State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0223

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Antonio Barrera,
Appellant.

Filed February 12, 2024
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-20-8137

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, River D. Thelen, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Eva F. Wailes, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal from a final judgment of conviction following a court trial, appellant
Antonio Barrera argues that his conviction for aggravated first-degree controlled-substance
crime must be reversed because respondent State of Minnesota failed to prove that he
2
possessed a firearm that was within his immediate reach. He asks that the matter be
remanded to the district court for entry of judgment of conviction on a lesser-included
offense and resentencing. Because the evidence is sufficient to prove that Barrera
constructively possessed the gun and that it was within his immediate reach, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts are taken from the district court’s findings of fact and related
evidence at trial.
On December 16, 2020, at approximately midnight, a woman entered the Sauk
Centre Police Department and told officers that a white pickup truck had been following
her and her passenger. The woman and her passenger told officers that the occupants of the
truck pointed a shotgun at them. When asked if she knew who the occupants were, the
woman said, “I think his name is Rodolfo. I don’t know the last name.”
One of the officers at the station, Officer Von Wahlde, left in his squad car to look
for the truck. Once he spotted the truck, he began to follow it, waiting for other units to
join and help initiate a traffic stop. Officer Von Wahlde ran the license plates and
discovered that the truck was registered to Barrera. The truck was driving fifteen miles per
hour below the speed limit and alternately crossing over the fog line and the center line.
Several law-enforcement officers responded to the incident and converged where
the truck was traveling. Upon stopping the truck, one officer, Deputy Mayers, gave
commands for the truck’s driver to exit the vehicle. The driver complied immediately, was
handcuffed, and was placed in a squad car. The driver, who was subsequently identified as
3
Barrera, told officers that he had a passenger, later identified as R.R. (first name,
“Rodolfo”), in the truck.
Another officer, Deputy Ringness, who was on duty with his trainee, also responded
to the area. As they were arriving, the truck was traveling in the direction of Deputy
Ringness’s squad car. Deputy Ringness could see clearly through the front windshield of
the truck. When the truck was stopped, he decided that he and his trainee should move their
squad car because he did not want it to be in front of the truck during the stop. After moving
the car, Deputy Ringness and his trainee exited their squad car and moved into a ditch,
behind some trees.
Deputy Ringness watched the occupants of the truck with his rifle drawn to ensure
that no one grabbed a weapon. After Barrera left the truck, Deputy Ringness had a clear
view into the passenger compartment. He estimated that it took 30 to 60 seconds after
leaving the squad car for him to have a clear view of the passenger compartment. He
observed that the passenger, R.R., sat “very calm and still” and that R.R. did not reach into
the center console or the back seat or under the driver’s seat.
Deputy Ringness directed R.R. to exit the vehicle. Once R.R. was outside of the
vehicle, the officers secured R.R. in a separate squad car from Barrera. Officer Von Wahlde
estimated that one-and-a-half minutes elapsed between when Barrera exited the truck and
when R.R. exited the truck.
Another officer, Deputy Younkin , conducted a driving-while-intoxicated (DWI)
investigation and observed Barrera exhibit several signs of impairment. While searching
Barrera’s person incident to his arrest, Deputy Younkin found a permit to carry a handgun.
4
Officer Von Wahlde assisted Deputy Mayers in searching the truck. Officer
Von Wahlde found live .40-caliber ammunition on the floorboard, between the seats in the
front of the truck, and Deputy Mayers observed two live rounds of .40-caliber handgun
ammunition on the front, driver’s side floorboard. Deputy Mayers also found a small black
pouch tucked under the driver’s seat, which contained several plastic bags of suspected
methamphetamine, pills, and drug paraphernalia. Officer V on Wahlde found two blue
plastic tote bins, resembling ammunition carriers, on the rear floorboard between the driver
and passenger seats. He opened the totes and observed that they were filled with a white,
crystal substance that he believed to be methamphetamine. The substance in the tote bins
was not tested.
Deputy Mayer searched the front of the vehicle, including the center console. The
console was closed, and, when he went to open it, he could see ammunition in the latch to
lift the armrest on the console. Deputy Mayers testified that, to open the console, he flipped
up the armrest, which revealed a seat bench, and then he flipped up that seat bench to reveal
the bottom compartment. Deputy Mayers searched the bottom compartment and found a
handgun, a holster, approximately $1,000 in cash, an empty extended magazine, and a
plastic bag of suspected methamphetamine. The firearm was a.40-caliber handgun, with its
barrel pointing toward the passenger side and the handle pointing toward the driver. The
contents of a plastic bag found in the black pouch and the plastic bag in the bottom
compartment were later tested and confirmed to be methamphetamine totaling 122.87
grams.
5
At the police department, Officer Von Wahlde interviewed Barrera after he was
given a Miranda warning. Barrera explained that he had been with R.R. at a gas station and
was vacuuming out his truck while R.R. spoke with some people behind the truck. Barrera
said that he did not hear the conversation. The people that R.R. was speaking to then left
in their vehicle, and R.R. told Barrera to follow them. Barrera and R.R. got into the truck,
and Barrera sped to catch up with the other vehicle. Officer Von Wahlde asked, “At what
time did [R.R.] grab the gun?” and Barrera answered, “I have no clue.” Barrera later said,
“The gun was never drawn.”
DNA testing on the firearm revealed that there was insufficient genetic information
collected to develop a profile based on the DNA.
Barrera was initially charged with two counts: first-degree aggravated controlled-
substance crime (possession of a firearm) in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
152.021, subdivision 2b(1) (2020), and DWI for operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of a controlled substance in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20,
subdivision 1(2) (2020). Later, the state amended the complaint by adding two counts: first-
degree controlled-substance possession in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 152.021,
subdivision 2(a)(1) (2020), and DWI for operating a motor vehicle while the body contains
any amount of schedule I or II controlled substances, in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 169A.20, subdivision 1(7) (2020).
After a bench trial, the district court found Barrera guilty of all counts. The district
court sentenced Barrera to 86 months in prison for the first-degree aggravated controlled-
substance crime, finding that it lacked discretion to grant a dispositional departure, and to
6
a concurrent 91 days on the second DWI count. The district court did not adjudicate the
remaining counts.
Barrera appeals.
DECISION
Due process requires the state to prove every element of the charged crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Minn. 2020). The statute under
which Barrera was convicted provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of aggravated controlled substance
crime in the first degree if the person violates . . . subdivision
2, paragraph (a), clause (1) . . . and the person or an accomplice
sells or possesses 100 or more grams or 500 or more dosage
units of a mixture containing the controlled substance at issue
and:
(1) the person . . . possesses on their person or within
immediate reach . . . a firearm.

Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2b (2020).
The only dispute on appeal is whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that Barrera possessed a firearm within his immediate reach. When evaluating the
sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts carefully review the record to determine
“whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was
sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Horst, 880
N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). The reviewing court assumes that “the
fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” State v. Griffin, 887
N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016). The reviewing court will not overturn a conviction if the
fact-finder could have reasonably found the defendant guilty, giving due regard to the
7
presumption of innocence and the burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
See id. “[Appellate courts] use the same standard of review in bench trials and in jury trials
in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733
(Minn. 2011).
On appeal, Barrera makes two distinct challenges: (1) the state did not provide
sufficient evidence to prove that he possessed the firearm and (2) the state did not provide
sufficient evidence to prove that the firearm was within Barrera’s immediate reach. We
address each challenge in turn.
Possession of the Gun
Barrera argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that he
constructively possessed the firearm. Possession can be either actual or constructive. State
v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017). Constructive possession may be proved in
two ways. Id. The state may show that the item was found in a place that was under the
defendant’s exclusive control to which other people normally do not have access. Id.
Alternatively, if the item was found “in a place to which others had access, the State must
show that there is a strong probability . . . that at the time the defendant was consciously or
knowingly exercising dominion and control over it.” Id. A defendant may possess an item
jointly with another person. Id.
There is no direct evidence that Barrera possessed the firearm, only circumstantial
evidence. Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether
the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted).
“[C]ircumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not
8
required with direct evidence.” Id. “When the direct evidence of guilt on a particular
element is not alone sufficient to sustain the verdict,” appellate courts apply the
circumstantial-evidence standard of review. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn.
2017).
Under the circumstantial-evidence standard of review, appellate courts first
determine the circumstances proved. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn.
2013). At this step, the reviewing court defers to “the [fact-finder]’s acceptance of the proof
of these circumstances” and “assume[s] that the [fact-finder] believed the State’s witnesses
and disbelieved the defense witnesses.” Id. at 598-99 (quotations omitted).
Second, the reviewing court determines whether the circumstances proved, when
viewed “as a whole,” are “consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted). At this step, appellate courts
do not defer to the fact-finder’s choice between reasonable inferences. Id. “Circumstantial
evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so
directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any
reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn.
2010) (quotation omitted). If it does not, the conviction must be reversed. See id. at 475.
The following circumstances were proved by the state:

(1) Barrera was the driver and registered owner of the vehicle;

(2) R.R. was the passenger;

(2) there was live .40- caliber handgun ammunition on the front
floorboards of Barrera’s vehicle;

9
(3) two rounds of live ammunition were found on the floor where
Barrera’s feet would have been while he drove;

(4) a.40-caliber handgun was located in the bottom compartment of the
truck’s center console;

(5) there were two live rounds of ammunition in the latch used to lift the
armrest on the middle console;

(6) the firearm was oriented with the handgrip toward the driver and the
barrel toward the passenger;

(7) the compartment also contained approximately $1,000 in cash, an
extended magazine, and a plastic bag of methamphetamine;

(8) two blue plastic tote bins, resembling ammunition carriers, that
contained a substance the officers believed to be methamphetamine
were found on the rear floorboard between the driver and passenger
seats;

(9) the back seats were filled with household goods;

(10) law enforcement located a permit to carry a handgun in Barrera’s
wallet;

(11) except for a period of approximately 30 to 60 seconds, Deputy
Ringness was able to see R.R. as he sat in the passenger compartment
during the traffic stop;

(12) R.R. remained calm and still during the stop and was not observed
manipulating anything in the vehicle;

(13) Barrera acknowledged the presence of a firearm in the vehicle when
he told an officer, “The gun was never drawn;”

(14) Barrera told law enforcement that, before the stop, he had been with
R.R. at a gas station and was vacuuming out his truck while R.R.
spoke to some people behind the truck; and

(15) when the people R.R. was speaking with left, R.R. told Barrera to
follow them, and Barrera sped to catch up with the car.

10
Barrera does not dispute that the circumstances proved by the state are consistent
with guilt on the element of constructive possession of the gun. Rather, he argues only that
these circumstances “also support a reasonable inference that [R.R.] alone exerted
dominion and control over the firearm.” We disagree.
The only reasonable inference from the circumstances proved is that Barrera
knowingly exercised dominion and control over the gun. The firearm was found in the
truck’s center console, which was next to Barrera, and the handle was oriented toward him
while the barrel was pointed toward R.R. While proximity is not determinative of
constructive possession, it is an important consideration. State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825,
834 (Minn. App. 2015). And “[e]ase of access is . . . [another] factor relevant to
establishing constructive possession.” State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. 2015).
Barrera’s proximity to the firearm and its orientation in a way that would allow him to
more easily grasp it suggest that he had constructive possession of it.
Barrera was the owner and driver of the truck. He should have been aware of the
contents of the vehicle; not only was there live .40-caliber ammunition—compatible with
the firearm—on the driver’s side floor, but he was also vacuuming the truck before chasing
after the people from the gas station. Also, he indicated that he knew the firearm was
present in the truck when he told law enforcement officers, “The gun was never drawn.”
Barrera also had a handgun permit on his person while R.R. did not.
Moreover, there were significant quantities of a substance that officers suspected
was methamphetamine in the backseat of Barrera’s truck as well as confirmed
methamphetamine in a plastic bag in the compartment with the firearm and in the pouch
11
found under the driver seat. There was also $1,000 cash in the compartment with the
firearm. An officer testified that individuals often carry firearms when they have large
amounts of money and controlled substances to protect against robbery. These
circumstances suggest that Barrera had constructive possession of the firearm as part of his
involvement in the distribution of methamphetamine.
Finally, while law enforcement officers did not have their sights on R.R. before the
stop and for approximately 30 to 60 seconds during the stop, when officers did observe
R.R., he did not make any movements suggesting that he stashed the firearm in the console
unbeknownst to Barrera.
The circumstances proved here distinguish this case from the two cases relied upon
by Barrera. In Harris, the supreme court reversed the appellant’s conviction for unlawful
possession of a firearm, concluding that the circumstances proved permitted the reasonable
inference that Harris did not know the firearm was in the car. 895 N.W.2d at 603. But
Harris was driving a car that he did not own, accompanied by front and rear passengers,
and the firearm was not immediately visible but rather was hidden slightly behind the driver
in a space between the headliner and the roof of the car. Id. In Sam, this court reversed the
appellant’s conviction for possessing a controlled substance, concluding that the
circumstances proved permitted the reasonable inferences that the methamphetamine
found in the glove compartment in front of the passenger’s seat was placed there either
before Sam borrowed the car or by the passenger in the car. 859 N.W.2d at 835-36. Sam
was not the owner of the car, and the passenger—unlike Sam—had methamphetamine on
12
his person and was also observed making movements toward the center of the car. Id. at
834.
Here, there is no reasonable theory that Barrera did not constructively possess the
firearm given his proximity to the firearm, the control he exercised over his truck, his
knowledge of its contents, his statement indicating knowledge of the gun’s presence, his
involvement in the transportation of methamphetamine, and the absence of any evidence
of movements by R.R. in the truck. As a result, sufficient evidence supports the district
court’s finding that Barrera possessed the handgun.
Gun Within Immediate Reach
Barrera next argues that, under the plain language of Minnesota Statutes section
152.021, subdivision 2b(1), the state failed to prove that the firearm was within his
“immediate reach” because the process to access the firearm required Barrera to take two
steps—lifting up the armrest and then lifting up the seat.
Barrera’s challenge first requires us to interpret the meaning of “within immediate
reach.” A question of statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo. State v. Vasko, 889
N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017).
The statute does not provide a definition of “within immediate reach.” Both Barrera
and the state turn to dictionary definitions. See State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 436
(Minn. 2017) (looking to dictionary definitions to determine ordinary meaning of terms not
defined by statute). Barrera, citing definitions of the word “immediate” in The American
Heritage Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary, argues that the phrase “within immediate
reach” means that the firearm “can be possessed immediately and without delay.” See The
13
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 878 (5th ed. 2018) (defining
“immediate” as “[o]ccuring at once; happening without delay”); Black’s Law Dictionary
897 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “immediate” as “[o]ccuring without delay; instant”). The
state cites The American Heritage Dictionary definition of “immediate” cited by Barrera
as well as additional meanings of the word included in that dictionary and argues that the
evidence is sufficient under any of the meanings. See American Heritage, supra, at 878
(defining “immediate” as “occurring at once; happening without delay”; “of or near the
present time”; “of or relating to the present time and place; current”; “close at hand; near”).
In a nonprecedential but persuasive opinion issued after the parties’ briefs were filed
in this case, we concluded that “immediate reach” under Minnesota Statutes section
152.021, subdivision 2b(1), “requires the state to prove that a firearm is accessible by
touching because the defendant’s access is ‘ without delay’ and ‘close at hand.’” State v.
Moore, No. A22-1570, 2023 WL 6799617, at *5 (Minn. App. Oct. 16, 2023), rev. granted
(Minn. Jan. 16, 2024).1 Given the parties’ arguments and in light of the consistent meaning
of “immediate” that we applied in Moore, we conclude that the question here is whether
the evidence is sufficient to prove that Barrera had access to a close-at-hand firearm without
delay.
Whether the firearm was within Barrera’s immediate reach was an element proved
by direct evidence. “[D]irect evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or

1 See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions and order
opinions are not binding authority except as law of the case, res judicata or collateral
estoppel, but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
14
observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” Harris, 895
N.W.2d at 599 (quotation and alteration omitted). When an element of an offense is
supported by direct evidence, an appellate court’s review is limited to “a painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the [fact-finders] to reach the verdict
which they did.” Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 40 (quotation omitted). The appellate court must
assume “the [fact-finder] believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the
contrary.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). “[A] conviction may be
based on a single person’s testimony.” State v. Cao, 788 N.W.2d 710, 717 (Minn. 2010).
Here, the evidence included testimony from Deputy Mayer that, at the time of the
arrest, the firearm was located in the bottom compartment of the center console next to
Barrera’s seat. He also testified that the handle was oriented toward Barrera and that the
gun was not found beneath any other belongings in the compartment. Finally, he testified
that the firearm was accessible by simply lifting the armrest and then lifting the seat bench
to reveal the compartment.
Deputy Mayer’s testimony was sufficient direct evidence that the firearm was within
Barrera’s immediate reach. Because Barrera was in the driver’s seat, next to the console
compartment with the firearm, and the firearm was accessible by simply lifting the armrest
and the seat bench, we conclude that the firearm was “close at hand” and accessible
“without delay.” We are not persuaded by Barrera’s argument that, because there were two
intervening steps to access the firearm, the state necessarily failed to prove that the firearm
was within Barrera’s immediate reach.
15
Because t he state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Barrera possessed the
handgun and that it was within his immediate reach, the evidence is sufficient to sustain
Barrera’s conviction for aggravated first-degree controlled-substance crime.
Affirmed.