In the Matter of the Welfare of: Z. A. W., Child.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- In Re Welfare of J.B.A. 581 N.W.2d 37
- In the Matter of the WELFARE OF C.J.H., Child 878 N.W.2d 15
- In Re the Welfare of J.L.Y. 596 N.W.2d 692
- In Re the Welfare of L.K.W. 372 N.W.2d 392
- Waters v. Fiebelkorn 13 N.W.2d 461
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0073
In the Matter of the Welfare of:
Z. A. W., Child.
Filed October 30, 2023
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-JV-22-5888
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant Z.A.W.)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Dana D. Erickson, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)
Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.
*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to adjudicate hi m delinquent,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by failing to determine that adjudication
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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was necessary for his rehabilitation. Because a district court is not required to make such
a determination when deciding whether to adjudicate a juvenile delinquent, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Z.A.W. by juvenile-delinquency
petition with third -degree riot in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.71, subd. 3 (2020), and
fifth-degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(2) (2020). The state
alleged that Z.A.W. was involved in an incident in which a group of students threw the
victim to the ground and beat him in a school bathroom. The incident was captured on
video.
Pursuant to an agreement with the state, Z.A.W. admitted to fifth-degree assault in
exchange for dismissal of the riot charge. The parties agreed that they would argue the
disposition of the case and any terms of disposition to the district court.
At the disposition hearing, the state argued for adjudication of delinquency and
Z.A.W. argued that the district court should continue the case without adjudication. The
district court stated that it was “extremely concerned about the minimization of the events
that happened in this case,” discredited Z.A.W.’s characterization of the incident, noted
that Z.A.W.’s school discipline history included other physical altercations, and stated that
Z.A.W. showed “zero remorse.” The district court adjudicated Z.A.W. delinquent, placed
him on probation, and ordered restitution.
Z.A.W. appeals.
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DECISION
Z.A.W. argues that the district court abused its discretion by adjudicating hi m
delinquent, rather than continuing the case without adjudication, because adjudication was
not necessary for his rehabilitation in light of the risk to public safety and the seriousness
of the offense. Because the district court is not required to determine whether adjudication
is necessary for rehabilitation when deciding whether to adjudicate a juvenile as delinquent
or to continue the case without adjudication, we disagree that the district court abused its
discretion by adjudicating Z.A.W. delinquent.
We review a juvenile-delinquency disposition order, including the decision whether
to continue a case without adjudication, for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of J.B.A.,
581 N.W.2d 37, 38 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 31, 1998). But the
interpretation of procedural rules is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. In re
Welfare of C.J.H., 878 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Minn. 2016). When interpreting rules with
unambiguous language, we apply their plain meaning. Id. at 21.
Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 15.05, subdivision 1, sets forth
the district court’s options after charges have been proved in a delinquency proceeding. It
mandates:
On each of the charges found by the court to be proved,
the court shall either:
(A) adjudicate the child delinquent pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes, section 260B.198, subdivision 1; or
(B) continue the case without adjudicating the child
delinquent pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section 260B.198,
subdivision 7.
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Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Nothing in this rule requires a district court to
make a finding that adjudication is necessary for rehabilitation before adjudicating a child
delinquent rather than continuing the case without adjudication. 1 In re Welfare of J.L.Y.,
596 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. App. 1999), rev. granted (Minn. Sept. 28, 1999) and ord.
granting rev. vacated (Minn. Feb. 15, 2000).
The language Z.A.W. cites in support of his argument is found in Minnesota Rule
of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 15.05, subdivision 2(B), which provides that a district
court must “consider whether a particular disposition will serve established principles of
dispositions, including but not limited to” factors such as “[n]ecessity” and “the best
interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 2(B). But whether to order a
particular disposition is a distinct inquiry from the determination of whether to adjudicate
or continue a case without adjudication. In re Welfare of J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d. 241, 245-46
(Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002).
When a district court decides the disposition, it must determine that the disposition
it is imposing is necessary to restore law-abiding conduct. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05,
subd. 2(B)(1) (“It is arbitrary and unjust to impose a disposition that is not necessary to
restore law abiding conduct.”); Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 2(B)(1)(b) (directing
a district court to consider whether a disposition is proportional and defining proportional
1 Before continuing a case without adjudication pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Juvenile
Delinquency Procedure 15.05, subdivision 1(B), a district court must find that it is (1) “in
the best interests of the child” and (2) “not inimical to public safety.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.198, subd. 7(a) (2022); Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4(A).
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as “the least restrictive action consistent with the child’s circumstances”). When a district
court adjudicates a juvenile as delinquent, however, it does not have to consider whether
adjudication is necessary for rehabilitation. See J.L.Y., 596 N.W.2d at 695 (finding nothing
in the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Procedure or “the statute that requires particularized
findings on the court’s decision to impose or withhold adjudication of delinquency. The
particularized findings . . . are required in determining a disposition, but not when deciding
whether to adjudicate or [continue the case without] adjudication.”). In other words, the
decision whether to adjudicate a juvenile as delinquent or to continue without adjudication
is a distinct determination from the decision of what disposition is appropriate in a juvenile
matter. And consideration of whether a particular action is necessary for rehabilitation of
the juvenile is required only for the disposition determination.2 Thus, the district court did
2 We note that a district court’s dispositional order must contain written findings of fact
that support the disposition and that set forth “why public safety and the best interests of
the child are served by the disposition ordered” and “what alternative dispositions were
recommended to the court and why such recommendations were not ordered.” Minn. R.
Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 2(A)(1)-(2); accord Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1(b) (2022)
(setting forth nearly the same requirements provided by rule 15.05, subdivision
2(A)(1)-(2)). Failure to make required written findings is reversible error. In re Welfare
of L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392, 401 (Minn. Ap p. 1985); see also In re Welfare of N.T.K.,
619 N.W.2d. 209, 211 -12 (Minn. App. 2000) (citing L.K.W. and noting that “we have
repeatedly emphasized the importance of findings in our many published decisions that
hold inadequate juvenile disposition findings constitute reversible error”). The district
court’s form disposition order does not contain the required findings, and we do not see
any such findings elsewhere in the record. But because Z.A.W. did not argue that the
district court erred by failing to make required findings with respect to the disposition
order, we do not consider any such potential error. See Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d
461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944) (“[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to
appear affirmatively before there can be reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing error
rests upon the one who relies upon it.”).
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not abuse its discretion by not considering whether adjudicating Z.A.W. delinquent was
necessary for his rehabilitation before making an adjudication determination for him.
Furthermore, our review of the record shows that the district court properly
exercised its discretion in deciding to adjudicate Z.A.W. delinquent. At the disposition
hearing, the district court stated that Z.A.W. minimized the event, did not show remorse,
and had a school discipline history that included physical altercations. While admitting to
the factual basis for fifth-degree assault, Z.A.W. stated that he “didn’t hit [the victim]
hard,” “barely hurt the kid,” and “was mostly staying back.” The predisposition report
included a description of the event from Z.A.W., in which he minimized what had
happened and his participation in it, and a summary of Z.A.W.’s school discipline history
that referenced incidents of physically aggressive behavior. The district court provided
several reasons supported by the record for why it adjudicated Z.A.W. delinquent, and we
see no abuse of discretion in its decision to do so.
Affirmed.