State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0205

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Abdullahi Abshir Abdullahi,
Appellant.

Filed December 4, 2023
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-23988

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman , Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction and 72-month prison sentence for first-degree
aggravated robbery, arguing that his guilty plea is invalid because it did not establish venue.
He also contends that the district court abused its discretion by (1) imposing a 12-month
sentencing enhancement, and (2) denying his motion for a downward dispositional and
durational departure. We affirm.
FACTS
On December 28, 2021, police officers responded to a report of a carjacking.
Officers spoke with the victim, who stated a young male, later identified as appellant
Abdullahi Abshir Abdullahi, had approached her in a parking ramp with “a gun
[positioned] in front of his stomach.” He “demanded her keys, which she handed over in
fear for her life,” and drove away in her vehicle. The parking ramp’s video surveillance
showed Abdullahi “linger[ing] near the elevator just before the robbery.”
Abdullahi was charged with one count of first-degree aggravated robbery. 1 In
November 2022, Abdullahi pleaded guilty pursuant to a Norgaard plea,2 admitting that on
the day of the robbery he was under the influence of narcotics and could not “recall
everything that [was] alleged in the complaint.” Abdullahi agreed that if a jury were to

1 Abdullahi was also charged with one count of financial transaction card fraud and one
count of fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. The state dismissed these charges as
part of the plea agreement.

2 State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 1961).
3
hear all the evidence, reflecting the facts as alleged in the complaint, and hear the testimony
from the victim and police officers, there is a substantial likelihood that he would be found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first -degree aggravated robbery. Abdullahi’s
admissions were also recorded in his plea petition and Norgaard addendum. The district
court accepted Abdullahi’s guilty plea, finding it was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,
and that the Norgaard requirements were satisfied.
Before sentencing, the district court appointed an evaluator under Minn. R. Crim.
P. 20.02 to assess Abdullahi’s mental state at the time of the offense and directed probation
to complete a presentence investigation (PSI ).
3 The rule 20 evaluator noted Abdullahi’s
history of mental-health-related hospitalizations and that he had been described as having
limited insight and judgment. But the evaluator concluded Abdullahi was not suffering
from a mental or cognitive impairment at the time of the offense to support a mental-illness
defense. The evaluator also noted Abdullahi’s prior resistance to recommended treatment.
The PSI report likewise described Abdullahi’s recurring mental-health issues,
chemical dependency, and childhood trauma. It documented prior intervention efforts and
criminal activity, including a 2020 extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) adjudication of
aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery. The report recommended a guidelines
sentence of 72 months’ imprisonment based on an offense severity level of eight, a

3 We are mindful of our obligation under Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4,
subd. 1(b)(2), to protect the confidentiality of nonpublic information, and include in this
opinion only information that Abdullahi presents in his brief.
4
criminal-history score of two, and a 12- month sentencing enhancement flowing from the
2020 EJJ adjudication.4
Abdullahi moved for a mitigated, 48- month stayed sentence. He argued that a
downward dispositional departure is warranted because his age, remorse, cooperation,
support from his family, probation officer and former juvenile case manager, as well as his
community resources for treatment and education made him particularly amenable to
probation. Abdullahi acknowledged that he was previously unwilling to participate in
services but asserted that he had remained sober for a year and was “ready for change.” He
also pointed to his undiagnosed mental illnesses, childhood trauma, and “limited insight
and judgment” as favoring a dispositional departure. And he argued for a downward
durational departure on the ground that his offense is less serious than a typical first-degree
aggravated robbery because he only threatened the use of force, and he did not use actual
force in carrying out the offense.
The state argued against a mitigated sentence, stating Abdullahi had been on
probation at the time of the current offense, and had historically failed to take advantage of
intervention efforts, making it unlikely he would decide to do so now. The state also
contended that a durational departure was unwarranted because Abdullahi’s conduct—

4 The presumptive sentence, without modifiers, is 58 to 81 months’ imprisonment. Minn.
Sent’g. Guidelines 4.A (Supp. 2021). The “severe violent offense” enhancement shifts the
presumptive sentence to 70 to 93 months’ imprisonment. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
2.G.14.b (Supp. 2021).
5
waiting in the parking ramp for a victim and brandishing a weapon to steal her vehicle—
was not less serious than conduct associated with a typical aggravated robbery.
Before sentencing Abdullahi, the district court stated that it considered the departure
motion, the arguments of counsel, the victim impact statement, the PSI report, and
Abdullahi’s statements to the court. The district court noted that it had “thought a lot”
about the case and the dispositional departure factors, and concluded Abdullahi is not
amenable to probation. It explained that while Abdullahi “clearly [had] struggled with
mental health issues, untreated, [and] undiagnosed over the years,” these issues are
common to many people in the prison system and do not rise to the level of “substantial
and compelling” to justify a departure. And the court rejected Abdullahi’s request for a
durational departure, stating his offense was not “less serious than other crimes” because
“[n]obody should be pointing guns at people.” The court imposed the presumptive
sentence of 72 months’ imprisonment.
Abdullahi appeals.
DECISION
I. Abdullahi’s guilty plea is accurate.

A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v.
Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017). But they must be allowed to do so if
“withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
To avoid a manifest injustice, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.
Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016). The accuracy requirement focuses on
the factual basis for the plea and ensures the defendant does not plead guilty to a greater
6
offense than what they could be convicted of after a trial. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643,
649 (Minn. 2007). The same standards apply to Norgaard pleas. State v. Ecker, 524
N.W.2d 712, 716-17 (Minn. 1994). A guilty plea is accurate when there are “sufficient
facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge
to which he desires to plead guilty.” Kelsey v. State, 214 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Minn. 1974).
We review the validity of a guilty plea de novo. Barrow v. State, 862 N.W.2d 686, 689
(Minn. 2015).
Abdullahi argues that his guilty plea is inaccurate because the record is insufficient
to establish that the offense occurred in Hennepin County. The record defeats this
argument. Abdullahi’s testimony at the plea hearing and his admissions in both his plea
petition and Norgaard addendum fully demonstrate that the offense occurred “on
December 28, 2021 . . . in Minneapolis, Hennepin County.” Because there is a strong
factual basis establishing venue, Abdullahi’s Norgaard plea is valid and he is not entitled
to withdraw it.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by including the severe-violent-
offense enhancement as part of Abdullahi’s presumptive sentence.

The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide presumptive sentences based on the
severity level of the offense and the offender’s criminal-history score. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2 (Supp. 2021). The guidelines seek to “maintain uniformity, proportionality,
rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (202 2). We
review sentences imposed by a district court for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Delk,
781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). But
7
interpretation of the sentencing guidelines is a question of law we review de novo, applying
“the same principles as when interpreting statutes.” State v. Scovel, 916 N.W.2d 550, 554
(Minn. 2018). If the language of the sentencing guidelines is plain and unambiguous, we
will give it effect. Id. at 554-55. Only if the language of a sentencing guideline is
susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation will we look to other factors. Id. at
555.
The guidelines include a sentencing enhancement for offenders convicted of
“second or subsequent severe violent offenses.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.G.14.b . The
guidelines enumerate 16 severe violent offenses, including first-degree aggravated
robbery. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 8 (Supp. 2021). A district court must increase an
offender’s presumptive sentence for the current offense by 12 months for a prior severe
violent offense. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.G.14.b.
Abdullahi asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 12-month
sentencing enhancement because: (1) a prior conviction for aiding and abetting first-degree
aggravated robbery does not constitute a severe violent offense, and (2) the record is
insufficient to show he previously committed a severe violent offense.
5 We address each
argument in turn.

5 Abdullahi also contends that the district court erred by imposing a five-year mandatory
minimum sentence without a sufficient determination by the fact- finder that his prior
conviction involved a firearm. Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subds. 5, 9 (Supp. 2021) (providing
a five-year mandatory minimum for an offender’s second conviction of first- degree
aggravated robbery involving a firearm). It is clear from the record that the district court
did not impose a five-year mandatory minimum, nor did it rely on section 609.11 in making
its sentencing determination. Accordingly, Abdullahi’s argument fails.
8
A. Aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery is a severe violent
offense.

The parties do not dispute that Abdullahi’s current conviction of first-degree
aggravated robbery qualifies as a severe violent offense. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
2.G.14.a(1); 8. But Abdullahi contends that a prior conviction of aiding and abetting first-
degree aggravated robbery does not qualify because aiding and abetting is not one of the
16 enumerated severe violent offenses. See id. And he reasons that in the absence of a
prior conviction for a severe violent offense, the district court erred by imposing the 12-
month enhancement. We are not persuaded.
A defendant is “criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person
intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the
other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2022). Aiding and abetting is
a theory of criminal liability, not a separate substantive offense. State v. Britt, 156 N.W.2d
261, 263 (Minn. 1968); see also State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 407 (Minn. 2020).
Accordingly, one who aids another’s crime is liable as a principal for that crime. Ezeka ,
946 N.W.2d at 407. In Browder v. State, we rejected the offender’s argument that he was
not subject to the ten-year conditional- release period required by Minn. Stat. § 609.3455,
subd. 6 (2012), because he was only convicted of aiding and abetting the violation of an
enumerated sex-offense statute. 899 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 22, 2017). We construed the plain language of the statute, which requires an
offender imprisoned “for a violation of” an enumerated statute to serve a conditional-
9
release term, to include a person who aids another person who directly violates one of the
enumerated statutes. Id. (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6).
The same analysis applies here. The 12 -month sentencing enhancement is
implicated when an offender is “convicted of” a second or subsequent severe violent
offense. Abdullahi’s 2020 EJJ adjudication for aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated
robbery is an adjudication for first-degree aggravated robbery. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
2.G.14.a(1); 8. Because first-degree aggravated robbery is an enumerated severe violent
offense, a conviction based on aiding and abetting the same likewise constitutes
commission of a severe violent offense. Id.
B. The record establishes that Abdullahi committed a prior severe violent
offense.

As previously noted, an offender’s presumptive sentence is based on the severity
level of their current offense and their criminal-history score. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.
Application of the 12- month sentencing enhancement operates like any other aspect of a
defendant’s criminal-history score—it depends on the existence of a qualifying prior
conviction. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B., 2.G.14.a.
At sentencing, the state bears the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the
evidence, that a prior conviction qualifies for inclusion in a defendant’s criminal-history
score. State v. Maley, 714 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Minn. App. 2006). A fair preponderance of
the evidence means that the evidence of the conviction must lead the district court to
believe it is more likely than not that it exists. See State v. Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d 408,
418 (Minn. 1980). A sentence based on an incorrect criminal-history score is an illegal
10
sentence that may be corrected at any time. State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 147
(Minn. 2007). If the state’s evidence does not support the score used at sentencing and the
defendant did not object, the case must be remanded to allow the state the opportunity “to
further develop the sentencing record so that the district court can appropriately make its
determination.” State v. Outlaw, 748 N.W.2d 349, 356 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied
(Minn. July 15, 2008). We review a district court’s determination of a defendant’s
criminal-history score for an abuse of discretion. Maley, 714 N.W.2d at 711.
Abdullahi argues that the record is insufficient because the state did not prove the
existence of his 2020 EJJ adjudication and he did not admit he had been adjudicated. This
argument is unavailing.
As an initial matter, the state is not required to provide a certified copy of a
conviction or adjudication to establish an offender’s criminal-history score. See Minn. R.
Evid. 1005 (stating “an official record . . . if otherwise admissible, . . . may be proved by
copy, certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902 or testified to be correct by a witness
who has compared it with the original”). Rather, the state must submit persuasive evidence
that sufficiently substantiates the information that would be proved through a certified
record of conviction. Maley, 714 N.W.2d at 712. Persuasive evidence may take different
forms. In State v. Jackson, we concluded a probation officer’s in-court description of the
documents he reviewed regarding the defendant’s prior out-of-state conviction was
sufficient under rule 1005. 358 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Minn. App. 1984); see also State v.
Griffin, 336 N.W.2d 519, 525 (Minn. 1983) (concluding the state had met its burden by
offering “considerable documentation” of the defendant’s prior conviction). In contrast, in
11
Maley, we concluded the state had not met its burden when it relied primarily on a
sentencing worksheet. 714 N.W.2d at 712 (concluding nothing in the transcripts of the
proceedings as they developed over multiple hearings, as well as the documents discussed
at those hearings, was sufficient to prove the existence of two prior convictions).
The record convinces us that the state provided sufficient evidence of Abdullahi’s
2020 EJJ adjudication. First, at the bail hearing, the state noted that Abdullahi was “on EJJ
supervision for another aggravated robbery.” Abdullahi’s juvenile probation officer
responded that he had submitted “a probation violation report with a warrant to [detain
Abdullahi] should he be released due to his EJJ status.” The district court acknowledged
that Abdullahi’s current offense is “similar to [his EJJ conviction] in Juvenile Court ,”
where, at the time, he had “48 months hanging over [his] head.”
Second, at an omnibus hearing, the state reported it had made an initial plea offer
under which Abdullahi would plead guilty to first-degree aggravated robbery and receive
a sentence “of 60 months to the Commissioner of Corrections, concurrent with revocation
of a[n] EJJ sentence.” Abdullahi advised the district court that he understood the state’s
offer but rejected it.
Third, at Abdullahi’s guilty-plea hearing, his lawyer told the court there was “a
pending probation violation matter that [was] also tagging with [the current] case” and that
he was “work[ing] with EJJ judge” in juvenile court. Abdullahi’s lawyer also confirmed
that Abdullahi understood that the state was seeking the 12-month enhancement for a
subsequent severe violent offense. And it is apparent from the record that counsel was
referring to Abdullahi’s 2020 EJJ adjudication.
12
Finally, the PSI report details Abdullahi’s EJJ adjudication for aiding and abetting
first-degree aggravated robbery that occurred in Hennepin County in January 2020. The
PSI report states Abdullahi was adjudicated as an EJJ for this offense in March 2020,
received a stayed 48-month sentence, and was placed on probation until December 2023.
Abdullahi did not challenge this portion of the PSI report or the prosecutor’s argument at
sentencing that the district court should deny Abdullahi’s departure motion because “the
defendant was on EJJ probation.”
In short, the record convinces us that the state submitted ample evidence that
Abdullahi had previously been adjudicated for a severe violent offense. As in Jackson,
Abdullahi’s probation officer spoke to the veracity, character, and status of Abdullahi’s
prior EJJ adjudication. Jackson, 358 N.W.2d at 683. In contrast to Maley, the transcripts
of the proceedings, and the documents discussed at the hearings in this case, establish the
existence of the 2020 EJJ adjudication. Maley, 714 N.W.2d at 712. And, unlike the
precedent involving out-of-state convictions, Abdullahi’s prior EJJ offense was charged
and adjudicated in Hennepin County —the same jurisdiction in which Abdullahi pleaded
guilty and faced sentencing with respect to the current offense. Because the state proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that Abdullahi has a prior EJJ adjudication for first-
degree aggravated robbery, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court by
imposing the 12-month sentencing enhancement the guidelines require.
13
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a presumptive
sentence.

A district court must impose a sentence within the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines’ presumptive range unless it finds substantial and compelling circumstances to
depart. State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 270 (Minn. 2020). A court need not explain
its decision to impose a presumptive sentence so long as it “carefully evaluate[s] all the
testimony and information presented before making a determination” not to depart. State
v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Minn. App. 1985). We review a district court’s
decision to impose a presumptive sentence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Olson, 765
N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App. 2009).
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Abdullahi’s
motion for a downward dispositional departure.

A dispositional departure is premised on the defendant’s characteristics, and “on
whether the presumptive sentence would be best for him and for society.” State v.
Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983). A defendant’s particular amenability to
probation may support a dispositional departure. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn.
1982). When assessing a defendant’s particular amenability to probation, a district court
may consider “the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his
attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.” Id. The presence of
mitigating factors authorizes the district court to depart but does not require it to do so.
Wells v. State, 839 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2014).
Abdullahi argues the district court abused its discretion because his age,
cooperation, support from his family and community, and plan to participate in services
14
make him particularly amenable to probation. We are not persuaded for two reasons. First,
the presence of any mitigating factor does not require the district court to depart. Id.
Second, the district court announced its decision after stating on the record that it
considered the victim impact statement, the PSI report, Abdullahi’s departure motion, the
arguments presented by counsel, and Abdullahi’s statements to the court. The district court
found Abdullahi’s actions had negatively affected the community and that he was not
particularly amenable to probation.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Abdullahi’s
motion for a downward durational departure.

“A durational departure must be based on factors that reflect the seriousness of the
offense, not the characteristics of the offender.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623
(Minn. 2016). It cannot be based on facts already accounted for as elements of the offense.
State v. Meyers, 869 N.W.2d 893, 897 (Minn. 2015); see, e.g., Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 626-
627 (rejecting an argument that using coercion to commit third- degree criminal sexual
conduct was less serious than using force when both satisfy the stat ute). And although a
district court may depart based on a single mitigating factor, the defendant’s conduct must
be “significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.”
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 624-25 (quotation omitted).
Abdullahi urges us to conclude that the district court abused its discretion because
his offense is less serious than the typical first-degree aggravated robbery offense. We are
not convinced. The record contains no evidence of offense-based factors that would justify
a downward durational departure. To the contrary, the record establishes Abdullahi had
15
been waiting in the parking ramp before approaching the victim, pointing a firearm at her,
and causing her to surrender her car keys “in fear for her life.” We disagree that first-
degree aggravated robbery accomplished by threat of force is less serious than when
accomplished by using actual force because both satisfy the elements of the offense. Minn.
Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2020); see Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 626-27. In sum, our careful
review of the record persuades us that this is not a “rare” case in which we should disturb
the presumptive sentence. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
Affirmed.