State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0114

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Terry Wayne Watts,
Appellant.

Filed February 24, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Reyes, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-14-366

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the postconviction court erred when it denied him (1) custody
credit for jail time he served in California after he pleaded guilty but before his sentencing
in Minnesota and (2) relief for the seven-year delay between his guilty plea and sentencing
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in violation of his due-process rights. We affirm on the first issue but reverse and remand
on the second issue because the findings are insufficient to permit appellate review.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Terry Wayne Watts with drug-
related offenses in Polk County in 2014. Under a negotiated plea deal, appellant pleaded
guilty to first-degree controlled-substance sale in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021,
subd. 1(1) (2012), on May 22, 2015, and the state dismissed the other charges. The district
court placed appellant on conditional release until his scheduled sentencing hearing in
August 2015 but allowed him to visit family in California.
While in California, authorities arrested and charged appellant with multiple
felonies, including kidnapping and taking a vehicle without consent. Appellant pleaded
guilty to his California charges under a plea agreement on August 3, 2015, only after being
informed by the California Superior Court and attorneys that his California sentence would
run concurrent to his Minnesota sentence. At his plea hearing in California, appellant’s
California counsel, the California prosecutor, and the California court all understood that
Minnesota would honor this deal based on conversations the California attorneys had with
appellant’s Minnesota counsel, Jessen Alexander, and Polk County prosecutor Scott
Buhler. Specifically, the California prosecutor confirmed in an email that he “ended up
contacting Mr. Buhler because I was a little concerned that he made representations to me
that he was not standing behind. He confirmed with me there was an agreement to run the
[Minnesota and California] sentences concurrent and that he conceded this point in
[appellant’s] sentencing hearing.” Separately, Alexander also confirmed with Buhler that
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the Minnesota sentence would run concurrent to the California sentence and understood
that Buhler would not seek additional jail time in Minnesota after appellant completed his
California sentence. Based on these representations, appellant pleaded guilty, and on
September 15, 2015, the California court sentenced him to 104 months in prison.
After appellant waived his right to be physically present at his Minnesota
sentencing, Alexander coordinated with California authorities to get appellant on the phone
for a sentencing hearing in the Minnesota case on or about June 8, 2016. The district court
rescheduled the hearing because Buhler had childcare issues and needed to stay home. I n
an email to Alexander that same day, Buhler stated that he believed a 150-month Minnesota
sentence, notably longer than appellant’s 104-month California sentence, was appropriate
for the Minnesota charges. While acknowledging that he agreed to give appellant credit
for his California jail time, Buhler now stated that he did not agree that appellant would
not have to spend any time in prison in Minnesota.
Alexander’s representation of appellant ended on June 30, 2016, due to his transfer
to a different office. In a case note, Alexander stated that “Buhler is playing games. He is
now saying 150 months due to a breach of a plea agreement. All of my conversations with
him about the number were that [appellant] would not be coming back to MN, he’d serve
all his time in CA. Buhler has changed his mind it appears.”
Attorney Eric Gudmundson was assigned to appellant’s case but did not contact
appellant until six months later, when he wrote appellant a letter introducing himself,
informing him about an offer from the state for 150 months, and attaching the state’s offer
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letter.1 Gudmundson informed appellant that , under the proposed deal, he would likely
have to come back to Minnesota and serve about one year after his California release.
Gudmundson noted that, if appellant did not want to take the offer, he would likely not be
entitled to have any of the time he served in California apply to his Minnesota sentence.
Appellant states in an affidavit that he decided to accept this offer to get credit for his
California sentence and personally wrote a letter to Buhler indicating his acceptance but
received no response.
In an order issued on June 4, 2017, the district court acknowledged that appellant
wanted to be sentenced in absentia and noted several hearings it set to sentence or schedule
sentencing between November 2015 and January 2017 that were ultimately unsuccessful
because California did not make appellant available. 2 The district court administratively
closed the case based on appellant’s incarceration in California for the foreseeable future,
issued a body-only warrant for appellant, and discharged Gudmundson and the State Public
Defender’s Office from its obligations to represent appellant. As a result, appellant
continued to serve his prison sentence in California without representation in Minnesota.
In May 2021, appellant sent a letter to the district court requesting that he be
sentenced according to the terms of the 2015 plea agreement. Appellant received no
response from the district court. In November 2021, appellant hired a private attorney,

1 The only offer letter in the record before this court is the original plea agreement from
May 2015. The discussed second offer letter is nowhere in the record.
2 Appellant states that he did not receive notices for any of his hearings in Minnesota during
this time and believes that the documents were not sent to him through the proper procedure
for California prisons.
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Challis Williams, to represent him. On January 6, 2022, Williams moved for appellant to
be sentenced via Zoom while he continued to be incarcerated in California. He received
no response from the district court. Appellant again sent a letter to the district court
requesting to be sentenced in early March 2022. Appellant again received no response.
Appellant finished serving his California prison sentence on March 29, 2022, and was
extradited to Minnesota where he was eventually released on bail with conditions pending
sentencing.
The district court finally sentenced a ppellant in Minnesota on October 25, 2022,
seven years after his California sentencing. Appellant moved for a downward dispositional
departure and requested credit for his California jail time. The state opposed appellant’s
jail-credit request because of his admission that he used heroin in prison in California until
he obtained sobriety in 2017. Buhler admitted that he had discussions with the California
attorneys about giving appellant credit for time served there and admitted that he did not
object to this agreement, despite appellant’s initial breach of the plea agreement by
incurring charges in California. However, Buhler now argued that appellant’s heroin use
in prison negated any such agreement. The state argued for an 81-month sentence with no
credit for appellant’s custody time in California. 3 The district court denied appellant’s
departure motion. As a result , appellant agreed to this sentence. 4 The district court

3 The Drug Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA) of 2016 entitled appellant to a sentence
reduction.
4 Contrary to the state’s contentions, appellant raised the jail-credit issue below, and so it
is properly before this court on appeal.
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sentenced appellant to 81 months in prison with jail credit only for his time in custody in
Minnesota.
Appellant petitioned for postconviction relie f on July 3, 2023, arguing that the
Minnesota and California sentences should have run concurrently and that the seven-year
sentencing delay violated his due-process rights. The postconviction court scheduled, then
cancelled, an evidentiary hearing. Ten months later, on May 6, 2024, the postconviction
court denied appellant’s petition for relief, determining that appellant was not entitled to
jail credit for time served in California, that appellant’s rights were not violated, and that
he was “treated more than fairly.” This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The postconviction court did not err by declining to award appellant custody
credit for the time he served in California toward his Minnesota sentence.

Appellant argues that, even though he is seeking credit from his California sentence
to count toward his current Minnesota sentence, the postconviction court erred by applying
State v. Roy, 928 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn. 2019), and Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B),
because this is not a custody-credit issue but instead is an issue of whether his two sentences
should run concurrently. Appellant argues alternatively that, “[t]o the extent Minn. R.
Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B), applies here, its interjurisdictional custody rule must be
modified or overruled.” We disagree.
It is the defendant’s burden to establish that they are entitled to credit for time spent
in custody during a criminal proceeding. State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 376, 377 (Minn.
2008); Roy, 928 N.W.2d at 344. A defendant’s entitlement to jail credit is not up to the
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district court’s discretion. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B); Roy, 928 N.W.2d at 344;
State v. Parr, 414 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 1988).
“A district court’s decision whether to award credit is a mixed question of fact and law; the
court must determine the circumstances of the custody the defendant seeks credit for, and
then apply the rules to those circumstances.” Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 379. Appellate
courts review a district court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo
“questions of law, such as the interpretation of the rules of criminal procedure.” Roy, 928
N.W.2d at 344.
“When determining whether to award custody credit, we distinguish between
intrajurisdictional custody (custody within Minnesota) and interjurisdictional custody
(custody outside of Minnesota).” Id. at 345. Courts look to avoid four potential concerns
with respect to intrajurisdictional custody: “de facto conversion of a concurrent sentence
into a consecutive sentence; indigent persons serving effectively longer sentences as a
result of their inability to post bail; irrelevant factors affecting the length of incarceration;
and manipulation of charging dates by the prosecutor so as to increase the length of
incarceration.” Id. (citation omitted). By contrast, “[f]or a defendant to receive credit on
a Minnesota sentence for time spent in another jurisdiction’s custody, the defendant’s
Minnesota offense must be ‘the sole reason’ for the custody.” Id. (quotations omitted)
(emphasis added); see also Parr, 414 N.W.2d at 779.
Here, appellant seeks credit toward his Minnesota sentence for the time he spent in
custody in California on a non -Minnesota crime. As a result, the interjurisdictional rule
applies. See Roy, 928 N.W.2d at 345. Under this test, appellant can receive credit only for
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the time he served in California that is solely in connection with his Minnesota offense. Id.
(citation omitted). Because appellant’s Minnesota offense is not “the sole reason” for his
custody in California, he is not entitled to credit for that time. Id. (citations omitted).
Appellant raises several arguments as to why the postconviction court erred by
applying Roy and the interjurisdictional rule.
Appellant first argues that Roy and the interjurisdictional rule do not apply because
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 2.F (2022) assumes that sentences should run
concurrently. Appellant also argues that the sentencing guidelines bar “de facto
consecutive” sentences. But for the concurrent versus consecutive sentencing distinction
to be relevant, there must be multiple sentences being served at the same time. 5 See Roy,
928 N.W.2d at 347 (“In order for a sentence to be concurrent or consecutive, the defendant
must be subject to another sentence at the time the court imposes the second sentence.”
(citing Minn. Stat. § 609.15, subd. 1(a) (2018))). Here, just like the defendant in Roy,
appellant had been released from his California sentence before he began serving his
Minnesota sentence. See id. (noting Roy had no concurrent sentences because s he had
been released from Red Lake Detention Center when sentenced in Minnesota district
court). As a result, when the district court sentenced appellant in Minnesota, he had no
other active sentence and could not serve his Minnesota sentence concurrent to anything
else.

5 See State v. Jones , 848 N.W.2d 528, 537 n.5 (Minn. 2014) (“A consecutive sentence is
one which does not begin to run until the expiration of the term of the prior sentence. By
contrast, concurrent sentences are served simultaneously.” (quotations omitted)).
9
Appellant’s reliance on State v. Wakefield , 263 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. 1978), for the
argument that his sentence is presumptively concurrent is similarly misguided. The
supreme court addressed this argument in Roy, when Roy argued that caselaw supports
awarding credit against a Minnesota sentence “for time that a defendant spent in custody
in connection with another jurisdiction’s charges if both jurisdictions prefer concurrent
sentencing and neither says a sentence is to be run consecutive.” Roy, 928 N.W.2d at 346
(quotation marks omitted). The supreme court noted that “Wakefield [is not] persuasive
because Wakefield is not a custody credit case. It involved the related, but separate issue,
of concurrent versus consecutive sentencing.” Id. The defendant in Wakefield had a second
sentenced imposed in Minnesota “while he was serving another sentence” outside of
Minnesota. Id. Further, “Wakefield did not address what custody credit the defendant
should have received for any time he spent in federal custody before receiving his
Minnesota sentence.” Id. Despite appellant’s argument, this is not a Wakefield case
because his California prison sentence ended in March 2022 before he was sentenced in
Minnesota in October 2022. For the same reason, appellant’s reliance on State v. Jennings,
448 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. App. 1989), which is also not a jail-credit case, but is about
consecutive sentences and a defendant’s demand for execution of a stayed sentence, is
equally unavailing.
Appellant cites to State v. Bauman, 388 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. App. 1986) to argue
that his “subsequent Minnesota sentence was concurrent to his unexpired sentence from
[California]” and that “the rule against de facto consecutive sentences applies in the
interjurisdictional context.” Appellant’s argument fails for two reasons.
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First, Bauman is factually distinguishable. Importantly, Bauman had two active
prison sentences at the same time. Id. at 796. Here, appellant finished serving his
California prison sentence before being sentenced on his Minnesota offense. His
Minnesota sentence was indeed subsequent to his California sentence, but not concurrent
to it.
Second, Bauman did not address , much less apply, the interjurisdictional rule as
required under Roy. Moreover, the supreme court in Roy considered and rejected the
arguments that appellant now makes. Roy, just like appellant, argued that “denying her
credit for the time she served in [another jurisdiction] would transform her sentences into
de facto consecutive sentences and would increase the length of her incarceration based on
irrelevant factors that are subject to manipulation.” Roy, 928 N.W.2d at 346. The supreme
court noted that “these are factors we consider when we apply the intrajurisdictional
custody credit rule, not the interjurisdictional rule” and declined to consider them. Id.
Finally, appellant argues that, even if the interjurisdictional rule and Roy apply, we
should modify or overrule it. But this court is bound by Minnesota Supreme Court
precedent. State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018).
Because appellant’s other sentence was served in California and falls under the
interjurisdictional custody-credit rule, and because appellant’s California charges were
unrelated to his Minnesota offense, we discern no error by the postconviction court’s
determination that appellant was not entitled to custody credit for the time he spent in
prison in California.

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II. The postconviction court did not make sufficient findings to allow appellate
review as to whether the seven-year delay between appellant’s guilty plea and
sentencing violated his due-process rights.

Appellant argues that the seven-year delay between his plea hearing and sentencing
hearing violated his due-process rights and requests immediate release from custody and
any other appropriate relief. Because the postconviction court did not make sufficient
findings on this issue that appellant properly raised and argued before it, we reverse and
remand.
“[A]n undecided question is not usually amenable to appellate review.” Hoyt Inv.
Co. v. Bloomington Commerce & Trade Ctr. Assocs., 418 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 1988);
see also Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts
generally address only those questions previously presented to and considered by lower
court). The postconviction court must make findings and determinations to allow appellate
review, but when “the reviewing court cannot ascertain whether the postconviction court
actually considered one of the petitioner’s claims, remand is appropriate.” Waiters v. State,
14 N.W.3d 279, 282-83 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).
Appellant acknowledges that Minnesota, unlike other states, does not have a rule or
statute requiring sentencing to occur within a certain time after an adjudication of guilt.
See Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 447 nn.10-11 (2016) (identifying states with
rules and statutes that provide for speedy sentencing). Appellant relies on the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Betterman, as well as other federal cases, to support his due-
process argument. In Betterman, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment speedy-trial right does not apply once a defendant is found guilty at trial or
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pleads guilty to criminal charges. Id. at 439. However, in dicta, the Supreme Court stated
that “[f]or [an] inordinate delay in sentencing . . . a defendant may have other recourse,
including, in appropriate circumstances, tailored relief under the Due Process Clause[].”
Id. at 439. In a footnote, the Supreme Court highlighted that relevant considerations for a
due-process violation “may include the length of and reasons for delay, the defendant’s
diligence in requesting expeditious sentencing, and prejudice.” Id. at 448 n.12. As Justices
Sotomayor and Thomas highlighted in their concurrences, the S upreme Court was not
being asked to decide, and did not decide, whether there is a due-process right to a speedy
sentencing. See Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 449 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“We have never decided whether the Due Process Clause creates an entitlement to a
reasonably prompt sentencing hearing. Today’s opinion leaves us free to decide the proper
analytical framework to analyze such claims if and when the issue is properly before us.”);
Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 450-51 (2016) (Sot omayor, J., concurring) (“The
Court has no reason to consider today the appropriate test for such a Due Process Clause
challenge . . . the question is an open one,” and “[i]n the appropriate case, I would thus
consider [the Barker test] the correct test for a Due Process Clause delayed sentencing
challenge.”).
Appellant argues for application of the factors that the Supreme Court highlighted
in Betterman: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for delay; (3) defendant’s assertion of his
right; and (4) prejudice to defendant. See 578 U.S. at 448 n.12; see also Barker v. Wingo,
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407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972).6 However, we cannot review appellant’s argument because
the postconviction court did not make sufficient findings on this issue to enable us to do
so. See Hoyt Inv. Co. , 418 N.W.2d at 175; Waiters, 14 N.W.3d at 282-83. The only
reference by the postconviction court to appellant’s due-process argument is that it
“identifies no violations of the state or federal constitutions” or “relevant rules, statutes[,]
or case law.” We cannot ascertain whether the postconviction court “actually considered”
appellant’s due-process argument because the findings and determinations on this issue are
cursory at best. Further, it cancelled a scheduled evidentiary hearing, so there is no
transcript to review. But see Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024) (“Unless the
[postconviction] petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that
the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the court shall promptly set an early hearing on the
petition.” (emphasis added)). We therefore reverse and remand to the postconviction court
to consider and make findings regarding appellant’s argument and, if necessary, to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the issue.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

6 Since Betterman, several federal and state courts have found a due-process right to speedy
sentencing, with some applying the Barker factors. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 709
F. App’x 103, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Lacerda, 958 F.3d 196, 219-20 (3d
Cir. 2020); United States v. Yupa Yupa, 796 F. App’x 297, 299 (7th Cir. 2019); State v.
Canosa, 523 P.3d 1059, 1070 (Haw. 2023); State v. Lopez, 410 P.3d 226, 233 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2017); State v. Clawson, 421 P.3d 269, 272 (Mont. 2018).