State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0107

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Eric Humberto Sanchez,
Appellant.

Filed January 8, 2024
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge *

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CR-22-879

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ryan S. Hansch, McLeod County Attorney, Steven R. Ott, Assistant County Attorney,
Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Melissa Haley, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
In this direct ap peal from the judgment of conviction for second -degree assault,
appellant argues (1) the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant used
a dangerous weapon, (2) the state failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt self-defense
and def ense-of-property, (3) the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the
statutory definition of “great bodily harm” as part of its instruction on whether a dangerous
weapon was used in the assault , and (4) the district court erred in its resp onse to a jury
question by referring the jury to an element with erroneously included “attempt” language.
We affirm.
FACTS
In June 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Eric Humberto
Sanchez with one count of second -degree assault with a dangerous weapon causing
substantial bodily harm in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd . 2 (2022). Later, the
state amended the complaint to add a second count —first -degree criminal damage to
property in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(4) (2022). These charges stemmed
from an alleged assault that took place in June 2022. The case proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, J.S., the victim in this case, testified that he and Sanchez had been friends
through a coworker. One evening, Sanchez and J.S. met two women in Minneapolis. After
the evening out, J.S. dropped Sanchez off near Sanchez’s home and dropped L.L., one of
the women they met, off outside of her home.
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Sometime after J.S. arrived home, Sanchez called. Sanchez wanted J.S. to bring him
the things he had left in the backseat of J.S.’s car. Sanchez said that “if he had to come
looking for his things . . . something was going to happen.” J.S. testified that he viewed
Sanchez’s statement as a threat. J.S. responded that he would bring Sanchez his things the
next day, but Sanchez would not agree to that arrangement. J.S. contacted L.L., and L.L.
asked J.S. to return Sanchez’s things “to avoid problems.” At L.L.’s suggestion, J.S. picked
her up and drove back to Sanchez’s home. J.S. parked in front of Sanchez’s home. Sanchez
got into the backseat of J.S.’s car, behind the front passenger seat.
J.S. testified that Sanchez told him to start th e car, and he refused. He then t old
Sanchez to get out of his car. J.S. testified that Sanchez got upset, grabbed his things, and
got out of the car. J.S. saw that Sanchez had a baseball bat in his right hand. J.S. recounted
that Sanchez had the bat down by his side in a position that did not appear to be aggressive.
J.S. testified that Sanchez started coming to J.S.’s door , and then J.S. got out of the car to
talk with Sanchez. J.S. testified that Sanchez began to respond aggressively, and J.S.
observed that Sanchez had characteristics “of a person that [ was] very upset.” J.S.
explained that the two began to circle each other with J.S. moving away from his car and
Sanchez moving closer to it. J.S. became worried because Sanchez was now grabbing the
bat with “strength” and both hands.
J.S. testified that suddenly Sanchez swung the bat “from . . . downwards up . . . with
speed.” J.S. recounted that he was hit in the face and that his nose was broken by the bat.
J.S. testified that Sanchez continued hitting hi m with the bat, aiming for his head, while
J.S. blocked the blows with his left arm. J.S. said he was hit in the ribs with the bat. J.S.
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testified that after he was hit several times with the bat, he and Sanchez fell to the ground
and Sanchez started punching him. J.S. testified that, in addition to his broken nose, he had
swollen tissue, injuries on his arms, and bruises from being hit with the bat.
When Sanchez walked away, J.S. went back to his car and called 911. While J.S.
called 911, he saw Sanchez i n front of the house holding a pipe, and J.S. got out of the car
and grabbed the bat for the first time. While J.S. was still on the phone with 911, Sanchez
dropped the pipe and grabbed a pole saw. J.S. got into his car and Sanchez tried to stab J.S.
with the pole saw by thrusting it through the front passenger door. J.S. got out of the car
and ran away down the street.
Officers and medical assistance arrived, and J.S. was taken by ambulance to the
hospital. The doctor who treated J.S. testified that he became involved with J.S.’s treatment
within minutes of J.S. arriving because an assault with a baseball bat heightened the level
of concern that J.S. could have had life-threatening injuries. The doctor explained that in
trauma cases like J.S.’s they need to “rule out . . . significant injury and . . . life or limb
threats.” The hospital staff performed CT scans of J.S.’ s brain (to check for a brain
hemorrhage), neck (to check for a broken neck), face, abdomen (to check for internal organ
injuries), and pelvis. The hospital staff also performed a chest x- ray to assess for rib
fractures or a collapsed lung . The doctor described J.S.’s injuries as including a nasal
fracture; a bloody, swollen, and tender nose ; swelling and tenderness on the left forearm ;
and tenderness in the abdomen. The doctor testified that he was concerned with the
mechanism of J.S.’s injuries because when a human is assaulted with a baseball bat there
is a potential for significant bodily harm.
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At trial, Sanchez testified to his version of the assault. Sanchez testified that after
he got out of the car, J.S. got out of the car with the bat and started swinging it at Sanchez.
He testified that he wrestled with J.S. over the bat. He testified tha t he got the bat from J.S.
and threw to the side before punching J.S., causing J.S.’s injuries. Sanchez also testified
that J.S. bit him during the struggle. He testified that he asked J.S. to leave “like, 20 times.”
Sanchez never testified to hitting J.S. with the bat. L.L.’s testimony regarding the assault
was similar to Sanchez’s.
In its instructions to the jury, the district court gave the statutory definition of
“dangerous weapon,” which includes the term “great bodily harm.” But t he jury
instructions did not include the statutory definition of “great bodily harm.” “Bodily harm”
and “substantial bodily harm” were defined in the jury instructions. The instructions
directed the jury to “apply the co mmon, ordinary meaning” of any word or phrase not
defined by the district court. Trial counsel had multiple opportunities to object to the
proposed jury instructions and to propose modifications. Defense counsel did not object to
the omission of the statut ory definition of “great bodily harm.”
During deliberations, the district court received a jury question that read: “In
regard[] to second degree assault—second point says a dangerous weapon used or intended
to be used. Does that weapon [have to] be what pertains to #3—what caused substantial
bodily harm? Does dangerous weapon have to be what caused ‘substantial bodily harm?’”
The district court proposed re sponding, “No, please refer to the first element.” Defense
counsel objected and stated, “I guess what I’m asking for in clarifying with them is that
either that they find that he did, in fact, attempt to assault [J.S.] with a baseball bat,
6
specifically, or that he caused him substantial bodily harm with the bat.” Ultimately, the
district court wrote back, “No, please refer to 1st element.”
The jury found Sanchez guilty of second-degree assault. Subsequently, Sanchez was
sentenced to 36 months in prison on the assault conviction.
Sanchez appeals.
DECISION
I. The state proved there was sufficient evidence to establish that a dangerous
weapon was used during the assault.

Sanchez argues that his conviction must be reversed because the state provided
insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he used a dangerous weapon
during the assault. In a criminal case, due process requires the prosecution to “prove every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 142
(Minn. 2020).
The jury found Sanchez guilty of second -degree assault under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.222, subd. 2, which provides that a person who “ assaults another with a dangerous
weapon and inflicts substantial bodily harm ” has committed second-degree ass ault.
“Dangerous weapon” is statutorily defined, in relevant part, as “any . . . other device or
instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely
to produce death or great bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (2022). The state
therefore needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sanchez used (1) a device or
instrumentality (2) in a manner that was calculated or likely to produce death or great
bodily harm. “Great bodily harm” is statutorily defined as “bodily injury which creates a
7
high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which
causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member
or organ or other serious bodily harm.” Id., subd. 8 (2022).
A. Sanchez’s use of the baseball bat rendered it a “dangerous weapon”
within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6.

Sanchez argues that the way he used the baseball bat did not convert the baseball
bat to a “dangerous weapon.” We disagree. Whether a defendant’s conduct meets the
definition of a particular offense presents a question of statutory interpretation that is
reviewed de novo. State v. Hayes , 826 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. 2013).
Determining whether an object is a dangerous weapon depends on “the nature of the
object itself” and “the manner in which it was used.” State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281,
285 (Minn. 1997). An ordinary object may become a “dangerous weapon” if the object is
dangerous and “used in a manner calculated to cause great bodily harm.” State v. Coauette,
601 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn. App. 1999), rev. denied (Minn. Dec . 14, 1999); see, e.g.,
State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983) (concluding that a three-foot-long board
was a dangerous weapon when used to repeatedly beat the victim); State v. Moyer , 298
N.W.2d 768, 770 (Minn. 1980) (concluding that gasoline was a dangerous weapon when
intentionally poured and lit in sole exit of apartment in attempt to kill occupants); State v.
Mings, 289 N.W.2d 497, 498 (Minn. 1980) (concluding that boots were a dangerous
weapon when used to kick the victim repeatedly in head and chest) .
Sanchez struck J.S. at least ten times with the bat while J.S. was unarmed. He
gripped the bat with both hands and struck J.S. in the head and ribs. And while J.S. did not
8
face extensive hospitalization, he was subjected to extensive testing to rule out life -
threatening injury and he suffered a broken nose in addition to redness, swelling, and
tenderness to several other parts of his body. Further, Sanchez was not using the baseball
bat in a manner similar to how it is intended to be used when he repeatedly struck J.S. Cf.
Coauette, 601 N.W.2d at 448 (concluding that shooting a paintball gun out of a car window
did not transform the paintball gun into a dangerous weapon where the defendant’s intent
was to use the paintball gun in a manner consistent with its intended use —to splash
unsuspecting targets with washable paint, not cause bodily harm). The circumstances in
this case demonstrate that Sanchez used the baseball bat “in a manner calculated to cause
great bodily harm.” See id. at 447. We therefore conclude that the baseball bat, as used by
Sanchez, was a dangerous weapon.
B. The state provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Sanchez
used the baseball bat in a manner that constituted a dangerous weapon.

We next turn to the question of whether the state provided sufficient evidence for
the jury to find that Sanchez used the baseball bat in the manner that constituted a
dangerous weapon. When appellate courts eva luate the sufficiency of the evidence, they
“carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences
drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of t he offense of which he was convicted.” State v.
Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts must
view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed that
the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” Id. Further, “[t]he
9
verdict will not be overturned if the fact -finder, upon application of the presumption of
innocence and the State’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id.
The dangerous weapon element was established by direct evidence. “[D]irect
evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true,
proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599
(Minn. 2017) (quotation and alteration omitted). When an element of a n offense is
supported by direct evidence, this court’s review is limited to a painstaking analysis of the
record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict that they did. State v. Horst,
880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016). The reviewing court must assume “the jury believed the
state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore , 438
N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). “[A] conviction may be based on a single person’ s
testimony.” State v. Cao, 788 N.W.2d 710, 717 (Minn. 2010).
J.S. testified that Sanchez hit him with the baseball bat at least ten times and that
Sanchez broke his nose by hitting him in the face with the bat at least two times. J.S.
testified that Sanchez gripped the bat in both hands as he hit J.S. And J.S. testified that
Sanchez hit him in the ribs with the bat.
The doctor testified that he became involved within minutes of J.S. arriving because
an assault with a baseba ll bat heightened the level of concern that J.S. could have life -
threatening injuries. The doctor further testified about the extensive tests he conducted to
10
rule out the life -threatening injuries that might have been caused by the assault with the
baseball bat.
Neither J.S. nor the doctor gave significantly conflicting testimony on these points.
We therefore conclude that, although Sanchez and L.L. testified to the contrary, the direct
evidence provided by the state , viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was
sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that Sanchez used the bat in a manner that rendered
it a “dangerous weapon.”
II. The state provided sufficient evidence to disprove self-defense and defense of
property.

Sanchez argues that his conviction must be reversed because the state did not
provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he was not justified in
using force against J.S.
A. Self-defense
Minnesota law allows a person to use reasonable force against another to resist an
offense against them. Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2022). The elements of self-defense
include:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the
defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he
or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm;
(3) the existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and
(4) the absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid
the danger.

Basting, 572 N.W.2d at 285. The defendant has the burden of producing evidence to
support a self-defense claim. Id. at 286. “Once it is raised, the state has the burden of
disproving one or more of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The state “need
11
only disprove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the elements of self-defense.” State
v. Radke, 821 N.W.2d 316, 324 (Minn. 2012).
Sanchez argues that the evidence presented demonstrated that he had an honest and
actual belief that force was necessary and that his use of force was reasonable. But Sanchez
bases his argument on the incorrect assumption that J.S. was the initial aggressor.
A person is the initial aggressor if they “began or induced the incident” by engaging
in activity that is a “good deal greater than mere conversation.” State v. Carridi ne, 812
N.W.2d 130, 145 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). “An aggressor in an incident has no
right to a claim of self -defense.” Bellcourt v. State , 390 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Minn. 1986).
J.S. testified that Sanchez was the first to use physical force. The jury’s verdict shows that
the jury did not find Sanchez’s testimony credible, and we defer to the jury’s credibilit y
determinations in our sufficiency of the evidence analysis . See State v. Barshaw , 879
N.W.2d 356, 366 (Minn. 2016).
Because the initial aggressor element was disproved with J.S.’s testimony about the
assault, we apply the direct evidence standard of review. According to J.S., before Sanchez
struck him in the face with the baseball bat, the two were just talking. J.S. recounted that
suddenly Sanchez swung the bat “from . . . downwards up . . . with speed” and hit J.S. in
the face, breaking J.S.’s nose. J.S. recounted that Sanchez repeatedly hit him with the bat
and that he w as struck on his left arm —which was raised to protect his head —and on his
ribs. According to J.S., this is when they fell to the ground . Sanchez started punching J.S.,
and J.S. finally struck Sanchez back. J.S. did not testify to any other physical alterca tion
between the two after this point to which his extensive injuries could be attributed.
12
We conclude that J.S.’s testimony, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
conviction, was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sanchez was the initial
aggressor. We therefore do not address Sanchez’s contentions about the other elements of
self-defense.
B. Defense-of-Property
Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(4) (2022), provides that reasonable force may be used
“by any person in lawful possession of real or personal property, or by another assisting
the person in lawful possession, in resisting a trespass upon or other unlawful interference
with such property.”
Sanchez argues that he was “actively trying to defend his home and property from
[J.S.’s] verbal and physical threats.”
Applying the direct-evidence standard of review, we conclude that the state’s
evidence was sufficient to disprove that J.S. was trespassing or otherwise unlawfully
interfering with Sanchez’s property. J.S. testified that he did not move toward the house
while holding the bat and that he never stepped onto Sanchez’s property. Because we
conclude that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was
sufficient to disprove this element of defense -of-property, we do not address whether the
state’s evidence was sufficient to disprove the other elements of this defense.
III. The district court did not commit reversible error when it did not instruct the
jury on the statutory definition of “great bodily harm.”

Sanchez argues that his conviction must be reversed because the district court’s
omission of the statutory definition of “great bodily harm” from the jury instructions was
13
a plain error affectin g his substantial rights. Sanchez’s trial counsel did not object to this
omission. When there is no objection to jury instructions at trial, the appellate court has
discretion to consider a claim of error on appeal “if there was plain error affecting
substantial rights or an error of fundamental law in the jury instructions.” State v.
Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted) .
A. Omitting the statutory definition of “great bodily harm” was plain error.
An error is plain if it is “clear” or “obvious,” meaning that it “contravenes case law,
a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Ramey , 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006)
(quotation omitted). “ Failure to properly instruct the jury on all elements of the offense
charged is plain error.” State v. Watkins , 820 N.W.2d 264, 268 (Minn. App.
2012) (quotation omitted), aff’d on other grounds, 840 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 2013) .
To prove second -degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd . 2, the
state needed to prove that Sanchez used a “dangerous weapon.” Again, “dangerous
weapon” is statutorily defined as “any . . . device or instrumentality that, in the manner it
is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6. And “ great bodily harm” is statutorily defined as “ bodily
injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm .” Id., subd. 8.
Sanchez argues that omission of the statutory definition of “great bodily harm” was
plain error. “[T]he elements of the crime should be explained, but detailed definitions of
the elements to the crime need not be given in the jury instructions if the instructions do
14
not mislead the jury or allow it to speculate over the meaning of the elements.” Peterson
v. State, 282 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Minn. 1979) (footnote omitted) . In State v. Moore , this
court determined that omitting the statutory definition of “force ,” where force was an
element of the charged offense, was error because the instructions “failed to include details
that are necessary to fully explain the applicable law.” 863 N.W.2d 111, 121- 22 (Minn.
App. 2015). The district court’s omission of the statutory definition of “great bodily harm”
is analogous to the omission in Moore because the jury was not given details necessary to
fully understand the applicable law. Omitting the definition of great bodily harm from the
jury instructions was contrary to the rule set forth in Moore and was, therefore, plain error.
B. Omitting the statutory definition of “great bodily harm” did not affect
Sanchez’s substantial rights.

An error in instructing the jury “ affects a defendant ’s substantial rights if the error
was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Huber , 877 N.W.2d 519,
525 (Minn. 2016). An erroneous jury instruction “ is prejudicial if there is a reasonable
likelihood that giving the instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury’ s
verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted). The defendant must prove prejudice, which is “a heavy
burden.” Id. Sanchez argues that omission of the statutory definition of “great bodily harm”
affected his substantial rights because the state was relieved of proving that Sanchez used
a dangerous weapon in the assault.
Without knowing the statutory definiti on, the jury could have found Sanchez guilty
of second -degree assault even if it found that the bat, as used, was capable of producing
only bodily harm less serious than the statute requires. However, this court must consider
15
this possibility in light of t he evidence presented about the manner in which the bat was
used. Contrary to Sanchez’s contention, the state produced sufficient evidence on the
question of whether Sanchez used the bat as a dangerous weapon. J.S. testified that Sanchez
used the bat to hit J.S. in the head at least two times with sufficient force to cause his nose
to break. Sanchez also hit J.S. with the bat repeatedly, including striking J.S. in the ribs.
Additionally, the doctor testified that an assault with a baseball bat causes height ened
concern that the victim could have life -threatening injuries. Given this evidence, which
was sufficient to show that the bat was used in a manner capable of causing life-threatening
injuries to J.S., there is not a reasonable likelihood that failing t o instruct the jury about the
definition of “great bodily harm” had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict . The district
court therefore did not commit reversible error by omitting the definition of “great bodily
harm” from the jury instructions.
IV. The district court did not commit reversible error in its response to the jury’s
question.

Sanchez argues that his conviction must be reversed because the district court’s
response to the jury’s question did not accurately clarify the law and highlighted
erroneously included “attempt” language.
The district court may, among other options in its exercise of discretion, respond to
a jury’s request for additional instructions during deliberation by providing additional
instructions or by re reading portions of it s original instructions. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03,
subd. 20(3); see also State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 772 (Minn. 1986). The standard
of review is abuse of discretion. State v. Laine , 715 N.W.2d 425, 433 (Minn. 2006). “A
16
district court abuses its discret ion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the
law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291
(Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
During deliberations, the district court received a question from the jury that read:
“In regard[] to second degree assault —second point says a dangerous weapon used or
intended to be used. Does that weapon [have to] be what pertains to #3—what caused
substantial bodily harm? Does dangerous weapon have to be what caused ‘substantial
bodily harm?’” The district court’s proposed response was: “No, please refer to the first
element.” Sanchez’s trial counsel objected to this response. She noted that the first element
included “attempt to inflict bodily harm” and asked the district court to “clarify[] with [the
jury] that either . . . they find he did, in fact, attempt to assault [J.S.] with a baseball bat,
specifically, or that he caused him substantial bodily harm with the bat.”
Minnesota law is clear that the “dangerous weapon” need not cause substantial
bodily harm to sustain a conviction of second -degree assault under Minn . Stat. § 609.222,
subd. 2. State v. Harlin , 771 N.W.2d 46, 50 (Minn. App. 2009) , rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
17, 2009). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by declining to adopt
Sanchez’s trial counsel’s proposed response.
Sanchez also argues that “as a result of the court’s response to the jury request for
clarification, the jury could have concluded that all that was needed for a guilty verdict was
a misdemeanor assault as defined in element one —either the completed assault or an
attempted assault.” This argument is unpersuasive. T he jury instructions require d the jury
to find that all four element s were proven beyond a reasonable doubt to conclude that
17
Sanchez was guilty. The third element in the jury instruction on second -degree assault was
that “the defendant inflicted substantial bodily harm on [J.S.].” Because the district court’s
response did not clearly contradict or override the remaining jury instructions, we conclude
that the response was not an abuse of discretion.
We next turn to the question of whether the inclusion of the “attempt” language in
the jury instructions was reversible error. B ecause Sanchez’s trial counsel did not object,
the inclusion of “attempt” in the jury instructions must be reviewed for plain error and its
effect on Sanchez’s substantial rights —not abuse of discretion. See Crowsbreast, 629
N.W.2d at 437. The inclusion of “attempt” language without an attempt charge , or the
definition of “attempt” in the jury instructions is plain error. See State v. Smith, 901 N.W.2d
657, 661 (Minn. App. 2017) (explaining that jury instructions must “a ccurately state the
law” and “define the crime charged and explain the elements”), rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
14, 2017).
However, this error did not affect Sanchez’s substantial rights. “[A]n error affects
substantial rights when there is a reasonable likelihood that a m ore accurate instruction
would have changed the outcome in [the] case.” Moore, 863 N.W.2d at 123 (quotation
omitted). Sanchez admitted to getting into a fist fight with J.S. but disputed that he hit J.S.
with the baseball bat. The factual question before the jury was whether Sanchez used the
baseball bat —the dangerous weapon—in the assault. The jury’s guilty verdict
demonstrated its conclusion that the state proved that Sanchez used the b aseball bat in
assaulting J.S. A more accurate instruction therefore would not have changed the outcome
in this case. Our precedent does not compel a different conclusion. See State v. Edwards ,
18
900 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. App. 2017) (concluding that the inc lusion of “attempting to
inflict bodily harm” in the jury instructions for second -degree assault with a dangerous
weapon charge was not reversible error where the defense conceded that the defendant got
into a fist fight and the only dispute was whether the defendant used a knife —the alleged
dangerous weapon), aff’d mem., 909 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 2018). We conclude that inclusion
of the “attempt” language in the jury instructions was not reversible error.
Affirmed.