Tyler Todd Plaster, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0092

Tyler Todd Plaster, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed November 6, 2023
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-19-832

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathleen Heaney, Sherburne County Attorney, George Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
Challenging an order denying postconviction relief, appellant seeks to withdraw his
guilty plea to fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. Appellant asserts that his plea attorney
misinformed him of the aggregate sentence he could receive if convicted at trial. From that
premise, appellant argues that the district court erroneously concluded (1) that he did not
receive ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) that he was not prejudiced by his plea
attorney’s advice. Because we conclude that there is no reasonable probability that
appellant would not have pleaded guilty even if he were properly advised of his potential
sentencing exposure, we affirm.
FACTS
In June 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Tyler Todd Plaster
with two counts of felony fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.345, subdivision 1(b) (2014), and one count of gross misdemeanor
fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.3451,
subdivision 1(1) (2016). These allegations arose from three separate sexual assaults, which
occurred in 2014, 2015, and 2018. When the state filed these charges, Plaster was serving
an 85-month sentence for an unrelated first-degree controlled- substance offense. His
anticipated release date for the controlled-substance charge was in November 2022.
In December 2019, Plaster entered into the following plea agreement with the state.
Plaster agreed to plead guilty to one count of felony fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct.
3
The state agreed to dismiss the two remaining charges and to request a sentence of 59
months, based on a criminal history score of 4.
At the plea hearing, the district court asked Plaster if he wanted to proceed with the
agreement, and he answered: “I do under the pretense that there will be no additional time
as a result of this plea.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, during a colloquy that preceded
Plaster’s guilty plea, Plaster’s plea attorney asked him: “[D]o you understand that[,] what
the negotiation is[,] is that you plead guilty to this offense and that it’s anticipated by all
the parties that you would not receive any additional time beyond the time that you’re
presently serving?” (Emphasis added.) Plaster responded: “That is correct.”
The district court accepted the parties’ agreement and imposed an executed sentence
of 59 months concurrent to Plaster’s existing 85-month controlled-substance sentence.
In March 2022, Plaster filed a petition for postconviction relief. Plaster contended
that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his plea attorney
misinformed him regarding the aggregate guidelines sentence he could have received after
trial and conviction. 1 At an evidentiary hearing on Plaster’s petition, the district court
received several exhibits, including the plea hearing transcript. The district court did not
receive testimony from Plaster’s plea attorney because he had passed away prior to the
hearing.

1 Plaster also maintained that his sentence was illegal because it was based on an erroneous
criminal history score. The district court ultimately granted Plaster’s request for
resentencing based upon his correct criminal history score.
4
At the postconviction hearing, Plaster testified as follows. On the morning of his
December 2019 guilty plea, Plaster met with his plea attorney before his pretrial conference
to discuss his options, including a potential resolution of the case. Plaster’s attorney
informed him that, if Plaster was convicted at trial, the state would seek separate
consecutive sentences of 59 months for each of the two felony charges and ask that the
court impose those sentences consecutive to Plaster’s existing controlled-substance
sentence.2 The plea attorney also informed Plaster of the state’s proposed plea agreement,
i.e., that Plaster could plead guilty to one count of felony fourth-degree criminal sexual
conduct, that the state would move to dismiss the two other counts, and that Plaster would
serve a 59-month sentence concurrent to his controlled-substance sentence.
According to Plaster, if he had known his correct post-trial guidelines sentencing
exposure, he would not have pleaded guilty. Plaster said that he had “very little to lose by
going to trial.” Plaster claimed that, given “[t]he amount of time that [he] would have
served as a result of going to trial and losing[,] there was essentially nothing for [him] to
lose[,]” even if the district court excluded certain defense evidence. But Plaster also
testified that pleading guilty was “just really simple logic[,]” agreeing that he “discuss[ed]
taking the deal” with his plea attorney in order to avoid the “risk [of] serving additional
time beyond [his] controlled substance conviction.” Under questioning by his

2 Such consecutive sentencing would have resulted in Plaster remaining in custody until
2029, instead of the November 2022 release he anticipated for his controlled-substance
offense. But under the applicable Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, the district court could
not have imposed sentences for the current offenses consecutive to Plaster’s prior
controlled-substance offense without an aggravated departure. See Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.F.2.a.(1)(i)(a); 6 (2014).
5
postconviction lawyer, Plaster affirmed that, “if [he] would have known that [he] didn’t
face [additional sentencing] exposure and that it was unlikely that [he] would serve
additional time beyond [his] controlled substance conviction[,] if that had been [his]
understanding[, then he] would have made a different decision.” (Emphasis added.)
The district court denied Plaster’s request to withdraw his guilty plea. The court
found that “Plaster’s sole concern when entering the plea agreement was avoiding any
extension of his anticipated release date from his Controlled Substance offense sentence.”
The district court also found that, “[d]uring the evidentiary hearing, . . . Plaster testified . . .
that accepting the offer was ‘simple logic’ to avoid additional time in prison.” Based on
these findings, the district court concluded that “Plaster would have accepted any plea
agreement that did not affect his anticipated release date” relating to the controlled-
substance sentence he was serving. Thus, the district court ruled that “Plaster has not
proven by a reasonable probability that he would have insisted on trial instead of pleading
guilty.”3
Plaster appeals.
DECISION
Plaster challenges the district court’s denial of his postconviction request to
withdraw his guilty plea based on the alleged ineffective assistance of his plea attorney.
Plaster argues that, if he had been accurately advised by his plea attorney about his total

3 The district court also concluded that Plaster’s attorney’s advice about Plaster’s post-trial
guidelines sentencing exposure was objectively reasonable.
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guidelines sentencing exposure after trial, he would not have pleaded guilty. The state
counters that the plea advice Plaster received did not prejudice him, and we agree.
“We review a district court’s denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of
discretion.” Edwards v. State, 950 N.W.2d 309, 314 (Minn. App. 2020) (citing Brown v.
State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017)). “‘A postconviction court abuses its discretion
when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on
an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.’” Id. (quoting
Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017)). “Legal issues are reviewed de novo,
but our review of factual issues is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the
record to sustain the postconviction court’ s findings.” Pearson, 891 N.W.2d at 596
(quotation and citation omitted). In other words, we “do not reverse the postconviction
court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also id. at
600 (reiterating this same standard of review specifically as to postconviction ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel appeals). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire
evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State
v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 334 (Minn. 2010) (citations omitted).
“We apply the Strickland standard[4] to determine whether a criminal defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel in entering a guilty plea. ” State v. Bell, 971
N.W.2d 92, 106 (Minn. App. 2022) (citing Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Minn.
2012)), rev. denied (Apr. 27, 2022). To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel

4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
7
claim, a defendant must demonstrate both (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.” Campos, 816 N.W.2d at 486 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Bell, 971
N.W.2d at 106. “We may address the prongs in either order, and a claim may be disposed
of on one prong without analyzing the other.” Eason v. State, 950 N.W.2d 258, 268 (Minn.
2020).
Assuming without deciding that Plaster’s plea counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness regarding Plaster’s post-trial guidelines sentencing
exposure, we consider whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for such assumed
error by Plaster’s plea attorney, Plaster would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to tri al. See, e.g., Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 538 (Minn. 2023) ;
Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 735 (Minn. 2010); State v. Bell, 971 N.W.2d 92, 106 (Minn.
App. 2022), rev. denied (Apr. 27, 2022).
The district court did not clearly err in finding that “Plaster’s sole concern when
entering the plea agreement was avoiding any extension of his anticipated release date from
his Controlled Substance offense sentence” because that finding is sustained by sufficient
evidence in the record. Plaster testified at the plea hearing that he wanted to proceed with
his plea negotiation “under the pretense that there [would] be no additional time as a result
of [his guilty] plea” and that he and all parties understood that he would “not receive any
additional time beyond the time that [he was] presently serving” for his controlled-
substance offense. And he testified at the postconviction hearing that “accepting the offer
8
was ‘simple logic’ to avoid additional time in prison,” that he “discuss[ed] taking the deal”
with his plea attorney so he “wouldn’t risk serving additional time beyond [his] controlled
substance conviction[,]” and that “if [he] would have known that . . . it was unlikely that
[he] would serve additional time beyond [his] controlled substance conviction[,] . . . [he]
would have made a different decision.” Considering the entire evidentiary record before
us, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.
With the foregoing finding in mind, we review the district court’s analysis of
Strickland’s prejudice prong de novo. Applying that standard, we agree with the district
court’s conclusions that “Plaster would have accepted any plea agreement that did not
affect his anticipated release date” for the controlled-substance sentence he was serving
and that Plaster did not prove “by a reasonable probability that he would have insisted on
trial instead of pleading guilty” if his plea attorney had properly advised him regarding his
post-trial guidelines sentencing exposure.
Under the 2014 Sentencing Guidelines applicable to Plaster’s felony charges, the
two counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct are both severity-level F offenses. See
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.B, 5.B (2014). Accordingly, had Plaster sustained convictions
on all charges after trial, the district court could have imposed— without an aggravated
departure from the guidelines and based on Plaster’s undisputed criminal history score of
4—an executed sentence of 70 months for his first felony offense and a concurrent executed
sentence of 92 months for his second felony offense.
5 And the district court could have

5 The guidelines provide that, when a district court imposes multiple sentences in the same
proceeding, it must sentence each count in the order of occurrence and, “[a]s each offense
9
imposed a 365-day sentence, consecutive to Plaster’s concurrent felony sentences, for his
gross-misdemeanor fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct offense. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.03, .15, subd. 1(b) (2014). Presuming Plaster’s same sentencing date and awarded
jail credit, Plaster’s earliest eligible release date from such aggregated sentences would
have been in October 2023—approximately 11 months later than his anticipated release
from his existing controlled-substance sentence. See Minn. Stat. § 244. 101, subd. 1
(providing for the supervised release of offenders after serving two-thirds of an executed
felony sentence); Minn. Stat. § 64 3.29, subd. 1 (providing for a reduction of a local jail
sentence by one day for every two days served in custody based on the offender’s “good
conduct” while incarcerated) (2014).
Consequently, had Plaster’s plea attorney provided him with accurate advice
concerning his post-trial guidelines sentencing exposure, that advice would have included
an admonition that, by proceeding to trial, Plaster risked nearly a year beyond the prison
time he was serving for his controlled-substance offense. And because the district court did
not clearly err in finding that “Plaster’s sole concern when entering the plea agreement was
avoiding any extension of his anticipated release date from his Controlled Substance
offense sentence[,]” we conclude that there is no reasonable probability that Plaster would
have rejected th at agreement—which guaranteed him no additional time in custody—in
favor of a trial.

is sentenced, include it in the criminal history on the next offense to be sentenced.” Minn .
Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.1.e (2014).
10
Based on the record before us, the district court did not abuse its discretion by acting
in an arbitrary or capricious manner, nor did the court base its ruling on an erroneous view
of the law, nor did it make clearly erroneous factual findings. Plaster has failed to establish
that he was prejudiced by his plea counsel’s advice. Plaster’s ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim therefore fails, and he is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. See Bell,
971 N.W.2d at 106.
Affirmed.