East Phillips Neighborhood Institute, Inc., et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0261

East Phillips Neighborhood Institute, Inc., et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

The City of Minneapolis,
Respondent,

Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed June 20, 2023
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-20-8414

Miles J. Ringsred, Duluth, Minnesota; and

Elysabeth Royal, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellants East Phillips Neighborhood Institute,
Inc. and Cassandra Holmes)

Kristyn Anderson, Minneapolis City Attorney, Mark Enslin, Rebekah M. Murphy,
Assistant City Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent City of Minneapolis)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Christina Brown, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and Minnesota
Environmental Quality Board)

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellants East Phillips Neighborhood Institute Inc. and Cassandra Holmes
(together, EPNI) challenge a district court order denying a motion for a temporary
injunction to prevent respondent City of Minneapolis from demolishing a building known
as the Roof Depot during the pendency of this litigation. Appellants assert that the district
court erred by not applying Wadena Implement Co. v. Deere & Co., 480 N.W.2d 383, 389
(Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. March 26, 1992), in determining whether to grant
temporary injunctive relief for asserted violations of the Minnesota Environmental Rights
Act (MERA), Minn. Stat. §§ 116B.01-.13 (2022), and the Minnesota Environmental Policy
Act (MEPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 116D.01-.11 (2022). Because the merits of EPNI’s claims
have not yet been determined, the district court properly applied Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 314 N.W.2d 314, 321- 22 (Minn. 1965), to determine the propriety of
temporary injunctive relief. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
EPNI is a non-profit organization that opposes the city’s Hiawatha Campus
Expansion Project (the project), which will involve demolishing the Roof Depot and
expanding the city’s Hiawatha Maintenance Facility (HMF) in order to consolidate the
city’s water distribution maintenance functions. In 2016, the city purchased the property
in the East Phillips neighborhood of Minneapolis that will house the project. Before the
3
city purchased the property, EPNI had hoped to purchase it and repurpose the Roof Depot
to develop a multi-use facility that would include an urban farm consisting of hydro and
aqua culture, a community employment and training center, and low -income housing. In
2020, EPNI took two measures to challenge the project under the state’s environmental-
protection statutes.
EPNI first submitted a petition under MEPA for the preparation of an
environmental-assessment worksheet (EAW). East Phillips Neighborhood Inst., Inc. v.
City of Minneapolis, No. A21- 1297, 2023 WL 1770292, at *1 (Minn. App. Feb. 6, 2023)
(EPNI), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2023). The city determined that an EAW was not
mandatory but nevertheless elected to prepare one. Id. Following completion of the EAW,
the city determined that the project did not require an environmental-impact statement. Id.
We affirmed the city’s decision, id. at 8, and the supreme court denied EPNI’s petition for
further review.
EPNI second initiated this action in district court to challenge the project under
MEPA a nd MERA. EPNI moved for a temporary injunction to prevent the city from
demolishing the Roof Depot during the pendency of the litigation. The district court denied
the motion, reasoning that it was appropriate to consider the Dahlberg factors in deciding
whether to grant temporary injunctive relief. The court found that the first three Dahlberg
factors—the relationship of the parties, the relative harms, and the likelihood of success on
the merits—weighed against granting an injunction. The court found that the fourth and
fifth factors—public policy and administrative burden—were neutral.
4
In assessing the relative harms, the district court explained that EPNI’s inability to
build its urban farm concept was not irreparable harm from the Roof Depot demolition
because the city owns the property and “it is not certain that the Urban Farm would be
realized even if the Court granted an injunction and EPNI prevailed at trial.” In relation to
environmental harms asserted by EPNI, the district court explained that any increase in
vehicular traffic would be attributable to the project as a whole, not to the demolition of
the Roof Depot that EPNI sought to enjoin. And the district court found that EPNI had not
submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the demolition would cause
environmental harm through disturbance of arsenic in soils beneath the Roof Depot.
In considering public policy, the district court recognized MERA’s public policy to
“preserve the state’s natural resources for future generations, ” but found that it could not
“conclusively determine at this stage that the Roof Depot demolition will or will not upend
MERA’s public policy objective.” The district court also recognized the competing
interests “in preventing additional pollution in a community that is already
disproportionately affected” and “supporting the efficient distribution of drinking water to
[c]ity and suburban residents.” The court found: “On balance, these considerations do not
weigh in favor of one party or the other, and so the fourth Dahlberg factor is neutral.”
1

1 We similarly recognized in reviewing the city’s decision not to prepare an environmental-
impact statement that EPNI had “come forward in good faith and with legitimate concerns
for the health of their neighborhood” and the city “has undertaken the project in good faith
and with the legitimate purpose of improving water services for the community.” EPNI ,
2023 WL 1770292, at *7.
5
The district court contrasted the lack of demonstrable harm to EPNI from
demolishing the Roof Depot with the “significant economic harm” that the city would
suffer if demolition were delayed, noting that:
The [c]ity estimates that delays to the [p]roject will cost the
city $175,000-250,000 per month as a result of accelerated
construction costs, holding costs for the [p]roperty, and costs
related to “stop/starts” with multiple [p]roject consultants.
Delays will require the [c]ity to continue incurring thousands
of dollars per year in fuel, maintenance, and employee time
costs due to the current decentralized nature of [Hiawatha
Maintenance Facility] functions. Additionally, the [c]ity’s
East Water Yards Campus building is over 100 years old and
deteriorating, and is not compliant with the American[s with]
Disabilities Act. The longer the [p]roject is delayed, the longer
those employees will work in a building that is not equipped
for their needs.

EPNI appealed the denial of injunctive relief and requested an injunction pending
appeal, which the district court granted.
2
DECISION
A district court decision to grant or deny temporary injunctive relief is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. DSCC v. Simon, 950 N.W.2d 280, 286 (Minn. 2020). A district
court abuses its discretion by acting on an erroneous interpretation of law. Id. EPNI’s
argument in this appeal is discrete: it argues that the district court erred by applying
Dahlberg instead of Wadena to determine the propriety of temporary injunctive relief.

2 EPNI and the city moved for expedited consideration by this court, and the city moved to
dissolve the injunction pending appeal. We granted the motions for expedited
consideration and denied the motion to dissolve the injunction pending appeal.
Accordingly, the city remains enjoined from demolishing the Roof Depot during the
pendency of this appeal.
6
Minnesota courts generally apply the Dahlberg factors in determining whether to
grant temporary injunctive relief. See id. “Because a temporary injunction is granted
before a trial on the merits, ‘a showing of irreparable harm is required to prevent undue
hardship to the party against whom the injunction is issued, whose liability has not yet been
determined.’” Id. at 286 (quoting Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278
N.W.2d 81, 92 (Minn. 1979)). In determining whether there is irreparable injury, the
district courts must consider five factors, including the moving party’s likelihood of
success on the merits. Id. at 286-87.
A party seeking permanent injunctive relief similarly “must establish that their legal
remedy is not adequate[,] and that the injunction is necessary to prevent great and
irreparable injury.” Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 92. But the irreparable injury analysis for
permanent injunctive relief does not encompass the party’s likelihood of success on the
merits because the party has already succeeded on the merits. See id. (“If irreparable harm
can be inferred from an alleged breach for purposes of a temporary injunction, it can be
inferred from a trial court’s actual finding of a breach by the defendant.”). “[W]here a trial
court has determined that the prevailing party is entitled to relief, it may fashion such
remedies, legal and equitable, as are necessary to effectuate such relief.” Id.
In Wadena, this court recognized that a statute may provide a basis for a court to
grant injunctive relief without conducting an irreparable-injury analysis. 480 N.W.2d at
389. We held that “where injunctive relief is explicitly authorized by a statute . . . proper
exercise of discretion requires the issuance of an injunction if the prerequisites for the
remedy have been demonstrated and the injunction would fulfill the legislative purposes
7
behind the statute’s enactment.” Id. 3 In Wadena, the prerequisites for injunctive relief
under the applicable statute had been demonstrated because “the court combined the
injunction and summary judgment hearings.” Id.
Three years after Wadena, we decided State by Ulland v. Int’l Ass’n of
Entrepreneurs of Amer., 527 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 18,
1995). In Ulland, the issue was what standard applied to the commissioner of commerce’s
motion for a temporary injunction based on the appellants’ alleged violation of insurance
laws. Id. at 136-37. Because the appellants in Ulland disputed the applicability of the
insurance laws to them, we held that the district court was required to apply the Dahlberg
factors before granting temporary injunctive relief. Id. at 137. In other words, we
concluded that the prerequisites for injunctive relief under the applicable statute had not
been demonstrated. Id. at 137; see also Pac. Equip. & Irr., Inc. v. Toro Co. , 519 N.W.2d
911, 917 (Minn. App. 1994) (reasoning that district court properly considered Dahlberg
factors because parties disputed the applicability of the Minnesota Franchise Act), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 16, 1994).

3 The Minnesota Supreme Court recently reached a similar conclusion in determining that
a district court order denying permanent injunctive relief under a statute was appealable
under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b). See State v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., 899 N.W.2d 467,
471-72 (Minn. 2017). The court rejected an argument that the district court’s order had not
denied an injunction because there was no equitable showing or analysis. Id. The court
explained that “[t]he conditions that must be met to grant a sta tutory injunction are
determined by the text of the statute authorizing the injunction.” Id. at 472. Like Wadena,
the Minn. Sch. of Bus. case involved a request for permanent injunctive relief under a
statute. See id. (explaining that “a permanent injunction sought under Minn. Stat. § 8.31,
subd. 3, does not, by the terms of the statute, require a showing of irreparable harm,
inadequacy of other remedies, consideration of equitable principles, or analysis of the
Dahlberg factors”).
8
In this case, the district court properly considered the Dahlberg factors in
determining whether to grant EPNI’s motion for temporary injunctive relief.4 The parties
dispute whether the city violated MEPA or MERA, and there has been no determination
on the merits. Therefore, the requisites for relief under the statutes have not been
demonstrated, and it was necessary for the district court to determine whether appellants
would be irreparably injured by applying the Dahlberg factors, including the consideration
of whether EPNI is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims. In this manner, this case
is distinguishable from Wadena, where the district court combined the injunction and
summary-judgment proceedings and determined liability before imposing permanent
injunctive relief under a statute. 480 N.W.2d at 389. We therefore reject EPNI’s argument
that the district court erred by applying Dahlberg instead of Wadena.5
Because the district court properly considered the Dahlberg factors, and because
EPNI does not argue any other basis for reversal, we affirm.
Affirmed.

4 In determining to apply the Dahlberg factors, the district court relied on this court’s
decision in Drabik v. Martz, which affirmed a district court decision that granted temporary
injunctive relief under MERA after applying the Dahlberg factors. 451 N.W.2d 893, 898
(Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 1990). EPNI correctly asserts that the
court did not address an argument in Drabik that Dahlberg did not apply. However,
because Drabik involved a temporary injunction before the merits had been determined, it
is not inconsistent with the later-decided Wadena.

5 EPNI alternatively argues that, if this court determines Wadena does not apply, Dahlberg
“does not adequately address the legislative intent of MEPA and MERA” and a “modified
standard” should apply. “[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court
or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.” Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283,
286 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987).