aunt, father, a social worker,
a guardian ad litem, father’s mother, and two of father’s friends. Additionally, the district
court took judicial notice of district court records in father’s other cases, which included
twelve criminal cases, two juvenile matters, and a child-protection case. The district court
also received five child-protection reports concerning two children father shares with his
current partner.
Following the trial, the district court reopened the record to receive new evidence
regarding father’s recent probation violation. The probation-violation report, dated

2 The petition was filed pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 260C.307, subdivision 1
(2022), which allows “[a]ny reputable person . . . having knowledge of circumstances
which indicate that the rights of a parent to a child should be terminated” to petition for the
termination of parental rights.

3 Mother intends to consent to the adoption and voluntarily terminate her parental rights.
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November 30, 2022, alleged that father had tampered with a drug test and used
methamphetamine and alcohol. Father later admitted to these allegations in court and was
resentenced to probation.
On December 23, 2022, the district court issued a 31-page order terminating father’s
parental rights to the child. The district court determined that there was clear and
convincing evidence that father abandoned the child and that father is palpably unfit to
parent the child, and th at termination of father’s parental rights is in the child’s best
interests.
DECISION
The law presumes that a natural parent should be entrusted with caring for his own
child and that it is in a child’s best interest to be cared for by a parent. In re Welfare of
Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted). A district court
can involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights only when it finds clear and convincing
evidence of at least one of nine statutory bases for termination. Id. at 132; see also Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2022) (listing nine statutory factors). When a statutory basis
for termination is present, the district court’s “paramount consideration” in deciding
whether to terminate parental rights is “the best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 7 (2022); see also In re Welfare of Child. of J.D.T., 946 N.W.2d 321,
327 (Minn. 2020).
In an appeal of a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights, we review the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its determination regarding the existence
of a statutory basis for termination for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child. of
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J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). The
appellate court must consider “whether the district court’s findings address the statutory
criteria and whether the district court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and
are not clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.
2008). An appellate court will “affirm the district court’s termination of parental rights
when at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing
evidence and termination is in the best interests of the child.” Id.
The scope of clear -error review is narrow. This standard “does not contemplate a
reweighing of the evidence, inherent or otherwise; it is a review of the record to confirm
that evidence exists to support the decision.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963
N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021); see In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601
n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney in a juvenile-protection appeal), rev. denied
(Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). “When the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on
appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences
and findings to the contrary.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223 (quotation omitted). In applying
the clear-error standard of review, the appellate court (1) views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the findings, (2) does not reweigh the evidence, (3) does not find facts,
and (4) does not reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22.
Here, the district court found that the evidence supported termination of father’s
parental rights on two statutory grounds—abandonment and palpable unfitness. Moreover,
the district court found that clear and convincing evidence established that termination was
in the child’s best interests. We conclude that the record supports the district court’s factual
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findings and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that father is
palpably unfit to be a parent. Additionally, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that termination serves the child’s best interests.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that clear and
convincing evidence established that father is palpably unfit to be a party to
the parent and child relationship.

Father argues that the record does not support the factual findings underlying the
district court’s determination that he is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child
relationship. Thus, father contends, the district court abused its discretion in terminating
his parental rights on this ground.
Under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4), a statutory basis
to terminate parental rights exists when a parent is deemed
palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship
because of a consistent pattern . . . of specific conditions
directly relating to the parent and child relationship . . . which
are determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that
renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable
future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental,
or emotional needs of the child.

To terminate on this basis, there must be “a consistent pattern of specific conduct or specific
conditions existing at the time of the hearing that, it appears, will continue for a prolonged,
indefinite period and that are permanently detrimental to the welfare of the child.” In re
Welfare of Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 2008). In addition, the specific
condition must directly affect the individual’s ability to parent. Id. at 662.
The district court made the following factual findings to support the determination
that father is palpably unfit: father has a long record of criminal behavior and a “significant
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anti-social criminal lifestyle”; father’s claim that he has recently changed his lifestyle to
endorse only law-abiding behavior is undercut by his recent probation-violation report
where he admitted to using methamphetamine; father’s criminal lifestyle exposes the child
to “illegal drug use, illegal drug activity,” domestic violence, traumatic episodes, and
frequent, unpredictable absences from the home; father has consistently engaged in a
criminal lifestyle, beginning in 2004 and continuing through the month of the termination
trial; social services intervention is not likely to accomplish reform and rehabilitation goals
with father; and father ’s testimony that he is willing to engage with social services is
“undermined by his insistence that he will only do so under Court order.” Based on these
facts, the district court concluded that father is “unable, for the reasonably foreseeable
future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs of the
child.”
Father contends that “any argument that he is unfit is conjecture based on his past
history” and that he presented evidence that he “is employed, in a relationship, has housing
and resources, and helps co-parent his partner’s children.” But there is ample evidence in
the record that supports the district court’s finding that father’s criminal activity and drug
use are both consistent and likely to continue for a prolonged , indefinite period. See T.R.,
750 N.W.2d at 661.
The record shows that father’s criminal behavior and drug use have been
continuous. Since 2004, father has pleaded guilty to many criminal offenses, including
theft, burglary, receiving stolen property, and possession and manufacture of
methamphetamine. As a result of these offenses, he has spent frequent and prolonged
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periods of time in jail or prison. At the time of the trial, father had four pending criminal
cases charging him with multiple felony-level offenses for incidents occurring in late 2021.
Although father testified at trial that he has been sober for “a few years now,” the social
worker noted that father tested positive for methamphetamine in August 2021 and was
observed driving with an infant in his car that same day. Shortly after the trial, father also
admitted to methamphetamine and alcohol use in connection with a probation violation.
He admitted that he does not participate in drug treatment options such as support meetings.
Indeed, father’s mother testified that father has not participated in formal drug treatment
since father was approximately 16 years old.
Additionally, the record contradicts father’s assertion that he is “employed, in a
relationship, has housing and resources, and helps co-parent his partner’s children.” Father
called three witnesses to testify on his behalf at the trial, each of whom testified about
wanting to support father’s sobriety. However, as the district court noted, these witnesses
have had no past success in influencing father’s criminality and drug use. Father’s mother
testified that she has suggested treatment several times, but father has not participated.
Another witness testified that she has provided similar support to her own children but has
not yet helped father with his chemical-dependency issues.
Father testified that his current partner is a support for him. But the social worker
testified that between September and November 2021, the county had investigated father’s
partner five times. The county was concerned about criminal activity, chemical
dependency, and domestic violence in the presence of the two children father shares with
his partner. And the social worker testified that while she was working with father’s partner
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and their children, the family was potentially homeless or living in a trailer or storage
locker. This testimony was corroborated by one of father’s witnesses, who testified that
father lived in a trailer behind a business for a period of time.
Finally, the record supports the district court’s finding that social service
intervention is not likely to rehabilitate father in the foreseeable future. Father’s own
testimony demonstrates his unwillingness to engage with rehabilitative services. Father
admitted that he does not attend sober support meetings. He also testified that, when his
current partner was being investigated by the county over concerns about the wellbeing of
their two children, he was not “involved in it” because it was “between [his partner] and
whatever.” Father acknowledged that he has been unwilling to work with social services
in the past and would do so in this case only “[i]f the judge thought that [a social service
agency] would be required into our lives.”
The district court’s factual findings are well supported by the record, as is its
determination that the evidence established father’s palpable unfitness by clear and
convincing evidence. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
this basis for termination exists in this case. Because one statutory basis is sufficient for
termination of parental rights, S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385, we need not address the second
statutory ground for termination that father challenges on appeal, abandonment of the child.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination
of father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child.

Father argues that the district court erred when it determined that the termination of
his parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
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A district court may only terminate parental rights if, among other things, the
termination is in the best interests of the child. Id. In evaluating the best interests of a
child in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, a district court must consider (1) “the
child’s interests in preserving the parent-child relationship,” (2) “the parent’s interests in
preserving the parent -child relationship,” and (3) “any competing interests of the child.”
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). “Competing interests include health considerations,
a stable environment, and the child’s preference.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814
N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012).
“[D]etermination of a child’s best interests is generally not susceptible to an
appellate court’s global review of a record, and . . . an appellate court’s combing through
the record to determine best interests is inappropriate because it involves credibility
determinations.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App.
2009) (quotation omitted). We review a district court’s best-interests determination for an
abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of J.R.R., 943 N.W.2d 661, 669 (Minn. App.
2020).
The district court found clear and convincing evidence that the child had no interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship because “[t] here is no relationship to preserve
as one has never been established in almost 7 years.” Additionally, the district court found
that father’s efforts to establish a relationship “have never been more than nominal.” It
noted that father has never had contact with the child and, besides “a few attempts in
January of 2019,” father has “made no effort to have contact with the child” and “provided
no financial support to the child.”
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The district court further found that the balance of these interests weighed in favor
of terminating father’s parental rights. It observed that the child has lived with aunt since
birth and has formed strong relationships with aunt, her husband, and their other children.
According to the district court, aunt and her husband provide a “safe, loving and stable
home for the child” while father has done “virtually nothing to advance the interests of the
child.” Based on these underlying findings of fact, the district court concluded that
terminating father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests because the child will be
“freed for adoption” by aunt and her husband and will “achieve stability in his life.”
Father argues that the district court’s determination was clearly erroneous because
the evidence “shows [father] attempted to initiate a relationship with child, but was rebuked
by [aunt].” He contends that the record shows he “made efforts to preserve a parent-child
relationship.”
However, the record supports the district court’s findings. After nearly seven years,
father has never met the child. Other than sending the child a single gift card, father
admitted that he has n ever attempted to financially support the child. Father has never
sought the advice of legal counsel or the support of social services to pursue visitation or
parenting time, which father admitted was not due to financial constraints.
The record also shows that the child has been living in a safe, stable environment
with aunt since birth. According to aunt, the child has close relationships with his custodial
family, thinks of aunt’s husband as a father figure, and is “very—very attached” to aunt’s
four other children. Both aunt and mother testified that, because the child is in a stable
environment, the child has not been impacted by father’s frequent criminal activity,
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substance abuse, and absence. Mother also testified that “nobody in this world loves that
child more than [aunt] does.” The guardian ad litem testified that she was concerned about
how long it would take for father and the child to build a relationship given father’s
continued incarceration.
The district court’s factual findings have substantial support in the record.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining
that the child’s interest in a permanent, safe, and stable home outweigh father’s competing
interest in maintaining his parental rights, and that termination of father’s parental rights
was in the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.