State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0126

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dontae Deshaun White,
Appellant.

Filed August 28, 2023
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-10743

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
1. The procedural and timing requirements for a defendant challenging a restitution
award under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3 (2022), are not jurisdictional.
2. Life-insurance proceeds that a murder victim’s family receives are not an
economic benefit conferred by the defendant and should not be considered in determining
2
restitution and the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense
under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1) (2022).
OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant Dontae Deshaun White seeks review of the district court’s restitution
order following his conviction for second-degree intentional murder. White’s opening brief
to this court argues that the district court erred in determining the amount of restitution for
the victim’s mother because (1) the mother testified at the restitution hearing that the
victim’s life-insurance proceeds paid for all funeral expenses that she submitted to the court
and (2) some costs included in the restitution award were not related to the victim’s funeral
or directly caused by his murder. Respondent State of Minnesota, in its brief to this court,
argues that we should affirm the restitution order—first, because White did not comply
with the procedural and timing requirements provided in Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3,
and alternatively, because the district court did not err in determining the restitution
amount.
After both parties submitted their primary briefs, this court granted the parties’ joint
request to supplement the record with emails about White’s restitution challenge. At oral
argument, the state referred to these emails and withdrew its argument that White did not
comply with the procedural and timing requirements of Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3.
This court then requested supplemental briefing on whether White complied with the
procedural and timing requirements and whether the requirements are jurisdictional,
among other questions.
3
We first determine that White’s restitution challenge did not comply with the
procedural and timing requirements of Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3, but we also hold
that these requirements are not jurisdictional. Thus, the district court had jurisdiction over
White’s restitution challenge.
Second, we consider the merits of White’s restitution challenge and hold that
life-insurance proceeds received by the murder victim’s mother are not an economic
benefit conferred by White and therefore should not be considered in determining “the
amount of economic loss” sustained by the victim’s family under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045,
subd. 1(a)(1). Thus, the district court did not err by refusing to consider the life-insurance
proceeds that the victim’s mother received when it awarded restitution. Finally, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding restitution for costs
that postdate the victim’s funeral. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
On April 17, 2020, K.B. and his roommate hosted a party of approximately 100
people at their house. At the door, party attendees paid a cover charge and were searched
for weapons. K.B. and his roommate were armed. White and his brother attended the party,
and White snuck a gu n inside the home. K.B. asked White’s brother to leave. White
watched this exchange from across the room and walked over to his brother and K.B. White
then shot and killed K.B.
In May 2020, the state charged White with second-degree intentional murder of
K.B. under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2018), and possession of a firearm by a
prohibited person under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (Supp. 2019). In August 2021, a
4
jury found White guilty of both counts, and in October, the district court sentenced White
to 307 months in prison for second-degree murder. At sentencing, the district court reserved
restitution to give K.B.’s mother , H.T., time to complete the required forms. White
appealed his conviction and sentence, and this court affirmed. State v. White ,
No. A22-0072, 2022 WL 16728878, at *1 (Minn. App. Nov. 7, 2022), rev. denied (Minn.
Jan 25, 2023).
On January 11, 2022, H.T. filed a claim for $15,778.68 in restitution that included
an itemized list of expenses. On January 18, the district court ordered White to pay
$15,778.68 in restitution to H.T. On May 23, White filed a memorandum challenging
restitution and arguing that “[t]he amounts sought [by H.T.] are not ‘out-of- pocket
expenses resulting from the crime,’ pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 611A.045” (2022) and that
“White has extremely limited ability to pay.”
The district court held a restitution hearing on June 1, at which H.T. and White
testified. H.T. testified, in response to questions, that K.B.’s life-insurance proceeds paid
for the itemized costs included in her January 11 restitution request. At the end of the
hearing, White’s attorney asked to “submit an additional brief . . . adding some new
information on the costs that should be covered” by restitution. The district court granted
the request and gave the state the opportunity to file a responsive brief.
On June 16, White filed a request for “documentation from H.T. showing the exact
amount she was given by K.B.’s life insurance policy.” This request went unanswered. On
July 22, White moved to deny restitution because H.T. “has already been made whole
through a life insurance payout that co vered the entirety of the losses [she] accrued from
5
funeral expenses.” The state opposed, arguing that H.T. “suffered a loss because
[life-insurance] funds that could be used otherwise had to be appropriated for funeral
expenses.”
In an October 25 order, the district court denied White’s motion and ordered White
to pay “the previously ordered” restitution. The district court first determined t hat the
restitution requested was “reasonable and . . . directly related to [K.B.’s] funeral.” Second,
the district court determined that K.B.’s “life insurance policy does not preclude
restitution” because “ the intended purpose of a life insurance policy is to provide
supplemental income to a deceased[’s] family members after the death of the policyholder;
and not solely to cover financial expenses related to the funeral of a crime victim.” Third,
the district court ruled that White failed to establish his inability to pay, determining that
White “has the ability to pay some amount towards restitution.”1
White appeals.
ISSUES
I. Did White’s restitution challenge comply with the procedural and timing
requirements of Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3, and are th ose requirements
jurisdictional?

II. Did the district court err by failing to consider life-insurance proceeds received by
the murder victim’s mother in determining the amount of her economic loss under
Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1)?

III. Did the district court abuse its discretion by awarding restitution for some expenses
that postdate the murder victim’s funeral?

1 On appeal, White does not challenge the district court’s determination regarding his
ability to pay.
6
ANALYSIS
I. Although White failed to comply with the procedural and timing requirements
for challenging a restitution award, they are not jurisdictional.

Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045, subdivision 3, provides two key requirements
for a defendant seeking to challenge restitution. First, a defendant “may challenge
restitution, but must do so by requesting a hearing within 30 days of receiving written
notification of the amount of restitution requested, or within 30 days of sentencing,
whichever is later.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b). The hearing request “must be made
in writing and filed with the court administrator.” Id. After the 30- day time period has
passed, a defendant “may not challenge restitution,” id., unless the challenge relates to “the
district court’s legal authority to award restitution,” Evans v. State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 361
(Minn. 2016).
Second, if a defendant “intends to challenge the amount of restitution or specific
items of restitution or their dollar amount,” the defendant must provide “a detailed sworn
affidavit . . . setting forth all challenges to the restitution or items of restitution, and
specifying all reasons justifying dollar amounts of restitution which differ from the
amounts requested by the victim or victims.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a). The
defendant’s affidavit “must be served on the prosecuting attorney and the court at least five
business days before the hearing.” Id.
In its primary brief to this court, the state argues that White “did not comply with
the applicable statutory requirements” because he failed to file a written hearing request
within the 30-day time period and failed to serve an affidavit challenging restitution at least
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five business days before the restitution hearing. White moved for additional time to
respond so the parties could jointly move to supplement the record with “e-mail
communications between [the district court], the prosecutor from the Hennepin County
Attorney’s Office and appellant’s trial c ounsel pertaining to the timing of a ppellant’s
restitution challenge.” In an affidavit filed in support of the motion, White’s attorney
averred that the state’s attorney was “not aware of the e-mails” at the time the state filed
its brief with this court. In a written order, this court granted White’s request for more time
to respond and granted the joint motion to supplement the record with the specified emails.
White’s reply brief argues that “the supplemented record shows that both parties waived
the statutory requirements under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045,” subd. 3 , and that the state
forfeited any challenge to White’s compliance with the procedural and timing
requirements.
At oral argument, the state’s attorney mentioned the emails and then withdrew the
state’s argument about White’s failure to comply with the statutory requirements to
challenge restitution. After oral argument, this court directed the parties to submit
supplemental briefs on the following questions: (1) did White comply with the procedural
and timing requirements of Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3, (2) are these requirements
jurisdictional, and (3) did the state forfeit or waive any challenge to White’s compliance
with the procedural and timing requirements? The parties’ supplemental briefs agree on
the answers to all three questions, which we will discuss in turn.
8
A. White did not comply with the procedural and timing requirements to
challenge restitution.

The state did not raise the issue of White’s compliance with the procedural and
timing requirements in district court, and thus, the district court did not rule on this issue.
On appeal, White’s supplemental brief acknowledges, and the state agrees, that White did
not comply with the procedural and timing requirements of Minn. Stat. § 611A.045,
subd. 3. White failed to file a written request for a restitution hearing within 30 days of
receiving written notification of the amount of restitution H.T. requested, and White did
not serve an affidavit at least five business days before the hearing.
We appreciate White’s candor. Our review of the supplemental record establishes
that on January 18, seven days after H.T.’s restitution request , White’s attorney emailed
the prosecuting attorney and the district court, stating that White “contest[ed] the amount
requested for restitution” and that if the district court’s order was “the last final word on
restitution . . . then [White] would ask the court to schedule a hearing as soon as feasible.”
White never filed a written hearing request with the court administrator, as required by
Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b), and White never served an affidavit challenging the
restitution request, as required by Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a). Thus, White’s
restitution challenge did not comply with the statutory requirements.
B. The procedural and timing requirements for challenging restitution are
claim-processing deadlines.

Because White did not comply with the procedural and timing requirements of
Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3, we consider whether the district court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over White’s restitution challenge. Jurisdiction is a “threshold
9
issue” that courts may raise sua sponte. Kingbird v. State, 973 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn.
2022). We note that this appears to be a question of first impression. 2 “Questions
concerning the authority and jurisdiction of the lower courts are legal issues subject to de
novo review.” State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn. 1999). Likewise, we review
questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920
(Minn. 2019). The appellate courts’ “objective in statutory interpretation is to effectuate
the intent of the legislature.” State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
omitted).
“Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear and determine cases that are
presented to the court.” State v. Losh, 755 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 2008). Subject-matter
jurisdiction “can never be forfeited or waived,” Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 731 (Minn.
2010) (quotation omitted), and “cannot be conferred by consent,” State ex rel. Farrington
v. Rigg, 107 N.W.2d 841, 842 (Minn. 1961). “On the other hand, inflexible
claim-processing rules are ‘unalterable on a party’s application but can nonetheless be
forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point.’” Reed, 793 N.W.2d
at 731 (quoting Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15 (2005)).

2 Existing caselaw has addressed whether the district court may deny a defendant’s
untimely restitution challenge and has affirmed a district court’s discretion to do so. See,
e.g., Hannon v. State , 957 N.W.2d 425, 434 (Minn. 2021) (concluding that “[a] district
court does not err in denying an untimely challenge to a restitution award”); Evans,
880 N.W.2d at 361 (determining the district court did not err in concluding the defendant’s
restitution challenge was untimely under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3 (2014)). Existing
caselaw has not addressed whether the district court has jurisdiction to consider an untimely
restitution challenge.
10
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized the “critical difference between a
rule governing subject -matter jurisdiction and an inflexible claim- processing rule.” Id.
(quotation omitted). For example, in Reed, the supreme court concluded that, in the
criminal-law context, “a statute-of-limitations defense is a claim-processing rule, which is
subject to waiver,” and “not a jurisdictional rule that deprives a district court of its power
to adjudicate a case.” Id. at 731-32 (citing Minn. Stat. § 628.26 (1974)).
In Carlton v. State, the supreme court explained how to determine whether a
statutory time limitation is jurisdictional. 816 N.W.2d 590, 601-02 (Minn. 2012). The
supreme court reasoned that statutory time “limitations operate as jurisdictional bars where
the claim subject to the limitations period is purely statutory.” Id. at 601. “In other words,
where a statute gives a new right of action, not existing at common law, a statutory time
limit constitutes an element in the right itself, such that failure to comply with the time
limit will deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear the claim.” Id. (quotation omitted). The
supreme court also explained that even if a statute creates a new cause of action, we “must
also look to the statute’s language, history, and structure to evaluate whether the
Legislature intended the time limit . . . to be a waivable statute of limitations, or a
jurisdictional bar.” Id. at 602.
In their supplemental briefs, the parties apply the Carlton framework and argue that
the procedural and timing requirements of Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3, are
“non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules.” We agree for two reasons.
First, Minnesota Statutes chapter 611A “did not create an entirely new cause of
action unknown at common law.” Id. at 601. White argues that before Minnesota statutes
11
authorized restitution, “district courts ordered restitution as a condition of probation for
theft and forged checks convictions.” The state asserts that “the principles that power the
restitution statute existed at common law,” citing Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light
Co., 104 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1960). This court has recognized that “[r]estitution is an
age-old concept, stretching back to ancient societies where offenders were required to
reimburse victims or their families for losses sustained from an offense.” State v. Davis,
907 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018). Accordingly,
restitution predates the legislature’s “first statutory provision for restitution in 1983.” Id.
Second, the restitution statute’s language and legislative history guide our
understanding of legislative intent. See Carlton, 816 N.W.2d at 602. Minnesota Statutes
section 611A.045, subdivision 3, does not refer to the district court’s jurisdiction. While
the procedural and timing requirements are stated in mandatory language, the supreme
court has held that mandatory language alone does not mean the legislature intended the
procedural requirements to be jurisdictional. See In re Civ. Commitment of Giem,
742 N.W.2d 422, 430 (Minn. 2007) (“In the absence of a clear legislative statement that
the [statutory] deadlines operate to divest the court of jurisdiction . . . we hold that the
deadlines . . . , while written in mandatory language, do not divest the district court of
subject matter jurisdiction.”).
Legislative history shows that the legislature did not adopt procedural or timing
requirements to challenge restitution when it first passed Minn. Stat. § 611A.045 in 1985.
1985 Minn. Laws ch. 110, § 2, at 306. The five-day affidavit requirement and the 30-day
restitution-hearing requirement were enacted in 1994 and 1999, respectively. 1994 Minn.
12
Laws ch. 636, art. 7, § 4, at 2298-99; 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 38, § 1, at 160. When the
legislature intends that time limits will “alter drastically the district court’s
jurisdiction . . . we would expect the deprivation of jurisdiction to be explicitly stated.”
Carlton, 816 N.W.2d at 604. Instead, the bill adding the 30 -day time limit for
restitution-hearing requests was introduced as “limiting the time period during which a
defendant may challenge a restitution request.” State of Minnesota, Journal of the Senate,
81st Sess. 60 (Jan. 14, 1999). And the bill adding the five-day affidavit requirement was
described as “providing that the offender has the burden to produce evidence if challenging
restitution dollar amounts.” State of Minnesota, Journal of the House, 78th Sess. 5003
(March 7, 1994). Based on the statutory language and legislative history of the procedural
and timing requirements, we conclude that the legislature did not intend to create a
jurisdictional bar. See Carlton, 816 N.W.2d at 602.
For the reasons discussed, we hold that the procedural and timing requirements of
Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3, are claim- processing rules rather than jurisdictional
requirements. Thus, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over White’s untimely
restitution challenge.
3 Further, because the procedural and timing requirements of Minn.
Stat. § 611A.045 are claim-processing rules, they may be forfeited or waived. See Reed,

3 Although we conclude that the procedural and timing requirements of Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.045, subd. 3, are not jurisdictional, we observe that the informality of the parties’
email correspondence regarding White’s restitution challenge created significant
problems—an incomplete record, the state’s reliance on that record when preparing its
brief, the withdrawal of an issue at oral argument, and the delayed submission of this
appeal. These inefficiencies would have been avoided if counsel had followed the statute’s
mandatory language and filed a written hearing request with the court administrator.
13
793 N.W.2d at 731. The parties agree that the state forfeited and/or waived the
requirements either by failing to object in district court or by agreeing to waive them in the
emails included in the supplemental record. Because the state withdrew its challenge on
appeal to White’s compliance with the procedural and timing requirements, we conclude
that the state waived the issue. See State v. Krause, 817 N.W.2d 136, 148 n.10 (Minn. 2012)
(“A waiver is an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right.” (quotation
omitted)). Thus, we need not address whether the state forfeited and/or waived the statutory
requirements during district court proceedings.
II. The district court did not err by refusing to consider life-insurance proceeds
received by the murder victim’s mother in determining the amount of her
economic loss.

“A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of
a criminal charge . . . if the offender is convicted.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a)
(2022). “The primary purpose of the [restitution] statute is to restore crime victims to the
same financial position they were in before the crime.” State v. Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662,
666 (Minn. 2007). “A request for restitution may include, but is not limited to, any
out-of-pocket losses resulting from the crime, including medical and therapy costs,
replacement of wages and services . . . and funeral expenses.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.04,
subd. 1(a). “[I]n determining whether to order restitution and the amount of the restitution,”
the district court shall consider “the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a
result of the offense” and “the income, resources, and obligations of the defendant.” Minn.
Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1), (2). “The term ‘victim’ includes the family members . . . of
a . . . deceased person.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.01(b) (2022).
14
District courts have broad discretion to award restitution, and this court will not
reverse a district court’s restitution decision absent an abuse of that discretion. State v.
Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015). “The district court’s factual findings will
not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. “The interpretation of the restitution
statute is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.” State v. Currin,
974 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. 2022).
H.T. testified at the restitution hearing that she received proceeds from K.B.’s
life-insurance policy and used the proceeds to cover the cost of “everything” she included
in her restitution request. The district court concluded that H.T. was entitled to restitution
under Minn. Stat. § 611A.04 (2022) to “cover financial expenses related to the funeral”
despite having received proceeds from the victim’s life-insurance policy. The district court
reasoned, first, that “[o]ne of the primary purposes of a life insurance contract is to provide
for the financial needs of a person,” citing MONY Life Insurance Co. v. Ericson, 533 F. Supp. 2d 921, 924 (D. Minn. 2008). Next, the district court pointed out that
requiring H.T. “to use the proceeds of her son’s insurance policy to pay his funeral
expenses” would “frustrate[]” the “primary purpose of the policy.”
In his opening brief to this court, White argues that the district court “erred in its
calculation of loss because it refused to subtract the life insurance pay-outs from the funeral
expenses incurred.” White argues that “the plain meaning of the statutory phrase[] ‘the
amount of economic loss’ . . . show[s] that the legislature intended to require insurance
15
proceeds gathered as a result of the crime to be accounted for in determining the aggregate
loss.”4
White relies on Currin, in which the supreme court stated that “ the amount of
economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense” under Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1), “is the total or aggregate diminution or deprivation of money,
goods, or services that a victim suffers as a direct result or natural consequence of the
defendant’s crime.” Id. at 573 (emphasis added). The supreme court concluded that
“restitution awards must account for any benefits received from the defendant to determine
the aggregate economic loss.” Id. (emphasis added). White asserts that under Currin,
H.T.’s “aggregate economic loss . . . was zero” because life-insurance proceeds are a
“benefit conferred on the victim due to the defendant’s conduct.” The state argues that
Currin is factually distinct because it did not involve “a murder and the issue of funeral
expenses for the” victim.5

4 White also argues that “subtracting insurance proceeds from economic losses is an
accepted legal principle when calculating restitution” and analogizes life insurance to
homeowners’ insurance. White contends that in State v. Wigham, “[ t]he state
acknowledged that allowing the victim to recover insurance proceeds and restitution from
the defendant was a ‘duplication error.’” 967 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Minn. 2021). But White
misreads Wigham, in which “[t]he State recognized a possible duplication error in the
restitution amounts requested in the affidavits submitted by the insurance company and the
homeowner.” Id. (emphasis added). Also, Wigham concerned the district court’s
consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay restitution, and thus, the supreme court did
not decide whether insurance proceeds should be offset when awarding restitution to a
homeowner who received proceeds under a homeowners’ policy. Id. at 666.

5 We agree with the state that the facts i n Currin are unique and very different from the
facts in this case. Currin—who was barred from participating as a medical- assistance
provider— billed the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) for nursing services
rendered by agencies that Currin secretly owned and managed. Id. at 569. The district court
16
We conclude that the life-insurance proceeds H.T. received from K.B.’s murder are
not an economic benefit conferred by White or his offense. Under Currin, to determine the
amount of economic loss sustained by a victim as a result of an offense, the district court
considers any benefits the victim “received from the defendant.” Id. at 573. Life insurance
for a murder victim is an economic benefit to the beneficiary of the policy, but it is a benefit
conferred by the individual who paid the insurance premiums, not the defendant who
murdered the insured. 6 Therefore, a district court should not consider life-insurance
proceeds in determining the victim’s “amount of economic loss” under Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1).7

ordered Currin to pay restitution of $2.64 million, the total amount that DHS paid to
Currin’s agencies. Id. at 570. In a postconviction petition and on appeal, Currin argued that
“because her agencies used $1.1 million of the funds to pay for nursing services provided
to Medicaid beneficiaries, DHS received benefits from these payments, and therefore they
were not an economic loss” and should not be included in the amount of restitution. Id. The
supreme court affirmed the district court’s restitution award and emphasized that Currin
was disqualified from participating as a medical-assistance provider . Id. at 575-76. The
supreme court determined that “there was no benefit to DHS, the victim in this case, in
paying Currin’s agencies funds the agencies were not entitled to receive.” Id. at 575. The
court also noted that its holding was “limited to the unique facts and circumstances of [the]
case.” Id. at 576.

6 Because we determine that life-insurance proceeds are not a benefit conferred by the
defendant, we need not consider White’s argument that under Minn. Stat. § 611A.04,
subd. 1(a), the term “out-of-pocket losses resulting from the crime” means losses paid for
with “one’s own money rather than with money from another source,” such as insurance.
We note that Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a), states that “[a] request for restitution may
include, but is not limited to, any out-of- pocket losses resulting from the crime,
including . . . funeral expenses.” (Emphasis added.)

7 We note that other states have declined to offset life-insurance proceeds against restitution
awards. See, e.g., State v. Bruce, 907 N.W.2d 773, 776-77 (N.D. 2018) (affirming the
district court’s award of restitution for funeral expenses that were paid by a life-insurance
policy); Brown v. State, 657 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that
17
Because life-insurance proceeds are not a benefit conferred by the defendant, we
conclude that the district court did not err by refusing to consider the life-insurance
proceeds received by the victim’s mother in determining “the amount of economic loss”
under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1).
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding restitution for some
expenses that postdate the victim’s funeral.

Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045, subdivision 1(a)(1) , provides that in
determining restitution, the district court should consider “the amount of economic loss
sustained by the victim as a result of the offense.” In Riggs, the supreme court interpreted
the phrase “as a result of the offense” to “ require[] the district court to consider the
economic loss sustained by the victim as a consequence of the defendant’s violation of the
law.” 865 N.W.2d at 685-86. Later, in State v. Boettcher, the supreme court clarified that
the “general rule . . . is that a district court may order restitution only for losses that are
directly caused by, or follow naturally as a consequence of, the defendant’s crime. ”
931 N.W.2d 376, 381 (Minn. 2019).
A district court has broad discretion to award restitution, and we review the ultimate
question of whether to award restitution for abuse of discretion. Id. at 380. The district
court abuses its discretion when “its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or
is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn.

“whether the source of any portion of the funeral expenses was life insurance benefits is
immaterial” in determining restitution). This court is “not bound to follow precedent from
other states or federal courts,” but “these authorities can be persuasive,” especially when
Minnesota courts have not addressed the question. State v. McClenton, 781 N.W.2d 181,
191 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2010).
18
2013) (quotation omitted). The supreme court has recognized “that the restitution statute’s
broad language gives the district court significant discretion to award restitution for a
victim’s expenses.” Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d at 666.
Here, the district court determined that H.T.’s request for restitution was
“reasonable” and that the costs “are directly related to the victim’s funeral” because “[h]ad
Mr. White not murdered H.T.’s son,” H.T. “would not have had to orchestrate and also
financially cover the expenses for the victim’s funeral arrangements.” The district court
concluded that “the costs incurred were not excessive but proportional to the expected
services that surround the event of losing a loved one.”
White argues that the “district court erred in awarding restitution for several of the
claimed items because they were not costs that follow naturally as a consequence of
White’s crime.” White specifically challenges the district court’s award of restitution for
certain costs that postdate K.B.’s funeral. White argues that K.B.’s funeral occurred on
May 1, 2020, but the restitution award included expenses for a “celebration of life”
barbeque that occurred on June 12, 2020, and a “celebration of life” boat party that
occurred on August 14, 2020, making the costs from these events “too attenuated.” White
makes similar arguments about restitution for necklaces memorializing K.B. purchased in
January 20 21, K.B.-themed t-shirts, buttons, and masks purchased in March 2021, and
doves released in April 2021 on the anniversary of K.B.’s death. The state argues that
because “there exists some evidentiary support for the judge’s discretionary determination”
regarding restitution, the district court did not abuse its significant discretion.
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White relies on State v. Lindsey, in which the supreme court upheld a restitution
award for “several of the murder victim’s funeral expenses, including the cost of funeral
clothes, postage stamps for thank-you cards, a hotel room for a relative and reception, the
cost of hiring a soloist, a limousine service, and other miscellaneous items.” 632 N.W.2d
652, 664 (Minn. 2001). White argues that “unlike the items in Lindsey,” the items
challenged here “are not related to funeral costs.” White also cites State v. Tenerelli, in
which the supreme court upheld a restitution award for the costs of “a traditional Hmong
ceremony” involving “the sacrifice of live animals to heal the soul of someone who has
been physically and emotionally harmed.” 598 N.W.2d 668, 669, 672 (Minn. 1999). White
asserts that in Tenerelli, “there was an extensive record” about the necessity of the Hmong
ceremony, unlike here, where “there was nothing in the record about why [the postfuneral
costs] were similarly necessary.”
White’s arguments are unavailing. As noted above, Minn. Stat. § 611A.04,
subd. 1(a), provides that restitution “may include, but is not limited to, any out-of- pocket
losses resulting from the crime, including . . . funeral expenses.” ( Emphasis added.) The
supreme court has declined to “construe the [restitution] statute to exempt certain types of
expenses, even though [appellate courts] may consider these expenses inappropriate,”
noting that “[t]o do so would run contrary to the clear language of section 611A.04,” which
“delegat[es] the decision to the sentencing court.” Id. at 671 (quotation omitted). Thus,
given the “broad language” of Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a), and the district court’s
“significant discretion to award restitution,” the district court did not err in determining the
postfuneral costs were directly related to K.B.’s death. Id.
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DECISION
We hold that the procedural and timing requirements of Minn. Stat. § 611A.045,
subd. 3, are claim-processing rules. Thus, White’s failure to comply with the requirements
did not divest the district court of subject- matter jurisdiction over White’s restitution
challenge. We also hold that life-insurance proceeds received by a murder victim’s family
are not an economic benefit conferred by the defendant or the defendant’s crime. Therefore,
the district court did not err when it refused to consider the life-insurance proceeds received
by the victim’s mother in determining the amount of her economic loss under Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1). Finally, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by awarding restitution for costs that postdate the victim’s funeral.
Affirmed.