In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: T. B., Mother.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0130

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: T. B., Mother.

Filed August 28, 2023
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-21-876

Anne M. Carlson, Anne M. Carlson Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant
father, P.C.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Robert Hamilton, Assistant County Attorney,
Christos Jensen, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey
County Human Services department)

Marylene Herady, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)
.
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
Appellant father challenges the decision to transfer permanent legal and physical
custody of his child to foster parents, arguing that the district court erred when it determined
that respondent county made reasonable efforts to support placement of the child with
father and that the district court misapplied the law. We affirm.
2
FACTS
Mother T.B. (mother) has two children, F.B. (the child), born in 2015, and J.R., who
is the child’s half brother. Mother was the sole custodian of both children until her parental
rights were terminated on May 3, 2022. Appellant father P.C. (father) is the noncustodial ,
adjudicated father of the child.
The children were adjudicated Children in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS)
in 2018, and again in 2020, due to mother’s mental health issues. Respondent Ramsey
County Social Services Department (the county) was given temporary legal custody of the
children during both CHIPS proceedings, and the children were placed, at mother’s request,
with the foster parents, who have had a relationship with mother’s children since 2014. On
December 17, 2021, after mother failed to correct the conditions that led to the children
being placed out of her home, the county filed three petitions: (1) a petition to terminate
mother’s parental rights to both children; (2) a petition to transfer permanent legal and
physical custody of J.R. to the f oster parents; and (3) a petition to transfer permanent legal
and physical custod y of the child to the foster parents. The child had been placed with the
foster parents for more than 450 days . Over the previous five years, the child had been
placed with the foster parents for more than 870 days.
On December 29, 2021, father petitioned to have custody of the child transferred to
him.1 The district court held a trial on the competing custody petitions regarding the child

1 The court terminated mother’s parental rights as to both children on May 3, 2022.
Permanent legal and physical custody of J.R. was transferred to the foster parents on
September 28, 2022.
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over seven days between August and October 2022. The district heard the testimony of
the county caseworkers, the guardian ad litem (GAL), father, the foster parents, members
of father’s family, and multiple medical and behavioral health service providers for the
child. The following factual summary is based on the evidence presented at trial.
The child was d iagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and disinhibited social
engagement disorder when she was four years old. When the child began attending school,
her aggressive and disruptive behaviors met the criteria of an emotional or behavioral
disorder. An individualized education plan (IEP) was developed and put in place for her.
The child ’s service providers testified that the child requires ongoing medic al care and
consistent structure and routine. The child ’s service providers testified that the child
reported she was abused by father, including being beaten with a belt.
The district court admitted the case plans. According to the case plans, father
needed to undergo and follow the recommendations of parenting, psychological , and
chemical health assessment s, as well as satisfy the following requirements: (1) engage in
parenting education to focus on child development and appropriate limit setting and
discipline; (2) participate in the provision of services to understand the child’s needs and
progress; (3) complete domestic violence programming; ( 4) submit to drug testing;
(5) engage in indi vidual therapy; and (6) undergo psychoeducation about the trauma the
child has been through. The expert who conducted father’s psychological evaluation
testified that father had not recognized the child’s special needs and has never received
“treatments for [his] criminal behaviors.” The expert was therefore “concerned about
[father’s] capacity to safely care for [the child] .”
4
One of the caseworkers testified that father did not complete a majority of the items
in his case plans. Another caseworker testified she “did not believe that [ the child] would
have her day to day needs met and [ /or] that she would be safe in [father’s] care.” The
GAL testified that f ather failed “to demonstrate strong willingness to parent [the child] full
time,” was not compliant with taking the actions required by his case plan s, has complied
only minimally with a few of the requirements of the plans , has been unable to meet the
child’s emotional needs , and lacked understanding of the effect of the child’s trauma on
her behavioral and emotional regulation. The GAL stated she believed it was in the best
interests of the child for sole custody to be transferred to the foster parents.
In its order following the trial, the district court emphasized the trauma and abuse
experienced by the child. The district court then determined that f ather struggled to meet
the child’s emotional needs, failed to show a willingness to learn how to parent a child with
significant emotional and behavioral issues , failed to appreciate the impact of the child’s
trauma on her behavior, missed most of the child’s IEP meetings and participated
minimally when he did attend , was unaware of t he goals the child’s special education
teacher had for her, did not involve himself in her early childhood education programming,
and had next to no engagement with her psychiatrist and other professionals supporting the
child. In addition, the district court also found that father has been unemployed since 1997
and is more than $100,000 in arrears for child support related to other children. Moreover,
father has a history of romantic partners (including mother and the mother of four of
father’s other chi ldren) obtaining orders for protection against him, and he failed to
complete the domestic violence programming that was required as part of his case plans.
5
The district court also determined that the county made reasonable efforts to support
father, including arranging for father to undergo a psychological evaluation and parenting
assessment, and providing father opportunities to receive psychoeducation, to better
understand the child’s trauma, to participate in the development of the child ’s IEP, and to
engage with the child’s therapist and her psychiatrist.
Finally, the district court also determined it is in the child’s best interests to transfer
custody to the foster parents. The district court considered the fact that the child has never
lived with father and that the child has a strong interest in being placed with her sibling,
J.R. The district court noted that separating the siblings would be traumatic for the child
as J.R. is a significant part of the consistency and stability that the child needs. The district
court noted that the foster parents have provided a safe and loving home for both children
and observed that father’s prior criminal offense renders him ineligible to be a placement
option for J.R. Unlike father, the district court found that the foster parents have prioritized
the child’s needs and have e ngaged with all the professionals supporting the child,
including the child’s therapist, special education teacher, childcare provider, psychiatrist,
caseworkers, and the GAL. The district court also noted that the child’s behavioral and
emotional issues improved while she was in the care of the foster parents. Father appeals.
DECISION
Father argues that the district court erred in determining that the county made
reasonable efforts to support the child ’s placement with father because of deficiencies in
his case plan. Father also argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in failing to
6
apply a presumption in favor of biological parents.2 Because father forfeited a challenge
to the sufficiency to his case plan, and because the district court’s best interests
determinations were sufficient to overcome any presumption in favor of biological parents,
we affirm the district court’s decision.
Minnesota law requires that any “order permanently placing a child out of the home
of the parent or guardian” must include findings regarding the following four factors :
(1) how the child’s best interests are served by the order;
(2) the nature and extent of the responsible social ser vices
agency’s reasonable efforts or, in the case of an Indian child,
active efforts to reunify the child with the parent or guardian
where reasonable efforts are required;
(3) the parent’s or parents’ efforts and ability to use services to
correct the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement;
and
(4) that the conditions which led to the out -of-home placement
have not been corrected so that the child can safely return
home.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a) (2022). For noncustodial parents, “reasonable e fforts” require
a social services agency to use due diligence in assessing whether a noncustodial parent “is
willing and capable of providing for the day- to-day care of the child. ” Minn. Stat .
§ 260C.219, subd. 1(b) (2022). If the agency determines that the child cannot be in the
day-to-day care of either parent, the agency must “prepare an out-of-home placement plan
addressing the conditions that each parent must meet before the child can be in that parent’s
day-to-day care.” Id., subd. 1(c) (2022). Where, as here , the facts underlying the district
court’s decision to transfer legal custody are not disputed, this court reviews the district

2 Father does not assign error to any of the district court ’s factual findings.
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court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d
315, 321 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015).
Father initially argues that because the case plans did not require him to demonstrate
an understanding of the child’s needs, the case plans were deficient to a degree that amounts
to a lack of reasonable efforts . We are not persuaded to accept this argument for two
reasons. First, the county provided father with case plans in March 2021, June 2021, and
July 2022, but father made no challenge to the requirements or sufficiency of the case plans
to the district court. We therefore conclude that father has forfeited this argument by failing
to raise it below. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). 3 Second, father’s
argument misconstrues the case plan s. Contrary to hi s argument, the case plans did
emphasize the child’s needs and set forth specific steps that father would need to take to
demonstrate an ability to care for the child’s needs. 4
Father also argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in failing to apply
the presumption in favor of biological parents when it denied his petition to transfer
custody of the child to himself. Whether the district court correctly applied the law and

3 Father did not argue to the district court that the case plans failed to comply with
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.212 (2022), and we deem this argument forfeited as well.
4 For instance, the case plans state that father should “engage in parenting education to
focus on child development and appropriate limit setting and discipline,” “engage in [the
child’s] services to gain an understanding of her needs and progress,” and “engage in
individual therapy to address his minimization of interpersonal issues and gain
psychoeducation about trauma that [the child] has been through.” The goal of these
directives was to ensure father had “the supports and skills [] in place to parent a child with
extensive needs and a history of trauma.” In addition, the case plans list expected
responsibilities of father relating to the child’s needs, including attending and participating
in the child’s educational meetings, attending and participating in the child’s m edical and
mental health care appointments, and responding to the child’s daily health care needs.
8
whether a district court proper ly determine d that a party has overcome the legal
presumption present legal questions, which this court reviews de novo. In re A.R.M., 611
N.W.2d 43, 47 (Minn. App. 2000) ; In re Welfare of Child of J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d 241, 246
(Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2018) . Because the district court ’s
determinations about the best interests of the child are sufficient to overcome a presumption
in favor of biological parents, we conclude the district court did not err as a matter of law.
In general, courts have recognized the importance of placing a child with a
biological parent. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) (plurality
decision) (holding that a Washington state statute violated the substant ive due process
rights of a mother to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her
biological children), quoted in In re Custody of N.A.K., 649 N.W.2d 166, 174- 75 (Minn.
2002).5 This court has held that any presumption in favor of a biological parent, however,
can be overcome if the agency establishes that custody with that pa rent is not in the child’s
best interests:
But the presumption of fitness is not invincible. It is mer ely a
preliminary inference in favor of maintaining custody with a
natural parent in a contest with a nonparent; that it may be
overcome demonstrates its impermanence. And there is no
dispute that the district court’s 2003 order transferring legal
and physical custody overcame [parent’s] presumption of

5 The parties disagree regarding whether N.A.K. requires the district court to apply a
presumption in favor of father when deciding whether to grant father’s petition to transfer
custody. The agency argues that, given the holding in N.A.K., any presumption established
in that case only applies in custody disputes arising under chapter 518, not transfers of
custody arising under the child protection statutes. Because the district court’s uncontested
factual findings in this case are sufficient to overcome or rebut any presumption in favor
of father as a biological parent, we need not determine whether the holding in N.A.K. is
limited to chapter 518 custody dis putes.
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parental fitness. The presumption favoring parental custody
may be overcome if “there has been established on the
[parent’s] part neglect, abandonment, incapacity, moral
delinquency, instability of characte r or inability to furnish the
child with needed care,” or if custody otherwise would not be
in the child’s best interests.

In re Child of Evenson, 729 N.W.2d 632, 636 (Minn. App. 2007) (quoting N.A.K., 649
N.W.2d at 174-75 (emphasis added)) , rev. denied (Minn. June 19, 2007).
In this case, the district court ’s undisputed factual findings underlying the best
interests decision are sufficient to overcome any N.A.K.-based presumption that might
favor father.6 The district court found that the child has extensive needs that require
ongoing care , but father has continually minimized the child’s needs, failed to follow
through when offered education to better understand them, and failed to adequately engage
with the child’s care providers. In addition, the district court observed that the child h as
never lived with father and because of his criminal history, father cannot have custody of

6 We observe that the arguments presented to this court relate to two other legal issues.
First, as noted above, the Minnesota legislature has imposed certain procedural
requirements that apply when considering placement of a child with a third party when an
interested noncustodial or nonadjudicated parent requests custody. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.219, subd. 1(b) (requiring assessment of whether a “noncustodial or nonadjudicated
parent is willing and capable of providing for the day- to-day care of the child”). Neither
party addressed whether these and other statutory provisions sufficiently incorporate the
due process rights addressed in Troxel. Second, this court has noted that a presumption in
favor of a biological parent applies only to a “fit parent.” See Johnson-Smolak v. Fink, 703
N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn. App. 2005) (holding that a presumption applies “unless it is
shown that the parent is unfit . . . or that there are extraordinary circumstances requiring
that the parent be deprived of cu stody”). Neither party specifically addressed whether
father meets this or any other prerequisite, apart from the parties’ discussion of the district
court’s best interests determinations. Given our conclusion that the uncont ested factual
findings are sufficient to overcome or rebut any presumption in favor of father, we decline
to analyze these issues.
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the child’s sibling, J.R. Thus, granting father’s request would result in separating the child
and J.R., something that the district court found would be harmful to the child’s wellbeing.
Finally, in contrast, the district court found that the foster parents have prioritized the
child’s needs, engaged with all the professionals supporting the child, received custody of
J.R., and contributed to the child’s behavioral and emotional improvement while she was
in their care. These determinations necessarily overcome and rebut any presumption in
father’s favor.
Affirmed.