State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0109

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Cortez Drenele Williams,
Appellant.

Filed December 11, 2023
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-20-3762

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Kirstyn L. Oye, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Paul J. Maravigli, Special Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm, appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
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evidence obtained by law enforcement during a warrantless pat search that preceded
appellant’s arrest. Appellant contends that the district court erred when it determined that
law enforcement reasonably believed appellant was armed and dangerous because the
body-camera recording conflicts with the district court’s factual findings. Because we
conclude that other materials in the record support the district court’s factual findings and
that the body-camera recording does not contradict these findings, we affirm.
FACTS
On December 14, 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Cortez
Drenele Williams with unlawful possession of ammunition or a firearm under Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020). The following summary is based on the district court’s
factual findings, the record evidence submitted at the suppression hearing, and the
procedural history.
After midnight on December 12, 2020, law enforcement responded to a call
reporting a single car rolled over on the Blatnik Bridge connecting Duluth and Superior,
Wisconsin. Law-enforcement officers from Duluth arrived first and found Williams and
his uncle, both of whom were passengers in the rolled-over car. Law enforcement then
learned that the driver of the car had fled.
Williams told Officer L.G. that Williams, his uncle, and the driver left a strip club
in Superior after a fight broke out and shots were fired. Williams said that “bikers” and
“white guys” started shooting. L.G. received confirmation that shots were fired outside a
Superior strip club and that Williams was “a possible suspect in the shooting.” Law
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enforcement detained Williams for “further investigation” and did a pat search. L.G. found
a pistol in Williams’s front waistband and arrested him.
At an omnibus hearing in February 2021, Williams’s attorney raised two issues:
“the detention” and “frisk” of Williams before his arrest. Williams’s attorney asked to brief
the issues, indicated that Williams would not offer any testimony, and agreed that Williams
was waiving all other omnibus issues. The record for Williams’s suppression motion
included L.G.’s police report and body-camera recording. Williams filed a memorandum
of law in support of his motion, arguing that the pat search was “illegal and the fruits thereof
should be suppressed and the charge dismissed.” Williams contended that law enforcement
had “no information” that would “justify a pat search.”
The state opposed Williams’s motion. In its memorandum, the state argued that
Williams “consent[ed] to the pat search.” The state argued in the alternative that “the
evidence supports a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity,” but added that
“such a determination might require the testimony” of L.G. And “[r]ather than delay this
matter by reopening the record to present that testimony,” the state indicated that it would
“rely on the consensual nature of the search” in opposing Williams’s motion.
In a May 2021 order, the district court denied Williams’s motion to suppress
evidence. The district court determined that the pat search was constitutional because
“[l]aw enforcement learned that [Williams] was potentially involved in a shooting
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immediately prior to the accident and therefore reasonably believed that he may be armed
and dangerous,” and, alternatively, that Williams “consented to the search.”1
The state’s case against Williams went to a jury trial in August 2022. The jury found
Williams guilty, and the district court sentenced Williams to 60 months in prison.
Williams appeals.
DECISION
Williams argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence from the pat search. “When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress
evidence, [appellate courts] may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter
of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence. ”
State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). Appellate courts “review the district
court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal
determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation
omitted). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous only when, after reviewing all the
evidence, [the appellate court is] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
occurred.” State v. Pauli, 979 N.W.2d 39, 51 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).

1 In its order, the district court disposed of an additional issue. In Williams’s motion to
suppress, he argued that a “Miranda warning should have been given” before “[a]ny
questioning about the incident” involving shots fired at the Superior strip club. The state
argued that a Miranda warning was not necessary because “Williams was not in custody
at the time of the statements” and the “statements are not related to the criminal charge
under consideration.” The district court agreed with the state and determined that Williams
“could not have reasonably believed he was in police custody at the time he provided
statements to law enforcement and therefore a Miranda warning was not required.”
Williams does not challenge the district court’s Miranda determination on appeal.
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In his brief to this court, Williams first acknowledges that “[t]here is no dispute in
this appeal that [L.G.] had a valid basis for investigating and keeping Mr. Williams at the
scene of the accident.” But Williams argues that two clearly erroneous factual findings by
the district court require reversal. First, Williams argues that the district court erred in
finding that L.G. learned Williams was a suspect in the strip- club shooting before he
conducted a pat search of Williams , and therefore, L.G. lacked a reasonable belief that
Williams was armed and dangerous. Second, Williams argues that the district court erred
in finding that Williams consented to the pat search because L.G. told Williams “he was
going to search him. He did not ask for consent, and refusal was not an option.” We first
consider whether L.G. reasonably believed that Williams might be armed and dangerous.
Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.
“Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment—subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” State v. Dickerson ,
481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992) (quotation omitted). A “protective pat search” is one
such exception. Id. The state has the burden to prove that the search fell within an exception
to the warrant requirement. State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007).
The Minnesota Supreme Court, applying Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), has held
that “police may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably
believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 843. The
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purpose of the stop and frisk “is to reduce concerns that the suspect poses a danger to
officer safety.” Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 251.
“The legality of a pat search depends on an objective examination of the totality of
the circumstances.” State v. Lemert, 843 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 2014). “The officer need
not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of
others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The Minnesota Supreme Court has “allow[ed]
that the special training of police officers may lead them to arrive at inferences and
deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d
353, 369 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
In its order denying Williams’s motion to suppress, the district court found that L.G.
“learned that [Williams] was a possible suspect in the shooting” and concluded that the pat
search was constitutional. The district court explained: “Due to the information regarding
the shooting and [Williams’s] possible involvement, law enforcement suspected that [he]
may be armed and dangerous.”
On appeal, Williams argues that the district court erred in determining L.G.
“reasonably believed that [Williams] may be armed and dangerous” at the time of the pat
search. Williams’s brief points out inconsistencies between L.G.’s police report and the
body-camera recording. Williams also argues that the body-camera recording does not
include the same information that is contained in L.G.’s police report. Specifically, the
body-camera recording does not include any discussion among the officers about Williams
being a suspect in the strip-club shooting, and Williams argues that the recording shows
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L.G. “did not regard” Williams “as an armed and dangerous suspect” because L.G. and
Williams were “chatting amiably” and “joking.”
The state argues that L.G. “had reasonable and articul[able] suspicion justifying his
belief that [Williams] was armed.” The state points to Williams’s statement that he had
come from a strip club where a shooting occurred, Superior police’s confirmation that
Williams was a person of interest in the shooting, and L.G.’s experience and knowledge as
explained in the police report.
We begin by summarizing the body-camera recording and L.G.’s police report. The
body-camera recording shows L.G.’s arrival at the scene around 12:44 a.m. and ends with
the pat search of Williams at 1:18 a.m. After he arrived at the rolled-over vehicle, L.G.
learned about the strip- club shooting from Williams. L.G. then radioed dispatch with the
license-plate number of the rolled- over vehicle. L.G. asked dispatch to “check with
Superior” police about the strip-club shooting and stated that the rolled-over vehicle was
“possibly involved” in the shooting and was “probably leaving the scene.” L.G. asked
Williams for more information about the driver and what happened at the strip club.
Williams said he did not know where the driver went or why he fled. Williams also stated
that “bikers” and “a white guy” were involved in the strip-club shooting.
There is a six- minute gap in L.G.’s body-camera recording. When the recording
resumed, L.G. informed Williams that his uncle went to the hospital. L.G. offered to drive
Williams to the hospital after they “finish this investigation” and Superior police “look into
some stuff.” Williams asked if L.G. could drop him off elsewhere. L.G. responded that he
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had to “hold on to” Williams while Superior police were “trying to figure out who the
driver is.”
A Superior police officer then walked over and began talking to L.G. and Williams.
Williams stated that he was not the driver, and L.G. stated that Williams was a “witness to
something that was going on” at the strip club in Superior. Later, a Minnesota State Patrol
trooper spoke with Williams about the car accident. The state trooper suggested to
Williams that he “have a seat” in the squad car and “get out of the cold” because they were
“going to be here for a while.” Williams asked if he could leave, and L.G. stated, “ You
can’t leave yet.” L.G. and Williams walked over to the squad car.
L.G. asked Williams if he had any weapons on him. Williams said no. L.G. stated,
“Let me just do a quick check of your pockets real quick. Hands up,” and patted Williams
down. L.G. found a firearm on Williams and arrested him.
L.G.’s police report about the incident stated that L.G. asked Williams about why
the driver “fled the scene.” The report stated that “[a]t this time, a Superior police officer
arrived on the scene to assist” and “updated that this vehicle was possibly involved with
the shots fired call” at the Superior strip club; the Superior police officer also “advised
[L.G.] that Williams was a person of interest in the shots fired call and requested [L.G.]
detain him.” The report also stated that L.G. received information that Superior police “had
not yet recovered a firearm” from the shooting.
The report added that, based on L.G.’s “training and experience,” suspects
“involved in shootings or violent crimes tend to take the weapon with them” and suspects
“involved in criminal behavior in Superior, WI tend to flee to Duluth.” The report stated
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that “[w]ith the information from Superior [police] that Williams was [a]
potential . . . suspect from the shooting [and] the short time frame from the reported
shooting and the traffi c accident,” L.G. “believed Williams to be armed and dangerous.”
The report stated that L.G. then “advised Williams that he would be detained for further
investigation in which [L.G.] did a pat search.”
The conflict that Williams alleges is not supported by our review of the record for
two reasons. First, the police report supports the district court’s finding that before the pat
search, L.G. learned that Williams “was potentially involved” in the Superior strip-club
shooting. While L.G.’s body-camera recording does not show L.G. receiving information
that Williams was a suspect in the strip-club shooting, there is a six-minute gap in the
recording. The police report states that before the pat search, L.G. learned from Superior
police that the rolled-over vehicle “was possibly involved with the shots fired” at the strip
club and that “Williams was a person of interest” in the shooting. The district court appears
to have credited the information in L.G.’s police report as a summary of his conversation
with a Superior police officer during the six-minute gap in the body-camera recording. We
therefore conclude that the police report is consistent with the body-camera recording.
Even if we were to assume that there is a conflict between the police report and the
body-camera recording, we defer to the district court to make credibility determinations,
and here, the district court credited L.G.’s police report. See State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d
687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012) (“Deference must be given to the district court’s credibility
determinations.”).
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Second, the body -camera recording shows L.G.’s behavior was consistent with
having received information that Williams was a suspect in the strip-club shooting.
Williams argues that L.G.’s body-camera recording does not show “that he regarded Mr.
Williams as a suspect, much less someone with a gun” because L.G. “stood chatting
amiably” with Williams and allowed Williams to “wander the scene freely.” But Williams
ignores that the body -camera recording shows that L.G. repeatedly refused to allow
Williams to leave the scene. At one point, L.G. informed Williams that he needed to “hold
on to” him. And immediately before the pat search, Williams asked if he could leave, and
L.G. stated, “You can’t leave yet.” Thus, we conclude that L.G.’s conduct in the
body-camera recording is consistent with the district court’s finding that “law enforcement
suspected that [Williams] may be armed and dangerous.” We will not reweigh the evidence
to determine, as Williams urges, that L.G. “did not regard” Williams “as an armed and
dangerous suspect.” See State v. Harris, 405 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn. 1987) (stating that
weighing the evidence is for the fact-finder).
We note that Williams’s brief to this court relies on two opinions, neither of which
is persuasive under the circumstances of this case. In the first case, State v. Varnado, the
supreme court reversed this court and affirmed the district court’s determination that a pat
search of the appellant was “not justified” because the police officer “did not have a
reasonable basis to suspect that [the appellant] might be armed and dangerous.”
582 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. 1998). The officer in Varnado stopped the appellant for
driving with a cracked windshield and asked the appellant to sit in his police car while he
checked the status of her driver’s license. Id. at 888. The officer frisked the appellant before
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she entered the police car. Id. The supreme court reasoned that the officer could not have
reasonably suspected that the appellant was armed and dangerous because the appellant
“fully cooperated with the officers’ requests and did not make any furtive or evasive
movements,” was stopped for a “minor traffic violation,” and “[t]he officers had no reason
to believe that [the appellant] had a criminal history.” Id. at 890. Because, as described
above, we determine that the record supports the district court’s finding that L.G. learned
Williams was a suspect in a recent shooting before L.G. conducted the pat search and there
is no evidence similar to that discussed in Varnado, the opinion is not helpful to our
analysis.
Williams also relies on this court’s decision in State v. Shellito, in which we affirmed
the district court’s determination that police unlawfully expanded a traffic stop.
594 N.W.2d 182, 186 (Minn. App. 1999). The district court “was presented with
conflicting evidence in the form of [a police officer’s] testimony and the video recording
of the stop.” Id. at 185. “Based on its viewing of the video recording, the district court
discounted much of [the officer’s] testimony.” Id. at 186. We concluded that “the district
court has the discretion to draw its own conclusions and make factual findings” based on
record evidence and that “ample evidence in the record” supported the district court’s
finding that police unlawfully expanded the stop. Id.
But Shellito involves a conflict in the evidence that is not present here because the
district court appears to have credited L.G.’s police report as filling in the six-minute gap
in the body-camera recording. In contrast with the district court’s decision to reject the
officer’s testimony in Shellito, the district court here did not find that the body-camera
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recording contradicted L.G.’s police report. In short, the district court’s findings are
supported by L.G.’s police report and are not contradicted by the body-camera recording.
We conclude that record supports the district court’s factual finding that before the
pat search, L.G. learned Williams was a suspect in the strip-club shooting. The district
court’s legal determination that the pat search was lawful based on L.G.’s reasonable belief
that Williams was armed and dangerous is therefore sound. See Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at
843 (stating that police may conduct a pat search when they have a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and reasonably believe the
suspect might be armed and dangerous). Thus, we need not consider whether Williams
consented to the search.
Affirmed.