State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0175

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bonita Hoglund,
Appellant.

Filed February 5, 2024
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-21-981

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Peter H. Dahlquist, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges her judgment of conviction for refusal to submit to chemical
testing under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (2020). Appellant argues that the evidence
is insufficient to sustain her conviction because she never verbally refused when the deputy
2
served her with a search warrant for her blood or urine. We conclude that the circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction for test refusal. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Bonita Hoglund with refusal to
submit to chemical testing under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (count one), and
fourth-degree driving while impaired (DWI) under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(2)
(2020) (count two). 1 The following summarizes the state’s evidence as received at
Hoglund’s jury trial, along with the relevant procedural history.
At about 3:10 p.m. on October 1, 2021, Hoglund drove a black car south on
Highway 9 through New London. At about the same time, a Minnesota Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) conservation officer, who was a licensed peace officer, was
patrolling southbound on Highway 9 in a marked vehicle. The conservation officer saw
Hoglund’s car “cross the center line, . . . make some corrective action in the middle of the
lane, [and] cross over the fog line.” The conservation officer also saw students leaving the
high school and watched Hoglund drive through a crosswalk near the school even though
a “juvenile was waiting to cross.” At that point, the conservation officer started to follow
Hoglund. He saw her car “again go over the center and fog line[s] and make short corrective
movements [within] the lane.”

1 The state later amended the complaint to add a third charge, operation of a motor vehicle
under the influence of an intoxicating substance under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(3)
(2020), but dismissed this charge during trial.
3
The conservation officer initiated a traffic stop at a gas station, later testifying that
he believed Hoglund “might be impaired.” The conservation officer questioned Hoglund,
who complained of arm or shoulder pain. As they talked, the conservation officer observed
that Hoglund “was kind of leaning forward, [was] lethargic when she was talking, [had]
glossy, watery eyes,” had partially closed eyelids, slurred her speech, and swayed. In
response to questions, Hoglund denied consuming any alcohol.
The conservation officer requested an ambulance for Hoglund to assess her
complaints of pain. Hoglund complied with field sobriety testing, and the results showed
impairment. The conservation officer then administered a preliminary breath test (PBT),
which indicated that Hoglund had an alcohol concentration of 0.000. The conservation
officer suspected Hoglund might be impaired by a controlled substance and arrested her
for driving under the influence.
While others transported Hoglund to the hospital, the conservation officer applied
for a search warrant to obtain a blood or urine sample from Hoglund. The warrant
application was received as a trial exhibit without objection and summarized the
conservation officer’s observations of Hoglund, as discussed above, along with the PBT
and field-sobriety-test results. A district court judge found that probable cause existed and
issued the search warrant.
The conservation officer brought the search warrant to the hospital and spoke with
Hoglund. He was not wearing a body-worn camera at the time but used an audio recording
device during his conversation with Hoglund. The audio recording and a transcript of the
audio recording were received as trial exhibits without objection. The conservation officer
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told Hoglund that he “had a search warrant for blood or urine ” and that it is a crime to
refuse to submit to a search warrant for chemical testing, and he presented her with the
search warrant. Hoglund then informed him that she had taken Klonopin, a controlled
substance, that day.
The conservation officer asked Hoglund for a blood or urine sample. Hoglund
responded by repeatedly asking about probable cause. The following exchange typifies
Hoglund’s responses to the officer’s request for testing:
OFFICER: This is a search warrant issued by the judge.
HOGLUND: I know it is. I know but . . . there should be a
probable cause. There is none.
OFFICER: It states that there was probable cause . . . this isn’t
a place to hold court. You’ll have that opportunity later . . . but
right now the warrant is for your blood.

In response to the officer’s other requests for Hoglund to comply with the search warrant,
she either questioned probable cause or stated that there was no probable cause— at least
ten times. The conversation continued:
OFFICER: So are you refusing? Are you refusing?
HOGLUND: I’m not refusing . . . .
OFFICER: Yu- . . . .
HOGLUND: . . . nothin’
OFFICER: So then you (unintelligible)
HOGLUND: No, I’m not. No, I’m not. No, I’m not. I am not
refusing anything.
OFFICER: Well then why . . . .
HOGLUND: I am saying . . . .
OFFICER: . . . [C]an I not get your blood?
HOGLUND: . . . [W]hat is the probable cause?
. . . .
OFFICER: . . . [T]his is a warrant issued by the judge
so . . . you need to either give blood or you need to give
urine . . . otherwise it’s . . . a refusal once again.
. . . .
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OFFICER: . . . Bonita Mary Hoglund . . . is refusing to . . . .
HOGLUND: I’m not refusing.
OFFICER: This is your opportunity.
HOGLUND: Oh no.
OFFICER: We have waited—we’ve . . . .
HOGLUND: I’m not refusing, I want to know the probable
cause.
. . . .
OFFICER: The probable cause is that while following you,
you were going over the lines[,] . . . you went through a
crosswalk[,] . . . there was a kid standing by the crosswalk
waiting to cross [,] . . . you went through the
crosswalk[,] . . . you nearly missed a turn and almost went into
the ditch as you went into the Country Stop.

During the trial, the conservation officer testified that he asked Hoglund for a
blood or urine sample “over 25 times” throughout their approximately
one-hour-and-fifteen-minute interaction at the hospital. He described Hoglund’s demeanor
as “not aggressive but . . . noncompliant.” The conservation officer agreed that Hoglund
never specifically said, “No,” when asked to provide a blood or urine sample . He also
testified that Hoglund never agreed to provide, nor did she actually provide , a blood or
urine sample.
At the jury trial on November 3, 2022, the state offered testimony from two
witnesses, the conservation officer and a second officer who observed the field sobriety
tests. Hoglund did not testify or offer evidence. The jury found Hoglund guilty of both
counts. The district court convicted Hoglu nd of count one, test refusal, and imposed a
sentence of 365 days in jail, staying 335 days. No conviction was entered for count two,
DWI, which the district court determined to be an included offense.
Hoglund appeals.
6
DECISION
On appeal, Hoglund challenges her test-refusal conviction, arguing that the evidence
is insufficient to sustain the conviction as a matter of law. Hoglund does not challenge the
validity of the search warrant.
Due process requires that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact
necessary to the crime charged. State v. Hage, 595 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Minn. 1999). Under
Minnesota law, “[i]t is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test . . . of
the person’s blood or urine as required by a search warrant under sections 171.177 and
626.04 to 626.18.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2). “Refusal to reply to a request to
take . . . [a] test may constitute a refusal to submit to testing, ” and “[a] driver who fails to
respond to an officer has refused to take the test where there is no indication the driver is
incapable of refusal.” State v. Hagen, 529 N.W.2d 712, 714 (Minn. App. 1995).
When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction, an appellate court’s review “is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record
to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction,
was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Webb,
440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). An appellate court will not reverse a conviction for
insufficient evidence “if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence”
and the need for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, “could reasonably conclude that [the]
defendant was proven guilty” of the offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77
(Minn. 2004).
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A. Standard of Review
The parties disagree about which standard of review applies to assess the sufficiency
of the evidence. Our analysis varies depending on whether the element challenged on
appeal is supported by direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Stein, 776 N.W.2d 709,
714 (Minn. 2010) (“A conviction based on circumstantial evidence receives stricter
scrutiny than a conviction based on direct evidence.”). “[D]irect evidence is evidence that
is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without
inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether
the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[C]ircumstantial
evidence always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not required with direct
evidence.” Id.
Hoglund argues that the state offered “no direct evidence that Hoglund was
unwilling to submit to chemical testing,” and therefore, a circumstantial-evidence standard
of review applies. In support of her argument that no direct evidence supports this element,
she points out that the conservation officer agreed that Hoglund “didn’t specifically say no
she won’t give” a blood or urine sample.
The state argues that the record includes both direct and circumstantial evidence of
Hoglund’s unwillingness to submit to chemical testing . The state contends that the direct
evidence includes that Hoglund “indicated her desire to end the testing process at the
hospital” and “demanded to be taken to jail.” The state argues that “[o]ne cannot take a test
8
at the hospital if one is not at the hospital,” which directly proves Hoglund’s “actual
unwillingness.”
“Our previous decisions involving the criminal test-refusal statute have consistently
recognized the legitimacy of circumstantial evidence in establishing a defendant’s intent.”
State v. Ferrier, 792 N.W.2d 98, 101-02 (Minn. App. 2010) rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15,
2011). In a context other than test refusal, the supreme court has noted that direct evidence
of intent is rarely available, and therefore, intent generally must be proved “by drawing
inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the
circumstances.” State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). We have concluded
that a jury must determine the defendant’s intent to refuse when it evaluates, for example,
whether a driver is physically unable to test or “intends to frustrate the testing process.”
Ferrier, 792 N.W.2d at 101.2
While the record includes direct evidence of Hoglund’s conduct—for example, that
she never submitted a blood or urine sample despite being served with a search warrant—
there is also circumstantial evidence of her intent—for example, her repeated arguments
that probable cause was missing in response to the officer’s request for a blood or urine
sample. Because the state offered circumstantial evidence from which it asked the jury to

2Also, we note that this court, in a nonprecedential opinion, has applied a
circumstantial-evidence standard of review to assess inferences from a defendant’s conduct
to determine whether they refused testing. State v. Hunter, No. A21-0562, 2022 WL
274757, at *4 (Minn. App. Jan. 31, 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 2022). We find
Hunter persuasive because it considered similar facts to evaluate the sufficiency of the
evidence for a test-refusal conviction. “[N] onprecedential opinions may be cited as
persuasive authority.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01.
9
determine whether Hoglund refused to comply with the search warrant, we conclude that
the circumstantial-evidence standard of review is appropriate here.
Appellate courts apply a two-step analysis when reviewing a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence. State v. Hanson, 800 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn. 2011). The first
step identifies the circumstances proved by deferring to the fact-finder’s “acceptance of the
proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence” that conflicted with those
circumstances. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn. 2013) (quotations
omitted). The second step “examine[s] independently the reasonableness of all inferences
that might be drawn from the circumstances proved” to determine whether they are
“consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”
Id. at 599 (quotations omitted).
B. Circumstances Proved
First, we appreciate that Hoglund ’s brief to this court acknowledges the
circumstances proved in a light favorable to the state. Specifically, Hoglund’s brief states
that the circumstances proved include that the conservation officer informed Hoglund of
the search warrant for her blood or urine; Hoglund argued with the officer and asked what
was the probable cause for the search warrant; Hoglund was given “twenty-five
opportunities” to submit a blood or urine sample; Hoglund was with the conservation
officer for over an hour; and Hoglund never agreed to submit a sample of her blood or
urine, nor did she submit a sample of either.
Second, we include Hoglund’s list of circumstances proved along with additional
circumstances related to her test refusal as proved by the state’s evidence: (1) when
10
Hoglund was at the hospital, the conservation officer served her with the search warrant
and asked her to provide a sample of her blood or urine; (2 ) the conservation officer
informed Hoglund that refusing to provide a sample was a crime; ( 3) in response to the
conservation officer’s request for a blood or urine sample, Hoglund repeatedly asked about
probable cause and stated that there was no probable cause; ( 4) the conservation officer
informed Hoglund about his observations of her driving conduct and impairment and
explained the probable cause supporting the search warrant; ( 5) the conservation officer
asked Hoglund to provide a blood or urine sample approximately 25 times over more than
one hour; and (6) Hoglund never provided the conservation officer with a blood or urine
sample.
C. Consistency with Guilt

Hoglund implies, but does not directly argue, that the circumstances proved are
inconsistent with the conclusion that she refused to submit to chemical testing. Hoglund
contends that “[i]t is insufficient to prove that Hoglund did not submit a sample of her
blood or urine.” As indicated above, the state’s case proved more than Hoglund’s failure
to provide a blood or urine sample.
We review the circumstances proved in their totality. “[A] refusal to submit to
chemical testing includes any indication of actual unwillingness to participate in the testing
process, as determined from the driver’s words and actions in light of the totality of the
circumstances.” Ferrier, 792 N.W.2d at 101-02. A verbal refusal is not required. Id. “If the
conduct of any driver does frustrate the process, it will amount to refusal to test.” State v.
Collins, 655 N.W.2d 652, 658 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 2003).
11
We conclude that the circumstances proved are consistent with Hoglund’s
conviction for three reasons. First, “[a] driver who fails to respond to an officer has refused
to take the test where there is no indication the driver is incapable of refusal.” Hagen ,
529 N.W.2d at 714. Nothing in the record suggests that Hoglund was incapable of refusal,
nor did she make any claim that she was incapable, either during the testing process or
during district court proceedings. Yet, Hoglund failed to respond to the conservation
officer’s repeated requests to provide a blood or urine sample as required by a search
warrant.
Second, while “[a]ctual unwillingness to submit to testing must be proved,” we have
observed that “[d]espite this evident meaning of the statute, the language does not
suggest . . . that circumstantial evidence could not establish refusal without a direct
statement of unwillingness.” Ferrier, 792 N.W.2d at 101-02. The statute “does not state
that verbal refusal of testing is required. . . . It is discernible from the statutory language
that one may indicate unwillingness in nonverbal ways.” Id. at 101 (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Thus, the state need not prove that Hoglund stated she was refusing to
provide a blood and/or urine sample. Rather, the state was required to prove actual
unwillingness.
Third, Ferrier supports our conclusion that the circumstances proved by the state in
Hoglund’s case are consistent with her test-refusal conviction. Ferrier never said, “No,” or
“I refuse,” and this court affirmed her test-refusal conviction. Id. at 102. In summarizing
the circumstances proved, we noted that (1) the law-enforcement officer advised Ferrier
that refusal to submit to testing is a crime and asked her to provide a blood or urine sample;
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(2) Ferrier elected to provide a urine sample, but then did not provide a sample even after
being given “between 6 and 15 glasses of water”; and (3) Ferrier did not disclose any
physical inability to urinate. Id. We concluded that Ferrier’s failure to produce a urine
sample was sufficient evidence of her refusal to submit to testing. Id.
Similar to Ferrier, Hoglund never verbally refused to take a test or provide a sample.
Hoglund failed to provide a blood or urine sample in response to a valid search warrant
and repeated requests from the conservation officer. Even though Hoglund was with the
officer for over an hour, she responded to his requests for a sample by arguing about
probable cause. Thus, we conclude that the circumstantial evidence is consistent with the
conclusion that Hoglund refused to submit to testing.
D. Inconsistency with Reasonable Alternative Hypothesis

Hoglund argues that the evidence “fails to rule out the reasonable hypothesis other
than guilt, specifically, that [she] simply wanted to see the search warrant affidavit prior to
submitting to testing, and had [the conservation] [o]fficer . . . showed her that, she would
have provided a sample of her blood or urine.”
Hoglund’s request to see the search-warrant application, including the conservation
officer’s affidavit, does not convince us of her alternative hypothesis for two reasons. First,
Hoglund assumes that law-enforcement officers must consider a driver’s conditions,
requests, or counteroffers when administering a chemical test. Hoglund has identified no
legal support for her assertion that she can condition her compliance with chemical testing
13
on her demand to be shown the search-warrant application.3 We conclude that Hoglund’s
request to see the search-warrant affidavit, when viewed in a light favorable to the verdict,
is circumstantial evidence of refusal because refusal occurs when a driver is actually
unwilling to submit to the chemical-testing process. Ferrier , 792 N.W.2d at 101 -02
(concluding refusal occurs when there is “any indication of actual unwillingness to
participate in the testing process”); Collins, 655 N.W.2d at 658 (concluding that refusal
occurs when a driver’s actions frustrate the testing process).
Second, Hoglund’s alternative hypothesis is not reasonable because it is inconsistent
with the circumstances proved. The conservation officer asked Hoglund to provide a blood
or urine sample approximately 25 times over more than one hour. Hoglund repeatedly
asked the conservation officer about probable cause and stated that there was no probable
cause. The conservation officer informed Hoglund about his observations of her driving
conduct and impairment and explained the probable cause supporting the search warrant.
In fact, from our review of the transcript of their conversation, the conservation officer

3 Indeed, persuasive caselaw suggests otherwise. In a nonprecedential opinion, State v.
Hess, we discussed that “while law enforcement officers are obligated to provide drivers
with ‘a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice before deciding whether to submit to
[warrantless] chemical testing,’ a driver ‘has no right to have counsel present during the
test itself.’” No. A22-0781, 2023 WL 2962252, at *3 (Minn. App. Apr. 17, 2023) (first
quoting Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 473 N.W.828, 835 (Minn. 1991); and then
quoting Sturgeon v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 350 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Minn. App. 1984)), rev.
denied (Minn. June 28, 2023). We noted an absence of any legal authority requiring
officers to satisfy conditions that a driver may place on their willingness to submit to a
chemical test and discerned “no basis in the applicable statutes to support the proposition
that a driver may negotiate with testing officers regarding the administration of the test or
may otherwise insist that testing officers meet a driver’s preconditions.” Id. We concluded
that “Hess’s identified inference that he would have taken the chemical test only if a lawyer
had been present, even if true, is not consistent with innocence.” Id.
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appears to have read or closely paraphrased his affidavit in support of the search warrant
while speaking with Hoglund. It is therefore not a reasonable hypothesis that Hoglund
would have complied had the conservation officer shown her the search-warrant
application and affidavit.
We therefore conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Hoglund’s
conviction for refusal to submit to chemical testing.
Affirmed.